Let me elaborate.
VCs win upon liquidity event. And that happens either via M&A or via going public. After that, the shares are transferred to the hands of the LPs and they choose how they’d like to liquidate or keep. To date, we have neither seen a trillion dollar acquisition nor a trillion dollar IPO. I’m not saying it’ll never happen. I’m sure it will, at some point. A combination of inflation and companies finding more liquidity when private markets are bullish.
As Charles Hudson suggests in his one of his latest posts, the venture world has been changing. What was once a cottage industry gave way to multi billion dollar funds. While there are still many small sub-$100M funds, LPs have started evaluating venture capital not as just one big industry, but segmenting it by size of fund. Small funds, sub-$100M. Medium-sized funds, $100-500M. And big funds, funds north of $500M assets under management (AUM for short). And as the Mike Maples dictum goes, your fund size is your strategy.
Returning a billion-dollar fund requires different kinds of investments and math for it to work compared to returning a $50M fund. And one day, as large funds continue to expand into multiple stages, check size, but also eventually into public markets, we might see them start to bet on trillion-dollar outcomes. Because to return a 11- or 12-figure fund, you need to do just that. But given the market we’re in now, I imagine that won’t be in the near future.
The 10,000-foot view
So the thing you have to gain conviction around, as a macroeconomist, is not how big a venture fund should be. Nor the debate on how many VC funds is too many. The number nor the size truly matter in the grand scheme of things.
For an illiquid asset class like venture, where you’re betting on the size of the home runs, not one’s batting average, what you have to gain conviction around is:
- How many truly great companies are there every year
- How much capital is needed to get these companies to billion dollar outcomes
For the latter, there are two main ways to get to billion dollar exits: going public or getting acquired. And while there are outliers, the best way is for these businesses to get to $100M of recurring revenue.
And everything else is downstream of that.
As an LP once told me, “In the 1990s, it took $7 million to get to first revenue. In the 2000s and into the early 2010s, it took $700K. Now it takes $70K.” With each era and each wave of technological development, founders become more capital efficient. There are less barriers to get to market. Now with AI, it might just be $7K to get to first revenue, if not sooner.
The question is how much capital is needed to get to $1M ARR. If we take a decent burn multiple of 1.5x, then we underwrite an assumption that it’ll take $1.5M to get to $1M ARR. And possibly $4.5M to get to $3M ARR. And somewhere in there, that founder will find product-market fit and turn on the growth engine. CAC (customer acquisition cost) falls. And lifetime value increases. Payback periods shorten. And if all goes well, founders may find themselves with a sub-one burn multiple. And after they hit $1M ARR, and they triple the first two years, double the next three, they’re at $100M ARR. Of course, I’m illustrating the above all in broad strokes. The best case scenario. But most things don’t go according to plan.
Then an investor has to figure out if one should only make net new investments or re-capitalize a select few of their existing investments.
Then as LPs, what is the minimum ownership percentages that can return funds at each differentiated stage and fund sizes? And due for possibly another blogpost altogether, how does a 7-8x multiple on forward-looking ARR impact round sizes and valuations across bull and bear markets?
All this admittedly is both art and science. But I will admit that larger fund sizes and playing the AUM game may not be the answer.
In closing
My friend recently sent me this letter that Sam Hinkie wrote when he retired as GM of the 76ers. In it, he quoted the great Sage of Omaha when he closed down Buffett Partnership. “I am not attuned to this environment, and I don’t want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don’t understand just so I can go out a hero.” And it’s for that same reason, Sam stepped down. The same reason Jerry Seinfield turned down $110 million to do another season of Seinfeld. Even though the sequel business does quite well.
There is no shame in knowing when to hang up the cleats. And there is great power in being disciplined. In fact, it’s one of the most sought-after traits in fund managers. If not, the most sought-after.
In VC, it comes in all sizes, ranging from:
- Fund size discipline. There a lot of GPs out there who have gone on to raise 9- to 10-figure early stage funds. A mathematical equation that becomes increasingly harder to prove true, given outputs need to reflect inputs. In other words, larger funds are harder to return. There are a lot of VCs who would rather play the AUM (assets under management) game than stay disciplined on returns. Not just paper returns, but real cold hard cash. In the words of my friend Chris Douvos, “moolah in da coolah.” To quote another line from Chris, “OPM (other people’s money) is like opium. It’s addicting.” Something one too many investors have gotten addicted to.
- Thesis discipline. As a friend who’s been a VC across multiple economic cycles once told me, it’s much better to turn down an off-thesis hot deal led by a top tier firm than to take it.
- Career discipline. To echo the words of Sam Hinkie above.
And of course, knowing that we underwrite billion dollar outcomes, rather than trillion dollar ones. Then again, that’s just a subset of fund size and portfolio construction.
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.