โTo whom much is given, much is expected.โ โ JD Montgomery
JD Montgomery leads the Family Office division at Canterbury Consulting and is a seasoned advisor with nearly four decades of experience serving prominent families with a focus on strategy, organization and measurement. Based in Newport Beach, he serves a select group of multi-generational families and helps them navigate the complexities of wealth, purpose, and legacy. Mr. Montgomery partners with his clients to help them optimize the allocation of their resources across generations. Over the years, Mr. Montgomery has developed a deep network of relationships in the venture capital industry. He has helped his clients gain meaningful exposure to venture funds and direct investments and develop relationships with leading innovators and investors globally. He is a Managing Director, shareholder, and board member at Canterbury Consulting. He graduated from Stanford University and holds the Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA) designation.
(00:00) Intro (02:00) The definition of family offices (03:01) Generation 1 vs 2 (06:25) Building a family office at Gen 1 (07:48) The 3 considerations for succession planning (11:14) The “why” of succession planning (12:59) Building self-esteem in children (17:14) How do you help children choose their long-term passions? (20:16) When should next gen of family offices know how rich they are? (23:35) How do next gen family office members first get exposure to VC? (32:25) When do you give next gens influence over the family’s capital? (35:28) What % of the family capital should you give a next gen? (37:42) The ask (38:09) The hard and soft issues of wealth (42:41) How often do next gens inherit their parents’ support system? (46:35) How does a GP know how sophisticated an FO is? (53:43) How does an advisor know an FO’s sophistication? (59:10) Sophisticated simplicity (59:50) When’s the last time JD’s OS changed? (1:05:23) Post-credit scene: Time is a construct
โ[A family office] is a living, breathing organism that is built around peopleโa familyโthatโs there to serve them to accomplish their missions.โ โ JD Montgomery
โThere are three considerations: When do I give the next generation visibility? When do I show them all of the zeros? Secondly, when do I give them influence? And lastly, when do I give them control?โ โ JD Montgomery
โTo whom much is given, much is expected.โ โ JD Montgomery
โItโs impossible to wealth-transfer self esteem. There is some level of wealth that allows next gen to be able to do anything, and there is some level of wealth that allows the next generation to do nothing.โ โ JD Montgomery
“I don’t want to belong to any club that would accept me as a member.” โ Groucho Marx
โI donโt view venture as an asset class. I view it as a methodology to allocate capital to every sector on the planet thatโs changing. And oh, by the way, every sector on the planet is changing right now.โ โ JD Montgomery
โI call it the hard and soft issues of wealth. The hard issues are tax and legal and the economic side. The soft issues really relate to people. Is this individual mature in the development? Have they launched? Are they ready to be a good steward?โ โ JD Montgomery
โWe do surgery with chainsaws, and just hire people to clean up blood.โ โ JD Montgomery
โTime is something man invented to be able to coordinate action. It doesnโt exist otherwise.โ โ JD Montgomery citing something a Navy Seal once taught him
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Pavel Prata asked me if I was interested in writing a guest post on his blog a few months back. To which I responded with the fact, that I’m not sure there was much for me to add to the LP ecosystem that I haven’t written about already. And bless how supported he is, but he challenged me to write an updated summation of everything I’ve learned about investing in emerging managers as a progression of how much I’ve learned since I first wrote my initial blogpost that put me on the map in LP-GP land. Which to this point, I hadn’t written something public-facing on that. So eventually, after much inspiration, I finally did.
Now a few months later, I’m finally glad to share it here as well on this blog. I’m not going to include the nice formatting and graphics that Pavel and his team made, so if you want to check those out and for potentially, easier readability, check out my post here.
But without further ado, and thank you Pavel for the inspiration, voila!
Author’s note: God, I put on some weight for this photo.
The preface
In many ways, I sit in a place of privilege. I grew up in the Bay Area, and while I was not born into a household of tech, nor did I have any relatives who were deep in the tech ecosystem, I was fortunate to have friends who were and are far more tech forward than I was.
I remember being in elementary school in โ05 and my best friends were deadset on trying to get an account on this new-ish website called Thefacebook. And the primary reason was that we got bored of Club Penguin. The site needed us to be 18 or older (or at least we needed to be some age that we werenโt. We were still living out our best single-digit lives), but I donโt think anyone was really checking. Three misfits. One of us usually received detention for getting in fist fights. His brother would receive principal office visits for making other kids cry. Blunt guy. If your drawing was ugly, heโd be sure you knew. But both were and are good people.
The first would get in fights defending his friends from getting bullied. The second, while lacking social cues, would always sit down with you to help you improve your skills. And me, the supposed โgoody-two-shoesโ of our misfits who would follow rules, yet get in trouble trying to get them out of detention. And frankly, none of us were good with our words. Then and maybe still now. Yet nevertheless, one of my buddies found his way to a .edu email address from volunteering at the school library. And that was all we needed to get into the โbig kids club.โ
I went to a school in the Bay Area, due to it being the far cheaper alternative of the schools I would have loved to go to. There I got involved in the startup ecosystem really early on because of my zealotic obsession with free food in college. (Story for another day.) I became a startup investor because the accelerator was short on hands, and it was through the first startup I was with that I knew they existed as a non-profit at the time. I became an LP because of a community I was helping run and someone asked me to invest as an individual LP for only $1,000 to his oversubscribed fund that โI [had] been really helpful in building.โ To this day, I still donโt think I did anything. Then, I somehow built a network of LPs and GPs because I wrote one blogpost that was supposed to be my personal how-to-be-an-LP 101 that went serendipitously further than I expected.
And I say all of that to preface that:
My life is full of accidents and being lucky at the right place at the right time with the right people.
As a caveat that you should take all the words that will populate below with the biases that I may be coming to the table with.
That said, I do believe that life is all about increasing the surface area for luck to stick. Thereโs a line I really like that I came across a few years ago by Qi Lu, who created Bing, Microsoftโs search engine and is the former COO of Baidu: โLuck is like a bus. If you miss one, thereโs always the next one. But if youโre not prepared, you wonโt be able to jump on.โ
When Pavel asked me to write a step-by-step guide on how to choose managers in 2026, my immediate thought was that I couldnโt ever write it from the stance I have today, but if I were starting all over from nothing, except capital to invest, where would I begin?
Yet knowing what I know now, with the network I have now, with the brand I have nowโthough I still have a long way to go, how is investing in emerging managers today different from the last few years?
As such this essay will be split in two overarching sections:
For the LP whoโs just reached the block
For the LP whoโs been around the block
A big thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading, guiding and helping me frame early drafts of this piece.
For the emerging LP
One of my good friends described investing in venture funds in the 2020s as โexpert modeโ, as opposed to when he started in 2001 as โthe tutorial.โ He said that in 2001, there were 200 firms in total in the market. That he met with half of the firms in the market. Then invested in two-thirds of the firms he met with. And that resulted from three vintages that returned 5X net on his venture fund portfolio. According to him, every fund he invested in was an emerging manager. The whole asset class was an emerging asset class.
Today is undeniably harder than itโs ever been to be a venture fund LP. Thousands of firms in-market. Everyone tells you theyโre the greatest fund since sliced bread. Or in their words, theyโre top quartile, if not top decile. Everyone tells you they have unique access. Yet most people generally have access to the same โlegibleโ deals. Or at least, โlegibleโ founders which include a river of backwards bias. So, who has โbetterโ access? Time horizons are realistically 12-15 years, instead of the 10 years people pitch you. Plenty of GPs quietly โretireโ after 2-3 years to go work at a portfolio company or โget acquiredโ by a larger platform. IPO markets havenโt fully opened yet, and there just isnโt enough private capital to deploy into the largest companies. 2025 has been an interesting year of one of the lowest years in dollars raised, but one of the highest, with respect to dollars deployed. Six-layer SPVs, where the individual who manages the sixth layer has no idea who actually owns the underlying asset, just a forward contract towards the stock.
The first question you need to ask yourself, and likely the most important question, you need to ask yourself is if someone pitches you their fund, and itโs Wonderbread, why are you so lucky?
How are you luckier than the most established institutions whoโve done this for decades? How are you luckier than people who are college roommates with Sam Altman? How are you luckier than multi-stage venture funds who have a strong brand AND an active fund-of-funds program that invests in managers sharing their deal flow with them? How are you luckier than content creators who get pitched VC guests all the time? How are you luckier than the owner of Buckโs or Coupa or the real estate firms who own buildings on Sand Hill Road?
More likely than not, youโre not. Iโm not.
A long-time private equity allocator friend of mine has this great line, โThere are only two kinds of people who make money. Really smart people and dumb people who know theyโre not smart enough to beat the market. Everyone in between has just enough knowledge to make dumb decisions.โ
Thereโs a great line by the legendary Richard Feynman. โThe first principle is that you must not fool yourselfโand you are the easiest person to fool.โ Remember that.
So, after all those disclaimers, do you just not invest?
If the above scares you, probably not. Youโre more likely to generate consistent returns by investing in the indices. But if youโre willing to put in the blood, sweat and tears, maybe the below might be of value to you.
The first step is to see a lot of deals. You have no idea what quality looks like until youโve seen quality. Otherwise youโre spending a good chunk of time imagining what could be and what should be, but not is. Just like the GPs we evaluate need to prove they can โsee, pick and winโ, we as LPs have to do the legwork to see the best deals, to build the framework to pick them, and to win the deals that are hard to come by. But first, on seeingโฆ
Itโs like dating for the first time. I donโt know about you, and this might be TMI (too much information). Before I dated my first girlfriend, I had all these ideas implanted in me from Hollywood, Hallmark movies, Matthew McConaughey, Sandra Bullock, Anne Hathaway, Hugh Grantโyou get the point. I had these faint, rose-tinted ideas of how my future partner should, would, could act. But when I finally started dating, reality was wildly different from expectations.
The same is true when you look at funds. Whether itโs media, podcasts, or newsletters, they all tell you a warped perception of the reality of the market, told through the lens of a world that is most beneficial to their incentives. You need to figure it out your own. And when you do in the first year, maybe a bit longer, you will inevitably talk to more noise than signal. Accept that fact.
To get inbound, you need to do a combination of a few things. Pick your battles here:
Put โLPโ on LinkedIn. You will have random GPs find you in their search engines and reach out. Almost all will be noise here, unfortunately.
Go to events that attract GPs (i.e. EMC Summit, RAISE Global, Bridge Funding Global, SuperVenture, FII, Upfront Summit, etc.). Your priority here is to go to the side events that arenโt publicly disclosed that have LPs and GPs. If you canโt get in there, go find the LP/GP Happy Hours and dinners that are shared on Eventbrite, Luma, and/or Partiful. And if still you canโt get in, at these events, there are occasional speed dating breakout sessions.
Reach out to LPs and ask to buy them coffee as you are learning to be an LP. You can find these LPs either on:
Podcasts (i.e. Swimming with Allocators, Origins, Venture Unlocked, How I Invest, Superclustersโmentioning my friendsโ platforms before my own)
Reacting to LP and emerging manager content. There are a few LP โinfluencersโ out there. Note not only who reads and comments on these posts, but whether the original poster also replies back to those comments (which is a loose indicator on the depth of their relationship and if that commenter is somewhat respected in the ecosystem). FYI, donโt use me as a barometer, since I try to reply back to everyone. But a couple โinfluencersโ that might help you kickstart your search. Beezer Clarkson, David Clark, John Rikhtegar, Meghan Reynolds, Endowment Eddie (on X), Dan Gray, James Heath, Matt Curtolo, and so on. Occasionally, Hunter Walk, Charles Hudson, Rick Zullo, Peter Walker and a few other VCs also post good LP content. OpenLP is also a great platform that captures the most interesting thoughts regularly, as well as what Pavel is building now too.
Now, that you have a list of GPs and your calendar has a few meetings set up, you ideally get GPs to share their decks with you before the meeting. Although, understandably, it is harder for GPs to trust you with their decks if you havenโt yet built up social capital and trust.
If you can get the deck, I look for a few things. At least one interesting thing on the deck that can help the GP see more deals, pick better deals, or win competitive deals. And (b) is that โthingโ an insight that the GPโs prior background would have made explicit or obvious to that GP? For me, thatโs enough to take a first meeting. Do note that most decks look the same. And if you canโt tell one deck from another (thatโs okay, I started like that too), ask the GP before the interview, something along the lines of: โOf everything that is on your deck about the fund, is there one thing about you or your fund you hope that I catch that youโre really proud of but thereโs a chance I might not notice?โ
Naturally, you can ask that question, even if you donโt have the deck, and if their answer impresses you, take the meeting. I call that โsuspense.โ Partial information that I am privy to that elicits further questions and curiosity. To engage with any GP, I need that first.
So then I share my calendar. I use Calendly, but youโre welcome to use any alternative. And I include the below text along with the calendar invite to set expectations.
Do note that the meeting is only 15 minutes long. You donโt have to do this, but I find it useful because Iโve seen a number of GPs already. My CRM tells me just under 1000 that Iโm actively tracking. But there are definitely more in the universe. All that to say, Iโve come to realize for myself that I figure out if I want to continue a conversation with a GP or not within the first 5-10 minutes.
The only thing Iโm looking for in the meeting is โsurprise.โ Is there something I can learn from the GP that I didnโt know before? About them? About the industry? About the technologies? Ideally, you also consume quite a bit of information outside of each conversation. For instance, I read research papers, talk to people I think are smart, listen to podcasts, read newsletters, and build things here and there. The more information you consume outside, the higher your bar for โsurpriseโ will be over time.
And if I learn something, only then, do I actually start doing homework around the fund opportunity. And spending more time with a GP.
Diligence
For the purpose of this section, Iโm going to prioritize diligence as it relates to people. Iโll talk about portfolio sizing and construction in the section below. Iโm also going to assume you donโt have the ideal network to diligence the opportunity. What does the ideal network look like?
A small selection of A-players (founders, operators, co-investors, and LPs) that you trust AND they trust you to withhold judgment about them, as well as keep what they tell you in the highest level of confidence.
Admittedly, this will take time to build. Some longer than others. Your mileage may vary from multiple months to many years, sometimes decades. And this will be a part of your job as an LP to continually refine.
But in lieu of that, hereโs where Iโd start:
Find who are A-players. Needless to say, before you can build a relationship with A-players, you must first be able to recognize A-players. Admittedly, this is a lot of legwork. And everyone approaches this part differently. For me, I have to consume a large amount of information from disparate knowledge networks, talk to different people and see who they respect, listen to a lot of podcasts, read a lot of books and content, in hopes of triangulating clarity of thought, as well as executional discipline. I donโt have a silver bullet here unfortunately, but here are a few traits Iโve seen over the years that seem to have moderate to high correlation with A-players.
Find out what motivates and drives them. What do they need? What do they want? What do most people fail to understand about them? This will also take time, potentially longer than the first step. Your job for now is to establish trust and rapport. โWhat you share with me will never find its way back to the person I am calling about.โ
And as youโre doing all the above, and still looking at deals. For people you know well and you can attest to their intellectual and executional rigor, ask them for their opinion. For everyone else, focus on asking about the facts. Youโll need to use the facts to piece together a narrative. Instead of โWho do you likeโ, ask โWhen did you last talk to X?โ or โHow many intros did this GP make for you? And how were you introduced?โ
Naturally as part of diligence, you need to figure out and corroborate if a GP has an edge. Risks and weaknesses will always be present. Also, expect to get negative references. Any ambitious person is bound to ruffle feathers and rub people the wrong way. If you donโt find any, youโre either talking to the wrong people or you havenโt given those people a safe space to talk. Also I want to note, as Cendanaโs Kelli Fontaine once told me: โNeutral references are worse than negative references.โ
Negative references
Understanding why itโs negative is important. Is it merely a disagreement on perspective? Or is it evidence or an account of poor work ethic, abrasiveness, lack of open-mindedness, or poor morals?
For instance, โGP didnโt work that hard at our companyโ is not all bad, depending on their answer to โWhat did they do outside of work?โ If the answer is โI donโt knowโ, then your job is to find out what they did and if they worked hard there instead because working at their last company didnโt align with their goals.
To give another example, a friend of mine once did a reference on a founderโthe lesson is the sameโwhere a reference told him, โI really hated how X always wore tank tops and sandals when the office culture required us to be put together.โ And many of his former colleagues all said the same thing. Yet no one ever complained about the work he did. Because despite his poor dress code, his output was in the top percentile on the team.
GPs, by nature of pitching a (hopefully) new narrative and charting their own path, will be controversial. Itโs just part of the game. But obviously, it should not discount any bad behavior.
Other comments that belie a referenceโs negative sentiment about someone: โThe GP is interesting.โ Interesting is usually a quiet opinion withheld. Itโs always helpful in these situations to prod deeper.
โI like the GP as a friend/human.โ Why donโt you like this GP as an (investment) professional?
Neutral references
Neutral references come in different shapes and sizes. Note that if you ask leading questions, youโll get safe answers. For example, โDo you like X?โ leads to an answer of โOh yes, I like X.โ
The most common form of neutral references are often masked by positive, generic adjectives, but canโt be substantiated by real examples. Other forms include not remembering who the GP was despite the GP being on the cap table, or working together. Also, on-list references who opt to text/email you about their commentary on a GP instead of call. Or taking a really long time to schedule time with you to talk about the GP, versus immediately leaping out of their chair to tell you about a GP. In addition to that, references (usually on-list or their most notable co-investors or founders) who didnโt even know that the GP was raising a fund or what the GP would be investing into.
Positive references
Positive ones luckily are the easiest to spot. And itโs not just the words you hear, but the emotions you feel when someone tells you about the GP. These references, whether they say it explicitly or not, would go to war for the GP.
Peter Fenton at Benchmark recently shared a line I really like. “The highest accolade of a firm that they seek is a manifestation of a value system.” Most investmentsโboth at the level of an angel investment, but also a number of institutional investmentsโare written as one-night stands. The majority, if not all, of the conversations happen T-3 months before an investment is made. Then as soon as the investment happens, outside of the monthly or quarterly updates, and maybe the board meetings, no other meaningful conversation happens post-investment. And the truth is if an investor hasnโt built their value system (and for that matter, value-add system) before they start their firm, theyโre not likely to change their behavior and their habitual cycles after they start their firm. Moreover, noting my bias, I prefer to invest in GPs where I am investing in the worst version of their firm on the day I invest. That itโll only get better. And to do so, certain things need to compound: brand, value, network, among others. In order for that to happen, they need to have built a relationship, as opposed to a one-night stand, with many of their investments, even beyond their best ones. So the point of doing diligence is to find evidence of their firmโs value system before they start it.
Having shared the above, now that you have time with the GPs and some of their references, what do you ask?
Note that the below arenโt all-encompassing nor exhaustive questions and that you usually get more from asking follow-up questions instead of building a checklist of questions to ask. Merely, the below serve as a point of inspiration as you do your own due diligence. As such, Iโve structured the below into categories on how I assess a GPโs ability to see, pick and win through the reference calls I do, segmented by reference archetype.
Seeing
What does their sourcing engine look like? How much is inbound? How much is outbound? Do they have access to proprietary channels for deal flowโeven if momentarily? Do they know people who add value to the innovation ecosystem, but arenโt well connected to the rest of the innovation ecosystem?
I will note that most GPs will say most of their deal flow comes from founder referrals.
Recipient
Questions
What I Look For
The GP
How do you find opportunities before anyone else?
Are they fishing in new uncharted territories? Do they have non-redundant networks and access points?
Founders
How did you first meet this GP? Do you remember the type of conversation you initially had with said GP? If the GP met this person via an event: How often do you go to these events? Outside of meeting this GP, whoโs the most memorable friend youโve made via the event? If the two met via an intro: How often do you catch up with your mutual friend? Has your mutual friend introduced you to other investors?
Iโm trying to understand how much of a GPโs deal flow is inbound versus outbound. As well as how repeatable certain deal flow channels and nodes are.
Co-Investors
How is this GPโs deal flow different from yours? Why havenโt you pursued building out your own network in this field?
Can [insert big firm] just do what this GP can? Is there a structural moat?
LPs
For the funds you were also looking at or have in your portfolio, who seems to have the same deal flow channels as this GP?
Institutional LPs see a lot, and as a function, they likely see a lot of overlap in inbound channels. So for people who have the same channels, why does a certain GP capture value from it better than the rest?
Ex-colleagues
In what situations do you typically find this GP to be proactive when you used to work with her/him? What has this GP done that no one with her/his job title has ever done in the past?
How entrepreneurial is the GP? Is the new firm the first instance of their entrepreneurial nature or is this part of the GPโs inherent nature?
Picking
Thereโs a saying in the land of LPs. โYou donโt have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in has to be great.โ
So the question comes down to: how do you know if someone is great?
Recipient
Questions
What I Look For
The GP
Why have you and havenโt you put the most amount of capital behind your portfolioโs greatest value driver? If we could go through each of your past investmentsโgood and badโcan you enlighten me on why you invested in each?
The first question is figuring out if a GP understands how early and how much to put in their greatest outperformers. What signals do they rely on? Are they ready to invest with reserves? The second question is to understand how the GPโs ability to recognize excellence and insights has evolved. How quickly they ramp up. How many investments it takes for them to shift the way they think. At what point, do previous investments impact the way they make future investments?
Founders
What kinds of conversations did you have with the GP before they gave you a term sheet? How long did that journey take? Were you surprised at all? How did the conversations with this GP differ from the other ones you had?
From the perspective of a recipient, how much of a GPโs intention is well-understood before the GP embarks on a commercial relationship with the founder(s)?
Co-Investors
How often do you take intros the GP sends your way? Was that always the case? How has your relationship with this GP evolved over time? Where do you foresee it evolving towards?
Do investors understand and value a GPโs eye for people and opportunities? With the second set of questions, Iโm trying to understand how much a co-investor values this GPโs deals. If the co-investor works at a multi-stage fund, have they ever tried to hire this GP into their firm? Or had them as a scout? Or is it a purely, โitโs nice to have you in our orbitโ kind of relationship?
LPs
How have you directly experienced the value of being an LP?
Have the GPs provided any value to their existing LPs? Iโm primarily looking at GPs who claim to offer co-invest opportunities. Do they (a) know the founders well enough to get allocation for people the founders likely donโt know or trust yet, and (b) how much do they optimize for whatโs best for the fund versus whatโs best for the LPs? With (b), itโs not a bad thing to optimize for the fund, but setting expectations is important, instead of claiming to be helpful to LPs without actually being helpful.
Ex-colleagues
Has this GP hired anyone in the past that youโve genuinely impressed with? Why were you impressed by these individuals? Has this GP done anything to help these individuals succeed over time?
Thereโs no direct parallel between hiring and investing, but in terms of recognizing talent, there are some similarities.
Winning
Why do the worldโs best founders want to work with you? What do you have to offer that others donโt? Why would a world-class founder have you on the cap table when there are so many great options out there (and even when thereโs that much inbound interest)?
Recipient
Questions
What I Look For
The GP
What is your proudest piece of advice you gave a founder or the proudest thing you did for a founder? What’s something you did for a founder or a piece of advice you give that didn’t work out? What’s something you did/piece of advice that did better than you expected? Can I see every single version of your pitch deck to date? (If thereโve been previous vintages, ask for those as well.)
Iโm primarily looking for specificity. Was it proactive or reactive? And when corroborating with said founder later on, will that founder reflect the same sentiment? With regards to the second and third questions, do you measure when things deviate from expectationsโgood or bad? My goal with the last question is to understand how the GPโs thinking has evolved over time. How has the GPโs ability to storytell changed? Do they have a better grasp of how they can add value and what founders actually want over time?
Founders
Which other investors did you talk to before you took this GPโs check? Did you know that you were going to be a hot commodity? When and how did you know? How did the GP help when things werenโt going well? How did the GP react when things turned downwards?
Was there competition for the round? Itโs neither good nor bad if there was. And if there was, why did they end up taking this GPโs check? Would they still take it if this GP wrote double the check and asked for double the ownership?
Co-Investors
What value does this GP bring to the table that seems to be a constant ask from your portfolio companies?
Why will fellow investors fight for this GP to be on the cap table?
LPs
Who were the most elucidating individuals you talked to best appreciate this GPโs value-add?
Are there people you should have talked to but have yet to? Or are there people you talked to but asked the wrong set of questions? Or whom youโve yet to build rapport with?
Ex-colleagues
What would you say is this GPโs greatest asset/skillset? How have you seen it in practice? Whoโs the best person you know of for [insert what the GP claimed as value add]? Why? On that same scale, where this person is a 10, where does the GP sit? What would help this GP get to a 10?
A-players typically know other A-players, and understanding how they rank a GP among all the other practitioners they know is valuable intel.
Gravitational pull
To tie the above together, there is no perfect emerging GP. And if they are, theyโre probably not an โemergingโ GP. I look for emerging GPs who excel in two of the three areas (see, pick, win). One in isolation wonโt help. If youโre the worldโs best sourcer, but you donโt know how to pick the right one even when it falls on your lap, or you donโt know how to get the founder to choose you over others, then sourcing alone is for naught.
I look for GPs to have an unfair advantage in two of the three areas. I need the cards stacked in their favor. Oftentimes, their unfair advantages are further accented by what first surprised me in the first meeting or two. Furthermore, gravitational pull comes from acknowledgement of their unfair strengths, as well as the constant refinement of the craft that increases the firmโs leverage over time.
Partnership risk
One other important element to underwrite is partnership risk. To many experienced allocators, like Ben Choi once told me, this may even be the single biggest risk an LP has to underwrite. If youโre investing in a partnership, chemistry really matters. They may look great on paper. They may have complementary skillsets. But do they talk about each other in ways that raise each other up? How are decisions made? Is there a power imbalance? How is compensation shared (salary and carry)? How much do they not only respect but adore the othersโ strengths? How do they resolve conflict? Have they disagreed with each other before?
Portfolio construction and sizing
By the time you decide to invest in funds (or directly into startups too), you need to understand that youโre building a portfolio. Unless your hands are blessed by a higher being or that you have the Midas touch, there is a ridiculously low chance you can pick 2-3 funds and expect theyโll outperform. Naturally, you want all the funds you do invest in to do well, but sometimes in this world, you can do everything right and have things still not work out. So expect, on average, most funds will return you 0.8-5X their money back to you.
So there are a few things you need to figure out:
Assuming things go right, and youโve invested in this 5X fund:
Is a 5X net (which is roughly a little over 6X gross) return on your investment meaningful to you and your net worth?
If not, then the question comes down to: Is there something else you value from investing in this fund? Some value co-investment opportunities. I know of a number of venture funds, traditional fund-of-funds, and multi-family offices, who see their fund-of-fund program as a loss leader, with the primary goal of the fund-of-funds to generate deal flow for their direct investment practice. As an emerging LP, do consider that if you want co-investment opportunities, are you the largest (or at the minimum, one of the largest LP checks who care about co-investments)? If not, then consider the reality of why would the GP ever give you the best deal flow if youโre not their greatest (monetary) supporter.
If so, great. But at the risk of it being a 0.8X net fund, meaning you not only lost money to decision-making, but also to inflation and the opportunity cost of investing in a public market index, can you stomach the loss 12-15 years from now?
If not, invest a smaller check size.
If so, great.
Whatever is needed to 5X the fund, what is the exit value necessary for that?
If a GP has no reserves and invests pre-seed/seed, assume 75-80% dilution by the time of exit for the fundโs greatest value drivers. This does not account for acquisitions, which will have a little more nuance. This also assumes that there will be 5-6 rounds of investment after the one the GP invests in.
If a GP has reserves, depending on the industry, and how much they continue doubling down on the investment, itโs safe to assume 55-60% dilution. If the GP plans to continue doubling down on pro-rata past the Series A, do account for how much of the overall fund is allocated in a singular deal. Usually limited partner agreements cap it at around 15% of the overall fund, to allow for minimum diversification at the portfolio construction level.
And assuming you know the exit and enterprise value thatโs needed to 5X the fund, do you believe thatโs possible? Your job is to go into the internet archives and find, if in the last few years, what percent of companies in that industry has exited for that size. And how likely will it be for future companies to exit at that size? And even if so, do you believe the GP is in the right information flows to capture that outcome?
Is the number of companies the GP wants allocation into, reasonable to you? Every person has a different level of tolerance in this regard. To make some gross assumptions, if a GP invests in 50 companies in a fund, then they need a single company to 50X to return your money back once (obviously Iโm taking the gross, not the net numbers). And they need a single company to 150X to 3X the fund. At a $10M post-money valuation, a 150X would turn the company into a $1.5B company. Again, do open a spreadsheet for this. Iโm not accounting for dilution, fees, recaps, and a bunch of other things. This is purely a back-of-the-napkin version of: Do you believe a $1.5B outcome in this sector of choice is possible?
Do also note that given that venture is a power law business, a single value driver for a fund usually accounts for at least 60% of the overall fundโs returns. 1-2 companies account for another 20-30%. And the rest, the last 10%. I also want to play my own devilโs advocate that almost nothing in this industry is โusual.โ
Miscellaneous thoughts
Donโt invest in the first 50 funds you see. You will miss great deals. Thatโs okay. You donโt have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in should be great.
If youโve been out-of-market for more than a year, do the same. You need to know how people are hiding skeletons in their closet?
Trust the data, but not the judgments of people who see a plethora of deals in venture. Have they seen other funds with the same strategy before investing in this one? What was different?
Almost every fund you meet will say theyโre top quartile or top decile. Be skeptical of benchmarking data, or for that matter, publicly available data that will suffer from availability and selection bias. Theyโre either too opaque or delayed, and in the words of some institutional LPs, โtotally fabricated.โ
To borrow the words of my friend Peter Walker, whoโs constantly cited for his Carta reports, โโYou should probably, if youโre a founder, for instance, selectively ignore at least half of what Iโm saying because it doesnโt apply to you. And your job as a founder, your job as an investor, your job as a thoughtful person is to figure out which half.โ
Ignore the marketing jargon associated with โselectโ track records GPs share with you. Ask for their schedule of investments (SOI), which should include all their investments to date, not just the ones they want you to see. Figure out your own valuation methodology, and prescribe that to their SOI.
For me, SAFE notes donโt count as markups, only priced rounds. Any company that hasnโt gotten reevaluated in the market for over 2 years receives a discount. The only exception is strong revenue growth since last round. Discount is based on public market comparables and their revenue multiples. Usually 7-8X on revenue for me. Not always.
If a GP gives you โtargetโ or โprojectedโ multiples, youโre welcome to ignore the number outright. Whatโs more interesting and important are what were the assumptions that led to the projection. What is the expected dilution? How many rounds is a company expected to raise before their projected exit? What is the assumed graduation rate per stage? What is the conservative estimate?
Never trust the word of a GP. Spend more time on reference calls than you do with the GP. When doing references, if you know people really well AND believe they are the top 1% in what they do, ask for their opinion. Everyone else, ask for the facts.
Make sure the data corroborates with the narrative. Is the data/track record repeatable? Being 0.1% on the cap table in three rocketship companies is very different from an investor co-founding a company. The relationship is different. In the former case, the founders, much less the executives, even remember a GP exists.
When asking questions, roughly a third to a half of your questions should be the same across all managers, only then can you compare apples to apples.
When spending time with the GP, find out what they donโt want you to know. What are they scared of, that if you know, they think will look bad on them? Everyone has insecurities. Thatโs okay. But only once you figure that out, can you better assess the information theyโre telling you. And better yet, the information theyโre not telling you. Which is what you eventually go to diligence.
Sometimes thereโs just no LP/GP fit. They might be a great fund, but you just donโt feel the pull.
Set expectations clear from the get-go. If youโre in exploratory mode, say it. If youโre actively deploying, say it.
At any point in time, if you are no longer interested, and know that youโre most likely not going to invest, say it. Itโs better that a GP thinks youโre not going to invest, then you do, than think youโre going to invest, but you end up not.
Be mindful of a GPโs time. If youโre not going to write the largest check as a function of a GPโs fund, know you have limited time with them. Do not waste their time. Know you will have to do most of your homework without the help of the GP. If you want to be spoonfed diligence, this is the wrong asset class for you.
On spinouts, my primary concern is always: Were you successful because of your last firm or in spite of your last firm? If you no longer had the title you did last month or this month, would people engage with you differently? If youโre the keynote for a large conference (i.e. SuperVenture, FII, iConnections, etc.) when you held your last position, will they still invite you back as a headliner when youโre starting a new firm? When people talk about you behind your back about how amazing you are, do they talk in the past or present tense? Tactically, are you the ex-Redpoint partner or Tomasz? Are you ex-Greylock or Sarah? Are you ex-[insert big firm] or you?
As most insights, these will very rarely come out in conversation with the GP. More often than not, theyโll come out in diligence. Particularly off-list references. If you donโt have the network, you have to rely on on-list references and maybe a few good friends, but know that there is no incentive for people to speak ill of someone else to a stranger. So diligence only the facts. Youโre likely not going to get the honest โopinionsโ you want to adequately understand an opportunity.
For established LP
If youโre an established LP, you know most of the above. So instead, Iโll share a couple reminders that you may have heard before, but are paramount more today than before. Before I share them, hereโs how Iโm categorizing the difference between an emerging and an established, just because I know everyone has a different definition (i.e. AUM size, number of investments made, track record that extends for at least a decade, etc.). Do note, you donโt have to check all the boxes. As long as you have most of the below traits of an โestablished LPโ, youโre probably established. One of those touchy-feely things where when you see it, you know it.
Emerging LP
Established LP
No prior network to lean on
A robust network to source and diligence deals (meaning you get at least 5-10 quality referrals per month from legible people)
No brand
A brand where people will start a conversation with you purely because of the jersey you have on
You need to go out hunting for deals. Show up/host events. Build a platform. Actively book time on peopleโs calendars to find out whatโs going on.
(Related to the above) Inbound deal flow exceeds outbound, but with the understanding, to do your job well, you still need to do outbound.
You take time to deliberate on decisions. Understanding whatโs going on takes time. If you were to look only at a pitch deck, outside of the metrics, you might struggle to understand whatโs important. BTW, this is both good and bad. But good in the sense that you donโt have prejudice. And youโre more willing to uncover diamonds in the rough.
You make fast โnoโ decisions (at least internally). A function of the scar tissue and the training youโve had up to this point.
You invest opportunistically. You might not have the quality of deal flow to start a consistent deployment strategy. Thatโs ok, BTW.
You can invest opportunistically, but if you wanted, or have already, have capital and the network to deploy consistently against some schedule. Could be annually. Could be quarterly.
If you show up at any LP-only event, you might know the host and one other person at best.
If you show up at a random LP only event, you know at least a few other LPs in the room by name.
Youโre on an email basis, maybe LinkedIn basis with other allocators and investors. It will take time to build the relationships.
Youโre on a text/Whatsapp basis with other experienced LPs and they respond to you within a few hours, if not minutes.
You need to build out your systems for managing deal velocity and future volume. Easier to start when you have less volume. (Building out systems is an article to write for another day.)
You have a system for tracking your deal flow pipeline, diligence, and keeping track of your portfolio and anti-portfolio investments.
Youโre not intimately familiar with SEC (and others) regulations around the rules of engagement in LP land.
You know exactly what compliance will let you and not let you say. And you know the right verbiage to dance around these topics.
So the reminders:
Be open-minded. To have gotten this far in your investing career so far means youโve built biases to help you make better decisions. Likely, also faster decisions. Youโve probably used some phrase along the lines of โThere will always be another train leaving the station.โ And youโre right. Most are worth waiting on. But there will be a small, small select few that is worth breaking every rule you know for. The truly once-in-a-lifetime relationship (not just opportunity). Know that the greatest firms tomorrow do not look like the firms from before.
To check your biases, ask yourself three questions:
What do you typically gravitate towards? Why? Was there a part of your past that led you to gravitate towards X?
What, for whatever reason, do you not like? What gives you allergic reactions? Why?
What, for whatever reason, do you not notice at all? Of all the skimming you do, what are the parts of the narrative that you most easily gloss over? Why?
Numbers tell a very small part of the story.
Whatโs worth underwriting more than anything else is motivation. Motivation to outperform. Motivation why this upcoming fund means theyโll work harder than before. Motivation to get better at what they might already be good at. That means most of the work is qualitative, not quantitative.
If youโre an established institution, you already have a brand. You likely donโt have to hunt for deals (regardless of what you tell your stakeholders). And itโs probably all true. But you wonโt always have that brand. So itโs your job not to do a disservice to the brand. And almost always means you communicate expectations quickly and accurately.
There are two angles here.
Do you want to play in emerging venture today?
Do you want to re-up?
Emerging venture today is an asset class in and of itself. High attrition rates. Too many players. Lack of data. Lack of track record. Sometimes, even lack of network. The underwriting for someone who invests $250-500K checks is different from someone who typically leads rounds. The underwriting of a partnership potentially not yet fully formed until Fund N+2. Data rooms with missing data. A portfolio construction model that is a guestimate at best, completely made up at worst. Assuming youโre reading this, you know that. And that it is a full-time job.
How are you continually refreshing your networkโboth for sourcing and for diligence? Are you making sure your network isnโt stale? All networks atrophy over time. How are you keeping your most helpful contacts fresh, incentivized, and willing to give you their honest thoughts? You donโt need a lot here. It helps to optimize for at least 20 relationships, leaning largely into, and likely in the below order:
Fund-of-funds who see many deals and whose sole job is to evaluate emerging managers, and/or any institution who has a dedicated emerging manager program (i.e. Vanderbilt, Babson, Gresham, etc.)
Service providers (i.e. lawyers, fund accountants, fund admin) who get to know many emerging managers from a different angle
A select few hot founders who also angel invest and are superconnectors in their own right
Multi-stage fund GPs and partners who often co-invest with emerging managers. Focus on those who have dedicated event series and/or communities for emerging managers. I personally spend less time with venture funds with their own fund-of-funds programโnot because theyโre not great, but theyโre often biased to promote their own fund managers. Different story if I knew them before they launched their FoF program and I can get honest thoughts here. If you donโt know who to target, thereโs a select few namesโsay around 15-20โthat most active emerging managers love to have on their deck.
On re-ups:
What are the incentives of the organization? Do your incentives as an institution still align as strongly with the GP as it did when you first invested?
If not, have you communicated that pre-emptively with the manager?
In closing
Despite the surplus of information and the sheer number of venture funds (in the mid-to high thousands), none of us can do it alone. At least I donโt believe we can. Why? Unlike the public markets where there is as close as we can get to parity of information. The private markets, especially early-stage investments, exhibit none of that. People win on asymmetry of information.
Jacob Miller once told me on the podcast that in investing, there are three things you need to understand. Inputs, frameworks, outputs. Outputs, you canโt always control. But as long as you have good inputs and a great framework, your outputs should speak for themselves. With my blog, Iโve always tried to empower people with frameworks. With The Side Letter that Sam and I launched, weโre trying to empower people with inputs you canโt find anywhere else.
While Iโd love to surmise all of LP investing in one fell swoopโPavelโs given me quite the task at handโthe truth is I canโt. The best I can do is to share the frameworks I use. The next step is for you to find the inputs that will drive your investment decisions. Those can come from leveraging a platform or community. Hell, even investing in other funds-of-funds. Or collecting asymmetric information yourself. Or a combination of both. Itโs only a matter of how much time, attention, and energy you have on your hands.
As always, and I have to say this at the end of everything I write, the views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Again, a huge thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading early drafts of this piece to help me better refine my thoughts here. I wouldn’t be here without you.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
โLower barriers to entry doesnโt mean higher probabilities of success.โ โ Sam Huleatt
Sam Huleatt is the co-founder of The Side Letter, a platform driving network-based research for capital allocators. Prior to The Side Letter, he created and ran the The LP Institute at VC Lab, as well as let On Deck Angels at On Deck. Moreover, he’s a serial founder, active angel investor in over 35 companies, and an active allocator in emerging fund managers, including the likes of Notation Capital, Orange Fund, Inuka Capital, Asylum Capital, and more.
[00:00] Intro [01:34] Sam’s childhood [03:24] The most persistent myth about Sam he never bothered to correct [05:47] Bottom-up vs top-down investor [13:37] Can career VCs develop empathy for the founder? [18:43] Traits of someone who should definitely start a fund [26:45] Traits of someone who should NEVER start a fund [28:09] Air of inevitability [33:44] Why was Outlander VC inevitable? [36:11] Where should 60% of your Fund I capital come from? [41:47] Starting a VC fund is hard [44:46] Do LPs like GP accelerators? [51:35] Top 3 considerations for first-time LPs [58:03] How many GPs should 1st-time LPs meet? [1:01:06] Governing law of VC: Adverse selection [1:04:40] Incentive alignment on fees [1:06:36] Terms in LPAs vs side letters [1:11:16] What is The Side Letter?
โA career VC has a lot more experience having been on boards. And because of that, because theyโve been a career VC, theyโve seen more companies operating at scale and the issues that come into play in those cases, whereas operators-turned-GPs often have a narrow aperture because theyโve spent most of their career at one or two companies. On the one hand, the operator-GP obviously has a lot of empathy for founders because theyโve been that founder, but they probably havenโt experienced all of the difficult issues that come up as companies scale across lots of different environments. Career VCs have.โ โ Sam Huleatt
โThe best investors have an air of inevitability. Itโs not asking for permission or doing something because itโs perceived to be high status.โ โ Sam Huleatt
โLower barriers to entry doesnโt mean higher probabilities of success.โ โ Sam Huleatt
โMost people, after starting a fund, should assume that 60% of that Fund Iโyou should raise that from first-degree connectionsโpeople you already know. It may not be easy, but if you donโt have a network thatโs large enough or has those resources, you either need to reconsider your fund target size or maybe you need to spend more time building your network before you start to go out and do that raise.โ โ Sam Huleatt
โIf you donโt have an edge going into [a GP] accelerator, youโre certainly not going to find an edge in the accelerator.โ โ Sam Huleatt
โWhy do the best GPs in the world want you to be on the cap table? A lot of people forget that a key aspect of venture is not just picking, but being picked. Thatโs true for LPs and itโs true for GPs.โ โ Sam Huleatt
If you somehow made it to the bottom of these show notes, I’m also trying a new experiment where I write my reactions to the episode on my second blog, Superclusters After Hours. For Sam’s episode, you can find my reactions here.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
When I first started journaling again after years of not doing so (If you’re reading this, thank you, Professor Kellogg), I did so with pen and paper. Mostly due to an exercise Professor Kellogg had us do by finding comfort in the mistakes you make along the way. That that too is art. Is expression. Is personality. Most of my classmates eventually regressed back to pencil for notetaking or digital devices, but it is a practice that has stuck with me even till today.
When I first started dating my now girlfriend, she noticed me writing in ink. Every so often, I’d mess up and just strike through the words that were misplaced in my notes. She’d ask me why I didn’t write with a pencil. To which, I told her what Professor Kellogg told me and that over time, it became a habit. It made me write more intentionally. Also, I will note that ink looks better on paper than graphite does. At least when it comes to writing. High contrast, you know.
I grew up at the tail end of the Kodak and camera roll. I remember a time when every picture had to be taken with intention. With purpose. The framing had to be right. The lighting had to be perfect. The eyes had to stay open on flash. We now live in a world where digitial hoarding has become really, really easy. Google’s got me good, making m pay more and more as I somehow never delete emails anymore, only archiving them. One of my good friends has over 35,000 photos on her iCloud, and hasn’t deleted a single one since the first one was taken. Still a crazy number to me.
At the same time, the ephemera of the internet makes things easy to forget. Easy to erase. Public and private mistakes are erased as if there’s no digital footprint in the first place. Nearly every messaging platform allows you to delete a DM you send. I say “nearly” since I haven’t tried every single one out there. But it’s most likely, all. Snap was born on the idea of erasure, something many other platforms have inherited. Any post, tweet, or website can be erased. Many assume that you write in pencil, but forget even after rubber absorbs the graphite into its folds, the indelible imprint still exists. Watch any spy moie where they smear more graphite over an erased string of words to reveal the negative spacing of the letters that were, if you don’t believe me.
So, for those who share their voice in whatever capacity on the digital world, never forget the echo. The web archives exist. “This message has been deleted” exists. Local downloads exist. Witnesses exist. Screenshots exist. Granola exists.
As our civilization gets closer to a world that never forgets, what more can we do?
What less should we do?
Just a gentle reminder that we all write with pen on paper.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
โThe game you play as youโre building a reputation becomes a different game than when you have a reputation. And I tend to find, from an LPโs perspective, when youโre building reputation, thatโs actually when you deliver the most value.โ โ Alex Felman
Alex Felman is an entrepreneurial and family office professional. For over 10 years, as a second-generation member, he has run his own family office, Felman Family Office, and works with family offices around the world through his family’s multifamily group, MSF Capital Advisors. Using his expertise in Molecular Toxicology and Bio-entrepreneurship (B.A from University of California -Berkeley, MBA from Copenhagen Business School), he advises them in biotechnology, healthcare, and other futuristic tech industries with the goal of maintaining long-term wealth through innovation. He regularly speaks at family office and private wealth events on topics such as tech investment, manager selection, generation and succession issues, rising generation trends, and more.
He has used his experience within the family office industry and 20 year background as an educator to create Exponential U, a family office education program designed to help families become multigenerationally sustainable. His proprietary L3 framework (Learn, Leverage, Legacy) allows the holistic development of family members to ensure a smooth leadership transition.
[00:00] Intro [04:36] The ‘tastemaker’ for family offices [05:54] Exploration vs discipline [08:15] The hero’s journey in investing [09:49] The life line [13:39] Building and having reputation [16:06] Risk appetites for asset owners & allocators [18:44] Why won’t an institution invest in me? [19:50] The quiet thing LPs don’t talk about [25:15] When did Alex get involved with his family office? [29:09] Writing off sourcing slides [35:33] Different flavors of “sourcing from YC” [38:41] Emerging GPs are “investments-as-a-service” [40:08] Fund power law is greater than startups’ [43:44] Emotional value of investing in funds [44:45] Most VC funds are scams! [50:01] Optimistic cynic [51:43] Reminders today about the good ol’ days [54:17] Late stage capitalism [59:10] Post-credit scene: Dave Chappelle and podcasts
โEvery great conversation dances on the line of your understanding. You dance between both sides of the line and try to find out where what you know and what they know intersect and end. Good conversation is like play.โ โ Alex Felman
โWith my background from the family offices, I almost believe that most family offices moving forward will need their own personal tastemaker or sommelier. Someone whoโs curating the world specifically for the needs of that family.โ โ Alex Felman
โPeople get into trouble when theyโre using the wrong tool or trying to do something for a different purpose. For example, Iโm going to try to do discovery when Iโm in my routine. Ok, youโre probably running into problems. Or routinizing my discovery. Those two things are in conflict with each other.โ โ Alex Felman
โOne of the things people always forgetโ… What they remember from the heroโs journey is adventure, and we fight the dragon, and we get the treasure. But at the end of the heroโs journey, youโre supposed to bring that back to your community. And youโre supposed to forward it to your community. And youโre supposed to make your community better from the dragons and the treasure that you fight or find. Most people often leave off that last part. And I actually think that last part is extremely important.โ โ Alex Felman
โThe game you play as youโre building a reputation becomes a different game than when you have a reputation. And I tend to find, from an LPโs perspective, when youโre building reputation, thatโs actually when you deliver the most value.โ โ Alex Felman
โIf you have a family office where youโve actually outsourced it, your employee is more of an allocator than an owner. And in that case, that allocator is often making decisions to save their own job. Or to ensure that they continue to have a job.โ โ Alex Felman
โWhat I find is slightly sad is that ultimately because of security and comfort reasons, things like peopleโs pensions which should be more secure, are actually, in my opinion, taking riskier bets. And bets that will lead to worse outcomes.โ โ Alex Felman
โI believe that the amount of due diligence you do doesnโt matter depending on the deal size. So letโs say theyโre writing five $100 million checks compared to 100 $5 million checks, that is literally 20 times the amount of work. So even if theyโll get a better return on that 100 $5 [million checks], on a realistic level, it forces them to play certain types of games.โ โ Alex Felman
โWith at least funds on a standard two and twenty, somewhere around $75-100 million fund size is where the incentives shift from being carry-oriented to management-fee oriented. Once you get larger than that, then it actually becomes more incentivized for the fund managers to build up their funds than the actual returns itself.โ โ Alex Felman
โI would argue that power laws apply even more to funds than to startups.โ โ Alex Felman
โThe intersection of venture as a product or service meets venture as a job career. And there are a lot of fund managers who see venture as a job career and essentially want to use it as a way to get a paycheck. And because of that, theyโre going to put out a fairly boilerplate fund.โ โ Alex Felman
โMany venture funds are basically scams. I believe itโs a scam if you knowingly sell something you know you canโt deliver on. And the dirty secret in venture is if you purely look at venture from a financial point of view, most fund managers know they cannot hit their targets and yet they still sell that promise anyway. And I think that starts to become kind of scammy.โ โ Alex Felman
If you somehow made it to the bottom of these show notes, I’m also trying a new experiment where I write my reactions to the episode on my second blog, Superclusters After Hours. For Alex’s episode, you can find my reactions here.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Earlier this year, when catching up with a friend and talking about love, he shared his greatest relationship advice. “You want to marry someone who believes the world happens because of them, not to them.” And it really stuck with me. Both he and I are people who have big dreams. That in order to make our dreams happen we need every oar rowing in the same direction. That includes the people we surround ourselves with. More than anyone else, our romantic partner is likely the one we spend the MOST time with. But that in itself is a slight digression.
In a somewhat parallel sequence of events, at the end of last year, I had the opportunity to join a much, much larger shop. And while I ended up choosing not to join, the primary question I was asking myself was: If I were successful here, would I be successful in spite or because of the institution? The truth was from an outsider’s perspective, maybe even personally, it’d be really hard to tell.
Now why do I share the above? And where the hell am I going with all of this? What does love have to do with career opportunities?
So… this won’t be my most graceful transition between thoughts, but in my head, they all orbit the same genre.
One of the questions I used to ask LPs during my time in investor relations was: “What was the last investment you made that didn’t work out? Without naming names, what happened?”
And there are two reasons I ask that:
Oftentimes, knowing what an LP doesn’t or won’t ever invest in again is more telling than asking them what they do invest in. LPs are, by definition, generalist. And under that premise, they technically invest in “everything,” so you’ll end up getting very broad answers, especially if they cover more than one asset class.
Do they describe an investment that didn’t work out with active or passive verbs? Did it happen to them? Or do they own up/exhibit agency over their own decisions? Are they arbiters of their own destiny? “I made this investment decision, learned, and this is what I won’t do in the future. Or will still continue to do.” is different from… “This mishap happened to me. How could I have known? It is what it is. It’s not my fault. It was out of my control. It was someone else’s decision.”
For the latter point, people who don’t seem to be able to own up to the decision will likely not be your greatest champions if you’re an emerging manager. If at all. To them, life happens to them. They can’t control it. They have a narrative they keep telling themselves that they have no power. Some might be true. But these folks rarely stick their neck out for you.
By default, most emerging managers look less than pretty. A million reasons (most of which likely true) of what could go wrong. And it’s actually in the best interest of a capital allocator’s career and income that they stick their neck out for risky bets. Many institutions don’t compensate their team based on outlier performance. So incentives won’t be aligned. But to borrow an adage of Jobs, “the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do.” And at the very minimum, they have to believe they can change their own world.
When things are non-obviousโfrom a returns perspective or strategy or anything elseโyou need people who can and will invest courageously and own that decision.
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
โOne thing that is unique to private equity and venture capital is persistence is a little easier because of the brand. โThey did good deals, so therefore, the good deals come to find you.โ If you were in a long-only private equity shop or hedge fund, Amazon is not going to come find you because you invested in Shopify.โ โ JD Montgomery
JD Montgomery leads the Family Office division at Canterbury Consulting and is a seasoned advisor with nearly four decades of experience serving prominent families with a focus on strategy, organization and measurement. Based in Newport Beach, he serves a select group of multi-generational families and helps them navigate the complexities of wealth, purpose, and legacy. Mr. Montgomery partners with his clients to help them optimize the allocation of their resources across generations. Over the years, Mr. Montgomery has developed a deep network of relationships in the venture capital industry. He has helped his clients gain meaningful exposure to venture funds and direct investments and develop relationships with leading innovators and investors globally. He is a Managing Director, shareholder, and board member at Canterbury Consulting. He graduated from Stanford University and holds the Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA) designation.
[00:00] Intro [02:18] The “some day” exercise [11:12] Why does JD do “some day” every 6 months? [12:33] JD’s life line [16:44] When JD is 85 years old… [18:05] JD’s relationship with fatherhood despite the trauma [22:40] Annual dad report cards [25:33] Intentionality with GPs [28:41] How to avoid one-hit wonders [33:43] How to transfer self-esteem [36:05] How do you get GPs off of their talk track? [37:36] Non-obvious things JD looks for in GPs [41:43] Is selling 0.2X DPI in the first 4 years meaningful? [44:27] Should you recycle capital or deploy out of the next fund? [46:34] Why did JD choose to work with families? [48:07] “Never eat alone” [51:34] How does JD think about time allocation? [55:06] How many new GPs does JD meet with? [59:07] How did JD pass on then back Founders Fund? [1:03:22] The difference between unexplored gold veins and rotting trash [1:08:13] Mayan Mocha at Austin’s Picnik [1:08:58] JD’s secret street taco recipe [1:11:09] JD’s reminder that we’re still in the good ol’ days [1:13:20] Post-credit scene: No garlic and onions
โI donโt have a mentor per se. My mentor is hundreds, probably thousands of peopleโIโm sure thousandsโpeople that Iโve met where I try to learn just the amazing talent that person has and I smush it with the next person that I meet that might be most kind person that I meet or the most organized. So itโs this blend of a lot of people that really becomes the mentor.โ โ JD Montgomery
โDOD โ dear old dad.โ โ JD Montgomery
โKids grow up like trees and saplings. And a sapling needs a guiding post to hold them up when itโs windy.โ โ JD Montgomery
โOne of the other questions I will ask is: โTell me about the hardest thing youโve ever done in your life.โ โ JD Montgomery
โTo whom much is given, much is expected.โ โ JD Montgomery
โIn estate planning, you can transfer money, but you canโt transfer self-esteem. Self-esteem is gained by going through the school of hard knocks and doing things and relying on yourself.โ โ JD Montgomery
โOne thing that is unique to private equity and venture capital is persistence is a little easier because of the brand. โThey did good deals, so therefore, the good deals come to find you.โ If you were in a long-only private equity shop or hedge fund, Amazon is not going to come find you because you invested in Shopify.โ โ JD Montgomery
โIf theyโre passionate about somethingโif they want to leave the world just a little differentโtheir ding in the universeโand they want to give back, money doesnโt ruin them.โ โ JD Montgomery quoting a North Carolina professor
โI am not in a โwhatโ business; Iโm in a โwhoโ business.โ โ JD Montgomery
โGross IRR; gross performance. I donโt care. I care about net. Itโs okay to show gross and then net. I prefer net. But if you show gross only, itโs just gross.โ โ JD Montgomery
If you somehow made it to the bottom of these show notes, I’m also trying a new experiment where I write my reactions to the episode on my second blog, Superclusters After Hours. For JD’s episode, you can find my reactions here.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Meriam-Webster defines texture as “the visual or tactile surface characteristics and appearance of something” or “the disposition or manner of union of the particles of a body or substance.”
A more interesting definition, at least on the tactile front, might be the resistance you feel when your skin brushes against a substance. The friction you feel. The subsequent expressions of rough or smooth follow the amount of friction you experience.
“The more you remember, the more you will feel you have lived. I canโt vividly remember the details of more than a couple beach vacations, because they all blend together. But I vividly remember a night out in Tokyo at a tiny bar with my friend Joe, the first time I skinned up a mountain in Colorado, the longest run I ever took in the rolling hills of Tuscany, and getting lost in the streets of Kyoto with my daughter. The experiences I remember most are those that had texture โ some sort of surprise or hardship that implanted them in my brain. These experiences create โcore memoriesโ that remain distinct and persistent, no technology required. My thesis on the future of humanity is that we will optimize for more of the experiences weโll never forget. We will seek activities with texture to create memories that grip. And when we look back, the more of these textured memories we have, the longer we will feel we have lived.”
In a similar way, the ‘texture’ of life includes the moments we most struggled. And in the physical and metaphoric definition of ‘texture,’ leaves us scar tissue that protect our body from future similar experiences. It’s hard to recall the vivid details of life when it was all smooth sailing, but near impossible to forget our greatest character-building moments.
I’m a big believer that theses are the same. A product of our past experiences. And the restrictions we place on ourselves are a function of that. So regardless if an investment thesis is specialist or generalist, what I find more interesting are areas a GP chooses not to invest in, which include what they have never invested in, or have and will never again. Even more interestingly, assuming one only had the chance to interpret the “visual” nature of the thesis, what are the types of investments most people would think falls under a GP’s thesis, but a GP still will not invest in? The latter of which is the “tactile” nature of a thesis. The contact sport. That unless you interact directly with the GP, it is hard to tell.
Oftentimes, the GP may have more boundaries for themselves than we as LPs place on them. And that is always worth digging into.
The texture of the thesis.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
So, this is the first blogpost I’m cross-posting from my brand new Substack, Superclusters After Hours. Don’t worry, I’ll still write here weekly. This blog has always started as a personal blog. I write about what I want to write about on a weekly basis. Sometimes, it’s about venture. Other times, it’s about food, adventure, and random things I think about. The goal of the new blog is to become the primary catalog and archive for ephemeral LP content that I post on LinkedIn, with event invites whenever I do them. Events, for those of you reading this blog and know me, I have almost never publicized them before or after the event. And it’ll continue to stay that way. But I’m going to start playing around with the idea of doing Superclusters-only webinars with a very strict rule of confidentiality. TBD.
Hereโs a question I got from a GP recently, which to be fair, took me much longer than I initially intended to respond to.
To the GP who sent this to me, and I know youโre reading this, thank you. Itโs a great question. And one Iโve heard frustrate many a good GP out there.
So Iโm going to include below what I wrote to that GP โ word for word. So apologizing ahead of time for typos and grammatical errors.
Ok, this is an awesome question! Took some time here so I could better process my answer for you. Apologize for the delay and ramble ahead of time.
So I think there are 2 questions here: (a) how do you stand out as a GP who actually has deal flow when everyone claims they do, and (b) in a broader scope, how do LPs diligence deal flow?
Iโll start with the former.
(a) How can you prove to LPs you have deal flow thatโs different/better than others?
So first off, most people say the same thing: โI get deal flow from founders in my network and co-investors.โ But if everyone says that than even if itโs true, how does yours look any different? The truth is most LPs donโt know either. And in some ways, it might be easier to guide LPs how to think, that not only helps them diligence your fund, but also makes them a better LP, period. Keep in mind, most LPs cover a wide variety of asset classes and venture, much less emerging managers, is the smallest of the smallest chunk. And so they donโt have the incentive or the experience to really dedicate all their time to try to figure out how to better underwrite venture.
Itโs similar to a question a friend of mine recently asked me. My friend is someone who eats to live (as opposed to lives to eat. Yes, those people exist in the world). And recently he found himself in love with someone who loves to eat, and by function of that, lives to eat. And so he asked me, despite having eaten at a bunch of restaurants, โhow do I know which fine dining restaurant to bring his girlfriend to for their 6-month anniversary?โ And I gave him a whole list of things I look for when it comes to picking restaurants. For instance, reading Google and Yelp reviews, but specifically the 3 and 4-star ones, not the 5- or 1-star ones because theyโre so biased. And on top of that, I gave him recs of date-ish things to do pre- and post-dinner as well based on proximity to the restaurant. I also told him in the reservation to ask for a 10-15 minute kitchen tour after the dinner as an extra special experience. And after giving him all of that, he stares blankly at me. Not because he didnโt hear or understand what I told him, but because, really, he was just looking for a name. One name. He would then book it, and move on with his life. Because food, for him, was and is not his focus area. He had other โmore importantโ things to focus on in his life and in the relationship.
Similarly, most LPs are the same when they look at venture. They do it because they need to think about total portfolio allocation or the David Swenson model, but they donโt do it because they love it or that they believe in it. And so they need to know a name, and thatโs all they need.
So to get off my preamble, assuming that an LP has committed in their mind to spend time and do the work in emerging manager land, then you proceed with the next step. And unfortunately, most wonโt. And thatโs okay. Theyโre just not the right fit for you now.
So, the next step is really to guide them. One thing Iโve found to be helpful (if you have it) is to take your strongest few co-investors that you think you have the best relationship with, and ask the LP, โLetโs take X firm. What are the best investments they made in the last 12 months, say by revenue growth or headcount growth? And I will tell you if I saw them before they made their investment and who shared it with me.โ
Conversely, you should look at who else you know well in their existing portfolio, and have them vouch for you and the type of deals you see. Also potentially more importantly, the kind of person you are. The strongest co-signs are often GPs in their existing portfolio and institutional LPs that specialize in venture that theyโre really close to.
Another thing Iโve seen a GP do (paraphrasing here): โIโm going to give you a list of folks who send me deals, short list, and I can give you a longer one if youโd like. And I havenโt told them youโre going to call, so please use your best judgment when asking for their time. But ask them how many other VCs they passed the last 5 deals they shared with VCs to? If theyโre doing their job right, theyโll likely pass to more than one. But see if my name comes up. If it doesnโt, you have your answer. If it does, you have your answer.โ
Going a step further, and I donโt think Iโve seen any GP do this yet, but I feel like it should be more of a thing: Take all the deals youโve gotten from your โnetworkโ (i.e. founders, investors, etc), and segment them by, who sent you a deal because:
You co-invested with them in the past
You invested in them
You didnโt invest in them (compliment to an investor to get strong deal flow from someone they passed on) – anti-portfolio, but keep in mind this only matters, if the people you receive it from are successful founders in the eyes of an LP, maybe you asterisk these
You had no prior economic relationship with them
You used to work with them
Theyโre a fan of you/your content/etc
Iโm sure there are other segmentations, but you get the gist.
And in addition to that, when you pass on a deal that someone refers, categorize the deal into why itโs a pass:
Not a strong founder
Too expensive, but good founder
Good founder, but not in sector/thesis
Not raising at the time
And all the above you would show to an investor and I think should be a good snapshot as to the quality of your deals. Then if youโre comfortable with them, challenge them to try the same exercise with other investors. Part of proving something to an LP is to help them become a better investor, period. Whether they invest or not.
(b) How do LPs diligence deal flow?
The simple answer is: they do references. In terms of how many, Iโve heard everything from 3 to 40. The highest end being Cendana. Most institutions
For those that do 5 or less, primarily either use an oCIO/RIA (i.e. Cambridge, Stepstone, Hamilton Lane, some kind of MFO, etc.) or they primarily bet on firms that are hard to get but also wonโt get them fired, largely because they donโt just have the time/resources/team members to specifically underwrite emerging managers in venture. Because of the optimization of โI need to see โeverythingโโ and I donโt have the time to go deep and assuming they choose to do (in some parts) their own work, they:
(i) talk to a lot of spinouts โcause easier to reference and draft a memo to get buy in
(ii) talk on stage at conferences with the perception that they are open for business, which they technically are, but very selective
(iii) have you go through really long ODDs and DDQs in front of a (large) panel of stakeholders and decision makers in the organization. Ranges for 3 to 20-something people all listening to you answering questions. At that point, itโs your word against your word, but a committee will nitpick on everything. The upside is that itโs easier to share something you do that youโre 1 in 5 or 1 in 10 who do (as opposed to FoFs and venture-focused MFOs or institutions who need you to be 1 in 100 or 1 in 1000). The downside is you need to appeal to a larger group of people, and it takes more time outside of meetings (up to 350 question ODD).
But I digress. For the purpose of your question of your question and what I believe your frustration might be, Iโm going to focus on diligencing deal flow when youโre not in the room. Assuming itโs an LP who is actually intentional about diligence AND is open-minded enough to not bring too many of their own biases in…
On-list
Founders: sticking to the facts. How did you meet the GP? What did you talk about in the first meeting? How long did they take before they committed? What questions were asked? Did other VCs ask the same questions? How competitive was the round? If you offered any special terms, why and who else did you offer it to? Did they all take it? Have you introed any other founders or people to the GP? Has the GP provided you value post-investment?
Co-investors: Who gives you the best quality of deals? Intro to meeting ratio? Meeting to diligence ratio? Meeting to commitment ratio? How does this GP stack rank against other relationships/other verticals? Did the emerging GP intro you to the deal youโre co-investors in?
LPs: How many other firms of a similar strategy did you talk to? What were the sourcing strategies for the other firms? Compare and contrast.
Former employers/misc: deal flow isnโt really diligenced here. The best thing these folks can attest to is your character + network.
Off-list (a lot of off-list is done with people who, in the words of an LP, โowe you [the LP] more favors than they owe the GPโ)
Founders: Rank your favorite investors on the cap table. Who are your top 3? Why? If you were to start a new co, who would you take with you again?
Co-investors: How much signal is a deal if that GP sends it to you? Compare with other GPs. Why?
LPs: Have you gotten co-investments from the GP? How is their level of communication post-investment?
Others: Same as above.
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
A number of investors I’ve had conversations with recently used the word “spiky” to describe their investments and investment prospects. Both VCs who described founders that way and LPs who described GPs that way. With the latter, I want to caveat that these LPs were fund-of-funds and smaller family offices. The investment profile of a larger LP may look quite different given the incentives of the organization. But I digress.
What is “spiky?” Spiky, or ‘spikey’ (I’ll let you decide what your preferred spelling is), is an adjective used to describe someone who has a few traits that excel quite extremely. Not many, just a few. The implicit understanding is that sometimes they can be poorly proficient in many other areas. For example, you can be the world’s greatest AI researcher, but not know how to make scrambled eggs or cook at all for yourself. But in the areas where an individual is “spiky” in, they are in the world’s top 0.01% with very little other competition.
I’m also personally a big believer, that you really do have to be in at least the top 0.1% on something if you want to have a chance at top decile (10%) returns because by order of you needing to take on other responsibilities in a company and/or firm where you might not spike in those as much, your overall “spikiness” slips two decimal points. So, as an LP who aims for top decile minimum, I look for people who would be 1 in 1000. An a startup investor/VC, to bet on the 100Xers, the top 1% per say, you need to find people who have 1 in 10,000. Metaphorically speaking, the bar is higher since you’re less diversified compared to LPs.
So if that’s spiky, what is “lumpy?” You’re better than others in many areas. Potentially most areas. If 3.0 was the grade point average of your competition, you’re a 3.5 or 4.0. Numerically better, but you don’t particularly excel in any particular area. Or at least not in ways that make you an N of 1.
In emerging GP land, there are a lot of ‘lumpy’ people. Investors who are probably already in the top quartile, even top decile of the human population. To have the ambition, the track record, the network, and the wherewithal to start a fund requires a certain state of privilege, luck and effort that most can’t afford or have. They have just enough to be better, but not enough to be the best. These are, at least for me, the hardest people to say no to (assuming they’re good people). They’re people that I’ve described to other allocators (when they do diligence) as “good human beings” and “people I really enjoy hanging out with.” All true statements, by the way.
But even for spiky people, is their differentiator enough to create portfolio divergence? Sometimes, it doesn’t. Arguably, oftentimes, it doesn’t. Then the question becomes is their portfolio converging with others to a point where there’s still alpha? And for the (established) firms they’re converging with, (a) will they continue to converge (i.e. will the other firm(s) always want this investor around for their spikiness?), and (b) are the other (established) firm(s) best days ahead of them or behind them?
Expectedly so, you are now underwriting the other firm(s) as well.
I wish it were an easy judgment call, but it isn’t. And I’m likely to be wrong more often than I’m right. As most of us will be.
Then, there are people who are “smooth.” Some may call them generalists. Others may say well-rounded. And while both can be true, in a world of attention scarcity, whether in the mind of founders or co-investors or other LPs, you need to stand for something. And “smooth” people are easily forgotten. We don’t talk about them much because we forget about them.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.