How to Pick Emerging Managers in 2026

Pavel Prata asked me if I was interested in writing a guest post on his blog a few months back. To which I responded with the fact, that I’m not sure there was much for me to add to the LP ecosystem that I haven’t written about already. And bless how supported he is, but he challenged me to write an updated summation of everything I’ve learned about investing in emerging managers as a progression of how much I’ve learned since I first wrote my initial blogpost that put me on the map in LP-GP land. Which to this point, I hadn’t written something public-facing on that. So eventually, after much inspiration, I finally did.

Now a few months later, I’m finally glad to share it here as well on this blog. I’m not going to include the nice formatting and graphics that Pavel and his team made, so if you want to check those out and for potentially, easier readability, check out my post here.

But without further ado, and thank you Pavel for the inspiration, voila!


david zhou, cup of zhou, superclusters
Author’s note: God, I put on some weight for this photo.

The preface

In many ways, I sit in a place of privilege. I grew up in the Bay Area, and while I was not born into a household of tech, nor did I have any relatives who were deep in the tech ecosystem, I was fortunate to have friends who were and are far more tech forward than I was.

I remember being in elementary school in โ€˜05 and my best friends were deadset on trying to get an account on this new-ish website called Thefacebook. And the primary reason was that we got bored of Club Penguin. The site needed us to be 18 or older (or at least we needed to be some age that we werenโ€™t. We were still living out our best single-digit lives), but I donโ€™t think anyone was really checking. Three misfits. One of us usually received detention for getting in fist fights. His brother would receive principal office visits for making other kids cry. Blunt guy. If your drawing was ugly, heโ€™d be sure you knew. But both were and are good people.

The first would get in fights defending his friends from getting bullied. The second, while lacking social cues, would always sit down with you to help you improve your skills. And me, the supposed โ€œgoody-two-shoesโ€ of our misfits who would follow rules, yet get in trouble trying to get them out of detention. And frankly, none of us were good with our words. Then and maybe still now. Yet nevertheless, one of my buddies found his way to a .edu email address from volunteering at the school library. And that was all we needed to get into the โ€œbig kids club.โ€

I went to a school in the Bay Area, due to it being the far cheaper alternative of the schools I would have loved to go to. There I got involved in the startup ecosystem really early on because of my zealotic obsession with free food in college. (Story for another day.) I became a startup investor because the accelerator was short on hands, and it was through the first startup I was with that I knew they existed as a non-profit at the time. I became an LP because of a community I was helping run and someone asked me to invest as an individual LP for only $1,000 to his oversubscribed fund that โ€œI [had] been really helpful in building.โ€ To this day, I still donโ€™t think I did anything. Then, I somehow built a network of LPs and GPs because I wrote one blogpost that was supposed to be my personal how-to-be-an-LP 101 that went serendipitously further than I expected.

And I say all of that to preface that:

  1. My life is full of accidents and being lucky at the right place at the right time with the right people.
  2. As a caveat that you should take all the words that will populate below with the biases that I may be coming to the table with.

That said, I do believe that life is all about increasing the surface area for luck to stick. Thereโ€™s a line I really like that I came across a few years ago by Qi Lu, who created Bing, Microsoftโ€™s search engine and is the former COO of Baidu: โ€œLuck is like a bus. If you miss one, thereโ€™s always the next one. But if youโ€™re not prepared, you wonโ€™t be able to jump on.โ€

When Pavel asked me to write a step-by-step guide on how to choose managers in 2026, my immediate thought was that I couldnโ€™t ever write it from the stance I have today, but if I were starting all over from nothing, except capital to invest, where would I begin?

Yet knowing what I know now, with the network I have now, with the brand I have nowโ€”though I still have a long way to go, how is investing in emerging managers today different from the last few years?

As such this essay will be split in two overarching sections:

  1. For the LP whoโ€™s just reached the block
  2. For the LP whoโ€™s been around the block

A big thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading, guiding and helping me frame early drafts of this piece.

For the emerging LP

One of my good friends described investing in venture funds in the 2020s as โ€œexpert modeโ€, as opposed to when he started in 2001 as โ€œthe tutorial.โ€ He said that in 2001, there were 200 firms in total in the market. That he met with half of the firms in the market. Then invested in two-thirds of the firms he met with. And that resulted from three vintages that returned 5X net on his venture fund portfolio. According to him, every fund he invested in was an emerging manager. The whole asset class was an emerging asset class.

Today is undeniably harder than itโ€™s ever been to be a venture fund LP. Thousands of firms in-market. Everyone tells you theyโ€™re the greatest fund since sliced bread. Or in their words, theyโ€™re top quartile, if not top decile. Everyone tells you they have unique access. Yet most people generally have access to the same โ€œlegibleโ€ deals. Or at least, โ€œlegibleโ€ founders which include a river of backwards bias. So, who has โ€œbetterโ€ access? Time horizons are realistically 12-15 years, instead of the 10 years people pitch you. Plenty of GPs quietly โ€œretireโ€ after 2-3 years to go work at a portfolio company or โ€œget acquiredโ€ by a larger platform. IPO markets havenโ€™t fully opened yet, and there just isnโ€™t enough private capital to deploy into the largest companies. 2025 has been an interesting year of one of the lowest years in dollars raised, but one of the highest, with respect to dollars deployed. Six-layer SPVs, where the individual who manages the sixth layer has no idea who actually owns the underlying asset, just a forward contract towards the stock.

The first question you need to ask yourself, and likely the most important question, you need to ask yourself is if someone pitches you their fund, and itโ€™s Wonderbread, why are you so lucky?

How are you luckier than the most established institutions whoโ€™ve done this for decades? How are you luckier than people who are college roommates with Sam Altman? How are you luckier than multi-stage venture funds who have a strong brand AND an active fund-of-funds program that invests in managers sharing their deal flow with them? How are you luckier than content creators who get pitched VC guests all the time? How are you luckier than the owner of Buckโ€™s or Coupa or the real estate firms who own buildings on Sand Hill Road?

More likely than not, youโ€™re not. Iโ€™m not.

A long-time private equity allocator friend of mine has this great line, โ€œThere are only two kinds of people who make money. Really smart people and dumb people who know theyโ€™re not smart enough to beat the market. Everyone in between has just enough knowledge to make dumb decisions.โ€

Thereโ€™s a great line by the legendary Richard Feynman. โ€œThe first principle is that you must not fool yourselfโ€”and you are the easiest person to fool.โ€ Remember that.

So, after all those disclaimers, do you just not invest?

If the above scares you, probably not. Youโ€™re more likely to generate consistent returns by investing in the indices. But if youโ€™re willing to put in the blood, sweat and tears, maybe the below might be of value to you.

The first step is to see a lot of deals. You have no idea what quality looks like until youโ€™ve seen quality. Otherwise youโ€™re spending a good chunk of time imagining what could be and what should be, but not is. Just like the GPs we evaluate need to prove they can โ€œsee, pick and winโ€, we as LPs have to do the legwork to see the best deals, to build the framework to pick them, and to win the deals that are hard to come by. But first, on seeingโ€ฆ

Itโ€™s like dating for the first time. I donโ€™t know about you, and this might be TMI (too much information). Before I dated my first girlfriend, I had all these ideas implanted in me from Hollywood, Hallmark movies, Matthew McConaughey, Sandra Bullock, Anne Hathaway, Hugh Grantโ€”you get the point. I had these faint, rose-tinted ideas of how my future partner should, would, could act. But when I finally started dating, reality was wildly different from expectations.

The same is true when you look at funds. Whether itโ€™s media, podcasts, or newsletters, they all tell you a warped perception of the reality of the market, told through the lens of a world that is most beneficial to their incentives. You need to figure it out your own. And when you do in the first year, maybe a bit longer, you will inevitably talk to more noise than signal. Accept that fact.

To get inbound, you need to do a combination of a few things. Pick your battles here:

  • Put โ€œLPโ€ on LinkedIn. You will have random GPs find you in their search engines and reach out. Almost all will be noise here, unfortunately.
  • Go to events that attract GPs (i.e. EMC Summit, RAISE Global, Bridge Funding Global, SuperVenture, FII, Upfront Summit, etc.). Your priority here is to go to the side events that arenโ€™t publicly disclosed that have LPs and GPs. If you canโ€™t get in there, go find the LP/GP Happy Hours and dinners that are shared on Eventbrite, Luma, and/or Partiful. And if still you canโ€™t get in, at these events, there are occasional speed dating breakout sessions.
  • Reach out to LPs and ask to buy them coffee as you are learning to be an LP. You can find these LPs either on:
    • Podcasts (i.e. Swimming with Allocators, Origins, Venture Unlocked, How I Invest, Superclustersโ€”mentioning my friendsโ€™ platforms before my own)
    • Reacting to LP and emerging manager content. There are a few LP โ€œinfluencersโ€ out there. Note not only who reads and comments on these posts, but whether the original poster also replies back to those comments (which is a loose indicator on the depth of their relationship and if that commenter is somewhat respected in the ecosystem). FYI, donโ€™t use me as a barometer, since I try to reply back to everyone. But a couple โ€œinfluencersโ€ that might help you kickstart your search. Beezer Clarkson, David Clark, John Rikhtegar, Meghan Reynolds, Endowment Eddie (on X), Dan Gray, James Heath, Matt Curtolo, and so on. Occasionally, Hunter Walk, Charles Hudson, Rick Zullo, Peter Walker and a few other VCs also post good LP content. OpenLP is also a great platform that captures the most interesting thoughts regularly, as well as what Pavel is building now too.

Now, that you have a list of GPs and your calendar has a few meetings set up, you ideally get GPs to share their decks with you before the meeting. Although, understandably, it is harder for GPs to trust you with their decks if you havenโ€™t yet built up social capital and trust.

If you can get the deck, I look for a few things. At least one interesting thing on the deck that can help the GP see more deals, pick better deals, or win competitive deals. And (b) is that โ€œthingโ€ an insight that the GPโ€™s prior background would have made explicit or obvious to that GP? For me, thatโ€™s enough to take a first meeting. Do note that most decks look the same. And if you canโ€™t tell one deck from another (thatโ€™s okay, I started like that too), ask the GP before the interview, something along the lines of: โ€œOf everything that is on your deck about the fund, is there one thing about you or your fund you hope that I catch that youโ€™re really proud of but thereโ€™s a chance I might not notice?โ€

Naturally, you can ask that question, even if you donโ€™t have the deck, and if their answer impresses you, take the meeting. I call that โ€œsuspense.โ€ Partial information that I am privy to that elicits further questions and curiosity. To engage with any GP, I need that first.

So then I share my calendar. I use Calendly, but youโ€™re welcome to use any alternative. And I include the below text along with the calendar invite to set expectations.

calendly

Do note that the meeting is only 15 minutes long. You donโ€™t have to do this, but I find it useful because Iโ€™ve seen a number of GPs already. My CRM tells me just under 1000 that Iโ€™m actively tracking. But there are definitely more in the universe. All that to say, Iโ€™ve come to realize for myself that I figure out if I want to continue a conversation with a GP or not within the first 5-10 minutes.

The only thing Iโ€™m looking for in the meeting is โ€œsurprise.โ€ Is there something I can learn from the GP that I didnโ€™t know before? About them? About the industry? About the technologies? Ideally, you also consume quite a bit of information outside of each conversation. For instance, I read research papers, talk to people I think are smart, listen to podcasts, read newsletters, and build things here and there. The more information you consume outside, the higher your bar for โ€œsurpriseโ€ will be over time.

And if I learn something, only then, do I actually start doing homework around the fund opportunity. And spending more time with a GP.

Diligence

For the purpose of this section, Iโ€™m going to prioritize diligence as it relates to people. Iโ€™ll talk about portfolio sizing and construction in the section below. Iโ€™m also going to assume you donโ€™t have the ideal network to diligence the opportunity. What does the ideal network look like?

A small selection of A-players (founders, operators, co-investors, and LPs) that you trust AND they trust you to withhold judgment about them, as well as keep what they tell you in the highest level of confidence.

Admittedly, this will take time to build. Some longer than others. Your mileage may vary from multiple months to many years, sometimes decades. And this will be a part of your job as an LP to continually refine.

But in lieu of that, hereโ€™s where Iโ€™d start:

  1. Find who are A-players. Needless to say, before you can build a relationship with A-players, you must first be able to recognize A-players. Admittedly, this is a lot of legwork. And everyone approaches this part differently. For me, I have to consume a large amount of information from disparate knowledge networks, talk to different people and see who they respect, listen to a lot of podcasts, read a lot of books and content, in hopes of triangulating clarity of thought, as well as executional discipline. I donโ€™t have a silver bullet here unfortunately, but here are a few traits Iโ€™ve seen over the years that seem to have moderate to high correlation with A-players.
  2. Find out what motivates and drives them. What do they need? What do they want? What do most people fail to understand about them? This will also take time, potentially longer than the first step. Your job for now is to establish trust and rapport. โ€œWhat you share with me will never find its way back to the person I am calling about.โ€
  3. And as youโ€™re doing all the above, and still looking at deals. For people you know well and you can attest to their intellectual and executional rigor, ask them for their opinion. For everyone else, focus on asking about the facts. Youโ€™ll need to use the facts to piece together a narrative. Instead of โ€œWho do you likeโ€, ask โ€œWhen did you last talk to X?โ€ or โ€œHow many intros did this GP make for you? And how were you introduced?โ€

Naturally as part of diligence, you need to figure out and corroborate if a GP has an edge. Risks and weaknesses will always be present. Also, expect to get negative references. Any ambitious person is bound to ruffle feathers and rub people the wrong way. If you donโ€™t find any, youโ€™re either talking to the wrong people or you havenโ€™t given those people a safe space to talk. Also I want to note, as Cendanaโ€™s Kelli Fontaine once told me: โ€œNeutral references are worse than negative references.โ€

Negative referencesUnderstanding why itโ€™s negative is important. Is it merely a disagreement on perspective? Or is it evidence or an account of poor work ethic, abrasiveness, lack of open-mindedness, or poor morals?

For instance, โ€œGP didnโ€™t work that hard at our companyโ€ is not all bad, depending on their answer to โ€œWhat did they do outside of work?โ€ If the answer is โ€œI donโ€™t knowโ€, then your job is to find out what they did and if they worked hard there instead because working at their last company didnโ€™t align with their goals.

To give another example, a friend of mine once did a reference on a founderโ€”the lesson is the sameโ€”where a reference told him, โ€œI really hated how X always wore tank tops and sandals when the office culture required us to be put together.โ€ And many of his former colleagues all said the same thing. Yet no one ever complained about the work he did. Because despite his poor dress code, his output was in the top percentile on the team.

GPs, by nature of pitching a (hopefully) new narrative and charting their own path, will be controversial. Itโ€™s just part of the game. But obviously, it should not discount any bad behavior.

Other comments that belie a referenceโ€™s negative sentiment about someone:
โ€œThe GP is interesting.โ€ Interesting is usually a quiet opinion withheld. Itโ€™s always helpful in these situations to prod deeper.

โ€œI like the GP as a friend/human.โ€ Why donโ€™t you like this GP as an (investment) professional?
Neutral referencesNeutral references come in different shapes and sizes. Note that if you ask leading questions, youโ€™ll get safe answers. For example, โ€œDo you like X?โ€ leads to an answer of โ€œOh yes, I like X.โ€

The most common form of neutral references are often masked by positive, generic adjectives, but canโ€™t be substantiated by real examples. Other forms include not remembering who the GP was despite the GP being on the cap table, or working together. Also, on-list references who opt to text/email you about their commentary on a GP instead of call. Or taking a really long time to schedule time with you to talk about the GP, versus immediately leaping out of their chair to tell you about a GP. In addition to that, references (usually on-list or their most notable co-investors or founders) who didnโ€™t even know that the GP was raising a fund or what the GP would be investing into.
Positive referencesPositive ones luckily are the easiest to spot. And itโ€™s not just the words you hear, but the emotions you feel when someone tells you about the GP. These references, whether they say it explicitly or not, would go to war for the GP.

Peter Fenton at Benchmark recently shared a line I really like. “The highest accolade of a firm that they seek is a manifestation of a value system.” Most investmentsโ€”both at the level of an angel investment, but also a number of institutional investmentsโ€”are written as one-night stands. The majority, if not all, of the conversations happen T-3 months before an investment is made. Then as soon as the investment happens, outside of the monthly or quarterly updates, and maybe the board meetings, no other meaningful conversation happens post-investment. And the truth is if an investor hasnโ€™t built their value system (and for that matter, value-add system) before they start their firm, theyโ€™re not likely to change their behavior and their habitual cycles after they start their firm. Moreover, noting my bias, I prefer to invest in GPs where I am investing in the worst version of their firm on the day I invest. That itโ€™ll only get better. And to do so, certain things need to compound: brand, value, network, among others. In order for that to happen, they need to have built a relationship, as opposed to a one-night stand, with many of their investments, even beyond their best ones. So the point of doing diligence is to find evidence of their firmโ€™s value system before they start it.

Having shared the above, now that you have time with the GPs and some of their references, what do you ask?

Note that the below arenโ€™t all-encompassing nor exhaustive questions and that you usually get more from asking follow-up questions instead of building a checklist of questions to ask. Merely, the below serve as a point of inspiration as you do your own due diligence. As such, Iโ€™ve structured the below into categories on how I assess a GPโ€™s ability to see, pick and win through the reference calls I do, segmented by reference archetype.

Seeing

What does their sourcing engine look like? How much is inbound? How much is outbound? Do they have access to proprietary channels for deal flowโ€”even if momentarily? Do they know people who add value to the innovation ecosystem, but arenโ€™t well connected to the rest of the innovation ecosystem?

I will note that most GPs will say most of their deal flow comes from founder referrals.

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPHow do you find opportunities before anyone else?Are they fishing in new uncharted territories? Do they have non-redundant networks and access points?
FoundersHow did you first meet this GP? Do you remember the type of conversation you initially had with said GP?
If the GP met this person via an event: How often do you go to these events? Outside of meeting this GP, whoโ€™s the most memorable friend youโ€™ve made via the event?
If the two met via an intro: How often do you catch up with your mutual friend? Has your mutual friend introduced you to other investors?
Iโ€™m trying to understand how much of a GPโ€™s deal flow is inbound versus outbound. As well as how repeatable certain deal flow channels and nodes are.
Co-InvestorsHow is this GPโ€™s deal flow different from yours? Why havenโ€™t you pursued building out your own network in this field?Can [insert big firm] just do what this GP can? Is there a structural moat?
LPsFor the funds you were also looking at or have in your portfolio, who seems to have the same deal flow channels as this GP?Institutional LPs see a lot, and as a function, they likely see a lot of overlap in inbound channels. So for people who have the same channels, why does a certain GP capture value from it better than the rest?
Ex-colleaguesIn what situations do you typically find this GP to be proactive when you used to work with her/him?
What has this GP done that no one with her/his job title has ever done in the past?
How entrepreneurial is the GP? Is the new firm the first instance of their entrepreneurial nature or is this part of the GPโ€™s inherent nature?

Picking

Thereโ€™s a saying in the land of LPs. โ€œYou donโ€™t have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in has to be great.โ€

So the question comes down to: how do you know if someone is great?

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPWhy have you and havenโ€™t you put the most amount of capital behind your portfolioโ€™s greatest value driver?
If we could go through each of your past investmentsโ€”good and badโ€”can you enlighten me on why you invested in each?
The first question is figuring out if a GP understands how early and how much to put in their greatest outperformers. What signals do they rely on? Are they ready to invest with reserves?
The second question is to understand how the GPโ€™s ability to recognize excellence and insights has evolved. How quickly they ramp up. How many investments it takes for them to shift the way they think. At what point, do previous investments impact the way they make future investments?
FoundersWhat kinds of conversations did you have with the GP before they gave you a term sheet? How long did that journey take? Were you surprised at all? How did the conversations with this GP differ from the other ones you had?From the perspective of a recipient, how much of a GPโ€™s intention is well-understood before the GP embarks on a commercial relationship with the founder(s)?
Co-InvestorsHow often do you take intros the GP sends your way? Was that always the case?
How has your relationship with this GP evolved over time? Where do you foresee it evolving towards?
Do investors understand and value a GPโ€™s eye for people and opportunities?
With the second set of questions, Iโ€™m trying to understand how much a co-investor values this GPโ€™s deals. If the co-investor works at a multi-stage fund, have they ever tried to hire this GP into their firm? Or had them as a scout? Or is it a purely, โ€œitโ€™s nice to have you in our orbitโ€ kind of relationship?
LPsHow have you directly experienced the value of being an LP?Have the GPs provided any value to their existing LPs? Iโ€™m primarily looking at GPs who claim to offer co-invest opportunities. Do they (a) know the founders well enough to get allocation for people the founders likely donโ€™t know or trust yet, and (b) how much do they optimize for whatโ€™s best for the fund versus whatโ€™s best for the LPs?
With (b), itโ€™s not a bad thing to optimize for the fund, but setting expectations is important, instead of claiming to be helpful to LPs without actually being helpful.
Ex-colleaguesHas this GP hired anyone in the past that youโ€™ve genuinely impressed with? Why were you impressed by these individuals? Has this GP done anything to help these individuals succeed over time?Thereโ€™s no direct parallel between hiring and investing, but in terms of recognizing talent, there are some similarities.

Winning

Why do the worldโ€™s best founders want to work with you? What do you have to offer that others donโ€™t? Why would a world-class founder have you on the cap table when there are so many great options out there (and even when thereโ€™s that much inbound interest)?

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPWhat is your proudest piece of advice you gave a founder or the proudest thing you did for a founder?
What’s something you did for a founder or a piece of advice you give that didn’t work out? What’s something you did/piece of advice that did better than you expected?
Can I see every single version of your pitch deck to date? (If thereโ€™ve been previous vintages, ask for those as well.)
Iโ€™m primarily looking for specificity. Was it proactive or reactive? And when corroborating with said founder later on, will that founder reflect the same sentiment?
With regards to the second and third questions, do you measure when things deviate from expectationsโ€”good or bad?
My goal with the last question is to understand how the GPโ€™s thinking has evolved over time. How has the GPโ€™s ability to storytell changed? Do they have a better grasp of how they can add value and what founders actually want over time?
FoundersWhich other investors did you talk to before you took this GPโ€™s check?
Did you know that you were going to be a hot commodity? When and how did you know?
How did the GP help when things werenโ€™t going well? How did the GP react when things turned downwards?
Was there competition for the round? Itโ€™s neither good nor bad if there was. And if there was, why did they end up taking this GPโ€™s check? Would they still take it if this GP wrote double the check and asked for double the ownership?
Co-InvestorsWhat value does this GP bring to the table that seems to be a constant ask from your portfolio companies?Why will fellow investors fight for this GP to be on the cap table?
LPsWho were the most elucidating individuals you talked to best appreciate this GPโ€™s value-add?Are there people you should have talked to but have yet to? Or are there people you talked to but asked the wrong set of questions? Or whom youโ€™ve yet to build rapport with?
Ex-colleaguesWhat would you say is this GPโ€™s greatest asset/skillset? How have you seen it in practice?
Whoโ€™s the best person you know of for [insert what the GP claimed as value add]? Why? On that same scale, where this person is a 10, where does the GP sit? What would help this GP get to a 10?
A-players typically know other A-players, and understanding how they rank a GP among all the other practitioners they know is valuable intel.

Gravitational pull

To tie the above together, there is no perfect emerging GP. And if they are, theyโ€™re probably not an โ€œemergingโ€ GP. I look for emerging GPs who excel in two of the three areas (see, pick, win). One in isolation wonโ€™t help. If youโ€™re the worldโ€™s best sourcer, but you donโ€™t know how to pick the right one even when it falls on your lap, or you donโ€™t know how to get the founder to choose you over others, then sourcing alone is for naught.

I look for GPs to have an unfair advantage in two of the three areas. I need the cards stacked in their favor. Oftentimes, their unfair advantages are further accented by what first surprised me in the first meeting or two. Furthermore, gravitational pull comes from acknowledgement of their unfair strengths, as well as the constant refinement of the craft that increases the firmโ€™s leverage over time.

Partnership risk

One other important element to underwrite is partnership risk. To many experienced allocators, like Ben Choi once told me, this may even be the single biggest risk an LP has to underwrite. If youโ€™re investing in a partnership, chemistry really matters. They may look great on paper. They may have complementary skillsets. But do they talk about each other in ways that raise each other up? How are decisions made? Is there a power imbalance? How is compensation shared (salary and carry)? How much do they not only respect but adore the othersโ€™ strengths? How do they resolve conflict? Have they disagreed with each other before?

Portfolio construction and sizing

By the time you decide to invest in funds (or directly into startups too), you need to understand that youโ€™re building a portfolio. Unless your hands are blessed by a higher being or that you have the Midas touch, there is a ridiculously low chance you can pick 2-3 funds and expect theyโ€™ll outperform. Naturally, you want all the funds you do invest in to do well, but sometimes in this world, you can do everything right and have things still not work out. So expect, on average, most funds will return you 0.8-5X their money back to you.

So there are a few things you need to figure out:

  1. Assuming things go right, and youโ€™ve invested in this 5X fund:
    • Is a 5X net (which is roughly a little over 6X gross) return on your investment meaningful to you and your net worth?
      • If not, then the question comes down to: Is there something else you value from investing in this fund? Some value co-investment opportunities. I know of a number of venture funds, traditional fund-of-funds, and multi-family offices, who see their fund-of-fund program as a loss leader, with the primary goal of the fund-of-funds to generate deal flow for their direct investment practice. As an emerging LP, do consider that if you want co-investment opportunities, are you the largest (or at the minimum, one of the largest LP checks who care about co-investments)? If not, then consider the reality of why would the GP ever give you the best deal flow if youโ€™re not their greatest (monetary) supporter.
      • If so, great. But at the risk of it being a 0.8X net fund, meaning you not only lost money to decision-making, but also to inflation and the opportunity cost of investing in a public market index, can you stomach the loss 12-15 years from now?
        • If not, invest a smaller check size.
        • If so, great.
    • Whatever is needed to 5X the fund, what is the exit value necessary for that?
      • If a GP has no reserves and invests pre-seed/seed, assume 75-80% dilution by the time of exit for the fundโ€™s greatest value drivers. This does not account for acquisitions, which will have a little more nuance. This also assumes that there will be 5-6 rounds of investment after the one the GP invests in.
      • If a GP has reserves, depending on the industry, and how much they continue doubling down on the investment, itโ€™s safe to assume 55-60% dilution. If the GP plans to continue doubling down on pro-rata past the Series A, do account for how much of the overall fund is allocated in a singular deal. Usually limited partner agreements cap it at around 15% of the overall fund, to allow for minimum diversification at the portfolio construction level.
      • And assuming you know the exit and enterprise value thatโ€™s needed to 5X the fund, do you believe thatโ€™s possible? Your job is to go into the internet archives and find, if in the last few years, what percent of companies in that industry has exited for that size. And how likely will it be for future companies to exit at that size? And even if so, do you believe the GP is in the right information flows to capture that outcome?
    • Is the number of companies the GP wants allocation into, reasonable to you? Every person has a different level of tolerance in this regard. To make some gross assumptions, if a GP invests in 50 companies in a fund, then they need a single company to 50X to return your money back once (obviously Iโ€™m taking the gross, not the net numbers). And they need a single company to 150X to 3X the fund. At a $10M post-money valuation, a 150X would turn the company into a $1.5B company. Again, do open a spreadsheet for this. Iโ€™m not accounting for dilution, fees, recaps, and a bunch of other things. This is purely a back-of-the-napkin version of: Do you believe a $1.5B outcome in this sector of choice is possible?
      • Do also note that given that venture is a power law business, a single value driver for a fund usually accounts for at least 60% of the overall fundโ€™s returns. 1-2 companies account for another 20-30%. And the rest, the last 10%. I also want to play my own devilโ€™s advocate that almost nothing in this industry is โ€œusual.โ€

Miscellaneous thoughts

  1. Donโ€™t invest in the first 50 funds you see. You will miss great deals. Thatโ€™s okay. You donโ€™t have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in should be great.
  2. If youโ€™ve been out-of-market for more than a year, do the same. You need to know how people are hiding skeletons in their closet?
  3. Trust the data, but not the judgments of people who see a plethora of deals in venture. Have they seen other funds with the same strategy before investing in this one? What was different?
  4. Almost every fund you meet will say theyโ€™re top quartile or top decile. Be skeptical of benchmarking data, or for that matter, publicly available data that will suffer from availability and selection bias. Theyโ€™re either too opaque or delayed, and in the words of some institutional LPs, โ€œtotally fabricated.โ€
    • To borrow the words of my friend Peter Walker, whoโ€™s constantly cited for his Carta reports, โ€œโ€œYou should probably, if youโ€™re a founder, for instance, selectively ignore at least half of what Iโ€™m saying because it doesnโ€™t apply to you. And your job as a founder, your job as an investor, your job as a thoughtful person is to figure out which half.โ€
  5. Ignore the marketing jargon associated with โ€œselectโ€ track records GPs share with you. Ask for their schedule of investments (SOI), which should include all their investments to date, not just the ones they want you to see. Figure out your own valuation methodology, and prescribe that to their SOI.
    • For me, SAFE notes donโ€™t count as markups, only priced rounds. Any company that hasnโ€™t gotten reevaluated in the market for over 2 years receives a discount. The only exception is strong revenue growth since last round. Discount is based on public market comparables and their revenue multiples. Usually 7-8X on revenue for me. Not always.
    • If a GP gives you โ€œtargetโ€ or โ€œprojectedโ€ multiples, youโ€™re welcome to ignore the number outright. Whatโ€™s more interesting and important are what were the assumptions that led to the projection. What is the expected dilution? How many rounds is a company expected to raise before their projected exit? What is the assumed graduation rate per stage? What is the conservative estimate?
  6. Never trust the word of a GP. Spend more time on reference calls than you do with the GP. When doing references, if you know people really well AND believe they are the top 1% in what they do, ask for their opinion. Everyone else, ask for the facts.
  7. Make sure the data corroborates with the narrative. Is the data/track record repeatable? Being 0.1% on the cap table in three rocketship companies is very different from an investor co-founding a company. The relationship is different. In the former case, the founders, much less the executives, even remember a GP exists.
  8. When asking questions, roughly a third to a half of your questions should be the same across all managers, only then can you compare apples to apples.
  9. When spending time with the GP, find out what they donโ€™t want you to know. What are they scared of, that if you know, they think will look bad on them? Everyone has insecurities. Thatโ€™s okay. But only once you figure that out, can you better assess the information theyโ€™re telling you. And better yet, the information theyโ€™re not telling you. Which is what you eventually go to diligence.
  10. Sometimes thereโ€™s just no LP/GP fit. They might be a great fund, but you just donโ€™t feel the pull.
  11. Set expectations clear from the get-go. If youโ€™re in exploratory mode, say it. If youโ€™re actively deploying, say it.
  12. At any point in time, if you are no longer interested, and know that youโ€™re most likely not going to invest, say it. Itโ€™s better that a GP thinks youโ€™re not going to invest, then you do, than think youโ€™re going to invest, but you end up not.
  13. Be mindful of a GPโ€™s time. If youโ€™re not going to write the largest check as a function of a GPโ€™s fund, know you have limited time with them. Do not waste their time. Know you will have to do most of your homework without the help of the GP. If you want to be spoonfed diligence, this is the wrong asset class for you.

On spinouts, my primary concern is always: Were you successful because of your last firm or in spite of your last firm? If you no longer had the title you did last month or this month, would people engage with you differently? If youโ€™re the keynote for a large conference (i.e. SuperVenture, FII, iConnections, etc.) when you held your last position, will they still invite you back as a headliner when youโ€™re starting a new firm? When people talk about you behind your back about how amazing you are, do they talk in the past or present tense? Tactically, are you the ex-Redpoint partner or Tomasz? Are you ex-Greylock or Sarah? Are you ex-[insert big firm] or you?

As most insights, these will very rarely come out in conversation with the GP. More often than not, theyโ€™ll come out in diligence. Particularly off-list references. If you donโ€™t have the network, you have to rely on on-list references and maybe a few good friends, but know that there is no incentive for people to speak ill of someone else to a stranger. So diligence only the facts. Youโ€™re likely not going to get the honest โ€œopinionsโ€ you want to adequately understand an opportunity.

For established LP

If youโ€™re an established LP, you know most of the above. So instead, Iโ€™ll share a couple reminders that you may have heard before, but are paramount more today than before. Before I share them, hereโ€™s how Iโ€™m categorizing the difference between an emerging and an established, just because I know everyone has a different definition (i.e. AUM size, number of investments made, track record that extends for at least a decade, etc.). Do note, you donโ€™t have to check all the boxes. As long as you have most of the below traits of an โ€œestablished LPโ€, youโ€™re probably established. One of those touchy-feely things where when you see it, you know it.

Emerging LPEstablished LP
No prior network to lean onA robust network to source and diligence deals (meaning you get at least 5-10 quality referrals per month from legible people)
No brandA brand where people will start a conversation with you purely because of the jersey you have on
You need to go out hunting for deals. Show up/host events. Build a platform. Actively book time on peopleโ€™s calendars to find out whatโ€™s going on.(Related to the above) Inbound deal flow exceeds outbound, but with the understanding, to do your job well, you still need to do outbound.
You take time to deliberate on decisions. Understanding whatโ€™s going on takes time. If you were to look only at a pitch deck, outside of the metrics, you might struggle to understand whatโ€™s important. BTW, this is both good and bad. But good in the sense that you donโ€™t have prejudice. And youโ€™re more willing to uncover diamonds in the rough.You make fast โ€œnoโ€ decisions (at least internally). A function of the scar tissue and the training youโ€™ve had up to this point.
You invest opportunistically. You might not have the quality of deal flow to start a consistent deployment strategy. Thatโ€™s ok, BTW.You can invest opportunistically, but if you wanted, or have already, have capital and the network to deploy consistently against some schedule. Could be annually. Could be quarterly.
If you show up at any LP-only event, you might know the host and one other person at best.If you show up at a random LP only event, you know at least a few other LPs in the room by name.
Youโ€™re on an email basis, maybe LinkedIn basis with other allocators and investors. It will take time to build the relationships.Youโ€™re on a text/Whatsapp basis with other experienced LPs and they respond to you within a few hours, if not minutes.
You need to build out your systems for managing deal velocity and future volume. Easier to start when you have less volume. (Building out systems is an article to write for another day.)You have a system for tracking your deal flow pipeline, diligence, and keeping track of your portfolio and anti-portfolio investments.
Youโ€™re not intimately familiar with SEC (and others) regulations around the rules of engagement in LP land.You know exactly what compliance will let you and not let you say. And you know the right verbiage to dance around these topics.

So the reminders:

  1. Be open-minded. To have gotten this far in your investing career so far means youโ€™ve built biases to help you make better decisions. Likely, also faster decisions. Youโ€™ve probably used some phrase along the lines of โ€œThere will always be another train leaving the station.โ€ And youโ€™re right. Most are worth waiting on. But there will be a small, small select few that is worth breaking every rule you know for. The truly once-in-a-lifetime relationship (not just opportunity). Know that the greatest firms tomorrow do not look like the firms from before.
  2. To check your biases, ask yourself three questions:
    • What do you typically gravitate towards? Why? Was there a part of your past that led you to gravitate towards X?
    • What, for whatever reason, do you not like? What gives you allergic reactions? Why?
    • What, for whatever reason, do you not notice at all? Of all the skimming you do, what are the parts of the narrative that you most easily gloss over? Why?
  3. Numbers tell a very small part of the story.
  4. Whatโ€™s worth underwriting more than anything else is motivation. Motivation to outperform. Motivation why this upcoming fund means theyโ€™ll work harder than before. Motivation to get better at what they might already be good at. That means most of the work is qualitative, not quantitative.
  5. If youโ€™re an established institution, you already have a brand. You likely donโ€™t have to hunt for deals (regardless of what you tell your stakeholders). And itโ€™s probably all true. But you wonโ€™t always have that brand. So itโ€™s your job not to do a disservice to the brand. And almost always means you communicate expectations quickly and accurately.

There are two angles here.

  1. Do you want to play in emerging venture today?
  2. Do you want to re-up?

Emerging venture today is an asset class in and of itself. High attrition rates. Too many players. Lack of data. Lack of track record. Sometimes, even lack of network. The underwriting for someone who invests $250-500K checks is different from someone who typically leads rounds. The underwriting of a partnership potentially not yet fully formed until Fund N+2. Data rooms with missing data. A portfolio construction model that is a guestimate at best, completely made up at worst. Assuming youโ€™re reading this, you know that. And that it is a full-time job.

  1. How are you continually refreshing your networkโ€”both for sourcing and for diligence? Are you making sure your network isnโ€™t stale? All networks atrophy over time. How are you keeping your most helpful contacts fresh, incentivized, and willing to give you their honest thoughts? You donโ€™t need a lot here. It helps to optimize for at least 20 relationships, leaning largely into, and likely in the below order:
    • Fund-of-funds who see many deals and whose sole job is to evaluate emerging managers, and/or any institution who has a dedicated emerging manager program (i.e. Vanderbilt, Babson, Gresham, etc.)
    • Service providers (i.e. lawyers, fund accountants, fund admin) who get to know many emerging managers from a different angle
    • A select few hot founders who also angel invest and are superconnectors in their own right
    • Multi-stage fund GPs and partners who often co-invest with emerging managers. Focus on those who have dedicated event series and/or communities for emerging managers. I personally spend less time with venture funds with their own fund-of-funds programโ€”not because theyโ€™re not great, but theyโ€™re often biased to promote their own fund managers. Different story if I knew them before they launched their FoF program and I can get honest thoughts here. If you donโ€™t know who to target, thereโ€™s a select few namesโ€”say around 15-20โ€”that most active emerging managers love to have on their deck.

On re-ups:

  1. What are the incentives of the organization? Do your incentives as an institution still align as strongly with the GP as it did when you first invested?
  2. If not, have you communicated that pre-emptively with the manager?

In closing

Despite the surplus of information and the sheer number of venture funds (in the mid-to high thousands), none of us can do it alone. At least I donโ€™t believe we can. Why? Unlike the public markets where there is as close as we can get to parity of information. The private markets, especially early-stage investments, exhibit none of that. People win on asymmetry of information.

Jacob Miller once told me on the podcast that in investing, there are three things you need to understand. Inputs, frameworks, outputs. Outputs, you canโ€™t always control. But as long as you have good inputs and a great framework, your outputs should speak for themselves. With my blog, Iโ€™ve always tried to empower people with frameworks. With The Side Letter that Sam and I launched, weโ€™re trying to empower people with inputs you canโ€™t find anywhere else.

While Iโ€™d love to surmise all of LP investing in one fell swoopโ€”Pavelโ€™s given me quite the task at handโ€”the truth is I canโ€™t. The best I can do is to share the frameworks I use. The next step is for you to find the inputs that will drive your investment decisions. Those can come from leveraging a platform or community. Hell, even investing in other funds-of-funds. Or collecting asymmetric information yourself. Or a combination of both. Itโ€™s only a matter of how much time, attention, and energy you have on your hands.

As always, and I have to say this at the end of everything I write, the views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.


Again, a huge thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading early drafts of this piece to help me better refine my thoughts here. I wouldn’t be here without you.


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

How to Not Get Fired When Changing Your VC Strategy | El Pack w/ Beezer Clarkson | Superclusters

beezer clarkson

Beezer Clarkson from Sapphire Partners joins David on El Pack to answer your questions on how to build a venture capital fund. We bring on four GPs at VC funds to ask four different questions.

Precursor Ventures’ Charles Hudson asks what is the one strongly held belief about emerging managers that she no longer believes is true.

NextView Ventures’ Stephanie Palmeri asks how much should an established firm evolve versus stick to their guns.

Humanrace Capital’s Suraj Mehta asks what the best way to build brand presence is.

Rackhouse Venture Capital’s Kevin Novak asks if you’ve deployed your capital faster than you expected, what’s the best path forward with the remaining capital you have left?

Beezer Clarkson leads Sapphire Partnersโ€˜ investments in venture funds domestically and internationally. Beezer began her career in financial services over 20 years ago at Morgan Stanley in its global infrastructure group. Since, she has held various direct and indirect venture investment roles, as well as operational roles in software business development at Hewlett Packard. Prior to joining Sapphire in 2012, Beezer managed the day-to-day operations of the Draper Fisher Jurvetson Global Network, which then had $7 billion under management across 16 venture funds worldwide.

In 2016, Beezer led the launch of OpenLP, an effort to help foster greater understanding in the entrepreneur-to-LP tech ecosystem. Beezer earned a bachelorโ€™s in government from Wesleyan University, where she served on the board of trustees and currently serves as an advisor to the Wesleyan Endowment Investment Committee. She is currently serving on the board of the NVCA and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School.

You can find Beezer on her socials here.
Twitter: https://twitter.com/beezer232
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/elizabethclarkson/

Check out Sapphire’s latest breakdown on if venture is broken: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/venture-broken-what-2000-priced-early-stage-rounds-tell-clarkson-sjvjc/

And huge thanks to Charles, Suraj, Steph, and Kevin for joining us on the show!

Listen to the episode onย Apple Podcastsย andย Spotify. You can alsoย watch the episode on YouTube here.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[01:22] Where does Beezer’s advice come from?
[04:03] Charles and Precursor Ventures
[04:47] What’s something Beezer used to believe about seed stage venture that she no longer believes in
[08:04] Why did Charles choose to bet on pre-seed companies?
[10:21] What did LPs push back on when Charles was starting Precursor?
[12:18] Definition of early stage investing today
[14:38] Steph and NextView Ventures
[18:13] When do you stick your knitting or move on from the past as an established firm?
[30:48] Is venture investing in AI fundamentally different than investing in other types of companies?
[32:52] Does competition for a deal mean you’ve already lost it?
[36:09] Suraj and Humanrace Capital
[36:54] How should emerging managers build their brand?
[38:38] The audience most emerging managers don’t focus on but should
[40:39] How much does visible brand presence matter?
[43:47] Useful or not: Media exposure in the data room
[45:40] Backstreet boys
[46:37] Kevin and Rackhouse Venture Capital
[47:28] What Kevin is best known for
[48:03] Updated fund modelling when you’re ahead on your proposed deployment period
[58:00] The typical questions Beezer gets on LPACs
[1:03:22] Is venture broken?
[1:06:41] David’s favorite Beezer moment from Season 1

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

โ€œWhatever the evolution of venture is if youโ€™re just following someone else, the odds of you doing as well as them is just harder and that is probably a truism about life.โ€ โ€” Beezer Clarkson

โ€œIf youโ€™re going to get a 2X in venture over 20 years, frankly, as an LP, there are alternatives from a pure dollars in the ground perspective. But if youโ€™re looking at trying to capture innovation, which AI is now one of the great innovations, where are you going to capture that if not playing in venture? So is venture broken is a question of who are you.โ€ โ€” Beezer Clarkson

โ€œIf youโ€™re competing for the deal, youโ€™ve already lost it.โ€ โ€” Beezer Clarkson

โ€œI think the competition is more: Did I see it with enough time to build the conviction and build the relationship relative to the other people that might be coming in?โ€ โ€” Stephanie Palmeri

โ€œRecycling is incredibly important, but incredibly hard to plan for, especially as early as youโ€™re coming in, unless youโ€™re seeing evidence of acqui-hires today and you know youโ€™re going to have those dollars coming in. Obviously, really hard. So I would not bank your farm on that.โ€ โ€” Beezer Clarkson


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

35 Biggest Investing Lessons from 4 Seasons of Superclusters

piggy bank, investing, coin

The title says it all. I’m four seasons in and I’m fortunate to have learned from some of the best and most thoughtful individuals in the LP industry. I often joke with friends that Superclusters allows me to ask dumb questions to smart people. But there’s quite a bit of truth there as well. I look back in Season 1, and I’m proud to see the evolution of my questions as well.

There was a piece back in 2022 where Johns Hopkins’ Jeff Hooke said that “75% of funds insist they are in the top quartile.” To my anecdotal knowledge, that seems to hold. I might say 75% of angel investors starting their first funds say they’re top quartile. And 90% of Fund IIs say their Fund Is are top quartile. So the big looming question as an LP is how do you know which are and which aren’t.

And if we were all being honest with each other, the first five years of returns and IRRs really aren’t indicative of the fund’s actual performance. In fact, Stepstone had a recent piece that illustrated fewer than 50% of top-quartile funds at Year 5 stay there by Year 10. 30% fall to second quartile. 13% slip to third. 9% fall from grace to the bottom quartile. But only 3.7% of bottom-quartile funds make it to the top quartile after its 10-year run (on a net TVPI basis).

I’ve enjoyed every single podcast episode I’ve recorded to date. And all the offline conversations that I’ve had because of the podcast itself. Nevertheless, it’s always fascinating when I learn something for the first time on the podcast while we’re recording. Excluding the longer lessons some of our guests have shared (I’m looking at you Evan, Charlotte, and much much more), below are the many Twitter-worthy (not calling it X) soundbites that have come up in the podcast so far.

  1. โ€œEntrepreneurship is like a gas. Itโ€™s hottest when itโ€™s compressed.โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos
  2. โ€œIโ€™m looking for well-rounded holes that are made up of jagged pieces that fit together nicely.โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos
  3. โ€œIf you provide me exposure to the exact same pool of startups [as] another GP of mine, then unfortunately, you donโ€™t have proprietary deal flow for me. You donโ€™t enhance my network diversification.โ€ โ€” Jamie Rhode
  4. โ€œSell when you can, not when you have to.โ€ โ€” Howard Lindzon
  5. โ€œWhen you think about investing in any fund, youโ€™re really looking at three main components. Itโ€™s sourcing ability. Are you seeing the deals that fit within whatever business model youโ€™re executing on? Do you have some acumen for picking? And then, the third is: what is your ability to win? Have you proven your ability to win, get into really interesting deals that mightโ€™ve been either oversubscribed or hard to get into? Were you able to do your pro rata into the next round because you added value? And we also look through the lens of: Does this person have some asymmetric edge on at least two of those three things?โ€ โ€” Samir Kaji
  6. โ€œ85% of returns flow to 5% of the funds, and that those 5% of the funds are very sticky. So we call that the โ€˜Champions League Effect.โ€™โ€ โ€” Jaap Vriesendorp
  7. โ€œThe truth of the matter, when we look at the data, is that entry points matter much less than the exit points. Because venture is about outliers and outliers are created through IPOs, the exit window matters a lot. And to create a big enough exit window to let every vintage that we create in the fund of funds world to be a good vintage, we invest [in] pre-seed and seed funds โ€“ that invest in companies that need to go to the stock market maybe in 7-8 years. Then Series A and Series B equal โ€˜early stage.โ€™ And everything later than that, we call โ€˜growth.โ€™โ€ โ€” Jaap Vriesendorp
  8. โ€œ[When] youโ€™re generally looking at four to five hundred distinct companies, 10% of those companies generally drive most of the returns. You want to make sure that the company that drives the returns you are invested in with the manager where you size it appropriately relative to your overall fund of funds. So when we double click on our funds, the top 10 portfolio companies โ€“ not the funds, but portfolio companies, return sometimes multiples of our fund of funds.โ€ โ€” Aram Verdiyan
  9. โ€œIf youโ€™re overly concentrated, you better be damn good at your job โ€˜cause you just raised the bar too high.โ€ โ€” Beezer Clarkson
  10. โ€œ[David Marquardt] said, โ€˜You know what? Youโ€™re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.โ€™ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos
  11. โ€œMiller Motorcars doesnโ€™t accept relative performance for least payments on your Lamborghini.โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos
  12. โ€œThe biggest leverage on time you can get is identifying which questions are the need-to-haves versus nice-to-haves and knowing when enough work is enough.โ€ โ€” John Felix
  13. โ€œIn venture, we donโ€™t look at IRR at all because manipulating IRR is far too easy with the timing of capital calls, credit lines, and various other levers that can be pulled by the GP.โ€ โ€” Evan Finkel
  14. โ€œThe average length of a VC fund is double that of a typical American marriage. So VC splits โ€“ divorce โ€“ is much more likely than getting hit by a bus.โ€ โ€” Raida Daouk
  15. โ€œHistorically, if you look at the last 10 years of data, it would suggest that multiple [of the premium of a late stage valuation to seed stage valuation] should cover around 20-25 times. [โ€ฆ] In 2021, that number hit 42 times. [โ€ฆ] Last year, that number was around eight.โ€ โ€” Rick Zullo (circa 2024)
  16. โ€œThe job and the role that goes most unseen by LPs and everybody outside of the firm is the role of the culture keeper.โ€ โ€” Ben Choi
  17. โ€œYou can map out what your ideal process is, but itโ€™s actually the depth of discussion that the internal team has with one another. [โ€ฆ] You have to define what your vision for the firm is years out, in order to make sure that youโ€™re setting those people up for success and that they have a runway and a growth path and that they feel empowered and they feel like theyโ€™re learning and theyโ€™re contributing as part of the brand. And so much of what happens there, it does tie back to culture [โ€ฆ] Thereโ€™s this amazing, amazing commercial that Michael Phelps did, [โ€ฆ] and the tagline behind it was โ€˜Itโ€™s what you do in the dark that puts you in the light.โ€™โ€ โ€” Lisa Cawley
  18. โ€œIn venture, LPs are looking for GPs with loaded dice.โ€ โ€” Ben Choi
  19. โ€œIf I hire someone, I donโ€™t really want to hire right out of school. I want to hire someone with a little bit of professional experience. And I want someone whoโ€™s been yelled at. [โ€ฆ] I donโ€™t want to have to triple check work. I want to be able to build trust. Going and getting that professional experience somewhere, even if itโ€™s at a startup or venture firm. Having someone have oversight on you and [push] you to do excellent work and [help] you understand why it mattersโ€ฆ High quality output can help you gain so much trust.โ€ โ€” Jaclyn Freeman Hester
  20. โ€œLPs watch the movie, but donโ€™t read the book.โ€ โ€” Ben Choi
  21. โ€œIf itโ€™s not documented, itโ€™s not done.โ€ โ€” Lisa Cawley
  22. โ€œIf somebody is so good that they can raise their own fund, thatโ€™s exactly who you want in your partnership. You want your partnership of equals that decide to get together, not just are so grateful to have a chance to be here, but theyโ€™re not that great.โ€ โ€” Ben Choi
  23. โ€œWhen you bring people in as partners, being generous around compensating them from funds they did not build can help create alignment because theyโ€™re not sitting there getting rich off of something that started five years ago and exits in ten years. So theyโ€™re kind of on an island because everybody else is in a different economic position and that can be very isolating.โ€ โ€” Jaclyn Freeman Hester
  24. โ€œNeutral references are worse than negative references.โ€ โ€” Kelli Fontaine
  25. โ€œEverybody uses year benchmarking, but thatโ€™s not the appropriate way to measure. We have one fund manager that takes five years to commit the capital to do initial investments versus a manager that does it all in a year. Youโ€™re gonna look very, very different. Ten years from now, 15 years from now, then you can start benchmarking against each other from that vintage.โ€ โ€” Kelli Fontaine
  26. โ€œWe are not in the Monte Carlo simulation game at all; weโ€™re basically an excel spreadsheet.โ€ โ€” Jeff Rinvelt
  27. โ€œA lot of those skills [to be a fund manager] are already baked in. The one that wasnโ€™t baked in for a lot of these firms was the exit manager โ€“ the ones that help you sell. [โ€ฆ] If you donโ€™t have it, there should be somebody that itโ€™s their job to look at exits. โ€ โ€” Jeff Rinvelt
  28. โ€œGetting an LP is like pulling a weight with a string of thread. If you pull too hard, the string snaps. If you donโ€™t pull hard enough, you donโ€™t pull the weight at all. Itโ€™s this very careful balancing act of moving people along in a process.โ€ โ€” Dan Stolar
  29. โ€œGoing to see accounts before budgets are set helps get your brand and your story in the mind of the budget setter. In the case of the US, budgets are set in January and July, depending on the fiscal year. In the case of Japan, budgets are set at the end of March, early April. To get into the budget for Tokyo, you gotta be working with the client in the fall to get them ready to do it for the next fiscal year. [For] Korea, the budgets are set in January, but they donโ€™t really get executed on till the first of April. So thereโ€™s time in there where you can work on those things. The same thing is true with Europe. A lot of budgets are mid-year. So you develop some understanding of patterns. You need to give yourself, for better or worse if youโ€™re raising money, two to three years of relationship-building with clients.โ€ โ€” David York
  30. โ€œMany pension plans, especially in America, put blinders on. โ€˜Donโ€™t tell me what Iโ€™m paying my external managers. I really want to focus and make sure weโ€™re not overpaying our internal people.โ€™ And so then it becomes, you canโ€™t ignore the external fees because the internal costs and external fees are related.ย If you pay great people internally, you can push back on the external fees. If you donโ€™t pay great people internally, then youโ€™re a price taker.โ€ โ€” Ashby Monk
  31. โ€œYou need to realize that when the managers tell you that itโ€™s only the net returns that matter. Theyโ€™re really hoping youโ€™ll just accept that as a logic thatโ€™s sound. What theyโ€™re hoping you donโ€™t question them on is the difference between your gross return and your net return is an investment in their organization. And that is a capability that will compound in its value over time. And then they will wield that back against you and extract more fees from you, which is why the alternative investment industry in the world today isย where most of the profits in the investment industry are capturedย and captured by GPs.โ€ โ€” Ashby Monk
  32. โ€œI often tell pensions you should pay people at the 49th percentile. So, just a bit less than average. So that the people going and working there also share the mission. They love the mission โ€˜cause that actually is, in my experience, the magic of the culture in these organizations that you donโ€™t want to lose.โ€ โ€” Ashby Monk
  33. โ€œThe thing about working with self-motivated people and driven people, on their worst day, they are pushing themselves very hard and your job is to reduce the stress in that conversation.โ€ โ€” Nakul Mandan
  34. โ€œI only put the regenerative part of a wealth pool into venture. [โ€ฆ] That number โ€“ how much money you are putting into venture capital per year largely dictates which game youโ€™re playing.โ€ โ€” Jay Rongjie Wang
  35. โ€œWhen investing in funds, you are investing in a blind pool of human potential.โ€ โ€” Adam Marchick

Photo by Andre Taissin on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

The Limited Partner Game Show | Beezer Clarkson & Chris Douvos | Superclusters | S2 Post Season Episode

Beezer Clarkson leads Sapphire Partnersโ€˜ investments in venture funds domestically and internationally. Beezer began her career in financial services over 20 years ago at Morgan Stanley in its global infrastructure group. Since, she has held various direct and indirect venture investment roles, as well as operational roles in software business development at Hewlett Packard. Prior to joining Sapphire in 2012, Beezer managed the day-to-day operations of the Draper Fisher Jurvetson Global Network, which then had $7 billion under management across 16 venture funds worldwide.

In 2016, Beezer led the launch of OpenLP, an effort to help foster greater understanding in the entrepreneur-to-LP tech ecosystem. Beezer earned a bachelorโ€™s in government from Wesleyan University, where she served on the board of trustees and currently serves as an advisor to the Wesleyan Endowment Investment Committee. She is currently serving on the board of the NVCA and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School.

Chris Douvos founded Ahoy Capital in 2018 to build an intentionally right-sized firm that could pursue investment excellence while prizing a spirit of partnership with all of its constituencies. A pioneering investor in the micro-VC movement, Chris has been a fixture in venture capital for nearly two decades. Prior to Ahoy Capital, Chris spearheaded investment efforts at Venture Investment Associates, and The Investment Fund for Foundations. He learned the craft of illiquid investing at Princeton Universityโ€™s endowment. Chris earned his B.A. with Distinction from Yale College in 1994 and an M.B.A. from Yale School of Management in 2001.

You can find Chris and Beezer on their socials here.

Connect with Beezer here:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/beezer232
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/elizabethclarkson/

Connect with Chris here:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cdouvos
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/chrisdouvos/

And huge thanks to this episode’s sponsor, Alchemist Accelerator: https://alchemistaccelerator.com/superclusters

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

Brought to you by Alchemist Accelerator.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[03:07] Beezer’s childhood dream
[04:29] How Chris was let go from his $4.15 job at Yale
[08:09] Concentrated vs diversified portfolios
[09:30] First fund that Beezer and Chris invested
[11:42] Funds that CD and Beezer passed on and regret
[16:07] Favorite term in the LPA? Or not?
[19:18] What piece of advice did a GP in their portfolio share with them?
[23:15] What’s something that Beezer/CD said to a GP that they regret saying?
[28:06] What’s the most interesting fund model they’ve seen to date?
[33:20] What fund invested in 2020-2021 inflated valuations that they’ve reupped on?
[40:18] Events that they went to once but never again
[44:24] Life lessons from CD & Beezer
[54:02] The founding story of Open LP
[55:02] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring!
[57:58] If you learned something new in this episode, it would mean a lot if you could drop a like, comment or share it with your friends!

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

โ€œIf youโ€™re overly concentrated, you better be damn good at your job โ€˜cause you just raised the bar too high.โ€ โ€“ Beezer Clarkson

โ€œConviction drives concentration, and that you should be so concentrated as to be uncomfortable because otherwise youโ€™re de-worsified, not diversified.โ€ โ€“ Chris Douvos

โ€œ[David Marquardt] said, โ€˜You know what? Youโ€™re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.โ€™ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.โ€ โ€“ Chris Douvos

โ€œSometimes I treat GPs like I treat my teenage children which is: Every word out of a teenagerโ€™s mouth is probably a lie designed to make them look better or to hide some malfeasance.โ€ โ€“ Chris Douvos

โ€œMay we be blessed by a weak benchmark.โ€ โ€“ David Swensen

โ€œMiller Motorcars doesnโ€™t accept relative performance for least payments on your Lamborghini.โ€ โ€“ Chris Douvos (citing hedge fund managers)

โ€œAt the end of the day, the return on an asset is a function of the price you paid for it and the capital it consumes.โ€ โ€“ Chris Douvos


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

The Proliferation of LP Podcasts

I am under no illusion that there is a hell of a lot of interest in the LP landscape today. Not only from GPs who are realizing the difficulties of the fundraising climate, but also from aspiring and emerging LPs who are allocating to venture for the first time. The latter of which also have a growing set of interests in backing emerging GPs. And in the center console in this Venn diagram of interests lies the education of how to think like an LP.

I still remember back in 2022 and prior, we had Beezer’s #OpenLP initiative, Ted Seides’ Capital Allocators podcast, Notation Capital’s Origins, and Chris Douvos’ SuperLP.com. Last of which, by the way, can we start a petition to have Chris Douvos write more again? But I digress. All four of which trendsetters in their own right. But the world had yet to catch storm. Or maybe, the people around me and I had yet to feel the acceleration of interest.

Today, in 2024, we have:

There is no shortage of content. LPs are also starting to make their rounds. You’ll often see the same LP on multiple podcasts. And that’s not a bad thing. In fact, that’s very much of a good thing that we’re starting to see a lot more visibility here and that LPs are willing to share.

But we’re at the beginning of a crossroads.

A few years back, the world was starved of LP content. And content creators and aggregators like Beezer, Ted, Nick, and Chris, were oases in the desert for those searching. Today, we have a buffet of options. Many of which share listenership and viewership. In fact, a burgeoning cohort of LPs are also doing their rounds. And that’s a good thing. It’s more surface area for people to learn.

But at some point, the wealth of information leads to the poverty of attention. The question goes from “Where do I tune into LP content?” to “If I were to listen to the same LP, which platform would I choose to tune into?

After all, we only have 24 hours in a day. A third for sleep. A third for work. And the last competes against every possible option that gives us joy โ€” friends, hangouts, Netflix, YouTube, hobbies, exercise, passion projects and more.

In the same way, Robert Downey Jr. or Emma Stone or Timothรฉe Chamalet (yes, I just watched Dune 2 and I loved it) is going to do multiple interviews. With 20, 30, even 50 different hosts. But as a fan (excluding die-hard ones), you’re likely not going to watch all of them. But you’ll select a small handful โ€” two or three โ€” to watch. And that choice will largely be influenced by which interviewer and their respective style you like.

While my goal is to always surface new content instead of remixes of old, there will always be the inevitability of cross-pollination of lessons between content creators. And so, if nothing else, my goal is to keep my identity โ€” and as such, my style โ€” as I continue recording LP content. To me, that’s the human behind the money behind the VC money. And each person โ€” their life story, the way they think, why they think the way they think โ€” is absolutely fascinating.

There’s this great Amos Tversky line I recently stumbled upon. “You waste years by not being able to waste hours.” And in many ways, this blog, Superclusters, writing at large, and my smaller experiments are the proving grounds I need to find my interest-expertise fit. Some prove to be fleeting passions. Others, like building for emerging LPs, prove to be much more.

Photo by Jukka Aalho on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

The Science of Re-Upping

baseball, follow on

Sooooooooโ€ฆ (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.

The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.

But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping playersโ€™ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else whoโ€™s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!

As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!

While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpostโ€™s contributors chose to stay off the record.


The year was 1997.

Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples โ€“ the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino โ€“ a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.

Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss โ€œsignificant timeโ€ earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his โ€œfatal flaw.โ€

Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where itโ€™s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.

If you donโ€™t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.

And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse โ€“ The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.

But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. Itโ€™s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. Itโ€™s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, itโ€™s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomarโ€™s โ€œfatal flawโ€ was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.

So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a โ€œstupid questionโ€, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, โ€œTheo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.โ€

Theo said, โ€œNeither. But Iโ€™m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, theyโ€™ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.โ€

You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:

โ€œYou have to either:

  1. Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
  2. Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
  3. Be better at figuring out what the future holds.โ€

For the purpose of this blogpost, weโ€™re going to focus on the first one of the three.

To begin, we have to first define a term thatโ€™ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece โ€“ expected value.

Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:

The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence

On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.

Weโ€™re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, thatโ€™s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.

Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a strangerโ€™s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, โ€œThe biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you canโ€™t organize around them with AI.โ€ Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word โ€œmodel.โ€ And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to โ€œinvest in companies that canโ€™t be described in a single sentence.โ€

But I digress.

Value itself is a huge topic โ€“ a juggernaut of a topic โ€“ and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, Iโ€™ll triangulate on one subset of it โ€“ future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.

In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.

For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:

E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

For the sake of this blogpost and model, letโ€™s call E(v), appreciation value. So, letโ€™s break down each of the variables.

What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is itโ€™s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage โ€“ they all look different. Additionally, Sapphireโ€™s Beezer recently said that itโ€™s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but thatโ€™s the game we play.

On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.

How much greater is the next roundโ€™s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, youโ€™re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if youโ€™re a smaller sub-$100M fund.

Itโ€™s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:

  • Have a real chance at the championship title.
  • Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
  • And/or have a city whoโ€™s willing to pay the premium.

โ€ฆ can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding canโ€™t.

The Bulls didnโ€™t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didnโ€™t extend Peyton Manningโ€™s contract โ€˜cause they didnโ€™t have the team that would support Peytonโ€™s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.

Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the โ€œluxury taxโ€ when betting on the worldโ€™s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?

If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a playerโ€™s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness โ€“ harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning โ€“ will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?

Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there โ€˜s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, theyโ€™re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just donโ€™t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. Howโ€™s that compared with the teamโ€™s average?

Of course, thereโ€™s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.

How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you donโ€™t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then itโ€™s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.

And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.

If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then itโ€™s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. Itโ€™s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.

But if you lack a large enough sample size, Iโ€™d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.

The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didnโ€™t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.

It is also important to note that the data weโ€™ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.

Take for instanceโ€ฆ

Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.ย ย 

Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.

Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.

In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.

All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios โ€“ either as an LP or as a GP:

  1. Is your entry point a good entry point?
  2. Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?

For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if itโ€™s a biblical line. Itโ€™s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isnโ€™t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.

For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If youโ€™re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. Itโ€™s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.

If youโ€™re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. ๐Ÿ˜‰

Photo by Gene Gallin on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Launching Superclusters

Hello friends,

I did a thing.

I started a podcast.

So why the name Superclusters?

I’ve always been a fan of easter eggs. Cup of Zhou also happens to be one of them. Superclusters is another. But this time, rather than leaving it for surprise, I’d love to spell out why and with that, the purpose of this podcast.

In the startup world, we always say startups are the stars of our universe. They shine the brightest and they light up the night sky. We also have tons of aphorisms in the startup world. For instance, “Aim for the stars, land on the moon”. Startups are often called moonshots. They need to achieve escape velocity. And so on.

So if startups are the stars of the universe, galaxies would be VC firms that have a portfolio of stars.

And if galaxies were VC firms, superclusters would be LPs. Superclusters are collections of multiple galaxies. For example, the supercluster that the Milky Way is in is called Laniakea (Hawaiian for “immense heavens,” for the curious).

So why a podcast on the LP world?

  1. The LP industry in ten years will be much bigger than it is today. We are not even close to the TAM of it.
  2. The LP industry will be a lot more transparent than it is today. FYI, as many of you know already, the industry is very opaque. Many want and still like to keep their knowledge proprietary. But what’s proprietary today will be common place tomorrow. I’m not here to share anyone’s deepest, darkest secrets, or anyone’s social security number. That’s none of my business. But the tactics that make the greatest LPs great are already being shared over intimate happy hours and dinners between a select few. And it’s only a matter of time before the rest of the world catches up. We saw the same happen with the VC industry, and now people are moving even more upstream.
  3. I think of content on a cartesian X-Y graph. On the X-axis, there’s intellectual stimulation. In other words, interesting. On the Y-axis, there’s emotional stimulation, or otherwise known as fun. Most financial services (for instance, hedge fund, private equity, venture capital, options trading) content tends to highly index on intellectual stimulation and not emotional. And for the purpose of this pod, I want to focus on making investing in VC funds fun AND interesting.

You can find my podcast on YouTube, Spotify, and Apple Podcasts for now. In full transparency, waiting on RSS feed approval for the other platforms, but soon to be shared on other platforms near you.

You can expect episodes to come out weekly with ten episodes per season, and a month break in between each to ensure that I can bring you the best quality content. ๐Ÿ™‚

You can find my first episode with the amazing Chris Douvos here:

Or if you’re an Apple Podcast person, here’s the Apple Podcast link.

Thank you’s

I am no doubt flawed, clearly evidenced by my verbal “ummmm’s” and “likes” in the podcast. But nevertheless pumped to begin this journey as a podcast host. I expect to grow in this journey tackling the emerging LP space and running a podcast, and I hope you can grow with me. So, any and all feedback is deeply appreciated. Recommendations of who to get on. What questions would you like answered. Formats that you find interesting. I’m all ears.

That said, I’m grateful to everyone who made this possible. My mighty editors, Tyler and JP. Without the two of you, I’d still be struggling telling head from tail on how to do J-cuts and L-cuts. The sole sponsor for the pod, Ravi and Alchemist. And while the pod itself is separate from Alchemist altogether, Ravi pushed me to make it happen. And for that and more, I am where I am now. Every single LP who took a bet on me for Season 1 when all I had for them was an idea and a goal. Chris. Beezer. Eric. Jamie. Courtney. Ben. Howard. Amit. Samir. Jeff and Martin.

And to everyone, who’s offered feedback, advice, introductions and pure energy to fuel all of this. Thank you!

And to you, my readers, I appreciate you taking time out of your busy day when there are so many things that fight for your attention, that you spend time with me every week! If I could just be a bit more self-serving, if you have the chance to tune in, I’d be extremely grateful if you could share it with one LP or one GP who could take something away from it.

Cheers,

David

P.S. Don’t worry. I’ll still continue to write on this blog weekly about everything else in between. That’s a habit I’m not willing to give up any time soon.

P.P.S. I’m already working on and recording for Season 2 of the pod, and I can tell you now that things will only get spicier.

P.P.P.S. Due to a million bugs and a half, I’m still working on launching a dedicated website for the podcast (superclusters.co), but until then, I’ll be sharing the show notes of each episode here.


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Are You Fishing in a Pond? Or Excavating a Pond?

fishing

The other day, I had a super insightful conversation with one of my awesome teammates here at Alchemist Accelerator about access and exposure. The difference between accelerators and emerging early-stage managers.

I’ll preface that for investors, particularly emerging managers, the three things you need to win are sourcing, picking, winning. And to be a GP, you need at least two of the above three. But for the purpose of this blogpost, I’m only focusing on sourcing.

I’ll also preface with the fact that I may be biased. I started in venture at SkyDeck, an accelerator. Additionally, I advise at a bunch of studios, incubators and accelerators. Moreover, I worked at On Deck when we launched our accelerator. And now, I’m here at Alchemist Accelerator.

I truly love early-stage programs. The earlier the better.

Instacart’s recent IPO is a clear example of venture returns compared to the public market equivalent as a function of stage. The earlier you invest, the more alpha you generate to your most liquid comparable.

Source: Axios

It’s the difference between a market maker and a market taker. A price maker and a price taker.

Though admittedly, one day, this too may become saturated, just like how venture capital went from 50-60 funds in ’07 and ’08 to now over 4000 in 2023. Do fact check me on exact numbers, but I believe I’m directionally accurate.

Let me give a more concrete example. Harvard is a phenomenal institution. And there’s a Wikipedia page full of breakout Harvard alums. But as an LP, if 50% of your managers, despite having different theses, all have half their portfolio as Harvard alums, then you as the LP are overexposed to the same underlying asset. The same is true for Stanford. Or seed or Series A funds investing in YC founders. All great institutions, but you’re not getting your buck’s worth of diversification.

The only caveat here is if you’re not looking for diversification. After all, the best performing fund would be the fund that invested a 100% of their fund in Google at the seed round. AND holding it till today. Realistically, they will have had to distribute on IPO.

The question is are you a fisher? Or are you a digger? One requires a fishing rod; the other a shovel. The latter requires more work, but you’re more likely to be the first to gold. Like Eniac was for mobile. Or Lux to deep tech.

So how do you know you’re fishing in someone else’s pond?

Easy. Your deal flow includes someone’s else’s brand. Whether that’s Sequoia or YC or SBIR. It’s not your own. You don’t own that pipeline. A lot of people have access to it. It’s no longer about proprietary deal flow, but about proprietary access to deals to borrow a framing from the amazing Beezer.

If your deal flow pipeline looks something like the graph below, you probably don’t have a sourcing advantage.

Source: Nodus Labs

Now that’s not to say there aren’t a lot of nonobvious companies coming out of YC or these startup accelerators. Airbnb, Sendbird, Twitch (the last of which Ravi who I work with here at Alchemist happened to be one of the first institutional investor for, so have heard some of these stories), and more were all non-obvious coming out of YC. And have also seen the same for companies coming out of Techstars, 500, and Alchemist, where I call home now. But that’s a picking advantage, not a sourcing one.

The flip side is, how do you know you’re excavating your own pond?

I’ll preface by saying having your own Slack or Discord “community” is not enough. Or having your own podcast.

I put community in quotes simply because having XXX members in a large group chat isn’t indicative that their presence is really there. Is their seat warm or cold?

I love using a stadium analogy. Imagine you sold a couple thousand season tickets to a team. You can name whatever sport it is. Football (yes, the rough American kind). Soccer. Basketball. Baseball. You name it. But despite all the tickets you sell, a solid percentage of your seats each game is empty. Can you really say that your team has fans? All you did was sell a couple of cold seats.

You can make the same analogy with likes or comments on Instagram. Which seems to be a problem these days, when an influencer with a couple thousand likes per post starts hosting their fan meetups, only to realize they rented out an empty hall. In case, you’re wondering for the IG example, it’s due to bots.

All that said, I like to think about excavation in the lens of competition for attention. Everyone only has 24 hours in a day. 7 days in a week. 365 days in a year. And as someone who is expecting any level of engagement from others, you are fighting for attention with every other product, person, and habit out there.

Perks of being a consumer investor, I think about this a lot. But in the same way, having an unfair sourcing advantage is the same.

Is the greatest source of your deals tuning into you at least four of the seven calendar days in a week? Or if you have a professional audience (i.e. only product people, or only execs), are they engaging at least 3 workdays per week or 8 workdays per month? Are they spending more time reading/listening/engaging with you than with their best friend?

If you have a community, do you have solid product-market fit? Is your daily active to monthly active over 50%? You don’t need a massive audience, but for the people who are primary sources of your deal flow, are you top of mind? As Andrew Chen says, at that point, “it’s part of a daily habit.”

Is it easy for them to share your content, what you’re doing, who you are with others? Does sharing you or your content generate dopamine and social capital for them? Do you embody something aspirational? Is your viral coefficient greater than 0.5? Even better if it’s 1, then you’re ready to go viral.

And do people stick around? Do the seats stay warm? Is your community self-propagating? Is your content evergreen? Or do you produce content at a voracious pace that it doesn’t have to be? Do you live rent free in people’s brain?

And once you do invest, are you the weapon in the arsenal of choice? For instance, 65% of Signalfire’s portfolio use their platform weekly to learn and get advice. But more on the winning side in a future essay.

In closing

To truly have a sourcing advantage, you need to be building your own platform that is impressionable and regularly take mind space from the founder audience. But if you don’t, that’s okay. You just need to be really good at picking and winning.

Photo by Popescu Andrei Alexandru on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

How to Win Hot Deals

hot, spicy, chili, pepper, deal

Two weeks ago, in an On Deck Angels workshop, one of our community members asked: “What do you recommend to do to increase access to allocation and top-performing deals?” To which I responded briefly with my belief that investors should always try to win their right on the cap table โ€” whether it’s in the current round or the next. And, there are four ways to win that right:

  1. Go early.
  2. Being a valuable asset to the company.
  3. You are never too good to chase the best.
  4. Get to know the lead investor. Specifically, in their mind, be different.

As a footnote to all this, Founder Collective did a study a year or so ago where they found the 30 most valuable companies in the world raised half as much and were worth 4x the 30 most funded companies in the world. So, while hot rounds are great and all, there’s no telling that they’ll be the most valuable companies in ten, even five, years’ time. All that to say, I realize I’m writing this blogpost in a down market โ€” likely only a few quarters of many more before we see the end of this recessionary period. The truth is, there are probably not as many hot rounds as there are before. But they still exist. And as an investor, you want to be ready for when that happens. While you set yourself up to have a prepared mind for getting picked, focus on picking.

To take a deeper dive on getting picked…

Just like it’s important for a founder to find product-market fit, it’s equally as important for an investor to find investor-market fit. Think of your check or your vehicle as a product in and of itself. As an investor, you are either great at picking or great at getting picked or both. For the purpose of responding to the above question, I’ll focus on the latter โ€” getting picked.

It’s a three-sided marketplace where your customers are your LPs, founders, and your co-investors. Of all the above, to be fair, LPs loving you doesn’t necessarily get you better access to deals, so we’ll save that discussion for another day. And while there are many factors to getting picked, it boils down to two things:

  1. Founders love you
  2. Co-investors love you

In both scenarios, you get proprietary access to deals. As Sapphire’s Beezer said, “โ€˜proprietary deal flowโ€™ is not really a thing.” Proprietary access, on the other hand, is a thing.

Lenny Rachitsky and Yuriy Timen put out a great piece on activation rates recently. In it, there’s one line I particularly like, when they defined the activation metric:

“Your activation milestone (often referred to as your ‘aha moment’) is the earliest point in your onboarding flow that, by showing your productโ€™s value, is predictive of long-term retention.”

The product, your fund or check. Retention, how likely they are to keep you on their speed dial (for a particular topic or function). And there are two distinct qualities of a great activation metric: “highly predictable” and “highly actionable.”

  • Highly predictable: The founders know exactly what they can get from you. The value you give isn’t vague, like “we invest in the best early-stage founders.” a16z can afford to say that. You can’t.
  • Highly actionable: Knowing what value founders can get from you, they know the exact types of questions to ask you to best extract that value.

The earlier you are in your investing journey, the more obvious you should make the above.

Taking the product analogy in stride, how do you get to a point where your customers get to your activation milestone? Where they form a new habit around keeping you top of mind?

How do you get founders to love you?

In my mind, there are two ways we can measure if founders love you:

  1. For founders you’ve invested in: If they answer with your name to “If you were to start a new company, who are the first three investors you would bring back to your cap table?”
  2. For founders you haven’t invested in: You get (great) deal flow from founders you passed on.

Tactically, in combination with being predictable and having your value be actionable…

Go early. Be the first check in when they’re still non-obvious. This of course requires a combination of luck and conviction. The latter is more predictable than the first. Be bullish when others are bearish.

Being a valuable asset to the company. Founders have 2 jobs: (a) make money and (b) hire people to make money. As an investor, everything you do is directly or indirectly involved in that. Also, when a founder fundraises, I would ask them what they plan to do with that money (i.e. hire VPs, more engineers, scale to X # of customers), and see if you can be preemptively helpful there.

You are never too good to chase the best. This is something that I picked up from a Pat Grady video some long while back. But to win the best deals, you go to where the founders are, don’t expect them to come to you. That’s how Sarah Guo, Pat’s wife, won a lot of deals that Sequoia wanted to get into.

How do you get co-investors to love you?

The best way to measure this is your co-investors proactively invite you to invest in future deals together.

The best way to get there is to:

Get to know the lead investor. Specifically, in their mind, be different.

Their lead investor might have a large portfolio where they can’t be as helpful to every investment they make. Try to squeeze in the round and be insanely helpful to their/your portfolio. And over time, as you co-invest in more deals, they’ll keep you top of mind for future ones.

For this one, it pays not to be generalist. I don’t mean as a function of industry but as a function of how you add value to your portfolio. Someone who can do everything is less desirable than someone who is really good at just one thing. Say, hiring executives or getting FDA approval or generating PR buzz. Interestingly enough, responsiveness is also a differentiator. I heard an investor say recently that the value of an investor is determined not by what happens during the meeting, but in between meetings. And I completely agree. The cap table doesn’t need another investor. The cap table needs people who will increase the chances of the company’s multi-billion dollar outcome.

The takeaway here is to not be better, but to be different. People can’t tell better, but they can tell different. That’s why the word differentiated is used so much. Have a differentiated approach. Have a diversified portfolio. On the other hand, having a better generalist strategy than a16z or Sequoia is hard to measure. While it may be true in the long run, better is difficult to measure in foresight, but obvious in hindsight. Just like product-market fit. Hard to pinpoint in the windshield, but obvious in the rearview mirror. It’s better to be the in a pool of one than a pool of many. Be the one CEO coach. Be the one who helps founders build robust communities. Or, be something that no one expects. Like Charlie Munger, be the best 30 second mind in the world.

Another reason I left this in the co-investor love section is that while being different does help you stand out to founders, there seems to be a lot more logo chasing from founders. Differentiation, unfortunately, falls short of brand recognition. I genuinely hope that this does change in the next few quarters.

In closing

While the question that inspired this blogpost is meant for hot rounds, the same holds for just being a great investor. One thing I’ve told many applicants to On Deck Angels is that we look for folks who are excited about putting investor on their resume and is willing to put in the legwork to become a great investor. The above is one of many paths to become one.

Arguably the above is how to be a great champion of people. The investor part comes with luck and having an eye for great talent, ideally before others. Betting on the non-obvious before they become obvious.

The best startup investors are disciplined and constantly learning. Some might argue that they may not have the time to entertain hot startups in general. Or at least startups when they are hot.

Photo by Pickled Stardust on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.

How Liquid Is Your Network?

liquidity

“How can I help?”

I’m sure every founder has heard that line at least 50 times every time they’re in fundraising mode. Hell, even outside of it. Pshhh, I’m guilty of saying it myself, while I do try to catch myself when I do. You’d think being helpful is table stakes as an early-stage investor. Surprisingly, being helpful as an investor is actually a huge differentiator.

Most investors are only as helpful as their check size, despite pitching their value-adds a million and one times. Some investors are extremely helpful only within the funding window(s) they are participating in. For instance, a seed investor is largely helpful during the 12-18-month funding window between the seed and the Series A. Others are helpful when they are asked. And a small handful of investors are true champions by being proactively helpful.

One of my favorite stories when I was interviewing LPs for the emerging LP playbook was when Brent invested in a GP who had a track record for being proactively helpful. This GP “was one of [Brent’s] first investors. He would often come into our office, and without being prompted, proceed to write code against our APIs.” Unprompted. Unsolicited, but insanely helpful.

Earlier this week, I was also reading the October investor update from a founder I love, and in it, he was talking about how much he loved the team at Sequoia (who have yet to invest), and shared that he had learned more about product in the last “3 days than [he had] in the last 3 months.”

A big part of the reason I joined the On Deck Angels team last year was to be a part of a community bringing the world’s most helpful investors together. As such, I’ve been lucky enough to be a student to our community on how they’re helpful โ€” whether they choose to invest or not. Some examples include:

  • Writing a 3-5 page bug report for every founder you take a meeting with. This teaches an investor two things: 1/ to be judicious of one’s time and only take meetings with founders that you are truly likely to invest in, since these take a while to research and write up, and 2/ to always think in a “give first” mentality.
  • Record a Loom breakdown of why you decided to pass and what would get you over the fence. I’ve shared this before, but one of my favorite VC quotes and has been since the day I learned of it is: “There is no greater compliment, as a VC, than when a founder you passed on โ€” still sends you deal-flow and introductions.”
  • Being able to admit how you can’t be helpful. As an investor, you don’t have to be good at everything, just really, really good at one thing, or a small handful of things.
  • Sharing their memos publicly on why they’re excited about a startup. This helps build a startup’s reputation, and also your own brand as a thought leader.
  • Sharing your deal memos and founder asks with your LPs (if you run a fund or syndicate). For this, admittedly, it’s best to get the founders’ approval, given the confidential nature of certain details.
  • Make an intro for every pitch meeting you take. Intros are often extremely high leverage. It takes you 1-2 minutes to write something up and send a double-opt-in intro. And oftentimes, can save the founders from at least tens of thousands of dollars worth of decision-making mistakes or costs. Of course, that requires you to have either photographic memory (which I don’t have) or a really good CRM. For the latter I use Airtable, and I track small details like: ideal catch-up frequency, preferred medium of communication, chill factor (yes, some of my intro emails can get a bit wonky depending on the person), and what makes them the best dollar on a founder’s cap table.

Many of the above aren’t necessarily hard to do, but just requires a consistent commitment to do them well. And of all the many ways one can help, they all fall into three buckets:

  1. Introductions
  2. Strategy, decision-making, and tactical advice
  3. Downstream and co-investment capital

The last is the most obvious. The second is easy to understand, but often the hardest to execute on, and often comes from being an active or former operator yourself.ย Hunter Walkย ofย Homebrewย has this line, โ€œNever follow your investorโ€™s advice and you might fail. Always follow your investorโ€™s advice and youโ€™ll definitely fail.โ€ Advice is just as helpful as it is dangerous. Something I’ll likely dive into in a future blogpost.

But for the purpose of this one, I’ll focus on introductions.

Network liquidity

I was recently reading Shawn’s chronicled reflections from his time as a Partner at On Deck โ€” someone I am deeply fortunate to have worked alongside. In it, one line immediately grabbed my attention:

“Network liquidity is table stakes. […] This refers to how successful we are at connecting founders to people that are relevant to their needs and asks. The most important dimensions to consider are accuracy (how relevant was an introduction) and speed (how fast did you deliver).”

In 2022, and I imagine even more so, in the next few decades, it’s not about who you know โ€” ’cause frankly, everyone will know everyone else. Social media, the metaverse, web3, the Zoom-ification of everything, and the rush back to IRL will only make this easier. I don’t believe any investor โ€” or in fact, anyone, period โ€” will have a “proprietary network.” So instead of who you know, it’s about how well you know them, and your ability to leverage that relationship.

We see this especially in the venture markets. In my recent blogpost, Sapphire’s Beezer shared: “We have felt for a number of years now (including pre-COVID) that the concept of โ€˜proprietary deal flowโ€™ is not really a thing.ย Proprietary access however is something we think is true, powerful and not simple to achieveย (hence why powerful ).”

I wrote quite a relevant essay a few months ago about how to write email forwardables. In order to tap into someone else’s network liquidity, there are two things you must establish:

  1. Your rapport with the person you’re asking it from
  2. Their rapport with the person you want to get to know

Requester and matchmaker rapport

I can’t speak for everyone, but my willingness to make intros depends strongly on both of the above, especially the former. Selfishly speaking, even if I don’t know the person who will receive the intro nearly as well, to put it bluntly, if I know I can look good to that person when I make it, that’s a strong motivator to do so. For that to happen, I need to fall in love with something about you โ€” the person who would like to be introed. It could be you (usually the greatest motivating factor) and your passion. Even better if your passion is contagious. It could be your product. Or your insight. Usually, it’s some permutation of the afore-mentioned.

I meet with 10-15 net new founders per week. 25-30, if it’s accelerator season. Given my job description, almost every single founder asks me for intros. Sometimes, even without context.

Matchmaker and intro recipient rapport

The other side of the equation is the rapport I have with the person you want to get to know. The truth is the world of intros is like any other asymmetric game. The most well-known, busiest, and often hardest-to-reach people are the ones bombarded with the most intro requests. But like any other human being on this planet, they only have 24 hours in a day.

As a matchmaker myself, I have to cognizant not to overwhelm incredibly busy individuals with a flood of intro requests. And it is my job to triage requests. Sometimes, it’s also helping, in the case of fundraising, founders recognize not what they say they want, but to help them figure out what they really need.

In making requests to famous friends

There are times when the busiest people I know are the only people are capable of fulfilling the ask. So, it also comes down to your accumulation of social capital with the intro recipient. I have two columns in my Airtable CRM, labelled:

  1. Why I am useful to them
  2. Is my usefulness a priority to them? (on a scale of 1-5)

With the former, have I given before I have taken? Have I helped them before? Additionally, is the intro request more of a give or a take? A great startup with a strong team and traction for an investor is more of a ‘give.’ It’s deal flow from them. On the flip side, a founder asking for free advice is more of a ‘take.’ In general, ‘takes’ require more social capital than ‘gives.’

With the latter, priorities change. You may be useful in one phase in their life, but no longer so, in another. For example, when an emerging manager is fundraising for their Fund I, I am someone who is extremely top of mind for them, but when they’re not, I slip in importance. But regardless of the phase in their life, if someone is kind and thoughtful AND you’ve helped with a major decision or inflection point in their life, they’ll always be around. That said, I never try to abuse that goodwill. Personally, I hate being in debt and having others be in my debt.

You can also be “useful” in many different ways. For instance, doing interesting things is one way. One of the most famous people I know with millions of followers across his socials is willing to entertain any ask I ask of him under the condition I invite him to every social experiment I host in LA.

In closing

The more relevant an ‘ask’ is to the recipient, the more likely they’ll respond positively. The more top of mind you are and the more social capital you have with someone, the faster they’re likely to respond. We live in a saturated market of attention. Everything in the world is asking for ours โ€” social media, kids, friends, work, portfolio companies, chores, Netflix, and sleep. And by no means all encompassing.

As you scale yourself as an investor, it’s important to think critically about who is in your network and how well you know them. If you’re a syndicate lead with 500 LPs, how many of them are passive capital? How many of them want to actively help your portfolio?

If you’re an investor who’s a Xoogler and wants to leverage the Google network, who do you know will go out of their way to help you? How many of them have you on speed dial? Which vintage were you a part of?

The great Richard Feynman once said, “You must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.” One of the greatest fallacies an investor or even a founder can make is to assume they have a larger leverageable network than they actually do. Only to realize that when you do need to draw on these connections, you’re unable to.

So, if you have the time this weekend or the next, sit down with a critical eye and ask yourself: How liquid is your network?

Photo by Terry Vlisidis on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.