On Wednesday this week, I hosted an intimate dinner with founders in the windy backdrop of San Francisco. And I’m writing this piece, I can’t help but recall one founder from that evening asking us all to play a little game she built. A mini mobile test to see if we could tell the difference between real headshot portraits and AI-generated ones based on the former. There were 15 picture. Each where we had to pick one of two choices: real or AI.
10/15. 6/15. 9/15. 11/15. 8/15… By the time it was my turn, having seen the looks of confusion of my predecessors, I wasn’t confident in my own ability to spot the difference. Then again, I was neither the best nor the worst when it came to games of Where’s Waldo? 90 quick seconds later, a score popped up. 10/15. Something slightly better than chance.
Naturally, we asked the person who got 11/15 if he knew something we didn’t. To which, he shared his hypothesis. A seemingly sound and quite intellectual conjecture. So, we asked him to try again to see if his odds would improve. 90 seconds later, 6/15.
Despite the variance in scores, none were the wiser.
Michael Mauboussin shared a great line recently. “Intuition is a situation where you’ve trained your system one in a particular domain to be very effective. For that to work, I would argue that you need to have a system, so this is the system level, that it’s fairly linear and stable. So linear in that sense, I mean really the cause and effect are pretty clear. And stable means the basic rules of the game don’t change all that much.”
For our real-or-AI game, we lacked that clear cause and effect. If we received individual question scores of right or wrong, we’d probably have ended up building intuition more quickly.
Venture is unfortunately an industry that is stable, but not very linear. In many ways, you can do everything right and still not have things work out. That same premise led to another interesting thread I saw on Twitter this week by Harry Stebbings.
In a bull market, and I was guilty of this myself, the most predictable trait came in two parts: (a) mark-ups (and graduation rates to the next round), and (b) unicorn status. In 2020 and 2021, growth equity moved upstream to win allocation when they needed it with their core check and stage. But that also meant they were less price-sensitive and disciplined in the stages preceding their core check.
The velocity of rounds coming together due to a combination of FOMO and cheap cash empowered founders to raise quickly and often. Sometimes, in half the funding window during a disciplined market. In other words, from 18 months to 9 months. Subsequently, investors found themselves with 70+% IRR and deploying capital twice or thrice as fast as they had promised their LPs. In attempts to keep up and not get priced out of deals. Many of whom believed that to be the new norm.
While the true determinant of success as an investor is how much money you actually return to your investors, or as Chris Douvos calls it moolah in da coolah, the truth is all startup investors play the long game. Games that last at least a decade. Games that are stable, but not linear. The nonlinearity, in large part, due to the sheer number of confounding variables and the weight distribution changing in different economic environments. A single fund often goes through at least one bull run and one bear run. So, because of the insanely long feedback loops and venture’s J-curve, it’s often hard to tell.
In fact, in recent news, Business Insider reported half of Sequoia’s funds since 2018 posted “losses” for the University of California endowment. We’re in the beginning of 2023. In other words, we’re at most five years out. While I don’t have any insider information, time will tell how much capital Sequoia will return. For now, it’s too early to pass any judgment.
The truth is most venture funds have yet to return one times their capital to their investors within five years. Funds with early exits and have a need to prove themselves to LPs to raise a subsequent fund are likely to see early DPI, but many established funds hold and/or recycle carry. Sequoia being one of the latter. After all, typical recycling periods are 3-4 years. In other words, a fund can reinvest their early moolah in da coolah in the first 3-4 years back into the fund to make new investments. There is a dark side to recycling, but a story for another time. Or a read of Chris Neumann’s piece will satiate any current surplus of curiosity.
But I digress.
In the insane bull run of 2020 and 2021, the startup world became a competition of who could best sell their company’s future as a function of their — the founders’ — past. It became a world where people chased signal and logos. A charismatic way to weave a strong narrative behind logos on a resume seemed to be the primary predictors of founder “success.” And in a market with a surplus of deployable capital and heightened expectations (i.e. 50x or higher valuation multiples on revenue), unicorn status had never been easier to reach.
As of January of this year — 2023, if you’re a time traveler from the future, there are over 1,200 unicorns in the world. 200 more than the beginning of 2022. Many who have yet to go back to market for cash, and will likely need a haircut. Yet for so many funds, the unicorn rate is one of the risks they underwrite.
I was talking with an LP recently where he pointed out the potential fallacy of a fund strategy predicated on unicorn exits. There have only been 118 companies that have historically acquired unicorns. And only four of the 118 have acquired more than four venture-backed unicorns. Microsoft sitting at 12. Google at 8. And Meta and Amazon at 5 each. Given that a meaningful percentage of the 1200 unicorns will need a haircut in their next fundraise, like Stripe and Instacart, we’re likely going to see a slowdown of unicorns in the foreseeable future. And for those on the cusp to slip below the unicorn threshold. Some investors have preemptively marked down their assets by 25-30%. Others waiting to see the ball drop.
The impending future is one not on multiples but one of business quality, namely revenue and revenue growth. All that to say, unless you’re growing the business, exit opportunities are slim if you’re just betting on having unicorn acquisitions in your portfolio.
So while many investors will claim unicorn rate as their metric for success, it’s two degrees of freedom off of the true North.
In the bear market we are in today, the world is now a competition of the quality of business, rather than the quality of words. At the pre-seed stage, companies who are generating revenue have no trouble raising, but companies who don’t are struggling more.
As Andy Rachleff recently pointed out, “Valuations are not the way you judge a venture capitalist, or multiples of their fund. […] The way that I judge a venture capitalist is by how many companies did they back that grew into $100M revenue businesses.” If you bring in good money, whether an exit to the public market or to a partner, you’re a business worth acquiring. A brand and hardly any revenue, if acquired, is hardly going to fetch a good price. And I’ve heard from many LPs and longtime GPs that we’re in for a mass extinction if businesses don’t pivot back to fundamentals quickly. What are fundamentals? Non-dilutive cash in the bank. In other words, paying customers.
Bull markets welcome an age of chasing revenue multiples (expectation and sentiment). Bear markets welcome an age of chasing revenue.
The latter are a lot more linear and predictable than the former.
Photo by Paul Bill on Unsplash
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.