Two weeks ago, Ted Seides put out a great blogpost titled: The Investment Office Playbook – What Managers Don’t See. It’s the truth behind the veil of “It’s not you, it’s me” answer that LPs give. And that the best time for managers to be approaching CIOs at institutions happens to be:
1-2 years after they’re just sworn in (in other words, after they’ve figured out their strategy)
Up to 2-4 years after that period when they’re deploying against that strategy
And around years 11-13 where they’re now restructuring their portfolio after their previous portfolio has been optimized and reached maturity
Last week, Sequoia’s Jess Leeshared a fascinating product-market fit framework. Probably the best breakdown of solutions to problems mapping I’ve seen of late. It echoes much of what I’ve writtenbefore, but more eloquently put.
And the reason I bring this up is not to induce whiplash as you’re reading this blogpost. But that it relates back to when to raise from large LPs. As most of us know, there’s a strong correlation between fundraising as a founder and fundraising as a GP.
The first step is to have a product that large LPs can invest in. As a matter of fact, you need to have a specific product (aka fund strategy) for the LP you wish to court. For example, if a large LP’s minimum check size is $20M and their maximum ownership is 10%, and you’re a $50M fund, you don’t have what they’re looking for. That’s okay. You should never resize your fund purely on an LP’s check size and ownership.
The second is to understand their deployment timeline. In the case of large LPs, like endowments and pensions, that’s usually 2-4 years after a new CIO is sworn in. And years 11-13 when they’re rebalancing their portfolio. For other institutions, like some corporates, it’s actually in the bylaws that every three years, there’s a new Head of Investments. Hell, at Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) — the largest sovereign wealth fund, or at least one of the largest ones — a new CEO is sworn in every five years. So the clock is always ticking.
To the second point, for a large LP:
Years 1-2
When the new CIO is just sworn in, in many ways, that might be the best time to pitch a new paradigm. When the strategy has yet to fully shape up. Will you get many checks during that period? Likely not. Unless you’re a pre-existing trusted relationship of the CIO. But even if you do convince the CIO/team, they’re likely only allocating a very small percentage to that field, which for the most part, should work for you.
The goal of the value proposition, and subsequently the onboarding and tutorial, is to give people the activation energy needed to overcome the customer mindset. As such, it means one’s product can’t just be 10-20% better, but 10X better.
For instance, to get over the “yeah, right” and the “it is what it is” mindset, in the words of NFX’s Omri Drory, “the best way to manipulate energy, and get what you want, is to remove that ‘imagination barrier.'”
As such, the CIO must believe in the new paradigm. In all fairness, this takes more validation and big headlines for a tenured CIO to usually begin to believe these.
Years 2-4 (and 11-13)
They’re deploying against a top-down approach. And just as in years 11-13, they’re looking for the best in class solutions for each vertical. Meaning they’ll talk to hundreds of managers and look through thousands of pitches to pick just a few. Processes are long because they dig deep on these multi-fund relationships, but this is also an opportunity for them to increase the surface area for luck to stick.
While we all know past performance isn’t an indicator of future results, there is a reliance on metrics and the consistency of such metrics. For instance, if one were to take the top 2 investments in your portfolio and bottom 2 investments and throw them out, what does your remaining track record look like?
Or if some of your funds have yet to have meaningful distributions, graduation rates become rather important. Not just that on average, 30% of seed stage deals graduate to Series A. And 30% of Series A to B. But how many of your deals graduate past more than one subsequent round? For example, do more than 10% of your seed deals graduate to Series B? Although, to play my own devil’s advocate, vintages post-2019 have yet to really learn the true impact of loss ratios.
In closing
The truth is it’s hard to tell when the best time is. And oftentimes, it’s just a matter of luck. For one to have the right fund a specific LP is looking for at a time when liquidity is good.
But in many other ways, like Ted suggests in his blogpost, it’s the ability to think from the perspective of an LP that is invaluable and greatly appreciated as an LP.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Last week, Youngrok and I finally launched our episode together on Superclusters. In the midst of it all, we wrestle with the balance between the complexity and simplicity of questions to get our desired answer. Of course, we made many an allusion to the DGQ series. One of which, you’ll find below.
In many ways, I started the DGQ series as a promise to myself to uncover the questions that yield the most fascinating answers. Questions that unearth answers “hidden in plain sight”. Those that help us read between the lines.
Superclusters, in many ways, is my conduit to not only interview some of my favorite people in the LP landscape, but also the opportunity to ask the perfect question to each guest. Which you’ll see in some of the below examples.
Asking Abe Finkelstein about being a Pitfall Explorer and how it relates to patience (1:04:56 in S2E1)
What Ben Choi’s childhood was like (2:44 in S1E6) and how proposing to his wife affects how he thinks about pitching (1:05:47 in S1E6)
How selling baseball cards as a kid helped Samir Kaji get better at sales (45:05 in S1E8)
In doing so, I sometimes lose myself in the nuance. And in those times, which happen more often than I’d like to admit, the questions that yield the best answers are the simplest ones. No added flare. No research-flexing moments. Where I don’t lead the witness. And I just ask the question. In its simplest form.
For the purpose of this essay, to make this more concrete, let’s focus on a question LPs often ask GPs.
“Tell me about this investment you made.“
In my mind, ridiculously simple question. Younger me would call that a lazy question. In all fairness, it would be if one was not intentionally aware about the kind of answer they were looking to hear OR not hear.
The laziness comes from regressing to the template, the model, the ‘what.’ But not the ‘why’ the question is being asked, and ‘how’ it should be interpreted. For those who struggle to understand the first principles of actions and questions, I’d highly recommend reading Simon Sinek’s Start with Why, but I digress.
Circling back, every GP talks about their portfolio founders differently. If two independent thinkers have both invested Company A, they might have different answers. Won’t always be true, but if you look at two portfolios that are relatively correlated in their underlying assets AND they arrive at those answers in the same way, one does wonder if it’s worth diversifying to other managers with different theses and/or approaches.
But that’s exactly what makes this simple question (but if you want to debate semantics, statement) special. When all else is equal, VCs are left to their own devices unbounded from artificial parameters.
Then take that answer and compare and contrast it to how other GPs you know well or have invested in already. How do they answer the same question for the exact same investment? How much are those answers correlated?
It matters less that the facts are the same. Albeit, useful to know how each investor does their own homework pre- and post-investment. But more so, it’s a question on thoughtfulness. How well does each investor really know their investments? How does it compare to the answer of a GP I admire for their thoughtfulness and intentionality?
(Part of the big reason I don’t like investing in syndicates because most outsource their decision-making to larger logos in VCs. On top of that, most syndicate memos are rather paltry when it comes to information.)
The question itself is also a test of observation and self-awareness. How well do you really know the founder? Were you intentional with how you built that relationship with the founder? How does it compare to the founder’s own self-reflection? It’s also the same reason I love Doug Leone’s question, which highlights how aware one is of the people around them. What three adjectives would you use to describe your sibling?
Warren Buffett once described Charlie Munger as “the best thirty-second mind in the world. He goes from A to Z in one go. He sees the essence of everything even before you finish the sentence.” Moreover in his 2023 Berkshire annual letter, he wrote one of the most thoughtful homages ever written.
As early-stage investors, as belief checks, as people who bet on the nonobvious before it becomes obvious, we invest in extraordinary companies. I really like the way Chris Paikdescribes what we do. “Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence
And just like there are certain companies that can’t be described in a single sentence — not the Uber for X, or the Google for Y — their founders who are even more complex than a business idea cannot be described by a single sentence either. Many GPs I come across often reduce a founder’s brilliance to the logos on their resume or the diplomas hanging on their walls. But if we bet right, the founders are a lot more than just that.
Of course, the same applies to LPs who describe the GPs they invest in.
In hopes this would be helpful to you, personally some areas I find fascinating in founders and emerging GPs and, hell just in, people in general include:
Their selfish motivations (the less glamorous ones) — Why do this when they can be literally doing anything else? Many of which can help them get rich faster.
What part of their past are they running towards and what are they running away from?
All the product pivots (thesis pivots) to date and why. I love inflection points.
If they were to do a TED talk on a subject that’s not what they’re currently building, what would it be?
Who do they admire? Who are their mentor figures?
What kind of content do they consume? How do they think about their information diet?
What promises have they made to themselves? No matter how small or big. Which have they kept? Which have they not?
How do they think about mentoring/training/upskilling the next generation of talent at their company/firm?
The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I know I just wrote a blogpost on how LPs assess if GPs can win deals. But after a few recent conversations with LPs in fund of funds, as well as emerging LPs, I thought it would be interesting to draw the parallel of not only proxies of how GPs win deals, but also proxies of how LPs win deals. And as such, coming back with a part two. Maybe a part one and a half. You get the point.
The greatest indicator for the ability to win deals as a VC is to see what the largest check (and greatest ownership target) a world-class founder will take from you. (That said, if you are only capable of winning deals based on price, you might want to consider another career. You should have other reasons a brilliant founder will pick you.) And even better if they give you a board seat.
The greatest indicator for the ability to win deals as an LP is to see what the smallest check a world-class GP will take from you. And even better if they give you a seat on the LPAC.
In the world where capital is more or less a commodity, the more capital one can provide (with some loose constraints on maximums), the better. But if someone who has no to little trouble raising is willing to open doors in a potentially over-subscribed fund for you, that’s something special.
An LP I was chatting with recently loves asking the question, “How big of a check size would you like me to write?” And to him, the answer “As much as you can.” Or “I’ll take any number.” is a bad answer. According to him, the best GPs know exactly how much they’re expecting from LPs, and sometimes as a function of how helpful they can be, especially in a Fund I or II. But always as a function of portfolio construction. Your fund size is after all your strategy, as the Mike Maples adage goes. While I don’t know if I completely agree with this approach, I did find this approach intriguing, and at least worth a double take.
I’m forgetting the attribution here. The curse of forgetting to write things down when I hear them. But I was listening to a podcast, or maybe it was a conversation, where they used the analogy that being a VC is like watching your child on the playground. You let your child do whatever they want to. Go down the slides. Climb the monkey bars. Sit on the swings. And so on. You let them chart their own narratives. But your job as the parent is once you see your kid doing something dangerous, that’s when you step in. When they’re about to jump off a 2-story slide. Or swing upside-down. But otherwise your kid knows best on how to have fun. In the founders’ case, they know how to build an amazing product for an audience who’s dying for it.
Excluding the fact that you’re a good friend or family that go way back, you likely have something of great strategic value to that GP — be it:
Network to other LPs
Operational expertise and value to portfolio companies (to a point where you being an LP will help the GP win deals with founders)
Operational expertise to the GP and the investment team
Investment expertise to help check the GP’s blindside
Access to downstream capital
Deal flow, or
Simply, mentorship
At the same time, ONSET Ventures once found that “if you had a full-time mentor who was not part of the company’s management team, and who had actually run both a start-up and a larger business, the success rate increased from less than 25% to over 80%.” (You can find the case study here. As an FYI, the afore-mentioned link leads to a download of the HBS case study.)
That’s the role of the board. The LPAC. Of the advisory board. For a founder or emerging GP, the full-time availability of said board members or LPAC members is vital.
A proxy of a mentor’s availability is pre-existing relationships between founder/emerging funder and said investor or advisor. Another is simply the responsiveness of the investor or advisor. Do they take less than 12 hours to reply? Or 3-5 business days? It’s for that latter reason Sequoia’s Pat Gradyonce lost out on an investment deal to his life partner, Sarah Guo. Being responsive goes a long way.
In sum, for LPs in fund of fund managers, small things go a long way.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.
The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.
But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!
As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!
While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.
The year was 1997.
Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.
Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”
Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.
If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.
And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.
But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.
So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”
Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”
You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:
“You have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.
What is value?
To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.
Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:
The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence
On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.
We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.
Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
But I digress.
Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.
In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.
For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:
E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.
Graduation rates
What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.
On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.
Valuation step ups
How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.
It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:
Have a real chance at the championship title.
Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.
… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.
The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.
Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?
Dilution
If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?
Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?
Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.
How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.
How does one use the appreciation value equation?
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.
And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.
If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.
But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.
The model
The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.
It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.
Take for instance…
Energy
Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.
Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.
Biotech
Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.
In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.
In closing
All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:
Is your entry point a good entry point?
Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?
For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.
For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.
If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
On Wednesday this week, I hosted an intimate dinner with founders in the windy backdrop of San Francisco. And I’m writing this piece, I can’t help but recall one founder from that evening asking us all to play a little game she built. A mini mobile test to see if we could tell the difference between real headshot portraits and AI-generated ones based on the former. There were 15 picture. Each where we had to pick one of two choices: real or AI.
10/15. 6/15. 9/15. 11/15. 8/15… By the time it was my turn, having seen the looks of confusion of my predecessors, I wasn’t confident in my own ability to spot the difference. Then again, I was neither the best nor the worst when it came to games of Where’s Waldo? 90 quick seconds later, a score popped up. 10/15. Something slightly better than chance.
Naturally, we asked the person who got 11/15 if he knew something we didn’t. To which, he shared his hypothesis. A seemingly sound and quite intellectual conjecture. So, we asked him to try again to see if his odds would improve. 90 seconds later, 6/15.
Despite the variance in scores, none were the wiser.
Michael Mauboussin shared a great line recently. “Intuition is a situation where you’ve trained your system one in a particular domain to be very effective. For that to work, I would argue that you need to have a system, so this is the system level, that it’s fairly linear and stable. So linear in that sense, I mean really the cause and effect are pretty clear. And stable means the basic rules of the game don’t change all that much.”
For our real-or-AI game, we lacked that clear cause and effect. If we received individual question scores of right or wrong, we’d probably have ended up building intuition more quickly.
Venture is unfortunately an industry that is stable, but not very linear. In many ways, you can do everything right and still not have things work out. That same premise led to another interesting thread I saw on Twitter this week by Harry Stebbings.
Today I got asked a fantastic question:
Have you ever been involved with a startup that achieved true product-market fit and still failed?
In a bull market, and I was guilty of this myself, the most predictable trait came in two parts: (a) mark-ups (and graduation rates to the next round), and (b) unicorn status. In 2020 and 2021, growth equity moved upstream to win allocation when they needed it with their core check and stage. But that also meant they were less price-sensitive and disciplined in the stages preceding their core check.
The velocity of rounds coming together due to a combination of FOMO and cheap cash empowered founders to raise quickly and often. Sometimes, in half the funding window during a disciplined market. In other words, from 18 months to 9 months. Subsequently, investors found themselves with 70+% IRR and deploying capital twice or thrice as fast as they had promised their LPs. In attempts to keep up and not get priced out of deals. Many of whom believed that to be the new norm.
While the true determinant of success as an investor is how much money you actually return to your investors, or as Chris Douvos calls it moolah in da coolah, the truth is all startup investors play the long game. Games that last at least a decade. Games that are stable, but not linear. The nonlinearity, in large part, due to the sheer number of confounding variables and the weight distribution changing in different economic environments. A single fund often goes through at least one bull run and one bear run. So, because of the insanely long feedback loops and venture’s J-curve, it’s often hard to tell.
In fact, in recent news, Business Insider reported half of Sequoia’s funds since 2018 posted “losses” for the University of California endowment. We’re in the beginning of 2023. In other words, we’re at most five years out. While I don’t have any insider information, time will tell how much capital Sequoia will return. For now, it’s too early to pass any judgment.
The truth is most venture funds have yet to return one times their capital to their investors within five years. Funds with early exits and have a need to prove themselves to LPs to raise a subsequent fund are likely to see early DPI, but many established funds hold and/or recycle carry. Sequoia being one of the latter. After all, typical recycling periods are 3-4 years. In other words, a fund can reinvest their early moolah in da coolah in the first 3-4 years back into the fund to make new investments. There is a dark side to recycling, but a story for another time. Or a read of Chris Neumann’s piece will satiate any current surplus of curiosity.
But I digress.
In the insane bull run of 2020 and 2021, the startup world became a competition of who could best sell their company’s future as a function of their — the founders’ — past. It became a world where people chased signal and logos. A charismatic way to weave a strong narrative behind logos on a resume seemed to be the primary predictors of founder “success.” And in a market with a surplus of deployable capital and heightened expectations (i.e. 50x or higher valuation multiples on revenue), unicorn status had never been easier to reach.
As of January of this year — 2023, if you’re a time traveler from the future, there are over 1,200 unicorns in the world. 200 more than the beginning of 2022. Many who have yet to go back to market for cash, and will likely need a haircut. Yet for so many funds, the unicorn rate is one of the risks they underwrite.
I was talking with an LP recently where he pointed out the potential fallacy of a fund strategy predicated on unicorn exits. There have only been 118 companies that have historically acquired unicorns. And only four of the 118 have acquired more than four venture-backed unicorns. Microsoft sitting at 12. Google at 8. And Meta and Amazon at 5 each. Given that a meaningful percentage of the 1200 unicorns will need a haircut in their next fundraise, like Stripe and Instacart, we’re likely going to see a slowdown of unicorns in the foreseeable future. And for those on the cusp to slip below the unicorn threshold. Some investors have preemptively marked down their assets by 25-30%. Others waiting to see the ball drop.
The impending future is one not on multiples but one of business quality, namely revenue and revenue growth. All that to say, unless you’re growing the business, exit opportunities are slim if you’re just betting on having unicorn acquisitions in your portfolio.
So while many investors will claim unicorn rate as their metric for success, it’s two degrees of freedom off of the true North.
In the bear market we are in today, the world is now a competition of the quality of business, rather than the quality of words. At the pre-seed stage, companies who are generating revenue have no trouble raising, but companies who don’t are struggling more.
As Andy Rachleff recently pointed out, “Valuations are not the way you judge a venture capitalist, or multiples of their fund. […] The way that I judge a venture capitalist is by how many companies did they back that grew into $100M revenue businesses.” If you bring in good money, whether an exit to the public market or to a partner, you’re a business worth acquiring. A brand and hardly any revenue, if acquired, is hardly going to fetch a good price. And I’ve heard from many LPs and longtime GPs that we’re in for a mass extinction if businesses don’t pivot back to fundamentals quickly. What are fundamentals? Non-dilutive cash in the bank. In other words, paying customers.
Bull markets welcome an age of chasing revenue multiples (expectation and sentiment). Bear markets welcome an age of chasing revenue.
The latter are a lot more linear and predictable than the former.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Last Friday, one of the greatest operators and super-connectors I know, who also moonlights as an angel investor, asked me: How do I know if I should professionalize as an investor?
Undeniably, a great question. But before I share my answer to her question, I thought it’d be best if I first elaborated on what “professionalize” means in this context. It’s a term we have used more than once here at On Deck Angels. And as a result, it has spilled over into the vocabulary I use even outside of venture. But in the context of investing, professionalize is where one would go from an amateur, part-time investor to a full-time investor. Either working at a fund, starting their own syndicate or fund, or as a full-time angel.
The thing is, to be a career startup investor, you have to be lucky. The capital required to have a seat at the poker table is high. While there are many platforms — from Republic to Wefunder to Titan Invest — that are working to democratize access, the truth, for now, still is that to access the best deals, you’re either lucky as a network leader or as a capital allocator. In other words, do you know the best and most entrepreneurial talent? And do you have a frick-ton of money?
And given that some element of luck on top of skill is table stakes, I felt the best response I could give wasn’t in the form of a statement or opinion, but in the form of five questions.
Why do you invest? What compels you to continue investing?
What are two positive adjectives you would use to describe your sibling*? What are two negative adjectives you would use to describe your sibling*?
*Or life partner, or someone you know really really well.
Have you ever laid someone off and regretted it? Why did you regret it? And at point after the event did you notice your regret?
If not… as an investor, have you ever said no to a founder and regretted it? Why did you regret it? And at point after the event did you notice your regret?
Of the five people you hang out with most, what are common traits that at least two of them have? List as many as you can.
If you were to start a fund or syndicate tomorrow, what would you call it?
So before you keep reading, I would recommend pausing. And to pull out a notepad and jot your own answers down to the questions above. It’s a useful exercise I ask myself, and evidently others as well, if you’re looking to professionalize as an investor.
When you’re ready, keep reading beyond the below image, as I’ll share my rationale behind the above questions.
*Author’s Note: Effectively, I was trying to space out the questions from the rationale of why I ask them below as much as I could, so that the below text wouldn’t influence your thinking (if you plan on doing this exercise).
Motivation – Why are you an investor? The underlying motivation matters. Are you in it for money? To pay it forward? To prove someone or some notion wrong? How fleeting is your motivation? Raising a fund is a decade-long relationship. Raising three is two-decades long of a relationship. So, the question is how deep is your motivation. Can it last multiple decades?
Strengths/weaknesses – This question is adapted from Doug Leone’s. People often describe others in comparison to themselves. For example, if I say Joanna is funny, by transitive property, I believe Joanna is funnier than I am. If I say Kai is smart, I believe Kai is smarter than I am. I often find this question to be much more useful in understanding a person than just asking for their strengths and weaknesses. After all, adjectives are, by definition, comparative words.
Standards – This question is a riff on Matt Mochary’s. If your answer to the question is no, then you don’t know your bar for excellence. Why does your bar matter? There’s a saying that A-players hire other A-players because they know just much it takes to win. B-players, on the other hand, know they’re not as good as A-players, but on average, still want to feel superior, so they hire C-players. A-players can stand B-players, but can’t stand C-players. So eventually, the A-players leave your company. Why does this matter for an investor? You need to be able to differentiate between an A-player and a B-player. The difference between a great founder and a good founder is a fine line, and most people miss it. If you want to have a chance at being a top decile investor, you need to know. After all, people often learn more from loss than from gain. For the second part of the question, being a great investor — or to be fair, a great anything — is all about the velocity in which you learn. Speed and direction.
Deal flow – This question is a proxy of where you’re going to the majority of your early deal flow, and likely who and where you’re connected the most with. The follow up would be do you get enough quality deal flow from people with these traits. In other words, if you had the capital, are you confident you could put at least $250K to use every quarter? If not, stay a scout or raise a syndicate instead of a fund. Until you can build up to this.
Legacy – Building a fund is multi-generational. Just three funds would be a 20-year relationship. And the best funds often outlive the founder(s) themselves. So the biggest question here is what kind of legacy are you trying to build? Or are you trying to build one? This legacy, founded upon your values, determines how you plan for succession and who you raise to be your firm’s next leaders.
In closing
Of course, the five questions aren’t an end-all-be-all. There’s still the ability to think through fund strategy and portfolio construction. There’s fund admin. The back office. Tech stack. Picking strategic markets where you have an unfair advantage. That said, if you can answer the above questions well, you’ll have a compelling narrative to either fundraise from LPs or join a larger fund.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
“If you look at all big human achievements, like flying to the moon, for instance, it’s all based on large scale cooperation. How did humans get to the moon? It wasn’t Neil Armstrong flying there by himself. There were millions of people cooperating to build the spaceship, to do the math, to provide the food, to provide the special clothing, and the funding.
“The big question becomes: why are we capable of cooperating on such a large scale when chimpanzees or elephants or pigs can’t?
“It’s the ability to invent and believe fictional stories.”
For any big achievement, and I’m specifically reminded of the recent news with FTX — for FTX to get as large as it did at its peak — it was a monumental achievement. It was the work of many, rather than a single individual. It was the result of many buying into this narrative that Sam Bankman-Fried shared. That includes his team. His customers. His investors, from Sequoia to Tiger to Softbank to Coinbase. Many of whom are smart people who gave into the velocity of the market the last two years.
Source: Sequoia article on FTX While I’m not sure how I feel about founders playing games during the meeting, I can’t deny the vision isn’t compelling.
To be fair, and this is not to condone the wrongdoings of the FTX team, every founder’s job is to distort reality. To put the human race on a fast track towards a future that is non-fiction to the founder, but fiction to everyone else. A world that isn’t false, but has yet to come. As author William Gibson once said, “The future is already here — it’s just not evenly distributed.”
I also love the thesis of Alexia‘s fund, Dream Machine. We make science fiction non-fiction.
Founders pitch their answer to: What will the world look like? Investors, customers, and talent then make bets with their time and money on which future they would like to see happen and the likelihood of it happening.
FTX is no exception. The fine line is when a founder does get creative, it is imperative for them to have a moral compass, which seems like SBF didn’t have. And of the million and one things they’ve done wrong (no board, giving loans using customer money, fraud, etc. and some more that are more questionable in nature, like political donations, etc. — none of which from what little I know are things I would ever endorse), I have to say they nailed their marketing and messaging. They got a lot of people excited about it fast. It’s easier to get people excited about the future of money than the future of fintech or the future of crypto.
The past week has been an insane week for crypto, namely when FTX filed for bankruptcy. And while there are many different angles to it, I took it upon myself to revisit a podcast episode from two months back where Nathaniel Whittemore, FTX’s former Head of Marketing, shared his marketing insights. Namely, around their 2021 Super Bowl ad.
A Super Bowl ad two years since its founding date. If nothing else, that’s impressive. Moreover, they got Larry David who has been known to never appear on ads to do it for them.
But what I found to be very powerful is Nathaniel breaks down why they chose to do a Super Bowl ad in the first place:
“People always focus on how much [an ad] costs. ‘This ad costs X.’ Which in a vacuum seems so high. […] What I think that analysis doesn’t take into consideration:
“The number of people actually watching those ads. If you’re gonna get X people with an ad that costs a $100,000, but then, 50x that with an ad that costs $5 million, that’s the same ratio.
“But the more important piece is that at least in America, the Super Bowl is the literal one moment each year that people not only are not annoyed with ads, but it is an active part of the experience that they’re having and they’re excited.”
He also does caveat that it doesn’t mean a Super Bowl is good for every kind of marketing campaign. But more so for brand-building, as opposed to product marketing or lead gen.
To echo that, David Sacks wrote a great piece on the importance of having an operating philosophy which I’ve referenced on this blog before. In it, he finds it incredibly powerful for companies to aggregate product updates and marketing campaigns in four big “lightning strikes” (each quarter) rather than have tidbits of information floating around every week.
Of course, companies like Twitch, Salesforce, Apple, and Google have taken it a step further by having a large launch event once a year. As Sacks mentions, “It’s not just about the external marketing value. There’s a huge internal benefit from setting dates and deadlines in order to hit a public launch.” It drives excitement and a narrative that both customers and future customers, as well as team members can get behind. The world is waiting. Your team is shooting to meet and beat expectations. And that’s incredibly motivating.
What does this mean for the crypto narrative?
A friend who took a hit from the recent series of events asked me at dinner last night, “What does this mean for crypto?”
Of which I think Yuval does a better job explaining it than I could. In the same podcast episode, he explains, “Not everybody believes in the same god or in any god. But everybody believes in money. And if you think about it, it’s strange because no other animal even knows that money exists. If you give a pig an apple in one hand and a pile of a million dollars in the other hand, the pig would obviously choose the apple. And the chimpanzee the same. And the elephant.
“Nobody, besides us, knows something like money exists in the world. The value of money doesn’t come from the paper. Most of the money in today’s world is not even paper; it’s just electronic data moving between computers. So where’s the value from? It’s from stories we believe.
“We are at risk of the whole thing collapsing. It happens from time to time in history. Inflation to some extent is that. The value of money is not what we were told it is. And inflation can sometimes hit thousands of persons and millions of persons. Eventually, the money becomes worthless.”
I don’t personally believe crypto will become worthless at any predictable point in the future. In fact, I think it has a great future ahead. Just a little early for its time from an infrastructure perspective. But, it is a non-zero possibility. That said, the more institutions, especially larger ones like FTX, that use crypto as the currency of faith, collapses, the more the faith behind the story of crypto will waver. And with repeated bad players, it is a race between mass adoption and the rate faith deteriorates.
For as long as the exchange currency is in dollars, crypto has still yet to be widely adopted. For instance, the value of crypto is pegged as a function of the dollar. As of the day I’m writing this on November 16th, 2022, if you type in bitcoin in Google search, the first search result is that Bitcoin is worth 16,768 US Dollars. In other words, as long as crypto is measured in dollars, the story of the dollar is stronger than that of crypto.
In closing
I’m not here to share my latest scoop or an update on the current situation about FTX. Twitter is filled with these already. Plenty of smart individuals have already covered all the ground I would ever even think about covering. I don’t keep my finger on the pulse of crypto and FTX nearly as much as my friends and colleagues.
Really, the purpose of this blogpost is really my curiosity that in order for FTX to get the notoriety that it has today, the team must have done something really well. And in my eyes, it’s not the product or the business, but the narrative in which they built. So, if someone at HBS or GSB isn’t writing a case study on this, they should.
P.S. Had to pass this to two friends at 6AM this morning to see if this blogpost was even worth publishing. Bless their hearts for their support so early in the morning.
#unfiltered is a series where I share my raw thoughts and unfiltered commentary about anything and everything. It’s not designed to go down smoothly like the best cup of cappuccino you’ve ever had (although here‘s where I found mine), more like the lonely coffee bean still struggling to find its identity (which also may one day find its way into a more thesis-driven blogpost). Who knows? The possibilities are endless.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Two weeks ago, in an On Deck Angels workshop, one of our community members asked: “What do you recommend to do to increase access to allocation and top-performing deals?” To which I responded briefly with my belief that investors should always try to win their right on the cap table — whether it’s in the current round or the next. And, there are four ways to win that right:
Go early.
Being a valuable asset to the company.
You are never too good to chase the best.
Get to know the lead investor. Specifically, in their mind, be different.
As a footnote to all this, Founder Collective did a study a year or so ago where they found the 30 most valuable companies in the world raised half as much and were worth 4x the 30 most funded companies in the world. So, while hot rounds are great and all, there’s no telling that they’ll be the most valuable companies in ten, even five, years’ time. All that to say, I realize I’m writing this blogpost in a down market — likely only a few quarters of many more before we see the end of this recessionary period. The truth is, there are probably not as many hot rounds as there are before. But they still exist. And as an investor, you want to be ready for when that happens. While you set yourself up to have a prepared mind for getting picked, focus on picking.
To take a deeper dive on getting picked…
Just like it’s important for a founder to find product-market fit, it’s equally as important for an investor to find investor-market fit. Think of your check or your vehicle as a product in and of itself. As an investor, you are either great at picking or great at getting picked or both. For the purpose of responding to the above question, I’ll focus on the latter — getting picked.
It’s a three-sided marketplace where your customers are your LPs, founders, and your co-investors. Of all the above, to be fair, LPs loving you doesn’t necessarily get you better access to deals, so we’ll save that discussion for another day. And while there are many factors to getting picked, it boils down to two things:
Founders love you
Co-investors love you
In both scenarios, you get proprietary access to deals. As Sapphire’s Beezersaid, “‘proprietary deal flow’ is not really a thing.” Proprietary access, on the other hand, is a thing.
Lenny Rachitsky and Yuriy Timen put out a great piece on activation rates recently. In it, there’s one line I particularly like, when they defined the activation metric:
“Your activation milestone (often referred to as your ‘aha moment’) is the earliest point in your onboarding flow that, by showing your product’s value, is predictive of long-term retention.”
The product, your fund or check. Retention, how likely they are to keep you on their speed dial (for a particular topic or function). And there are two distinct qualities of a great activation metric: “highly predictable” and “highly actionable.”
Highly predictable: The founders know exactly what they can get from you. The value you give isn’t vague, like “we invest in the best early-stage founders.” a16z can afford to say that. You can’t.
Highly actionable: Knowing what value founders can get from you, they know the exact types of questions to ask you to best extract that value.
The earlier you are in your investing journey, the more obvious you should make the above.
Taking the product analogy in stride, how do you get to a point where your customers get to your activation milestone? Where they form a new habit around keeping you top of mind?
How do you get founders to love you?
In my mind, there are two ways we can measure if founders love you:
For founders you’ve invested in: If they answer with your name to “If you were to start a new company, who are the first three investors you would bring back to your cap table?”
For founders you haven’t invested in: You get (great) deal flow from founders you passed on.
Tactically, in combination with being predictable and having your value be actionable…
Go early. Be the first check in when they’re still non-obvious. This of course requires a combination of luck and conviction. The latter is more predictable than the first. Be bullish when others are bearish.
Being a valuable asset to the company. Founders have 2 jobs: (a) make money and (b) hire people to make money. As an investor, everything you do is directly or indirectly involved in that. Also, when a founder fundraises, I would ask them what they plan to do with that money (i.e. hire VPs, more engineers, scale to X # of customers), and see if you can be preemptively helpful there.
You are never too good to chase the best. This is something that I picked up from a Pat Grady video some long while back. But to win the best deals, you go to where the founders are, don’t expect them to come to you. That’s how Sarah Guo, Pat’s wife, won a lot of deals that Sequoia wanted to get into.
How do you get co-investors to love you?
The best way to measure this is your co-investors proactively invite you to invest in future deals together.
The best way to get there is to:
Get to know the lead investor. Specifically, in their mind, be different.
Their lead investor might have a large portfolio where they can’t be as helpful to every investment they make. Try to squeeze in the round and be insanely helpful to their/your portfolio. And over time, as you co-invest in more deals, they’ll keep you top of mind for future ones.
For this one, it pays not to be generalist. I don’t mean as a function of industry but as a function of how you add value to your portfolio. Someone who can do everything is less desirable than someone who is really good at just one thing. Say, hiring executives or getting FDA approval or generating PR buzz. Interestingly enough, responsiveness is also a differentiator. I heard an investor say recently that the value of an investor is determined not by what happens during the meeting, but in between meetings. And I completely agree. The cap table doesn’t need another investor. The cap table needs people who will increase the chances of the company’s multi-billion dollar outcome.
The takeaway here is to not be better, but to be different. People can’t tell better, but they can tell different. That’s why the word differentiated is used so much. Have a differentiated approach. Have a diversified portfolio. On the other hand, having a better generalist strategy than a16z or Sequoia is hard to measure. While it may be true in the long run, better is difficult to measure in foresight, but obvious in hindsight. Just like product-market fit. Hard to pinpoint in the windshield, but obvious in the rearview mirror. It’s better to be the in a pool of one than a pool of many. Be the one CEO coach. Be the one who helps founders build robust communities. Or, be something that no one expects. Like Charlie Munger, be the best 30 second mind in the world.
Another reason I left this in the co-investor love section is that while being different does help you stand out to founders, there seems to be a lot more logo chasing from founders. Differentiation, unfortunately, falls short of brand recognition. I genuinely hope that this does change in the next few quarters.
In closing
While the question that inspired this blogpost is meant for hot rounds, the same holds for just being a great investor. One thing I’ve told many applicants to On Deck Angels is that we look for folks who are excited about putting investor on their resume and is willing to put in the legwork to become a great investor. The above is one of many paths to become one.
Arguably the above is how to be a great champion of people. The investor part comes with luck and having an eye for great talent, ideally before others. Betting on the non-obvious before they become obvious.
The best startup investors are disciplined and constantly learning. Some might argue that they may not have the time to entertain hot startups in general. Or at least startups when they are hot.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
“Readily available quantitative information about the present is not gonna give you they key to the castle. […] If everyone has all the company data today and the means to massage it, how do you get a knowledge advantage?
“The answer is you have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
Those are the words of the great Howard Marks on a recent Acquired episode.
When most of us first learned economics — be it in high school or college, we learned of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. In short, if you had access to both public and private information, you would be capable of generating outsized returns that outperformed the market.
The truth is that reality differs quite a bit. And that’s especially in early-stage investing. Investors often make investment decisions with both public and private information at their disposal. There is admittedly still some level of asymmetric information, but that depends on deep of a diligence the investors do. Yet despite the closest thing to a strong efficiency, there’s still a large delta between the top half and bottom half of investors. The gap widens further when you compare with the top quartile. And the top decile. And the top percentile. Truly a power law distribution.
Massaging the data
I’m no data scientist, although I am obsessed with data. But there are people who are, and among them, people I deeply respect for their opinion.
There’s been this relentless, possibly ill-placed focus on growth (at all costs) over the last two years. Oftentimes, not even revenue growth, but for consumer startups, user growth.
I want to say I first heard of this from a Garry Tan video. The job of a founder pre-product-market fit (pre-PMF) is to catch lightning in a bottle. The job post-PMF is to keep lightning in that bottle. Two different problems. Many founders ended up focusing on or were forced to focus on (as a function of taking venture money) scale before they caught lightning in that bottle. They spent less time on A/B testing to find a global maximum, and ended up optimizing for a local maximum.
Today, or at least as of September 2022, there’s this ‘new’ focus on retention and profitability (at all costs). But there’s no one-size-fit-all for startups. As a founder, you need to find the metric that you should be optimizing for — a sign that your customers love your product. Whether it’s the percent of your customers that submit bug reports and still use your product or if you’re a marketplace, the percent of demand that converts to supply. Feel free to be creative. Massage your data, but it still has to make sense.
From a fund perspective, equally so, it’s not always about TVPI, IRR, and DPI, especially if you’re an emerging fund manager. Or in other words, a fund manager who has yet to hit product-market fit. You probably have an inflated total-value-to-paid-in capital (TVPI) — largely, if not completely dominated by unrealized return. The same is true for your IRR as well. In the past two years, with inflated rounds and fast deployment schedules, everyone seems like a genius. So many investors — angels, syndicate leads, and fund managers — found themselves with IRRs north of 70% for any vintage of investments 2019 and after. Although an institutional LP that I was chatting with recently discounts any vintage of startups 2017 and after.
So the North Star metrics here, for fund managers, isn’t IRR or TVPI. It’s other sets of data. I’ll give two examples. For a fund manager I chatted with a few weeks ago, it was the percent of his portfolio that raised follow-on capital within 24 months of his investment because it was more than twice as great as the some of the best venture firms out there. Another fund manager cited the number of his LPs who invested in his fund’s pro rata rights through SPVs.
Making qualitative judgments
In this camp, these are folks who have an extremely strong sense of logic and reasoning. When a founder has yet the data to back it up, these investors go back to first principles.
In my experience, these investors are incredible at asking questions, like how Doug Leone asks a founder for their strengths and weaknesses. But more than just asking questions, it’s also about building frameworks and knowing what to look for when you ask said questions.
For instance, every investor knows grit is an important trait in a founder. More than knowing at a high level that grit is important, what can you do to find it out? For me, it boils down to two things.
Past performance. In other words, prior examples of excellence that they worked hard to get.
Future predictors. I ask: Why does this problem keep you up at night? Or some variation. Why does this problem mean so much to you? Why are you obsessed? Are you obsessed? Why is this your life’s calling? And I’m not looking for a market-sizing exercise here.
While I don’t claim to hold all the truths in this world, nor can I yet count myself in the highest echelons of startup investing, the most I can do here is share my own qualitative frameworks for thinking:
One of my favorite thought pieces on the internet is written by a legendary investor, Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate fame. In it, he illuminates a concept he calls “backcasting.” To quote him:
“Legendary builders, therefore, must stand in the future and pull the present from the current reality to the future of their design. People living in the present usually dislike breakthrough ideas when they first hear about them. They have no context for what will be radically different in the future. So an important additional job of the builder is to persuade early like-minded people to join a new movement.”
Early-stage investors must have the same genetics: the ability to see the future for what it is before the rest of humanity can. And they back founders who are capable of willing the future into existence and create reality distortion fields, a term popularized by Bud Tribble when describing Steve Jobs.
When I first jumped into venture, one of the first VCs I met — in hindsight, a futurist — told me, “Some of the best ideas seem crazy at first.” A visionary investor is willing to take the time to detect brilliance in craziness. Paul Graham, in a piece titled Crazy New Ideas, proposed that it’s worth taking time to listen to someone who sounds crazy, but known to be otherwise, reasonable because more than anyone else, they know they sound crazy and are willing to risk their carefully-built reputation to do so.
For 10x founders and investors alike, the more you hear them out, the more they make sense. That said, if they start making less and less sense the more you listen, then your time is most likely better spent elsewhere.
In closing
As you may already know, a great early-stage investor requires a different skillset than a great public equities trader or a hedge fund investor. You’re more likely to work with qualitative data than quantitative data. Regardless of what archetype of a venture investor you are, you have to believe that we are capable of reaching a better future than the one we live in today. It is then a question of when and how, not if.
Of course, I don’t believe that these three archetypes are mutually exclusive. They are more representative of spectrums rather than definitive traits. Think of it more like an OCEAN personality test than a Myers-Briggs 16 personalities.
To sum it all, I like the way my friend describes venture investors: pragmatic optimists. Balance the realities of today with how great the future can be.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Back in mid-2020, I started writing a piece on 99 Pieces of Unsolicited, (Possibly) Ungooglable Startup Advice. There was no ETA on the piece. I had no idea when I would publish it, other than the fact, that I would only do so once I hit the number 99. Yet, just like how I was inspired to write how similar founders and funders are, it finally dawned on me to start writing a similar piece for investors around mid-2021. The funny thing, is though I started this essay half a year later, I finished writing it one and a half months sooner while I was still on advice #95 for the former.
Of course, you can bet your socks I’ve started my next list of unsolicited advice for investors already. Once again, with no ETA. As I learn more, the subsequent insight that leads to an “A-ha!” moment will need to go deeper and more granular. And who knows, the format is likely to change.
I often find myself wasting many a calorie in starting from a simple idea and extrapolating into something more nuanced. And while many ideas deserve more nuance, if not more, some of the most important lessons in life are simple in nature. The 99 soundbites for investors below cover everything, in no particular order other than categorical resonance, including:
Unfortunately, many of the below advice came from private conversations so I’m unable to share their names. Unless they’ve publicly talked about it. Nevertheless, I promise you won’t be disappointed.
As any Rolodex of advice goes, you will not resonate with every single one, nor should you. Every piece of advice is a product of someone’s anecdotal experience. While each may differ in their gravitas, I hope that each of the below will serve as a tool in your toolkit for and if the time comes when you need it most.
To preface again, none of this is legal investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.
General advice
1/ To be in venture capital, you fundamentally have to be an optimist. You have to believe in a better tomorrow than today.
2/ “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.” – Mike Tyson. Told to me by an LP who invests in emerging and diverse managers.
3/ Have good fluidity of startup information. “No founder wants to meet a partner and have to answer the same questions again and again. Best partnerships sync and with every discussion, process the questioning.” – Harry Stebbings
4/ The lesson is to buy low, sell high. Not to buy lowest, sell highest.
5/ “The New York Times test. Don’t do anything you wouldn’t want to see on the front page of the NY Times.” – Peter Hebert
6/ “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.” – Warren Buffett
7/ When you’re starting off as an investor, bet on one non-obvious founder – a real underdog. Support them along their entire journey. Even if there’s no huge exit, the next one will be bigger. When their VPs go off and start their own businesses, they’ll think of you first as well.
8/ When planning for the next generation of your firm’s successors, hire and mentor a cohort of brilliant investors, instead of focusing on finding the best individual. Investing is often a lonely journey, and it’s much easier to grow into a role if they have people to grow together and commiserate with.
9/ “When exit prices are great, entry prices are lousy. When entry prices are great, exit prices are lousy.” – David Sacks
10/ Illiquidity is a feature, not a bug. – Samir Kaji
11/ Three left turns make a right turn. There is no one way to break into VC. Oftentimes, it’s the ones with the most colorful backgrounds that provide the most perspective forward.
12/ “Whenever you find yourself in the majority, it is time to pause and reflect.” As an early stage investor, I find Mark Twain’s quote to be quite insightful.
13/ “It’s not about figuring out what’s wrong; it’s about figuring out what is so right. The job of an investor is to figure out what is so overwhelmingly great, or so tantalizingly promising that it’s worth dealing with all the stuff that’s broken.” – Pat Grady retelling a story with Roelof Botha
15/ Track your deal flow. Here’s how I track mine. Another incredible syndicate lead with over 5x TVPI (total value to paid in capital) I met keeps it even simpler. A spreadsheet with just 4 columns.
Company
Valuation in
Valuation out
Co-investors – This is where you start sharing deal flow with each other here.
16/ One of your best sources of deal flow might not be from other investors, but those who are adjacent to the venture ecosystem, like startup lawyers and VC attorneys.
17/ A WhatsApp group with your portfolio is a great tool for diligencing investments, not as much for sourcing deals.
18/ “Decide once you have 70% conviction.” – Keith Rabois. Don’t make decisions with 40% conviction since that’s just gambling. Don’t wait till 90% conviction because you’ll miss the deal for being too slow.
19/ Ask questions to founders where they show grit over a repeated period of time. They need to show some form of excellence in their life, but it doesn’t have to be in their current field. From a pre-seed manager with 3 unicorns in a portfolio of 70.
20/ As an emerging manager, one of the best reasons for investing in emerging markets: Do you want to see the deals that the top 0.1% see? Or do you want to see the deals that the 0.1% passed on? From the same pre-seed manager with 3 unicorns in a portfolio of 70.
21/ Every day, open your calendar for just one hour (two 30-minute slots) to founders you wouldn’t have had otherwise. Your network will compound. From a manager who’s invested in multiple unicorns and does the above from 10-11PM every night.
22/ The bigger your check size, the harder you have to fight to get into the round.
23/ The best investors frontload their diligence so they can have smarter first conversations with founders.
24/ Perform immersion-based diligence. Become super consumers and super users of a category, as close as you can get to subject-matter experts. That way you know very quickly after meeting a founder if their product is differentiated or unique. While you’re at it, write 2-3 page bug report stress-testing the product. Founders really do appreciate it.
26/ When a founder can’t take no for an answer and pushes back, “I always have to accept the possibility that I’m making a mistake.” The venture business keeps me humble, but these are the benchmarks that the team and I all believe in. Inspired by JCal and Molly Wood.
27/ Win deals by “sucking the oxygen out of the air.” In investing there are two ways to invest: picking or getting picked. Picking is naturally in a non-competitive space. Getting picked is the exact opposite. You have to eat competition for breakfast. And when you’re competing for a deal everyone wants to get into, you have to be top-of-mind. You need to increase the surface area in which founders remember you, not just to take their time, but to be really, really valuable in as much time as you can spend with them. Inspired by Pat Grady on an anecdote about Sarah Guo.
Pitching to LPs
28/ Surprises suck. On Samir Kaji’s podcast, Guy Perelmuter of GRIDS Capital once said: “There’s only one thing that LPs hate more than losing money. It’s surprises.” More here.
29/ Fund I: You’re selling a promise. Fund II: You’re selling a strategy. And, Fund III: You’re selling the returns on Fund I.
30/ Steven Spielberg didn’t know what E.T. should look like, so he had everyone write down people they respected. And so E.T. looked a bit like everyone on that list, including Carl Sandburg, Albert Einstein and Ernest Hemingway. In a very similar way, come up with a list of your ideal LPs. And create a fund based on what they like to see and what you can bring to the table. Oftentimes, it’s easier to ask them for personal checks than checks out of their fund.
31/ Ask the founders you back for intros to their other investors as potential LPs in your fund.
32/ The return hurdles for LPs are different per fund type: *subject to market motions. Timestamped in Sept 2021 by Samir Kaji
Nano-fund (<$20M): 5-7x+
Seed fund: 3-5x+
Series A: 3x+
Growth: 2-2.5x+
Crossover/late growth (driven by IRR, not multiples): 10-12%+
33/ “If you know one family office, you know one family office.” Said by one of the largest LPs in venture funds. Each family office situation is uniquely different.
34/ Family offices are surprisingly closed off to cold emails, but often share a lot of deal flow with each other. Have co-investors or founders introduce you to them.
35/ It takes on average 2 months for an institutional LP to do diligence and reference checks. Plan accordingly.
36/ LPs look for:
Track record (could be as an individual angel as well)
Value add
Operational excellence
37/ Data shows that first-time/emerging managers are more likely to deliver outperformance than their counterparts, but as one, you still need to show you have experience investing.
38/ People, including LPs, tend to remember stories, more than they do data. Teach your LPs something interesting.
39/ LPs have started looking more into two trends: private investments and impact/ESG initiatives. By nature of you reading this blogpost, you’re most likely the former already. The latter is worth considering as part of your thesis.
40/ Every coffee is worthwhile in some form.
41/ LP diligence into VCs break down into two types: investment and operational DD.
Investment DD includes team, incentive alignment, strategy, performance, current market, and terms/fees.
Team: What does leadership look like? How diverse are you?
Alignment: Do you have performance-based compensation?
Strategy: What sectors are you investing into? What does your underwriting discipline look like?
Performance: What do your exits look like? Are you exits repeatable?
Market: What are the current industry valuations? Economies of scale?
Terms/fees: Are they LP friendly? Are the fees based on alphas or betas? Are they aligned with your value add?
Operational DD includes business model, operational controls, tech platforms, service providers, compliance and risk.
42/ If you’re pitching to other venture funds to be LPs, say for $250K checks, larger funds (i.e. $1B fund) typically have fund allocations because check size is negligible. And a value add as deal flow for them at the A. Whereas, smaller funds don’t because it is a meaningful size of their fund. So, GPs write personal checks.
43/ If you’re planning to raise a fund, think of it like raising 10 Series A rounds. For most Series A rounds, a founder talks to about 50 investors. So for a Fund I, you’re likely to talk to 500 LPs to close one.
44/ Send potential LPs quarterly LP updates, especially institutions. Institutions will most likely not invest in your Fund I or II, but keep them up to date on the latest deals you’re getting into, so you’re primed for Fund III.
45/ Family offices want to get in top funds but most can’t because top funds have huge waitlists. Yet they still want access to the same deals as top funds get access to. They’re in learning mode. Your best sell to family offices is, therefore, to have:
Tier 1 investors as your fund’s LPs
Tier 1 investors as co-investors
Deals that they wanted to get into anyway
46/ Your Fund I LPs are going to be mostly individual angels. They believe in you and your promise, and are less worried about financial returns.
47/ Institutional LPs are looking for returns and consistency. If you say you’ll do 70% core checks and 30% discovery checks, they’re checking to see if you stick to it. Institutions aren’t in learning mode, instead you as a fund manager fit into a very specific category in their portfolio. Subsequently, you’re competing with other funds with similar foci/theses as you do.
48/ Be transparent with your IRRs. If you know you have inflated IRRs due to massive markups that are annualized, let your (potential) LPs know. For early stage, that’s probably 25-30%+. Especially when you’re in today’s frothy market (timestamped Jan 2022). Or as Jason Calacanis says it for his first scout fund that had crazy IRRs, “It’s only down from here.”
49/ Don’t waste a disproportionate amount of time convincing potential LPs about the viability of your thesis. Shoot for folks who can already see your vision. If you manage to convince an LP that didn’t previously agree, they may or may not end up micromanaging you if your thesis doesn’t work out as “expected.” Inspired by Elizabeth Yin.
50/ “The irony for us was LPs asking about portfolio construction was a sign that the meeting was going poorly.” – Jarrid Tingle.
51/ Institutional LPs prefer you to have a concentrated startup portfolio – less than 30 companies. They already have diversification across funds, so they’re maximizing the chance that their portfolio has fund returners. That said, you’re probably not raising institutional capital until Fund III. Inspired by Jarrid Tingle.
52/ If you’re an emerging manager with a fund is less than 4 years old, boasting high IRR (i.e. 50%+) is meaningless to sophisticated and institutional LPs. Focus on real comparative advantages instead. – Samir Kaji.
53/ When raising early checks from LPs, ask for double the minimum check size. Some LPs will negotiate down, and when they only have to commit half of what they thought they had to, they leave feeling like they won.
54/ When potential LPs aren’t responding to your follow ups/LP updates, send one more follow up saying: “I am assuming you are not interested in investing into our fund. If I am wrong, please let me know or else this will be your last update.” Told to me by a Fund III manager who used this as her conversion strategy.
55/ It’s easier to have larger checkwriters ($500K+) commit than smaller checkwriters (<$100K). $500K is a much smaller proportion of larger checkwriters’ net worth than checkwriters who write $100K checks. And as such, smaller checkwriters write less checks, have less “disposable income”, and push back/negotiate a lot more with fund managers before committing. Told to me by a Fund III manager.
Fund strategy/management
56/ As an investor, if you want to maintain your ownership, you have to continue requesting pro-rata rights at each round.
58/ “Opportunity funds are pre-established blind pool vehicles that eliminate the timing issues that come with deal-by-deal SPVs. Opportunity funds sometimes have reduced economics from traditional 2/20 structures, including management fees that are sometimes charged on deployed, not committed capital. Unlike individual SPVs, losses from one portfolio company in an opportunity fund offset gains from another when factoring in carried interest.” – Samir Kaji. See the full breakdown of pros and cons of opportunity funds here.
59/ There are two ways to generate alphas.
Get in early.
Go to where everyone else said it’ll rain, but it didn’t. Do the opposite of what people do. That said, being in the non-consensus means you’ll strike out a lot and it’ll be hard to find support.
60/ Sometimes being right is more important than being in the non-consensus. Inspired by Kanyi Maqubela.
Market risk as a function of ownership – What is the financial upside if exit happens? Is it meaningful enough to the fund size?
Judgment risk – Are you picking the right companies?
Win rate risk – How can you help your portfolio companies win? What is your value add?
62/ By Fund III, you should start having institutional capital in your investor base.
63/ The closer you get to investing in growth or startups post-product-market fit, the closer your capital is to optimization capital. Founders will likely succeed with or without you, but your name on the cap table will hopefully get them there faster and more efficiently.
64/ If you’re a traditional venture fund, you have to invest in venture-qualifying opportunities, like direct startup investments. But you can invest up to 20% of your fund’s capital in non-venture-qualifying opportunities, like tokens/SAFTs (simple agreement for future tokens), real estate, secondaries, and so on.
65/ If increased multiples coming out of various vintage funds, feel free to deviate from the normal 2-20. Many funds have 25 or 30% carry now, or accelerators where 20% scales with multiples (and often with a catch-up back to 1.0x at higher carry). – Samir Kaji
66/ Normally, fund managers take 2% management fees, usually over 10 years, totaling 20% over the lifetime of the fund. These days, I’m seeing a number of emerging managers take larger management fees over less years. For example, 10% as a one-off. Or 5% over 2-3 years.
67/ “The razor I apply to investing and startups is that every decision that increases your probability of wild outlier success should also increase your probability of total failure. If you want to be a shot at being a 10x returning fund? You’ll have to take on the higher likelihood of being a 1x. If you think you’re going to build the next Stripe? You’re going to have to run the risk of going nowhere.” – Finn Murphy
69/ The longer you delay/deprioritize having diverse partners, the harder it’ll be to hire your first one.
Advising founders/executives
70/ A founder’s greatest weakness is his/her/their distraction. Don’t contribute to the noise.
71/ It’s far more powerful to ask good questions to founders than give “good answers”. The founders have a larger dataset about the business than you do. Let them connect the dots, but help them reframe problems through questions.
72/ You are not in the driver’s seat. The founder is.
73/ A great reason for not taking a board seat is that if you disagree with the founders, disagree privately. Heard from a prolific late-stage VC.
74/ Advice is cheap. Differentiate between being a mentor and an ally. Mentors give free advice when founders ask. Allies go out of their way to help you. Be an ally.
75/ The best way to be recognized for your value-add is to be consistent. What is one thing you can help with? And stick to it.
76/ Productize your answers. Every time a founder asks you a question, it’s likely others have the same one. Build an FAQ. Ideally publicly.
77/ If you have the choice, always opt to be kind rather than to be nice. You will help founders so much more by telling them the truth (i.e. why you’re not excited about their business) than defaulting on an excuse outside of their control (i.e. I need to talk with my partners or I’ve already deployed all the capital in this fund). While the latter may be true, if you’re truly excited about a founder and their product, you’ll make it happen.
78/ Help founders with their firsts. It doesn’t have to be their first check, but could also be their first hire, engineer, office space, sale, co-founder, team dispute, and so on.
79/ There are four big ways you can help founders: fundraising, hiring, sales pipeline, and strategy. Figure out what you’re good at and double down on that.
80/ Focus on your check-size to helpfulness ratio (CS:H). What is your unique value add to founders that’ll help them get to their destination faster? Optimize for 5x as a VC. 10x as an angel.
81/ “The job of a board is to hire and fire the CEO. If you think I’m doing a bad job, you should fire me. Otherwise, I’m gonna have to ask you to stay out of my way.” – Frank Slootman to Doug Leone after he was hired as CEO of ServiceNow.
SPVs and syndicates
82/ The top syndicates out there all have 3 traits:
Great team
Great traction
Tier 1 VC
If your deal has all of the above, and if you raise on AngelList, your deal is shared with the Private Capital Network (PCN), which AngelList’s own community of LPs and investors, a lot of which are family offices, who allocate at lest $500K of capital per year.
83/ If you’re raising an AngelList syndicate, you need to raise a minimum of $80K or else the economics don’t really make sense. AL charges an $8K fee.
84/ If you want to include Canadian investors in your syndicate, for regulation purposes, you need to invest 2% of the allocation size or $10K.
85/ Investing a sizeable check as a syndicate lead (e.g. $10K+) is good signal for conviction in the deal, and often gets more attention.
86/ 99% of LPs in syndicates want to be passive capital because they’re investing in 50 other syndicates. You can build relationships individually with them over time, but don’t count on their strategic value.
87/ Historically, smaller checkwriters take up 99% of your time. Conversely, your biggest checkwriters will often take up almost no time. Even more true for syndicates.
88/ LPs don’t care for deals where syndicate leads have time commitment without cash commitment.
89/ Don’t give LPs time to take founders’ time. Most of the time LPs don’t ask good questions, so it’s not worth the effort to set up time for each to meet with founders individually. On the other hand, a good LP update would be to host a webinar or live Q&A session. One to many is better than one to one.
90/ There’s a lot of cannibalism in the syndicate market. The same LPs are in different syndicates.
91/ Choose whether you will or will not send LP updates. Set clear expectations on LP updates. And if you do, stick to that cadence. The people who write you the $1-5K checks are often the loudest and demand monthly updates. If you choose not to, one of my favorite syndicate leads says this to their LPs, “We won’t give any LP updates. I’ve done my diligence, and I won’t give information rights. I have a portfolio of hundreds of deals, and I can’t be expected to give deal-by-deal updates every month or every quarter. So if you are investing, just know you’re along for the ride.” Some LPs won’t like that and won’t invest, but mentioning that upfront will save you from a whole lot of headaches down the road.
92/ If you’re setting up an SPV to solely invest in a fund (or where more than 40% of the SPV is going into the fund), all your SPVs can’t against the 249 LPs cap on a fund <$10M and a 99 cap on a fund >$10. But you can invest in funds if you’re setting up an SPV to invest in more than one fund. Context from Samir Kaji and Mac Conwell.
Evergreen/Rolling funds
93/ Just like vintage years/funds are important for traditional funds, vintage quarters matter to your LPs. If they didn’t give you capital during, say Q2 of 2021, when you invested in the hottest startup on the market, your Q1 and your Q3 LPs don’t have access to those returns.
94/ Whereas GPs typically make capital calls to their LPs every 6 months, AngelList’s Rolling Funds just institutionalized the process by forcing GPs to make capital calls every 3 months.
Angel investing
95/ “The best way to get deal access isn’t to be great with founders—it’s to have other investors think you’re great with founders. Build a high NPS with investors, since they have meaningfully more reach than an operator. But of course, fight hard to be great with founders too or else this will all crash down.” – Aaron Schwartz
96/ Make most of your personal mistakes on your own money as an angel (before you raise a fund).
97/ When you’re starting off, be really good at one thing. Could be GTM, growth, product, sales hires, etc. Make sure the world knows the one thing you’re good at. From there, founders and investors will think of you when they think of that one thing. Unless you’re Sequoia or a16z, it’s far better to be a specialist than a generalist if you want to be top of mind for other investors sharing deal flow.
98/ “As an angel investor, it’s more important to be swimming in a pool of good potential investments than to be an exceptionally good picker. Obviously if you’re able to be both, it’s better 🙂 but if you had to choose between being in a position to see great deals and then picking randomly, or coming across average deals and picking expertly, choose the former.” – Jack Altman
99/ “Just like the only way to get good at wine is to drink a lot of wine. The only way to get good at investing is to see a lot of deals.” – Lo Toney.
Disclaimer: None of this is investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal or investment advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
