The Curious Case of Disappearing TVPIs

disappear, card trick, shuffle, magic

In 2016, I jumped into the VC world, knowing no better than what my forefathers and foremothers taught me. Outside of a handful few, many of the people I looked up to and sought for advice had been in the business for less than a decade. In effect, they started their investing career after the GFC (Global Financial Crisis) in 2008. While they still bore more scar tissue than I did, I learned quickly that the one question to ask founders early on was “What is your last round’s valuation?” or “What valuation are you seeking?” For the latter question, the implicit answer we sought out for was their 12-month revenue. And subsequently, their valuation multiple. In Mark Suster‘s words, we were “praying to the God of Valuation.” But really, their exit multiples matter more than the entry or current multiple.

Going into 2023, we’re seeing median pre-money valuations drop across the board. Of which, late stage deals are taking the largest hit with over 80% drop in valuation at the Series D and over 70% drop at the Series C.

Source: Cooley GO

For fund managers and partners, the question was “What is your IRR or TVPI?” or “What’s your AUM?”. Rather, the answer we should be seeking isn’t some function of their portfolio’s valuations, but the quality of the businesses they invest in.

To be fair, I failed to fully appreciate the latter answer until this year.

The odds aren’t bad, but that doesn’t mean they’re great

Jared Heyman wrote a great piece last year on the probability of success for YC startups. After parsing through the data, he found that after a couple years of survival, a startup is just as likely to go through an exit (i.e. acquisition or go public) as it is to fail (i.e. inactive). Additionally, ~88% of startups reach resolution (exit or inactive) around the 12-year mark.

Source: Jared Heyman

It’s also interesting to note that the average time it takes for a YC company to exit (if they exit) is seven years. In fact, the time horizon has shortened in the past few years from an average timeline of nine years to five. Of course that’s pre-2022, so the time to exit is likely to increase once again to the mean or longer as:

  1. Markets are less liquid. Valuations drop. Rounds are smaller. Buyers are less eager to buy. Founders have less access to liquidity and exit opportunities. As such, the markets will demand more proof from founders of market traction.
  2. Investor sentiment is guarded, echoing Howard Marks. I haven’t seen the newest numbers but at best, I imagine we’ll see more capital go towards existing investments, maintaining overall investment volume. At worst, a decline of capital deployment, outside of ephemerally “hot” industries, like generative AI.
  3. Investors’ key worry is investment losses. Investors up and downstream become more risk averse.
  4. Interest rates are rising to curb inflation, leading to a debt investor’s market rather than an equity investor’s. Founders are likely to turn to expensive debt instruments (and many already have). Higher interest rates also mean greater return expectations from investors.

Jared does note in another piece that “while YC startups may cost 2-3 times as much as their non-YC peers to investors, they’re worth 6-7 times as much in terms of expected investor returns.” It’s great to be an LP in YC, but tough to be choosing YC startups. Of course, at the very end there’s a gentle reminder that VCs (and angels) are defined by the magnitude of their successes rather than the number of their failures (and successes). Just because a portco gets to an exit doesn’t mean it’ll be a fund returner. With shifting markets, this will be as true for YC under Garry’s leadership as for any other fund.

Of course, I don’t mean to pick on YC. They do a tremendous job of picking founders. And it’s true that they have set the golden standard for startup accelerators. It’s just that the above data was easily accessible.

Portfolio consistency

Interestingly enough, Oliver Jung, Airbnb’s former VP International, wrote half a month later that Adinvest’s Fund II made him $200 on every dollar he invested in the fund, largely because of a 1000x Adinvest II made into Adyen.

That’s a phenomenal outcome! To make investors back $200 on every dollar invested is definitely one for the books. The question becomes (and I have no inside scoop on this): How did the rest of the portfolio do? Was Adinvest’s Fund II purely based on luck or is there a consistent model that can be replicated in future funds?

For that question, it begs another. If we took out Adinvest’s investment in Adyen, what is the DPI (distributions to paid-in capital) of the rest of the fund? That will dictate Adinvest’s ability to raise a subsequent fund, at least from the larger, more sophisticated LPs. A great and consistent portfolio may look something a little like this.

Given that the average fund’s returns (with a large enough portfolio i.e. 100 portcos) normalizes to a 3x gross return — venture’s Mendoza line, 3-5x would put you in the ball park of good. High single digits would put you in the great category. And double digits would put you in epic.

And if Adyen really was the sole outlier success, did the GPs have the conviction to double down in subsequent rounds? If so, how did they earn their pro rata?

Sometimes all you need is one investment to push you from a nobody to a somebody, but if you’re intent on building a multi-decade-long career in the space, your founders should see you in the same or better light than those equipped with asymmetric information (i.e. those who read about you in the media).

While many Fund I’s and II’s may not have a reserve ratio, were the GPs and LPs able to continue to invest via SPVs? By doubling down, it’s the difference between a strategy to win and a strategy not to lose. How much of Adinvest’s AUM does their investment in Adyen account for? And being a fund manager means balancing oneself on the tightrope between the two strategies. In doubling down, that investment becomes a larger percent of the capital you manage (AUM). If you lose, you lose much more. If you win, you win a lot more.

Of course, this is true for any fund. I ended up overly picking on the case study of Adinvest to illustrate the point, but I have nothing against the great success Oliver, the other LPs and the team at Adinvest did have. On a broader spectrum, the purpose of having many shots on goal is theoretically so that you will have a few outliers. So your fund can grow based on a consistent strategy.

There are many times when all you have is that one outlier (often still in paper returns, not distributions yet). It happens. I’ve seen it happen. But if that one doesn’t work out, how forthcoming are you with your “disappearing TVPI?” I imagine a lot of investors who are planning to raise in 2023 will come face to face with these questions, having made big bets on hot startups in the last two years. Will you shrug it off? Or will you candidly share the lessons in which you learned?

The above is just something I’ve thought about a lot more as I see more emerging GP fundraising decks, as they boast about their angel portfolio (if they did have one).

In closing

There’s a proverb that goes: A broken clock is still right twice a day. You can be the worst investor out there, but with enough swings at bat, you’ll still be able to hit some outliers.

In the world of investing, you’re guaranteed to be wrong more often than you’re right. But I’ve seen many that do a lot of stuff ‘wrong’ and still have a winning fund. The big question… and the question, sophisticated and institutional LPs are asking is: Is it repeatable?

So, even if you did hit some home runs, is your success repeatable?


One last footnote. In talking with a number of investors who’ve been in the business for more than a decade, I’m starting to realize that selling (i.e. knowing when to sell and how much to sell) is just as important. An art and a science. I’ve written about it before (here and here), but I imagine I’ll revisit the topic again in long form soon. Especially as I see more discourse on the topic and funds close and liquidate in the near future. From great ones like Union Square Ventures to those who need to return some DPI to raise their next fund.

Photo by Edson Junior on Unsplash


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Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.