I’ve always admired the way Mike Maples has thought about backcasting. In summary, he proposes that true innovators are visitors from the future. Or as he puts it: “Breakthrough builders are visitors from the future, telling us what’s coming.” Such that they “pull the present from the current reality to the future of their design.” In other words, start from the future, then work your way backwards to figure out what you need to do today to get there.
And I find it equally as empowering to do the same exercise as an emerging manager. Hell, for any aspiring institutional investor. Be it from an angel to a GP. Or an individual LP to a fund of funds.
Start from your ideal fund model. Your ideal LP base. Your ideal pitch deck. Then work backwards to figure out what you need to do today. For the purpose of this blogpost, I’ll focus on reference checks.
For everyone in the investing world, especially in the early-stage private markets, we all know that reference checks is a key component of making investment decisions. Yet too often, founders and emerging managers alike think about them retroactively. Post-mortem. Testimonials that are often not indicative of one’s strengths. And especially not indicative of how a GP won that investment, as well as how they can win such investments in the future.
An exercise I often recommend investors do is write your ideal reference you would like to get from a founder. Be as specific as you can. What would your portfolio founders say about you? How have you helped them in a way that no one else can? What do founders who you didn’t fund say about you?
Another way to think about it is if you were to own a word — something that would live rent free in people’s minds — what would you own? Hustle Fund owns “hilariously early.” Spacecadet Ventures owns “the marketing VC” and they live up to it. Cowboy’s Aileen Lee created the idea of “unicorns.” “Software is eating the world” is attributed to Marc Andreessen.
On the flip side of the token, what are testimonials that should never be written about you?
Hell, at this point, if you’re an aspiring institutional investor, and have yet to spell things out, create the whole deck. Fill in the numbers and the facts later, but for now, make up your ideal deck. When leading indicators become lagging, then update it and fill it in.
Then be that kind of investor for every founder you help. As Warren Buffett once said, “You should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it.”
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Abe Finkelstein, Managing Partner at Vintage, has been leading fund, secondary, and growth stage investments focused on fintech, gaming, and SMB software, among others, leading growth stage and secondary investments for Vintage in companies like Monday.com, Minute Media, Payoneer, MoonActive and Honeybook.
Prior to joining Vintage in 2003, Abe was an equity analyst with Goldman Sachs, covering Israel-based technology companies in a wide variety of sectors, including software, telecom equipment, networking, semiconductors, and satellite communications. While at Goldman Sachs, Abe, and the Israel team were highly ranked by both Thomson Extel and Institutional Investor.
Prior to Goldman Sachs, Abe was Vice-President at U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, where he helped launch and led the firm’s Israel technology shares institutional sales effort. Before joining Piper, he was an Associate at Brown Brothers Harriman, covering the enterprise software and internet sectors. Abe began his career at Josephthal, Lyon, and Ross, joining one of the first research teams focused exclusively on Israel-based companies.
Abe graduated Magna Cum Laude from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania with a BS in Economics and a concentration in Finance.
Vintage Investment Partners is a global venture platform managing ~$4 billion across venture Fund of Funds, Secondary Funds, and Growth-Stage Funds focused on venture in the U.S., Europe, Israel, and Canada. Vintage is invested in many of the world’;s leading venture funds and growth-stage tech startups striving to make a lasting impact on the world and has exposure directly and indirectly to over 6,000 technology companies.
[00:00] Intro [03:22] How did Abe get his first job? [15:30] The currency of trust [17:12] How does Vintage view mistakes and weaknesses? [20:03] How Vintage organizes team offsites [28:42] The lessons Abe gained on people and long-term potential [33:47] Type 1 and Type 2 errors when evaluating GPs [36:00] How does Vintage work with their GPs and the GPs’ portfolio companies? [45:06] What Abe likes to see in a cold email [49:33] Funds that Abe says no to [51:18] When does fund size as a function of stage not make sense for Vintage? [54:51] Carry splits within a fund [1:02:08] What kinds of funds does Vintage not re-up in? [1:05:23] How did Abe become a Pitfall Explorer? [1:07:38] What Abe has learned over the years about patience? [1:11:05] One of Abe’s biggest blows in his career [1:16:23] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:18:58] Like, comment and share if you enjoyed this episode!
I know I just wrote a blogpost on how LPs assess if GPs can win deals. But after a few recent conversations with LPs in fund of funds, as well as emerging LPs, I thought it would be interesting to draw the parallel of not only proxies of how GPs win deals, but also proxies of how LPs win deals. And as such, coming back with a part two. Maybe a part one and a half. You get the point.
The greatest indicator for the ability to win deals as a VC is to see what the largest check (and greatest ownership target) a world-class founder will take from you. (That said, if you are only capable of winning deals based on price, you might want to consider another career. You should have other reasons a brilliant founder will pick you.) And even better if they give you a board seat.
The greatest indicator for the ability to win deals as an LP is to see what the smallest check a world-class GP will take from you. And even better if they give you a seat on the LPAC.
In the world where capital is more or less a commodity, the more capital one can provide (with some loose constraints on maximums), the better. But if someone who has no to little trouble raising is willing to open doors in a potentially over-subscribed fund for you, that’s something special.
An LP I was chatting with recently loves asking the question, “How big of a check size would you like me to write?” And to him, the answer “As much as you can.” Or “I’ll take any number.” is a bad answer. According to him, the best GPs know exactly how much they’re expecting from LPs, and sometimes as a function of how helpful they can be, especially in a Fund I or II. But always as a function of portfolio construction. Your fund size is after all your strategy, as the Mike Maples adage goes. While I don’t know if I completely agree with this approach, I did find this approach intriguing, and at least worth a double take.
I’m forgetting the attribution here. The curse of forgetting to write things down when I hear them. But I was listening to a podcast, or maybe it was a conversation, where they used the analogy that being a VC is like watching your child on the playground. You let your child do whatever they want to. Go down the slides. Climb the monkey bars. Sit on the swings. And so on. You let them chart their own narratives. But your job as the parent is once you see your kid doing something dangerous, that’s when you step in. When they’re about to jump off a 2-story slide. Or swing upside-down. But otherwise your kid knows best on how to have fun. In the founders’ case, they know how to build an amazing product for an audience who’s dying for it.
Excluding the fact that you’re a good friend or family that go way back, you likely have something of great strategic value to that GP — be it:
Network to other LPs
Operational expertise and value to portfolio companies (to a point where you being an LP will help the GP win deals with founders)
Operational expertise to the GP and the investment team
Investment expertise to help check the GP’s blindside
Access to downstream capital
Deal flow, or
Simply, mentorship
At the same time, ONSET Ventures once found that “if you had a full-time mentor who was not part of the company’s management team, and who had actually run both a start-up and a larger business, the success rate increased from less than 25% to over 80%.” (You can find the case study here. As an FYI, the afore-mentioned link leads to a download of the HBS case study.)
That’s the role of the board. The LPAC. Of the advisory board. For a founder or emerging GP, the full-time availability of said board members or LPAC members is vital.
A proxy of a mentor’s availability is pre-existing relationships between founder/emerging funder and said investor or advisor. Another is simply the responsiveness of the investor or advisor. Do they take less than 12 hours to reply? Or 3-5 business days? It’s for that latter reason Sequoia’s Pat Gradyonce lost out on an investment deal to his life partner, Sarah Guo. Being responsive goes a long way.
In sum, for LPs in fund of fund managers, small things go a long way.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
The great Jim Collins has this line I really like where he says fire bullets then cannonballs. “The right big things are the things you’ve empirically validated. So, you fire bullets, you validate, then you go big — bullets, then cannonballs — it’s both.”
Too often — something I see in me as much as I see in founders — when trying something new, we bottle it up. We charge the entropy of our creativity. Waiting to release it all at one big moment. A cannonball. No one else should or needs to know know. Sometimes it’s a fear of someone else stealing your idea. Sometimes, well, speaking more for myself, I just like surprises. I love the mystique. And on the slim chance you’re right, albeit rare, then awesome. But 999 out of 1000 times, you’re likely not. At least not in the first try.
I’m forgetting and also can’t seem to find the attribution. But I read somewhere that the only difference between vision and a hallucination is that others can see it. You see… the greatest YouTubers test their ideas with test audiences several times. In fact, they even test their video titles with select audiences a number of times before launching. (Instagram even added the ability to do it at scale for creators too.) Reporters do too with their headlines. Legendary investor Mike Maples at Floodgate once said, “90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.” ONSET Ventures also found in its research1 that founded the institution back in 1984 (prescient, I know) that there is a 90% correlation between success and the company changing its original business model.
All to say, one’s first idea may not always be the best and final idea. So, test things. With small audiences. With trusted confidants.
And while I may not do this all the time, with my bigger blogposts (like this, this, and this), I always run it by co-conspirators, subject-matter experts, lawyers, writers, bloggers, and people who love reading fine print. And sometimes the final product may not look like the one I initially intended, which will be true for an upcoming bigger blogpost. For events, like one I recently worked with the team at Alchemist on — redefining what in-person Demo Days look like at accelerators, we tested the idea with 20 other investors and iterated on their feedback before launching on January 30th this year. And still is not even close to its final evolution.
As Reid Hoffman once said, “If you are not embarrassed by the first version of your product, you’ve launched too late.”
Now that it’s out there…
One of the greatest Joker lines in The Dark Knight is: “Trust no one, salt and sugar look the same.”
It’s true. Whether people like something or not, they’ll always tell you things were good. It’s the equivalent of when one goes to a restaurant, orders something that’s a bit saltier than one’s liking, but when the server comes by to ask, “How is everything?”, most people respond with “Everything’s fine.” Or “good.”
You’re not going to get the real answer out of people oftentimes. Unless people really do love or hate something you did passionately. So… you must hunt for them. You must lure out the answers. You need to force people to take sides. There can be and shouldn’t be middle ground. If there are, that means they don’t like it.
Maybe it’s in the form of the NPS question. On a scale of 1-10, how likely would you recommend this product to a friend? And you cannot pick 7.
In the event space, I’ve come to like a new question. If I invited you to this event the week of, would you cancel plans to make this event? And to add more nuance, what kinds of events would you cancel to be here? What kinds of events would you not cancel?
Sometimes it helps to seed examples on a spectrum (although I try not to lead the witness here). Would you cancel a honeymoon? Or would you cancel going to another investor/founder happy hour? What about an AGM (annual general meeting, annual conference in VC talk)? What about a vacation?
As Joker said, salt and sugar look the same. So you have to taste it. Looking from afar won’t help. And if you want to iterate and improve, you need what people really think. I’d rather have people hate or dislike something I’ve created than have a lukewarm or worse, a “good” reaction.
In a way, if you’re not getting enough of an auto-immune response from the crowd, and the antibodies don’t start kicking in (aka the naysayers), you’re not really doing something new.
1 FYI, the research link redirects to its HBS case study, not the original research. Couldn’t find the latter unfortunately. But the point stands.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
In the process of catching up with a number of fund managers this week, I was reminded of two things:
That I still have an outstanding blogpost on intuition and discipline sitting on my desk, having gone through more revisions than I would like
That Fund I’s mostly start by drawing trendlines in your previous portfolio’s winners.
Now it’s not my job to call anyone out, but many of those I caught up with this week, told me in confidence (no longer in confidence now that I’m writing about it) that their best investments were simply due to being in the right place at the right time. That they were lucky. Others invested often off-thesis to accommodate for a brilliant founder that looked and sounded like nothing they had seen before. Then retroactively, went back to LPs in a subsequent fundraise armed with the knowledge to account for their previous outlier.
Chris Paik once wrote, ““Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence
Josh Wolfe said last year, “We believe before others understand.” And sometimes the investor themselves may not fully grasp what makes someone special other than that person is special.
Other times the company in which you initially bet on may not look like the company that earns you the most capital. As Mike Maples Jr. once said, “90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.
Of course, many LPs don’t want to hear that. They want to hear that you know exactly what you’re doing. That you can predict the future. But you can’t. In many ways, VCs invest in what stays the same. Not what changes. Human nature. Great hires. Network effects. Talent pools. Intellectual curiosity. Rigor. It’s a long list.
An amazing VC once told me. The job of a VC is to:
Have a wide enough aperture so enough light can come in
But have a fast enough trigger finger to catch the light, the reflections, the shadows just at the right time so that you get a good enough shot.
The rest is all done in the editing room, where you massage the photo with your expertise and experience to help it stand out.
I love that line. But simply put, the job of a VC is to:
Cast a wide enough net so that you can see as many great companies as you can,
Have the ability and awareness to know a great company when you see it.
After all, as an investor, you don’t have to invest in every great company, but every company you invest in must be great. Big anti-portfolios don’t mean much in this world if you can still get great returns.
All that to say, the job of an angel is to increase the surface area for luck to stick. And once enough do, a thesis blossoms.
A thesis, at the end of the day, is retroactive. And the best thing a fund manager can do is that the thesis the fund ends on is as close as possible to the initial. As LPs, it is our job to bet on the future of the thesis and the discipline of the fund manager. Both are equally as important. If things do change, a fund manager must preemptively communicate strategy drift and do so in the best interest of their investors.
It’s not ideal in many cases. For individual LPs and smaller family offices, strategy drift matters less. For large institutional LPs, it matters more. Because the latter don’t want you to be investing in the same underlying asset as other funds they’re invested into are.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I’ve had multiple conversations with emerging managers currently fundraising over the past few weeks, and the common theme, outside of the usual no’s, seems to be that larger LPs are saying, “If you were raising a larger fund, we would invest.”
And so there’s this catch 22 in the market right now. In one Fund I GP’s words, “either raise a larger fund and be told by the large checks that they don’t do Fund I’s. Or do a smaller fund, and be told by the high quality LPs that they’re too small.”
As a note, for the uninitiated, most large, seasoned LPs usually don’t want their check to be more than 10% of the fund. Why? Too much exposure in a single asset. And the need to diversify. Every year, there are really 20 great companies that are made. Or on the higher end, as Allocate’s Samir Kajirecently wrote, “30-50 companies drive the majority of returns.” Your goal as an LP, is to get as much exposure to those as possible. And they rarely all come out of just 1-2 funds.
If LPs are open to taking up more than 10% of the fund, they usually come with rather aggressive terms. For instance, investing into the GP stake, as opposed the to the LP. That’s a conversation for another day though.
As such, I’ve seen many a manager play both angles. They call it the “toggle.” If we raise a target of $10M fund, we’ll only do pre-seed. We’ll also have no reserves. If we raise a $25M fund, we’ll have 20% reserves and more seed checks. But if we’re able to close a $50M fund, we’ll have 33% reserves and do 50% pre-seed and 50% seed. The deltas between some fund managers’ targets and caps have grown as wide as the Grand Canyon. I was chatting with a Fund I GP yesterday who had a $10M target with $40M cap. Still relatively reasonable. Another GP raising their Fund I two weeks ago told me he had a $15M target and $70M cap. Far less reasonable. In fact, I might even say, a $15M fund and a $70M fund are two completely different strategies.
So begs the question, as a Fund I or II GP, is it worth raising a larger fund to possibly close large LPs or staying disciplined in your pre-product-market fit fund?
Spoiler alert… I don’t have the silver bullet. So if you’re looking for one, this blogpost isn’t worth your time.
But if you’re not, here’s how I’ve been thinking about it.
The short answer is really, whoever’s willing to give you money. Not the most sophisticated answer, but if you know large LPs well and they’re willing to invest in you, go bigger. Otherwise, you need to consider a more grassroots approach.
If you have a strong, portable, relevant track record that’s either returned good distributions already OR that has persisted for at least 6-7 years, larger LPs may be more open to investing in you. If not, you may need to play the numbers game with smaller LPs, that are liquidity-constrained as of now. And for that, you either take smaller checks, or prove you are the best option for their $250K LP check, that it somehow outcompetes the S&P, 3-year treasury bonds (because of interest rates), real estate and so on.
Also, remember that LPs are always nice in meeting #1. I’ve heard of very few instances where they’re not. A lot are just in exploratory mode. No pressure to commit. You will also need a great barometer of what nice looks like and what kindness looks like. Otherwise, you will waste a lot of time.
What does that mean? It is easier for a large LP to tell you “I will invest if your fund was bigger” than to tell you “No.” It’s the equivalent of VCs telling founders, “You’re too early for me.” And the same as recruiters and hiring managers telling job candidates “We have a highly competitive pool, and while we loved meeting you and you’re great…” There might be some truth to it, but a lot of smokes and mirrors, and a fear to offend people. I get it. We’re all people.
Just don’t lie to yourself.
Taking the hard road, which will be true for the vast majority of managers raising now, is to keep the fund size small and disciplined. Aim for a minimum viable fund. And deploy.
The minimum viable fund
Simply put, what is the minimum you need to execute your strategy? To set yourself up to raise a larger fund 1-2 funds from now?
What assumptions are you trying to prove?
What does your ideal Fund III look like? And What does fund-market fit look like to you? Be as detailed as you can. It could be that you’re getting four high quality deals per quarter. And that you have $30-40M to deploy per senior partner. That you’re leading rounds for target post-money valuations between $10-20M. That you have early DPI from Fund I by then. And so on.
Then work backwards. If that’s what Fund III looks like, what does Fund II look like? What does Fund I look like? As you’re backcasting, to borrow a Mike Maples Jr. term, each fund when you work backwards in time is focused on testing 1-2 key assumptions that you and LPs need to get conviction on. Assumptions that require data.
I’ll give an example of one kind of assumption. Your ability to win allocation.
If Fund III is where you lead pre-seed and seed rounds and have strong ownership targets, then Fund II is where you have to test if founders and other downstream investors will let you take pro rata for more than one round. And, if you can win or negotiate for that pro rata. It all comes down to, will a founder pick you over another awesome, possibly brand-name VC? And if so, why?
Some LPs prefer co-investment opportunities. And while it is helpful for them to go direct, part of the reason for it, is even if your fund can’t execute on the pro rata, just the ability to negotiate that is powerful for the day you need to lead. And if that’s Fund II, Fund I may be, can you win allocation in hot rounds and/or can you discover non-obvious companies before they become obvious?
Let’s say your Fund I is focused on the latter. You’re probably investing on $5-10M post-money valuations, and you’re going to try to maintain 5% ownership till the A-round. That’s $250-500K checks. $250K would be your base check, trying to get at least 30 shots on goal. That’s a $9-10M minimum viable fund, hoping for more than a 2% outlier rate in the generalist market, or north of a 10% outlier rate in bio, hard sciences, healthcare, or deep tech space.
Any less than 30 companies, you’re going for the hyper-concentrated portfolio and it’s a lot more about ownership and the greater the pressure, you need to pick well. But the goal is to get to a 3x net minimum for your fund by the time you get to a Fund III.
I heard from LPs with more miles on their odometer that once upon a time, it was normal for GPs to give undeployed capital back to their LPs. Circa 2002-2005 vintage funds. Where GPs don’t execute on 50% of their capital calls. But we don’t live in that era anymore. For better or worse.
Some LPs don’t even want their capital back early because then they need to pay taxes AND find another asset that compounds at the same or better rate your fund currently is. Say 25% IRR or CAGR. That’s hard. Because minus the inflated marks of the last 5 years, 25% is a hard benchmark to hit for the vast majority of funds.
So sometimes to be the best fiduciary, that means raising a small fund today (easier to return too) to set you best up for tomorrow.
The questions to ask
If you are in the midst of conversation and trying to court a large LP, do ask the following:
Have you invested in an emerging manager in the last two years? — If not, you’re unlikely to be their first. If you’re not seeing demonstrable progress from intro to partnership meeting to diligence within three meetings, move on. If they did so, 20 years ago, doesn’t count. That means investing in emerging managers is not top of mind for them.
What is your minimum check size? And how often, if ever do you deviate from it? If so, why was the last time you did so? — Multiply this number by 10. If it’s greater than your fund size, you might find more success elsewhere.
What is the typical process look like? — Find out what their process is and see if you’re progressing forward. If not, very clear they may not be interested.
(If the person you are talking to does seem to really like you) What are the questions you’re being asking in your investment committee? — Figure out the bottlenecks as soon as you can. And determine if that’s something you can solve for in the near future or not. If it’s track record, you realistically can’t.
What is the thing you hated most in the last few years? — Understand their red flags early on in the process. And cross your fingers, it’s not something that’s relevant to you or your fund. If it is, move on.
Of course, the above, while useful pre-qualifying questions, are mentioned in broad strokes. Your mileage may vary. Have there been examples of large LPs betting on small funds? Yes. But far and few in between. But don’t expect you will change many minds.
In closing
Fundraising is all about momentum and time you’re in market. You can theoretically spend six months trying to close one large LP, but your time might be better spent closing smaller checks in the beginning from people who believe in you and strong referenceable names. And if you so choose, come back to the large LP in the second half of your fundraise.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
VCs win upon liquidity event. And that happens either via M&A or via going public. After that, the shares are transferred to the hands of the LPs and they choose how they’d like to liquidate or keep. To date, we have neither seen a trillion dollar acquisition nor a trillion dollar IPO. I’m not saying it’ll never happen. I’m sure it will, at some point. A combination of inflation and companies finding more liquidity when private markets are bullish.
As Charles Hudson suggests in his one of his latest posts, the venture world has been changing. What was once a cottage industry gave way to multi billion dollar funds. While there are still many small sub-$100M funds, LPs have started evaluating venture capital not as just one big industry, but segmenting it by size of fund. Small funds, sub-$100M. Medium-sized funds, $100-500M. And big funds, funds north of $500M assets under management (AUM for short). And as the Mike Maples dictum goes, your fund size is your strategy.
Returning a billion-dollar fund requires different kinds of investments and math for it to work compared to returning a $50M fund. And one day, as large funds continue to expand into multiple stages, check size, but also eventually into public markets, we might see them start to bet on trillion-dollar outcomes. Because to return a 11- or 12-figure fund, you need to do just that. But given the market we’re in now, I imagine that won’t be in the near future.
The 10,000-foot view
So the thing you have to gain conviction around, as a macroeconomist, is not how big a venture fund should be. Nor the debate on how many VC funds is too many. The number nor the size truly matter in the grand scheme of things.
For an illiquid asset class like venture, where you’re betting on the size of the home runs, not one’s batting average, what you have to gain conviction around is:
How many truly great companies are there every year
How much capital is needed to get these companies to billion dollar outcomes
For the latter, there are two main ways to get to billion dollar exits: going public or getting acquired. And while there are outliers, the best way is for these businesses to get to $100M of recurring revenue.
And everything else is downstream of that.
As an LP once told me, “In the 1990s, it took $7 million to get to first revenue. In the 2000s and into the early 2010s, it took $700K. Now it takes $70K.” With each era and each wave of technological development, founders become more capital efficient. There are less barriers to get to market. Now with AI, it might just be $7K to get to first revenue, if not sooner.
The question is how much capital is needed to get to $1M ARR. If we take a decent burn multiple of 1.5x, then we underwrite an assumption that it’ll take $1.5M to get to $1M ARR. And possibly $4.5M to get to $3M ARR. And somewhere in there, that founder will find product-market fit and turn on the growth engine. CAC (customer acquisition cost) falls. And lifetime value increases. Payback periods shorten. And if all goes well, founders may find themselves with a sub-one burn multiple. And after they hit $1M ARR, and they triple the first two years, double the next three, they’re at $100M ARR. Of course, I’m illustrating the above all in broad strokes. The best case scenario. But most things don’t go according to plan.
Then an investor has to figure out if one should only make net new investments or re-capitalize a select few of their existing investments.
Then as LPs, what is the minimum ownership percentages that can return funds at each differentiated stage and fund sizes? And due for possibly another blogpost altogether, how does a 7-8x multiple on forward-looking ARR impact round sizes and valuations across bull and bear markets?
All this admittedly is both art and science. But I will admit that larger fund sizes and playing the AUM game may not be the answer.
In closing
My friend recently sent me this letter that Sam Hinkie wrote when he retired as GM of the 76ers. In it, he quoted the great Sage of Omaha when he closed down Buffett Partnership. “I am not attuned to this environment, and I don’t want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don’t understand just so I can go out a hero.” And it’s for that same reason, Sam stepped down. The same reason Jerry Seinfield turned down $110 million to do another season of Seinfeld. Even though the sequel business does quite well.
There is no shame in knowing when to hang up the cleats. And there is great power in being disciplined. In fact, it’s one of the most sought-after traits in fund managers. If not, the most sought-after.
In VC, it comes in all sizes, ranging from:
Fund size discipline. There a lot of GPs out there who have gone on to raise 9- to 10-figure early stage funds. A mathematical equation that becomes increasingly harder to prove true, given outputs need to reflect inputs. In other words, larger funds are harder to return. There are a lot of VCs who would rather play the AUM (assets under management) game than stay disciplined on returns. Not just paper returns, but real cold hard cash. In the words of my friend Chris Douvos, “moolah in da coolah.” To quote another line from Chris, “OPM (other people’s money) is like opium. It’s addicting.” Something one too many investors have gotten addicted to.
Thesis discipline. As a friend who’s been a VC across multiple economic cycles once told me, it’s much better to turn down an off-thesis hot deal led by a top tier firm than to take it.
Career discipline. To echo the words of Sam Hinkie above.
And of course, knowing that we underwrite billion dollar outcomes, rather than trillion dollar ones. Then again, that’s just a subset of fund size and portfolio construction.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
There was a fascinating episode on the Tim Ferriss Show recently, where we get the inside baseball on how David Maisel, founder of Marvel Studios, raised half a billion on a promise for a company who’s public market cap at the time was only a fifth of a billion. Naturally, not only was he against a lot of headwind externally, but internally as well. According to the board at the time, they would only greenlight the idea of producing their own films (as opposed to licensing their IP out) if “Marvel had no risk. Not little risk, but no risk.”
On the cusp of Captain America and Thor being licensed away, David asked the board to give him six months. The “zero risk” pitch then came in the form of external funding, huge financial upside (if things worked out), market timing, and a promise.
Financial upside for Marvel
As David puts it:
“First to my board, the argument, was if we own our own studio, it means we get the full financial upside that they understood very well.” As opposed to licensing, their traditional business model. Where Marvel only got five cents on every dollar of profit. As was the case with SONY and Spiderman.
“Number two, we decide on greenlight when the movies get made that they also understood because they only sold toys really at the time, and the toys were contingent on a movie, which they then control the timing. Now when you’re doing a public company and you’re giving guidance every year, how can you give guidance if you don’t even know what movies are going to get made? And so controlling greenlight was important, full creative control.”
Moreover, the team was able to take 5% of revenues as the producer fee AND keep all non-film revenues (i.e. toys, video games, etc.). And even if four out of the five films lost capital, they’d still make $25M in revenue each. In other words, $100M in sum. Half of Marvel’s public market cap at the time. Whose cap was only based on toy sales.
Market timing
“The bond bubble of 2004 was happening,” as David shared, “so it was a time where there was loans being made that shouldn’t have been made. And a lot of people were enamored with Hollywood as they get enamored every few years.”
Zero downside
Instead of funding the studio off balance sheet, David would go out to fundraise from others. So what was the external pitch?
“Give me four at bats, and if one of them hits, then every movie’s a sequel after that.”
On top of all the above, to me, there were some interesting terms for the investment that helped sweeten the deal:
Merrill Lynch got a 3% success fee upon the $525M closing.
David got a low interest rate loan from Merrill by getting it insured by MPAC, therefore the debt became AAA debt, which “was easy to sell to pensions and easy to sell to individual investors” in case things went awry.
Now I’m not sure if this is standard Hollywood practice. But I imagine it’s not, at least back in ’03 and ’04. I’m a venture guy after all. And as one, the above is news to me.
That said, the banks David went to fundraise from were not taking equity. It was “pure debt. So very low interest rate. And the only collateral were the film rights to ten Marvel characters of which we could make for the movies.” Which, to me, ten characters sounds like a lot for a company whose business is characters. I also imagine these were characters that had some level of historical fanbase, so they weren’t random ones from the archives.
But David clarifies. “A lot of people misunderstand that they think we pledged ten of our characters as collateral. It wasn’t that at all because in the worst case scenario, it only got collected if we lost money on those first four movies. And then those six characters, we owned all the rights besides film. And if a film was ever made by the bank, whoever collected this collateral, we got the same license fee that we get if we just license it that day to a party. So there was no opportunity cost.”
And the promise
This is history now, but at the time, was a bold claim. The idea was borne out of frustration as an entertainment investor. That:
Marvel couldn’t capture a large part of enterprise value through productions with just licensing
The first movie business was horrible. Sequels, on the other hand, were a lot more predictable. So, the focus after the first movie would not be on predicting profit, but maximizing profit margins.
So David had a thought. “What if after the first movie, every movie after that was a sequel or a quasi-sequel, which required all the characters, or a lot of the characters, to show up in multiple movies?”
The idea of sequel snowballed into what we now know as the MCU — the Marvel Cinematic Universe.
Bringing it back to venture
It’s a nice corollary to raising a Fund I, where you’re also selling a promise. A world vision. A painting of the future. Nothing’s proven yet. You’re sure as hell not selling a repeatable strategy yet, and definitely not any returns. Since there’s a good chance you haven’t returned capital to LPs before.
And this is true for not just funders, but also founders. In the words of Mike Maples, “Breakthrough builders are visitors from the future, telling us what’s coming. They seem crazy in the present but they are right about the future.
“Legendary builders, therefore, must stand in the future and pull the present from the current reality to the future of their design. People living in the present usually dislike breakthrough ideas when they first hear about them. They have no context for what will be radically different in the future. So an important additional job of the builder is to persuade early like-minded people to join a new movement.”
Dissent is a luxury
The truth is loads of people will disagree with you. You’re not looking for consensus. In fact, it’s better to be wrong and alone than right and with the crowd if you’re in the venture world. Either as a founder or an emerging GP. It’s something I recently learned from the one and only Chris Douvos. If you imagine a 2×2 matrix… On one axis, you have right and wrong. On the other, you have with the crowd and alone. You want to be in the right and alone quadrant for sure. That’s where “fortune and glory” exists. It’s where alpha exists. It is how you become an outlier and achieved outsized returns.
But the prerequisite to be there is to have the guts to start in the wrong and alone quadrant. If you start from being right and in the crowd, you’re one among many. And that doesn’t give you the liberty to have independent thinking. You’re constantly trapped in noise.
It’s as Abhiraj Bhal says. “If you are a category-defining company, you will always have a TAM question, if the category is defined by somebody else, you will not have a TAM question.” You want people to question you. And as humans, we like to fit in. But to create something transcendent, external doubt is your best friend.
As such, your promise of the future must seem bizarre.
Don’t start with the product, start with your customers
When you have a promise, admittedly, the easiest way is to start engineering it right away. Without market validation. Without stress testing. Which pigeonholes a number of founders. I forgot the origination, but there’s a great line that says, “The only difference between a hallucination and a vision is that other people can see the latter.”
And in order to test that, you need to get in front of potential users and customers first. Max, someone I had the joy of working with, once wrote the below timeless tweet:
My hot take of the day:
Most aspiring startup founders who think they should learn to code would be better off learning to write well instead.
As Elizabeth once shared: “We decided that we’d start with no product. We would not build anything. And, we just started selling ads. We manually brokered deals with publishers and advertisers and took a cut in between. We got our customers by emailing people and setting up the copy and links ourselves. People would pay me through my personal PayPal account. It was only when we realized we were onto something that we started building technology to remove bottlenecks.”
On the investor side, it’s building a thesis where great investments fall into. It’s a way of looking at the world in a perspective that may seem foreign to others, but almost obvious in retrospect. The thesis should elicit the response, “Why didn’t I think of that first?” But no matter how obvious, you are the best positioned to bring the thesis to life. That doesn’t mean you need returns yet. Although good graduation rates certainly help as a leading indicator.
In that regard, it’s quite similar to how David Maisel foretold of the Universe to come. Obvious once explained, yet still met with resistance from legacy players.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Voila, the fourth installation of 99 soundbites I’ve been fortunate enough to collect over the past year. The first four of what I imagine of many more to come. Each of which fall under one of the ten categories below, along with how many pieces of advice for each category:
You can also find the first three installments of 99 pieces of advice for both founders and investors here. Totaling us to a total of 396 pieces of advice.
But without further ado…
Fundraising
1/ If you’re an early stage startup, expect fundraising to take at least 3-4 months to raise <$1M. If you’re on the fast side, it may take only 2 weeks. – Elizabeth Yin*timestamped April 2022
2/ If you’re going to raise a round over 6-12 months, it often doesn’t seem fair that your first commits have the same terms as those who commit 6 months later, since you’ve grown and most likely have more traction at the time. As such, reward your early investors with preferred terms. Say you’re raising a $1M round. Break the round up to $300K and $700K. Offer a lower cap on SAFEs for the $300K. “Tell everyone that that offer will only be available until X date OR until you hit $300k in signed SAFEs. And that the cap will most likely go up after that.” Why? It lets you test demand and the pricing on the cap – to see if you’re cap is too high or too low on the first tranche. – Elizabeth Yin
3/ As a startup in recessionary times, you have to grow your revenue faster than valuations are falling to make sure you raise your next round on a mark up. Inspired by David Sacks and Garry Tan. *timestamped April/May 2022
4/ There’s only going to be 1/3 the amount of capital in the markets than in 2020 and 2021. So plan accordingly. If you’re not a top 0.1% startup, plan for longer runways. Fund deployments have been 1-1.3 years over the past 1.5 years, and it’s highly likely we’re going to see funds return back to the 3-year deployment period as markets tighten. *timestamped May 2022
5/ B2B startups that have the below disqualifiers will find it hard to raise funding in a correcting venture market:
No to little growth. Good growth is at least doubling year-over-year.
Negative or low gross margins. Good margins start at 50%.
CAC payback periods are longer than one year.
Burn multiples greater than 2 (i.e. You’re burning $2 for every dollar you bring in). A good burn multiple is 1 or less. – David Sacks
6/ Beware of “dirty term sheets.” Even though you’re able to get the valuation multiple you want, read the fine print for PIK dividends, simple “blocks” on IPO/M&A, and 2-3x liquidation preferences. Inspired by Bill Gurley.
7/ “This came at a very expensive valuation with certain rights that should not have come with it — like participating preferred, which is they first get their money out and then they participate in the rest, which was OK for the earlier rounds, but not for the later ones.” – Sabeer Bhatia in Founders at Work
8/ In a bear market, public market multiples are the reference points, not outlier private market multiples. Why? Public market multiples are their exit prices – how they return the fund. It matters less so in bull markets. – David Sacks
9/ Don’t trust the “why”, trust the “no.” Investors don’t always give the most honest responses when they turn down a company.
10/ If you inflate your projections, the only investors you’ll attract are dumb investors. They’ll be with you when things are going well and make your life a living nightmare when things aren’t, will offer little to no sound advice, and may distract you from building what the market needs. By inflating your projections, you will only be optimizing for the battle, and may lose the war if you can’t meet or beat your projections.
11/ VCs will always want you to do more than you are pitching. So if you’re overpromising, they’re raising their expectations even more down the road.
12/ Five questions you should answer in a pitch deck:
If you had billboard, what 10 words describe what you do?
What insight development have you had that others have not?
How you acquire customers in a way others can’t?
Why you?
What you need to prove/disprove to raise next round? – Harry Stebbings
13/ The longer you’re on the market, the greater the differential between expectations and reality, and the harder it is over time to close your round. Debug early on in the fundraising process (or even before the fundraising process) by setting and defining expectations through:
Leveraging market comparables. You don’t have to be good at everything, but you have be really really amazing at one thing your competitors aren’t. It’s okay if they’re better than you in other parts.
14/ You should reserve 10% of your round to allocate to your most helpful existing investors. Reward investors for their help. – Zach Coelius
15/ If your next round’s investor is willing to screw over your earlier investors out of pro rata or otherwise. After they leave, the only one left to screw over is you. – Jason Calacanis
16/ “Nobody’s funding anything that needs another round after them.” – Ben Narasin quoting Scott Sandell
17/ “When a VC turns you down for market size, what they are really saying is: I don’t believe you as the founder has what it takes to move into adjacent and ancillary markets well.” – Harry Stebbings
18/ When raising from corporates, be mindful of corporate incentives, which may limit your business and exit opportunities. “I’ve often seen the structure just simply be a SAFE with no information rights. No Board seats. Check sizes that are worth < 5% ownership. No access to trade secrets.” – Elizabeth Yin
19/ LOIs mean little to many investors, unless there’s a deposit attached to it. A customer must want the product so much they’re willing to take the risk of putting money down before they get it. 1-5% deposit would be interesting, but if they pay the product in full, you would turn investor heads. – Jason Calacanis
20/ “The most popular software for writing fiction isn’t Word. It’s Excel.” – Brian Alvey
21/ “Ask [prospective investors] about a recent investment loss, where the company picked someone else. See how they describe those founders, the process, and what they learned. This tells you what that investor is like when things don’t go their way.” – Nikhil Basu Trivedi
22/ “Founders, please hang onto at least 60% of the company’s equity through your seed raise. Series A or B is the first time founder equity should dip below 50%. I’ve seen cap tables recently where investors took too much equity early on, creating financing risk down the road.” – Gale Wilkinson
23/ “One of the worst things you can say to a VC is ‘we’re not growing because we’re fundraising.’ There are no excuses in fundraising.” – Jason Lemkin. Fundraising is a full-time job, but when you’re competing in a saturated market of attention, it’s you who’s fundraising, but not growing, versus another founder who’s also fundraising and is growing.
25/ The goalposts of fundraising (timestamped Oct 20, 2022 by Andrea Funsten):
Pre-seed: $750K-1.5M round
Valuation: $5-10M post (*She would not go over $7M)
Traction:
A working MVP
Indications of customer demand = have interviewed hundreds of potential customers or users
2-5 “Design Partners” (non-paying customers or users)
Seed: $2-5M round
Valuation: $12-25M post (*She would not go over $15M)
Traction:
$10-15K MRR, growing 10% MoM
6-12 customers who have been paying for ~6 months or more, a few that would serve as case studies and references
Hired first technical AE
Series A: $8-15M round
Valuation: “anyone’s guess”
Traction:
$1.5M in ARR is good, more like $2M
3x YoY growth minimum, but more like 3.5x • 12-20 customers, indications of ACV growth
Sales team in place to implement the repeatable sales playbook
26/ Don’t take on venture debt unless you have revenue AND an experienced CFO. – Jason Calacanis
27/ When you are choosing lead investor term sheets:
For small VC teams (team <10ppl): Make sure your sponsoring partner is your champion. Why does investing in you align with their personal thesis? Their life thesis? Which other teams do they spend time with? How much time do they spend with them? When things don’t go according to plan, how do they react? How do they best relay expectations and feedback to their portfolio founders?
For larger platform teams (team >10ppl): Ask to talk to the 3-5 best people at the firm. And when the investor asks you to define “best”, ask to talk to their team members who best represent the firm’s culture and thesis. Why? a/ This helps you best understand the firm’s culture and if there’s investor-founder fit. b/ You get to know the best people on the team. And will be easier to hit them up in the future.
28/ “If you are a category-defining company, you will always have a TAM question, if the category is defined by somebody else, you will not have a TAM question.” – Abhiraj Bhal
29/ “[Venture] debt typically has a 48-54 month term, as follows: 12 months of a draw period (ballooned to 18 months over the last few years), to which you can decide to use it or not 36 months to amortize it after that 12 months. The lender at this stage is primarily underwriting to venture risk, meaning they are relying on the venture investor syndicate to continue to fund through a subsequent round of financing.” This debt is likely to be paired with language that allow the fund to default if investors say they won’t fund anymore and/or just not to fund when asked. “They typically are getting 10bps-50bps of equity ownership through warrants. Loss rates must be <3-4% for the model to work.” If there’s less than 6 months of runway or cash dips below outstanding debt, then as a founder, expect a lot of distracting calls. – Samir Kaji
30/ The best way to ask for intros to investors is not by asking for intros, but by hosting an event and having friends invite investors to the event. There’s less friction in an event invite ask than an investor intro ask. The reality is that the biggest investors are inundated with intro requests all the time, if not just by cold email too.
Cash flow levers
31/ The bigger your customers’ checks are (i.e. enterprise vs. SMB vs consumer), the longer the sales pipeline. The longer the sales pipeline, the longer you, the founder, has to stay the Head of Sales. For enterprise, the best founders stay VP of Sales until $10M ARR. For SMB, that’s about $1-2M ARR, before you hire a VP of Sales. Inspired by Jason Lemkin.
32/ “‘I have nothing to sell you today — let’s take that off the table and just talk,’ he would say. ‘My goal is to earn the right to have a relationship with you, and I know it’s my responsibility to earn that right.'” The sales playbook of David Beirne of Benchmark Capital fame, cited in eBoys.
33/ “All things being equal, a heavy reliance on marketing spend will hurt your valuation multiple.” – Bill Gurley
34/ If you were to double or triple the price of your product, what percent of customers would churn? If the answer is anything south of 50%, why aren’t you doing it?
35/ Getting big customers and raising capital is often a chicken-and-egg game. Sometimes, you need brand name customers, before you can raise. And other times, you need capital before you can build at the scale for brand name customers. So, when I read about Vinod Khosla’s advice for Joe Kraus: “We had $1 million in the bank and we didn’t know what we were going to bid. We sat down in my office, all on the floor. Vinod said we should bid $3 million. I was like, ‘How do we bid $3 million? We only have $1 million in the bank.’ And he said, ‘Well, if we win, I’m pretty sure we can raise it, but if we don’t win, I don’t know how we’re going to raise.'”
36/ “Your ability to raise money is your strategy. If you’re great at it, build any business with network effects. If you’re bad at fundraising, it’s strategically better to build a subscription business with no network effects.” – Elizabeth Yin
37/ Be willing to fire certain customers (when things get tough or in an economic downturn). If they aren’t critical strategic partners or are loss making, figure out how to make them profitable. If you can, renegotiate contracts, like cheaper contracts for longer durations. If not, let them go. Make it easy to offboard.
38/ An average SaaS business, that doesn’t have product-led growth, is spending about 50% of revenue on sales and marketing. Those that are in hyper growth are spending 60%. – Jason Lemkin
39/ “The only thing worse than selling nothing is selling a few. If you sell nothing, you stick a bullet in it and move on. When you sell a few, you get hope. People keep funding even though it’s really not viable.” – Frank Slootman
40/ If your customer wants to cancel their auto-renew subscription to your product, you should refund them a 100% of their cost. – Jason Lemkin
41/ “Your price isn’t too high. Your perceived value is too low.” – Codie Sanchez
42/ “15-20% of IT spend is in the cloud.” And it’s likely to go up. – Alex Kayyal
43/ If your customers are willing to pay you way ahead of when your service is executed, you have an unfair and unparalleled cashflow advantage. – Harry Stebbings
44/ If you’re in the CPG business, it’s better to negotiate down the contract. “You buy 75, and you sell 60, they’re going to go, ‘Ah, I got 15,000 in inventory, it’s not a success.’ If you give them 40, and then they have to buy another 20, and they sell 60, they go, ‘Wow, we ordered 50 [(I think he meant 20)] more than our original order.’ You’re still at 60, but one, they’re disappointed, and one, they’re not. You’re still playing some weird mind games a little bit so that they feel good about whatever number was there.” – Todd McFarlane
45/ “If you are under 100 customer/users, get 20 of them in a Whatsapp Group. You will:
Get much higher quality feedback, faster, on the current product.
They will be WAY more proactive in suggesting future product ideas and helping you shape the product roadmap.
It will create a closer relationship between you and them and they will become champions of the product and company. People like to feel they had a hand in the creation process.” – Harry Stebbings
46/ Create multiple bank accounts with different banks to keep your cash, to hedge against the risk of a bank run. The risk is very unlikely to occur, but non-zero, especially in a recessionary market. Inspired by SVB on March 10, 2023. More context here, and what happened after here. Breakdowns here, here and here.
47/ “Keep two core operating accounts, each with 3-6 months of cash. Maintain a third account for “excess cash” to be invested in safe, liquid options to generate slightly more income.” – A bunch of firms
48/ “Maintain an emergency line of credit. Obtain a line of credit from one of your core banks that can fund the company for 6 months. Do not touch it unless necessary.” – A bunch of firms
49/ In case of a bank run: “1/ Freeze outgoing payments, let vendors know you need 60 days, 2/ Figure out payroll & let your investors know exactly when cash out, 3/ Attempt emergency bridge with existing investors; hopefully reasonable terms or senior debt (but given valuation reset this is a HARD discussion for many), 4/ Figure out who can take deferred salary on management team, which will extend runway, 5/ Make sure you communicate reality to team honestly so they can make similar plan for their household, 6/ Make sure you talk to HR about legal issues around payroll shortfall — which hopefully this doesn’t come to, 7/ In future, keep cash in 3 different banks.” – Jason Calacanis
50/ “Whenever a CEO blames their bad performance on the economy, I knew I had a really crappy CEO. ‘Cause it wasn’t the economy, it was a bad product-market fit. The dogs didn’t wanna eat the dogfood. Sometimes the economy can make that a little worse, but if people are desperate for your product, it doesn’t matter if the times are good or bad, they’re going to buy your product.” – Andy Rachleff
51/ General reference points for ACV and time to close are: $1K in 1 week. $10K in 1 month. $100K in 3 months. $300K in 6 months. And $1M in 12 months. – Brian Murray
52/ A B2B salesperson’s script from Seth Godin. “Look, you’ve told me you have this big problem you need to solve. You have a five million assembly line that’s letting you down, blah blah. If we can solve this problem together, are you ready to install our system? Because if it’s not real, let’s not play. Don’t waste my time, I won’t waste yours. You’re not going to buy from me because I’m going to take you to the golf course. You’re not going to buy from me because our RFP is going to come in cheaper than somebody else’s. You want my valuable time? I’m going to engage with you, and tell you the truth and you’ll tell me the truth. You’re going to draw your org chart for me. You’re going to tell me other complicated products you’ve bought and why your company bought them. And I’m going to get you promoted by teaching you how to buy the thing that’s going to save your assembly line. Let’s get real or let’s not play.” – Seth Godin
53/ “The job of a pre-seed founder is to turn investor dollars into insights that get the company closer to finding product-market fit.” – Charles Hudson
Culture
54/ Deliver (bad) news promptly. Keep to a schedule. The longer you delay, the more you lose your team’s confidence in you. For example, if your updates come out every other Friday, and you miss a few days, your team members notice. Your team is capable of taking the tough news. This is what they signed up for. Explain a stumble before it materially impacts your bottom line – revenue. Inspired by Jason Lemkin.
56/ “It’s easier, even fun, to do something hard when you believe you’re doing something that no one else can. It’s really hard to go to work every day to build the same thing, or an even worse version, of what others are already building. As a result, there was a huge talent drain from the company.” – Packy McCormick
57/ Lead your team with authenticity and transparency. “Employees have a ridiculously high bullshit detector, more so than anyone externally, because they know you better. They know the internal brand better.” So you have to be honest with them. “Here’s what we’re going to tell you. Here’s what we won’t, and here’s why.” Set clear expectations and leave nothing to doubt. – Nairi Hourdajian
58/ When someone ask Jeff Bezos, when does an internal experiment get killed? He says, “When the last person with good judgment gives up.” – Bill Gurley citing Jeff Bezos
59/ “Getting too high on a ‘yes’ can prepare you for an even bigger fall at the next ‘no.’ Maintaining your composure in the high moments can be just as important as not getting too down in the low moments.” – Amber Illig
60/ “Most have an unlimited policy paired with a results-driven culture. This means it’s up to the employee to manage their time appropriately. For example, no one bats an eye when the top performing sales person takes a 3 week vacation. But if someone is not pulling their weight and vacationing all the time, the perception is that they’re not cut out for a startup.” – Amber Illig
61/ “Whenever we’re dealing with a problem and we call a meeting to talk about the problem, I always start with this structure. We are here to solve a problem. So the one option that we know we’re not going to leave the room doing is the status quo. That is off the table. So whenever we finish this meeting, I want to talk about what option we’re taking, but it’s not going to be what we’re currently doing.” – Tobi Lutke
62/ “[Peter Reinhardt] would put plants in different parts of the office in order for the equilibrium of oxygen and CO2 to be the same. He would put noise machines in the perfectly placed areas and then reallocate the types of teams that needed to be by certain types of noise so that the decibel levels were consistent. What I don’t think people realize about founders is that they are maniacal about the details. They are unbelievable about the things that they see.” – Joubin Mirzadegan
63/ “Leadership is disappointing people at a rate they can absorb.” – Claire Hughes Johnson
64/ Page 19 Thinking: If you were to crowdsource the writing of a book, someone has to start inking the 19th page. And it’s gotta be good, but you can’t make it great on the first try. So you have to ask someone else to make it better, and they have to ask another to make their edits even better. And so on. Until page 19 looks like a real page 19. “Once you understand that you live in a page 19 world, the pressure is on for you to put out work that can generously be criticized. Don’t ship junk, not allowed, but create the conditions for the thing you’re noodling on to become real. That doesn’t happen by you hoarding it until it’s perfect. It happens by you creating a process for it to get better.” – Seth Godin
Hiring
65/ Hiring when your valuation is insanely high is really hard. Their options could very much be valueless, since they would depend on the next valuation being even higher, which either means you grow faster than valuations fall (market falls in a bear market) or you extend your runway before you need to fundraise again.
66/ It’s easier to retain great talent in a recession, but much harder to retain them during an expansionary market. Talent in a boom market have too many options. There’s more demand than there is supply of talent in a boom market.
67/ If you’re a company with low employee churn, you can afford to wait a while longer to find someone who is 20% better in the role. – Luis von Ahn
68/ “[Fractional CMOs and CROs often] want to be strategists. Tell you where to focus, and what to do better. But the thing is, what you almost always just need is a great full-time leader to implement all the ideas.” – Jason Lemkin. The only time it works is when the fractional exec owns the KPI and the function, where they work at least 60% of the time OR they work part-time and help you hire a full-time VP.
69/ Hire your first full-time comms person after you hit product-market fit, when you are no longer finding your first customers, but looking to grow your customer base. – Nairi Hourdajian
70/ “Ask [a high-performing hire] if there’s someone senior in her career that’s been a great manager, and if so, bring them on as an equity-compensated advisor to your company. If there’s someone in industry she really admires but doesn’t yet know, reach out to them on her behalf.” Give her an advisor equity budget, so they can bring on a mentor or someone they really respect in the industry. As a founder, create a safe space for both of them. Monthly 1:1s and as-needed tactical advice, introductions, and so on. And don’t ask that mentor to give performance feedback “because if so it’s less likely they’ll have honest, open conversations.” – Hunter Walk
71/ Hire talent over experience for marketing and product. “In marketing and product I prefer people with less experience and a lot of talent so we can teach them how we do things. They don’t have to unlearn anything about how they already work. We teach them how we work. For developers it might be different because it takes a lot of time to be a really good developer, and it’s relatively easy moving from one environment to another.” – Avishai Abrahami
72/ If you’re going to use an executive search firm to hire an exec, ask the firm three questions: “1/ Walk me through your hardest search? 2/ Walk me through a failed search? 3/ Why did it fail? 4/ How do you assess whether an exec is a good fit?” You should be interviewing the firm as much as the candidate. Watch out for “a firm with a history of candidates leaving in a short timeframe. Avoid firms that recycle the same execs.” – Yin Wu
73/ Before signing with any recruiting agency, ask “What happens if the person hired is a bad fit? (Many firms will restart the search to align incentives.) Is there a time limit for the search? (Some firms cap the search at 6 months. We’ve worked with firms without caps.)” – Yin Wu
Governance
74/ “The higher the frequency and quality of a young startup’s investor update, the more likely they are to succeed in the long run.” – Niko Bonatsos
75/ Five metrics you should include in your monthly investor updates:
Monthly revenue and burn, in a chart, for the whole year
Cash in the bank, at a specific date, and runway based on that
Quarterly performance for the past 8 quarters, in a chart
Target for the quarter AND year and how you are trending toward it
76/ Another reason to send great, consistent investor updates is that when prospective investors backchannel, you want to set your earlier investors up for success on how they pitch you.
77/ If you don’t have a board yet, still have an “investor meeting.” “Create investor meetings where you invite all your investors to do an in-person + Google Hangout’ed review every 60 days. They don’t have to come. But they can.” – Jason Lemkin
78/ “[The] most important measures of success for a CEO [are] internal satisfaction, investor relations and consumer support.” – Bob Iger
79/ “Entrepreneurs have control when things work; VCs have control when they don’t.” – Fred Wilson
80/ If an investor really wants their money back (usually when VCs have buyer’s remorse), there are times when they force you to sell or shut down your companies. Instead, ask them, “What would it take to get you off my cap table?” – Chris Neumann
Product
81/ “The ones that focus, statistically, win at a much higher rate than the ones that try to do two or three things at once.” – Bruce Dunlevie, cited in eBoys
82/ Once you launch, you’re going to be measured against how quickly you can ramp up to $1M ARR. One year is good. Nine months is great.
83/ The more layers of friction in the onboarding process (i.e. SSN, email address, phone number, survey questions), the better you know your user, but the higher the dropoff rate. For PayPal, for every step a user had to take to sign up, there was a dropoff rate of 30%. – Max Levchin in Founders at Work
84/ “Product-market fit can be thought of as progressively eliminating all Herbies until there are no more Herbies. Then, you’re in a mode where you can invest in growth because it’s frictionless.” – Mike Maples Jr. (In the book, The Goal, the trek is often delayed by a large kid called Herbie. As you can imagine, the group only moves as quickly as their weakest link.)
85/ “There’s a ruthlessness in the way Dylan finds sources, uses them and moves on.” – No Direction Home. Be ruthless about how knowledgeable you can be about your customers, about your problem space, and about your product. The knowledge compounds.
Competition
86/ “If you patent [software], you make it public. Even if you don’t know someone’s infringing, they will still be getting the benefit. Instead, we just chose to keep it a trade secret and not show it to anyone.” – Max Levchin in Founders at Work
87/ If you know you’re building in a hot space, and your competitors are being bought by private equity firms, share that with your (prospective) investors. The competitors’ innovation slows, and optimizing for profit and the balance sheet becomes a priority when PE firms come in. – David Sacks
88/ “As a startup, you always want to compete against someone who has ‘managed dissatisfaction at the heart of their business model.” – Marc Randolph
89/ “You cannot overtake 15 cars in sunny weather… but you can when it’s raining.” – Ayrton Senna. It’s easier to overtake your competitors in tough markets than great markets.
90/ “Having a real, large competitor is better than having none at all!” – Anna Khan
Brand/Marketing/GTM
91/ If you’re a consumer product, your goal should be to become next year’s hottest Halloween costume. Your goal shouldn’t be fit into a social trend, but to define one.
92/ Don’t be married to the name of your company. 40% of NFX‘s early stage investments change their names after they invest in the seed.
93/ The viral factor doesn’t take into account the time factor of virality. In other words, how long it takes for users to bring on non-users. Might be better instead to use an exponential formula. “Think of a basic exponential equation: X to the Y power. X is the branching factor, in each cycle how many new people do you spread to. Y is the number of cycles you can execute in a given time period. The path to success is typically the combination of a high branching factor combined with a fast cycle time.” – Adam Nash
94/ In a down market, you may not need as big of a marketing budget as you thought. Your competitors are likely not spending as much, if at all, to win the same keywords as before.
Legal
95/ “Nothing is more expensive than a cheap lawyer.” – Nolan Church
The hard questions
96/ “I’d love to kill it and I’d hate to kill it. You know that emotion is exactly the emotion you feel when it’s time to shut it down.” – Andy Rachleff, cited in eBoys
97/ “Inexperienced founders are usually too slow to fire bad people. Here’s a trick that may help. Have all the cofounders separately think of someone who should probably be fired, then compare notes. If they all thought of the same person…” – Paul Graham
98/ When you’re in crisis, find your OAR. Overcorrect, action, retreat. Overcorrect, do more than you think you need to. For instance, lay off more than you think you need to. Actions can’t only be with words. Words are cheap after all. And retreat, know when it’s time to take a step back. “Sometimes you just have to do your time in the barrel. When you’re in the barrel, you stay in the barrel. And then you slowly come out of it.” – Nairi Hourdajian
99/ “A half measure is usually something a management team lands on because it’s easy. If a decision is easy, it’s probably a half measure. If it’s hard, if it’s really damn hard… if it’s controversial, you’re probably doing enough of it. The other thing is a half measure often doesn’t have an end result or goal in mind. If you have a really specific goal, and implementing that goal is difficult, that’s probably doing your job. That’s probably what’s necessary.” – Tom Loverro
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
“Readily available quantitative information about the present is not gonna give you they key to the castle. […] If everyone has all the company data today and the means to massage it, how do you get a knowledge advantage?
“The answer is you have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
Those are the words of the great Howard Marks on a recent Acquired episode.
When most of us first learned economics — be it in high school or college, we learned of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. In short, if you had access to both public and private information, you would be capable of generating outsized returns that outperformed the market.
The truth is that reality differs quite a bit. And that’s especially in early-stage investing. Investors often make investment decisions with both public and private information at their disposal. There is admittedly still some level of asymmetric information, but that depends on deep of a diligence the investors do. Yet despite the closest thing to a strong efficiency, there’s still a large delta between the top half and bottom half of investors. The gap widens further when you compare with the top quartile. And the top decile. And the top percentile. Truly a power law distribution.
Massaging the data
I’m no data scientist, although I am obsessed with data. But there are people who are, and among them, people I deeply respect for their opinion.
There’s been this relentless, possibly ill-placed focus on growth (at all costs) over the last two years. Oftentimes, not even revenue growth, but for consumer startups, user growth.
I want to say I first heard of this from a Garry Tan video. The job of a founder pre-product-market fit (pre-PMF) is to catch lightning in a bottle. The job post-PMF is to keep lightning in that bottle. Two different problems. Many founders ended up focusing on or were forced to focus on (as a function of taking venture money) scale before they caught lightning in that bottle. They spent less time on A/B testing to find a global maximum, and ended up optimizing for a local maximum.
Today, or at least as of September 2022, there’s this ‘new’ focus on retention and profitability (at all costs). But there’s no one-size-fit-all for startups. As a founder, you need to find the metric that you should be optimizing for — a sign that your customers love your product. Whether it’s the percent of your customers that submit bug reports and still use your product or if you’re a marketplace, the percent of demand that converts to supply. Feel free to be creative. Massage your data, but it still has to make sense.
From a fund perspective, equally so, it’s not always about TVPI, IRR, and DPI, especially if you’re an emerging fund manager. Or in other words, a fund manager who has yet to hit product-market fit. You probably have an inflated total-value-to-paid-in capital (TVPI) — largely, if not completely dominated by unrealized return. The same is true for your IRR as well. In the past two years, with inflated rounds and fast deployment schedules, everyone seems like a genius. So many investors — angels, syndicate leads, and fund managers — found themselves with IRRs north of 70% for any vintage of investments 2019 and after. Although an institutional LP that I was chatting with recently discounts any vintage of startups 2017 and after.
So the North Star metrics here, for fund managers, isn’t IRR or TVPI. It’s other sets of data. I’ll give two examples. For a fund manager I chatted with a few weeks ago, it was the percent of his portfolio that raised follow-on capital within 24 months of his investment because it was more than twice as great as the some of the best venture firms out there. Another fund manager cited the number of his LPs who invested in his fund’s pro rata rights through SPVs.
Making qualitative judgments
In this camp, these are folks who have an extremely strong sense of logic and reasoning. When a founder has yet the data to back it up, these investors go back to first principles.
In my experience, these investors are incredible at asking questions, like how Doug Leone asks a founder for their strengths and weaknesses. But more than just asking questions, it’s also about building frameworks and knowing what to look for when you ask said questions.
For instance, every investor knows grit is an important trait in a founder. More than knowing at a high level that grit is important, what can you do to find it out? For me, it boils down to two things.
Past performance. In other words, prior examples of excellence that they worked hard to get.
Future predictors. I ask: Why does this problem keep you up at night? Or some variation. Why does this problem mean so much to you? Why are you obsessed? Are you obsessed? Why is this your life’s calling? And I’m not looking for a market-sizing exercise here.
While I don’t claim to hold all the truths in this world, nor can I yet count myself in the highest echelons of startup investing, the most I can do here is share my own qualitative frameworks for thinking:
One of my favorite thought pieces on the internet is written by a legendary investor, Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate fame. In it, he illuminates a concept he calls “backcasting.” To quote him:
“Legendary builders, therefore, must stand in the future and pull the present from the current reality to the future of their design. People living in the present usually dislike breakthrough ideas when they first hear about them. They have no context for what will be radically different in the future. So an important additional job of the builder is to persuade early like-minded people to join a new movement.”
Early-stage investors must have the same genetics: the ability to see the future for what it is before the rest of humanity can. And they back founders who are capable of willing the future into existence and create reality distortion fields, a term popularized by Bud Tribble when describing Steve Jobs.
When I first jumped into venture, one of the first VCs I met — in hindsight, a futurist — told me, “Some of the best ideas seem crazy at first.” A visionary investor is willing to take the time to detect brilliance in craziness. Paul Graham, in a piece titled Crazy New Ideas, proposed that it’s worth taking time to listen to someone who sounds crazy, but known to be otherwise, reasonable because more than anyone else, they know they sound crazy and are willing to risk their carefully-built reputation to do so.
For 10x founders and investors alike, the more you hear them out, the more they make sense. That said, if they start making less and less sense the more you listen, then your time is most likely better spent elsewhere.
In closing
As you may already know, a great early-stage investor requires a different skillset than a great public equities trader or a hedge fund investor. You’re more likely to work with qualitative data than quantitative data. Regardless of what archetype of a venture investor you are, you have to believe that we are capable of reaching a better future than the one we live in today. It is then a question of when and how, not if.
Of course, I don’t believe that these three archetypes are mutually exclusive. They are more representative of spectrums rather than definitive traits. Think of it more like an OCEAN personality test than a Myers-Briggs 16 personalities.
To sum it all, I like the way my friend describes venture investors: pragmatic optimists. Balance the realities of today with how great the future can be.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
