Tag: chris douvos

Posted on

If 198 Pieces of Unsolicited, (Possibly) Ungoogleable Advice for Founders Were Not Enough

windmill

This is my third iteration of the 99 series for founders. You can find the first two here and here. The premise for this series was simple. The best, most insightful, unsuspecting lessons are hidden in the deepest, darkest corners of the internet. Hell, many more are hidden in rooms behind closed doors. The goal of this 99 series is to unveil those. Advice you’ve likely never thought about, and most likely have never heard of.

While you don’t need to read all the below at once, it’s helpful to keep the below at your fingertips for when you do need them. As always, unless the advice is not cited, all advice has been backlinked to its source, in case you want the longer, sometimes more nuanced version.

To make it easier for you, I’ve also pooled the advice in categories, depending on your needs:

  1. Fundraising (22)
  2. Governance (5)
  3. Hiring/Team/Culture (44)
  4. Product/Customers (23)
  5. Competition (1)
  6. Legal (2)
  7. Expenses (1)
  8. Secondaries (1)

P.S. Have I started the next one in the 99 series for founders? Yes, I have. Stay tuned!

Fundraising

1/ “Once you take venture capital, the venture capitalist’s business model is your business model. You’ve got to get liquid at a number that makes sense for them. High valuations are good because you take less dilution. Et Cetera. But the reality is that when you have a high valuation, that starts to eliminate your options. ” — Chris Douvos

2/ The employee option pool is easier to negotiate than asking an investor to take less ownership. The pool at the time of term sheet comes out of founder/team’s equity. If the pool becomes completely allocated post-investment, you need to go back to the board and ask for a larger pool, and everyone (you and VCs) gets diluted then.

3/ Beware of the “senior pari-passu,” which means that that investor gets paid paid back before everyone else on the preference stack AND they get equal footing with all the other investors. The thing to watch out for isn’t necessarily for the mechanics of the term itself, but the fact that if you let one investor have that in this round, every subsequent round, investors then will ask for that as well.

4/ Repeat founders often ask for co-sale right immunity (usually 15%) when putting together term sheets. Co-sale rights are usually provisions investors add in to prevent you, the founder, from liquidating before a liquidity event. The rights dictate the when you want to sell your equity, the investor has first dibs to buy your equity AND if not, they can also sell their equity alongside you. Because there are additional provisions, most buyers may not want to put in all the work to diligence just to have an existing investor buy your equity. And also, if your existing investors are also selling, it sends a negative signal to potential buyers.

5/ If any corporates own more than 19.5% of a company, they have to write you off as a subsidiary of the corporate and report your losses as their losses. So they’re less valuation sensitive and care less for ownership.

6/ You’re likely not the only one in market with your solution. If a competitor raises a massive round, that’s market validation. And not a reason to change your pitch. You should only change your pitch if your customers are opting for your competitor, but not if VCs are talking about your competitor. If VCs ask about your well-funded competitor, say “My customers don’t bring this up with me. But rather they bring up incumbents and this is why we’re tackling this space in full force.”

7/ “Once you have $500k+ raised, spend 2/3 of your time on funds, 1/3 on small checks.” — Ash Rust

8/ Beware of SAFE overhangs. You probably don’t want to raise more than 25% on SAFEs in comparison to the next priced round. — Martin Tobias

9/ Don’t say “The market is so large, there are room for many winners.” To a VC, that’s code for “This founder is getting their ass handed to them by competition.” — Harry Stebbings

10/ If a large number of your employee base do not have the experience of being in a startup, “make a choice about how/when/if to be transparent about the things that are happening (good and bad) and the level of startup experience within the group will be a critical factor in whether the decision to be transparent turns out to be a good one.” — Javier Soltero

11/ To fundraise, even if your last X number of months sucked, you need to show just three months of great growth prior to the fundraise. — Jason Lemkin

12/ Rough benchmarks for enterprise revenue growth for things to be interesting to VCs (— Jason Lemkin):

  • Before $1M ARR, growing 10%-15% a month
  • Around $1M ARR, growing 8%-10% a month or so
  • Around $10M ARR, ideally doubling

13/ “An investor is an employee you can’t fire.” — Vinod Khosla

14/ “Things that break the rules have a bigger threshold to overcome to grab the reader’s attention, but once they do, they tend to have a stronger, and more dedicated following. Blandness tends to get fewer dedicated followers.” — Brandon Sanderson on creative writing, but applies just as well to pitches

15/ “Great worldbuilding with bad characters and a bad plot is an encyclopedia. Great characters and a great plot with bad worldbuilding is still often an excellent book. […] The fact that time turners break the entire universe of Harry Potter wide open does not prevent that from being the strongest book in the entire series.” — Brandon Sanderson on story plots, but also applies to markets and founding teams. Replace worldbuilding with market. Replace characters with team, and plot with product-market fit or founder-market fit.

16/ In all great stories, the protagonist (in the case of a pitch, you) is proactive, capable, and relatable. Your pitch needs to show all three, but at the minimum two out of the three. — Brandon Sanderson

17/ “Data rooms are where fund-raising processes go to die.” Prioritize in-person and live conversations. When your investor asks you for documents, ask for 15 minutes on their calendar so you can “best prepare” the information they want. If they aren’t willing to give you that 15 minutes, you’ve lost the deal already. — Mark Suster

18/ “Second conversation with a serious investor is usually around what are you trying to prove and who are you trying to prove that to.” — Fund III GP

19/ “Set your own agenda or someone else will.” — Melinda Gates

20/ “The ‘raise very little’ strategy only works if you’re in a market that most people believe (incorrectly) is tiny or unimportant. If other people are paying attention, you have to beat the next guy.” — Parker Conrad

21/ Beware of stacking SAFEs. And be sure to model out that you as the founder(s), won’t dip below 50% ownership before the Series A. This is a more common problem than most founders think. Inspired by Itamar Novick.

22/ “Before you send a single email or take your first call, you should have a fully-researched pipeline CRM with a minimum number of qualified target investors.” — Chris Neumann

  • Pre-Seed: 100 – 150 qualified target investors (a mix of angel investors and VCs)
  • Seed: 80 – 100 qualified target investors (mostly VCs)
  • Series A: 60 – 80 qualified target investors (all VCs)
  • Series B: 40 – 60 qualified target investors (all VCs)

Governance

23/ Find your independent board member before shit hits the fan (usually when your investor representation and you the founders disagree). Because by the time you find an independent board member when things go south, your investor will recommend someone who’ll most likely take their side. Board members recommended by VCs usually have long standing relationships with investors and are likely to sit or have sat on other boards with that investor previously. And because they have a longer standing relationship with that VC, they will likely side with the VC when there’s a disagreement.

24/ “Board members can’t make companies but they can destroy companies.” — Brian Chesky

25/ Ask your prospective investors how long they plan to be at their firm. The worst thing that can happen is you bring on a board member and they switch firms after a year, then you’re left with a someone you didn’t pick. It’s probably also a good idea to let the investor have their board seat, contingent on them working at that firm. — Joseph Floyd

26/ Consider incorporating the company in Nevada or Texas, as Delaware courts are becoming more judiciously activist. Especially consider this if you are either politically exposed or you want more leeway and protection as a founder. — Elad Gil

27/ “When you build with other people’s money, you don’t just owe them outcomes—you owe them truth. And selling your cash to a zombie isn’t a strategy. It’s a story you tell yourself to avoid facing the music.” — Lloyed Lobo

Hiring/Team/Culture

28/ “If you raise a lot of money, do a hiring freeze and don’t hire anybody for 90 days. Money’s not going to solve your problems. You are going to solve them.” — Ryan Petersen

29/ “If you had to hire everyone based only on you knowing how good they are at a certain video game, what video game would you pick?” — Patrick O’Shaughnessy. People’s choices can be quite revealing. You can likely ask the same question for any activity/sport/topic of choice.

30/ “I hate surprises. Can you tell me something that might go wrong now so that I’m not surprised when it happens?” — Simon Sinek. A great question on how to ask weaknesses without candidates giving you a non-answer.

31/ Beware of candidates who can’t stick to a job for at least 18 months. — Jason Lemkin.

32/ Beware of candidates who love what’s on their resume. You want to be sure you’d hire them even if they didn’t have those logos/titles. — Jason Lemkin.

33/ Beware of candidates who don’t have good reasons to leave their last job. Or any job for that matter. Also watch out for candidates that leave because of salary. — Jason Lemkin.

34/ As soon as you raise capital, you should move out of a coworking space. Because as long as you are there, you cannot shape your company’s culture when the culture of the rest of the coworking space is more prevalent. — A VC who was the first institutional check into 5+ unicorns

35/ “First time founders brag about how many employees they have. Second time founders brag about how few employees they have.” — Dan Siroker.

36/ 20 years of experience is more impressive than 20 one-year experiences for deeply technical problems.

37/ 20 one-year experiences is more impressive than 20 years of experience for cultural (consumer) problems.

38/ Great founders don’t delegate understanding. Senior execs aren’t hired until founders themselves prove out the playbook.

39/ Inspired by Marc Randolph. Set boundaries around your work. Ask yourself, do you want to be starting your 7th startup and their 7th wife/husband? If not, be uncompromising with boundaries around work and life. Usually, I see most founders not have that versus most tech employees, who set boundaries almost in the opposite direction.

40/ “My two rules of thumb for CEOs (and all leaders) are:

  • ‘if you feel like a broken record, you’re probably doing something right’ and 
  • ‘always craft your comms for the person who just started this week.'” — Molly Graham

41/ At Starbucks, no matter what seniority you are, every employee has lowercase titles. And it isn’t a typo.

42/ If you don’t know how to hire a 10/10 CTO looks like, find a world-class CTO then have them help you interview CTO candidates. It’s important to nail this right in the beginning no matter how long that takes. — Jason Lemkin

43/ “People duck as a natural reflex when something is hurled at them. Similarly, the excellence reflex is a natural reaction to fix something that isn’t right, or to improve something that could be better. The excellence reflex is rooted in instinct and upbringing, and then constantly honed through awareness, caring, and practice. The overarching concern to do the right thing well is something we can’t train for. Either it’s there or it isn’t. So we need to train how to hire for it.” — Danny Meyer

44/ Prioritize references over interviewing when hiring. “Executives have more experience bullshitting you than you have experience detecting their bullshit. So it’s like an asymmetric game where you’re a white belt fighting a black belt and they’re just going to punch you in the face repeatedly.” — Brian Chesky

45/ At the end of a candidate interview process, try to convince them out of joining the company. If you only paint them the rosy picture of joining, even if they join, they’ll joined disillusioned and with expectations that this job will be a country club, which it shouldn’t be.

46/ One of the best job ads out there by Ernest Shackleton, a 19th/20th century Antarctic explorer: “Men wanted for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honor and recognition in case of success.”

47/ “The health of an organization is the relationship between engineering and marketing. Or in enterprise, the relationship between engineering and sales.” — Brian Chesky

48/ “Great leadership is presence, not absence.” — Brian Chesky

49/ “I want the guy who understands his limitations instead of the guy who doesn’t. On the other hand, I’ve learned something terribly important in life. I learned that from Howard Owens. And you know what he used to say? Never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.” — Charlie Munger

50/ “If you pay great people internally, you can push back on the external fees. If you don’t pay great people internally, then you’re a price taker.” — Ashby Monk

51/ “Expect 60% of your VPs to work out — and that’s if you do it right.” — Dev Ittycheria

52/ Be generous with startup equity for your first 10 employees, “as much as leaving 30% of the pool to non-founders.” Be willing to give your early engineers 3-5% of equity, as opposed to only 50-100 basis points. — Vinod Khosla

53/ “A company becomes the people it hires. […] Experience has shown me that successful startups seldom follow their original plans. The early team not only determines how the usual risks are handled but also evolves the plans to better utilize their opportunities and to address and redefine their risks continuously.” — Vinod Khosla

54/ “I often tell pensions you should pay people at the 49th percentile. So, just a bit less than average. So that the people going and working there also share the mission. They love the mission ‘cause that actually is, in my experience, the magic of the culture in these organizations that you don’t want to lose.” — Ashby Monk

55/ “Innovation everywhere, but especially in the land of pensions, endowments, and foundations, is a function of courage and crisis.” — Ashby Monk

56/ “You stay obstinate about your vision; you stay really flexible about your tactics. […] Nobody ever got to Mount Everest by charting a straight path to the peak.” — Vinod Khosla

57/ Questions to ask a candidate by Graham Duncan:

  • What criteria would you use to hire someone to do this job if you were in my seat?
  • How would your spouse or sibling describe you with ten adjectives?
  • I think we’re aligned in wanting this to be a good fit, you don’t want us to counsel you out in six months and neither do we. Let’s take the perspective of ourselves in six months and it didn’t work.  What’s your best guess of what was going on that made it not work?
  • What are the names of your last five managers, and how would they each rate your overall performance on a 1-100?
  • What are you most torn about right now in your professional life?
  • How did you prepare for this interview?
  • How do you feel this interview is going?

58/ Empower your entire team to be owners in the success of your company. “Take ownership and don’t give your project a chance to fail. Dumping your bottleneck on someone and then just walking away until it’s done is lazy and it gives room for error and I want you to have a mindset that God himself couldn’t stop you from making this video on time. Check. In. Daily. Leave. No. Room. For. Error.” — Jimmy Donaldson “Mr. Beast”

59/ “CEOs are pinch hitters. We should be working on the things that nobody else can or nobody else is.” — Jensen Huang

60/ It’s only after you’ve seen excellence first hand do you no longer need to outsource the recognition of excellence to others (brands, titles, other references).

61/ “When you’re speaking with backchannel references, you know that some of these are also mentors to the candidate, and accordingly will have influence. They’ll likely call the candidate right after your call anyway to tell them how you’re thinking about them. So ask the pointed questions you need to, but then take 10 mins at the end to also tell this person what you’re building, why it could be a special company, the momentum you have in the market and why you’re particularly excited about the candidate for this role. Get the reference excited about this opportunity for the candidate.” — Nakul Mandan

62/ “Every meeting with a great candidate is a buy-and-sell meeting, and you want to build their excitement about you to its peak right before you make the offer. Making the offer too early—before they’re fully sold—can be just as bad as losing momentum by moving too slow on someone you know you want.” — Samantha Price

63/ On co-founders being in the same boat with no Plan B… “We actually wrote this in the shareholder’s agreement and it lived there all the way until the IPO. If one of us took another job or a side hustle or took any income from any other source, we should have to give up our shares. We wanted to be fully committed. If we’re going to fail, we’re not going to fail for lack of effort.” — Olivier Bernhard

64/ “You have made a mis-hire if your Customer Success leader doesn’t understand the pains, needs, and desires of your customers as well as you do within 90 days.” — John Gleeson

65/ Ask a candidate to explain a technical challenge and to talk through how they’d approach it. Then ask them to think through how they’d do it again – but in half the time.” — Keller Rinaudo Cliffton / Sarah Guo

66/ “Your org chart either accelerates or impedes your velocity. Conway’s Law inevitably shapes output—teams structured for pace will produce systems designed for pace.” — Sarah Guo

67/ “Just look at ARR per Employee. It’s the canary in the unicorn coal mine.” — Lloyed Lobo

68/ While your co-founders should excel in areas you lack and love growing further on that wavelength, they must also at some point in their career want to grow in the area you excel in. Otherwise, they’ll never truly appreciate the work you do. And unspoken expectations lead to quiet resentments.

69/ “I find most meetings are best scheduled for 15-20 minutes, or 2 hours.  The default of 1 hour is usually wrong, and leads to a lot of wasted time.” — Sam Altman

70/ “Strategy is choosing what not to do.” — Peter Rahal

71/ When hiring talent, ask yourself: Are this candidate’s best days ahead of her or behind her?

Product/Customers

72/ The best way to slow a project down is to add more people to it.

73/ “Never delegate understanding.” — Charles and Ray Eames

74/ There’s this great line in a book I was recently gifted by a founder. “There is only one boss — the customer. And he can fire everybody in the company, from the chairman on down, simply by spending his money somewhere else.”

75/ A community or 1000 true fans built without big brands and logos is far more impressive than a community built by leveraging someone else’s brands.

76/ If your value prop is unique, you should be a price setter not a price taker, meaning your gross margins should be really good.
A compelling value prop is a comment on high operating margins. You shouldn’t need to spend a lot on sales and marketing. So the metrics to highlight would be good new ARR/S&M, LTV:CAC ratios, payback periods, or percent of organic to paid growth. — Pat Grady

77/ “If we don’t create the thing that kills Facebook, someone else will.” — Mark Zuckerberg, via a red book titled Facebook Was Not Originally Created to Be a Company, given to every employee pre-IPO

78/ The best sales people are often those who communicate the most with the engineers and product team. They tend to understand the product the best. Rule of thumb should be 80% inside, 20% outside. — Former founder with a 9-figure exit

79/ “Concentration of force is the first principal strategy. Spreading yourself too thin means not concentrating resources on the sales you could win because you are spreading time on lower quality prospects. Doing 90% of what it takes to win doesn’t result in 90% of the revenue, it results in zero. You must pick the battles you can win and win the battles you pick.” — Rick Page

80/ “One of our clients said this about a large defense contractor with multiple subsidiaries: ‘having business at one business unit not only doesn’t help me at the next one, it actually hurt me. They hate each other so much that if one business unit is for me, the other ones are against me. But they are all united in one value: they hate corporate. So the potential for working my way to the corporate offices and coming down as their worldwide standard is impossible in an account like this.” — Rick Page

81/ “Pain doesn’t come from the business problem, it comes from the political embarrassment of the business problem. If the pain or lost opportunity is not visible, then it’s not embarrassing and it will not drive business buying activity to a close.” — Rick Page

82/ “Mr. Prospect, we’ve announced a 6% price increase. We’d hate to see you buy the same proposal later at a higher price, so we really need to get this business in by the end of the quarter to secure this price. — Not only is this technique predictable, but after months of building value for your solution, you have now commoditized yourself. You have turned it from value to price on order to close business at the end of the quarter. Once you have offered a discount, you have announced what kind of vendor you are and the only question now is the price. Let the games begin.” — Rick Page

83/ “You must refocus off the imagined political benefit of a lower price, and on the longer term benefits of the overall project. ‘Mr. Prospect, how are you measured and what you will be remembered for three years from now won’t be the price, it will be the success of the project. If this goes well, the cost will be a detail. If the project goes poorly, no one will say ‘well at least we got a bargain.”” — Rick Page

84/ “Try not to take no from a person who can’t say yes.” — Rick Page

85/ Stacking the bricks, a Steve Jobs’ concept. If you have a pile of bricks and lay them on the ground, then no one will notice the ground. If you stack them up vertically, you create a tower; and everyone will notice the tower. Consider this when you have product features, launches and fixes.

86/ As of Q4 2024, it takes about 70 days to close a $100K contract for enterprise customers. Use that as your benchmark. If you’re faster, brag about it. If you’re slower than that, figure out how to close faster. — Gong State of Revenue Growth 2025 report

87/ Beware of “annual curiosity revenue.” “AI companies with quick early ARR growth can lead to false positives as many are seeing massive churn rates.” — Samir Kaji

88/ Your job is to get to innovation retention before your incumbents get to innovation.

89/ If you didn’t help create the proposal with your customer, you’ve already lost.

90/ People don’t change when they’ve made a mistake. People change when there’s a public embarrassment of them making a mistake.

91/ Know your customers intimately. Go visit your customers as often as you can. In fact, get as many passes / office keys to their offices as possible, and spend time with them.

92/ “Every other week, we have a customer join for the first 30 minutes of our management team meeting: they share their candid feedback, and ~40 leaders from across Stripe listen. Even though we already have a lot of customer feedback mechanisms, it somehow always spurs new thoughts and investigations.” — Patrick Collison

93/ “I see a lot of b2b startups moving to multiyear pricing from monthly or annual. I think this is usually a bad idea. It hides customer delight issues. It lengthens sales cycles. Overall, it just reduces the signal startups need.” — Brian Halligan

94/ Customers will still highly rate your customer service even if they didn’t get what they wanted if you show you care. That you care for their plight, and you really try to help them get what they want. — Simon Sinek

Competition

95/ “When you get outreach from multiple VC associates out of nowhere, your competitor is out raising and they’re just doing their homework.” — Siqi Chen

Legal

96/ “If you’re selling the business, tell as few people as possible and do everything you can to make sure past employees or former business associates do not find out.” Beware of moths who can start lawsuits. — Sammy Abdullah

97/ When you’re working with boutique investment banks, to protect yourself in case the banker sues when you choose to go with a different buyer… “Make sure the banker contract says they only get paid on intros they make directly and have a 6 month tail. Terminate any banker agreement as soon as they’re no longer working and the process is over; do not let these agreements linger.” — Sammy Abdullah

Expenses

98/ “Never buy a SaaS product owned by private equity unless you have to. Main exception: if founder is still CEO. Why: Impossible to cancel, Price increases out of the blue, Lose any real customer success, Innovation slows down or even ends, Support usually terrible” — Jason Lemkin

Secondaries

99/ If you’re planning to sell founder secondaries, beware of signaling risk. Sometimes, you do have a major life event that needs capital (i.e. buying a home, having a baby, hospital bills, etc.). If you are to sell, don’t sell until the Series B. “And even then I’d suggest titrating up… 2% at A, 5% at B, 10% at >=C.” — Hari Raghavan

Photo by Jonny Gios on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

DGQ 24: What predictions did you have in the past that didn’t play out as you expected?

tarot, prediction

References and getting beneath the surface have always been fascinating to me. Because of my job, my interests, and my content, I meet a lot of GPs and founders. And when they’re in pitch mode, they will almost always tell you about how amazing they are and how amazing their product is. Truth is, they probably are amazing. But in our world where everyone is, no one is. So what’s more interesting to me is their level of self-awareness. For the purpose of this piece, this is mainly about GPs. And hopefully, in service of GPs and LPs investing in GPs.

When someone is pitching you, especially if it’s the first time you’re meeting with them, they will tell you about all the sunshine and rainbows. That they knew there was going to be a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. With a leprechaun there exclaiming, “I told you so.” I get the psychology behind it. Who wants to buy a new/used car with a dent behind the seat of the shotgun, just hidden from plain sight? Who wants to buy a home where the last owner passed away in it? Or an apartment where the family living above has rowdy kids?

For better or worse, usually for the worse, all of the above salespeople are looking for buyers, not customers. Customers are repeat purchasers; buyers are not. On the flip side, your LPs are more likely to be repeat purchasers. Customers. Specifically, the institutional LPs are looking for 20-year relationships. That’s 3-4 funds. Both Chris Douvos and Raida Daouk have independently shared with me that the average venture fund lasts twice as long as the average American marriage. So you need to know as much as you can get your hands on before you “marry” your LPs. And as such, LPs want to know both what worked and what didn’t. Or at least I do.

Usually, investors usually tell me all the predictions they had that worked out. “We were investing in AI back in 2019 before it became big.” To be fair, so were most other investors. “I knew cryptocurrency was going to be huge back in 2015.” And so on. As an LP, it’s hard to tell what is revisionist’s history and what isn’t. But what is helpful is to know if you had any predictions in the past that didn’t work out.

Why did you hold those beliefs so strongly? What were the factors that led you to that prediction? What did you learn after your prediction proved otherwise?

Venture is still very much a cottage industry. Why? No matter how big funds get. No matter how large deals become. And no matter how many rounds new names for the very first round of funding there are. Series A. Seed. Pre-seed. Angel round. You name it. The definition of venture is betting on the non-obvious before it becomes obvious. You will be wrong more often than you’re right. At the very end of the day, it is an art form. Not because it needs to be, but because very few have actually tried to break down the art form into a science.

Why? Science and strategy require games where the feedback loops are often AND where there are predictable, deterministic outcomes. If you input A in, you get B out. Venture is not that. You can do everything “by the book” and still fail. Although the book itself has yet to really be written.

Yet the most repeatedly successful firms (that have been able to transition leadership successfully to at least one other generation) are sommeliers of succession planning. How they transition this generation’s knowledge to the next. It requires not just being brilliant, but being brilliant enough to be able to break down instinct and intuition as if it were a math formula. If not classical physics, at least quantum.

All that to say, if I ask a GP to break down a prediction — whether it worked or didn’t — and they can’t answer it other than “I just knew,” I’m personally not sure if they’re ready to build a generational firm.

Photo by petr sidorov on Unsplash

The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

35 Biggest Investing Lessons from 4 Seasons of Superclusters

piggy bank, investing, coin

The title says it all. I’m four seasons in and I’m fortunate to have learned from some of the best and most thoughtful individuals in the LP industry. I often joke with friends that Superclusters allows me to ask dumb questions to smart people. But there’s quite a bit of truth there as well. I look back in Season 1, and I’m proud to see the evolution of my questions as well.

There was a piece back in 2022 where Johns Hopkins’ Jeff Hooke said that “75% of funds insist they are in the top quartile.” To my anecdotal knowledge, that seems to hold. I might say 75% of angel investors starting their first funds say they’re top quartile. And 90% of Fund IIs say their Fund Is are top quartile. So the big looming question as an LP is how do you know which are and which aren’t.

And if we were all being honest with each other, the first five years of returns and IRRs really aren’t indicative of the fund’s actual performance. In fact, Stepstone had a recent piece that illustrated fewer than 50% of top-quartile funds at Year 5 stay there by Year 10. 30% fall to second quartile. 13% slip to third. 9% fall from grace to the bottom quartile. But only 3.7% of bottom-quartile funds make it to the top quartile after its 10-year run (on a net TVPI basis).

I’ve enjoyed every single podcast episode I’ve recorded to date. And all the offline conversations that I’ve had because of the podcast itself. Nevertheless, it’s always fascinating when I learn something for the first time on the podcast while we’re recording. Excluding the longer lessons some of our guests have shared (I’m looking at you Evan, Charlotte, and much much more), below are the many Twitter-worthy (not calling it X) soundbites that have come up in the podcast so far.

  1. “Entrepreneurship is like a gas. It’s hottest when it’s compressed.” — Chris Douvos
  2. “I’m looking for well-rounded holes that are made up of jagged pieces that fit together nicely.” — Chris Douvos
  3. “If you provide me exposure to the exact same pool of startups [as] another GP of mine, then unfortunately, you don’t have proprietary deal flow for me. You don’t enhance my network diversification.” — Jamie Rhode
  4. “Sell when you can, not when you have to.” — Howard Lindzon
  5. “When you think about investing in any fund, you’re really looking at three main components. It’s sourcing ability. Are you seeing the deals that fit within whatever business model you’re executing on? Do you have some acumen for picking? And then, the third is: what is your ability to win? Have you proven your ability to win, get into really interesting deals that might’ve been either oversubscribed or hard to get into? Were you able to do your pro rata into the next round because you added value? And we also look through the lens of: Does this person have some asymmetric edge on at least two of those three things?” — Samir Kaji
  6. “85% of returns flow to 5% of the funds, and that those 5% of the funds are very sticky. So we call that the ‘Champions League Effect.’” — Jaap Vriesendorp
  7. “The truth of the matter, when we look at the data, is that entry points matter much less than the exit points. Because venture is about outliers and outliers are created through IPOs, the exit window matters a lot. And to create a big enough exit window to let every vintage that we create in the fund of funds world to be a good vintage, we invest [in] pre-seed and seed funds – that invest in companies that need to go to the stock market maybe in 7-8 years. Then Series A and Series B equal ‘early stage.’ And everything later than that, we call ‘growth.’” — Jaap Vriesendorp
  8. “[When] you’re generally looking at four to five hundred distinct companies, 10% of those companies generally drive most of the returns. You want to make sure that the company that drives the returns you are invested in with the manager where you size it appropriately relative to your overall fund of funds. So when we double click on our funds, the top 10 portfolio companies – not the funds, but portfolio companies, return sometimes multiples of our fund of funds.” — Aram Verdiyan
  9. “If you’re overly concentrated, you better be damn good at your job ‘cause you just raised the bar too high.” — Beezer Clarkson
  10. “[David Marquardt] said, ‘You know what? You’re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.’ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.” — Chris Douvos
  11. “Miller Motorcars doesn’t accept relative performance for least payments on your Lamborghini.” — Chris Douvos
  12. “The biggest leverage on time you can get is identifying which questions are the need-to-haves versus nice-to-haves and knowing when enough work is enough.” — John Felix
  13. “In venture, we don’t look at IRR at all because manipulating IRR is far too easy with the timing of capital calls, credit lines, and various other levers that can be pulled by the GP.” — Evan Finkel
  14. “The average length of a VC fund is double that of a typical American marriage. So VC splits – divorce – is much more likely than getting hit by a bus.” — Raida Daouk
  15. “Historically, if you look at the last 10 years of data, it would suggest that multiple [of the premium of a late stage valuation to seed stage valuation] should cover around 20-25 times. […] In 2021, that number hit 42 times. […] Last year, that number was around eight.” — Rick Zullo (circa 2024)
  16. “The job and the role that goes most unseen by LPs and everybody outside of the firm is the role of the culture keeper.” — Ben Choi
  17. “You can map out what your ideal process is, but it’s actually the depth of discussion that the internal team has with one another. […] You have to define what your vision for the firm is years out, in order to make sure that you’re setting those people up for success and that they have a runway and a growth path and that they feel empowered and they feel like they’re learning and they’re contributing as part of the brand. And so much of what happens there, it does tie back to culture […] There’s this amazing, amazing commercial that Michael Phelps did, […] and the tagline behind it was ‘It’s what you do in the dark that puts you in the light.’” — Lisa Cawley
  18. “In venture, LPs are looking for GPs with loaded dice.” — Ben Choi
  19. “If I hire someone, I don’t really want to hire right out of school. I want to hire someone with a little bit of professional experience. And I want someone who’s been yelled at. […] I don’t want to have to triple check work. I want to be able to build trust. Going and getting that professional experience somewhere, even if it’s at a startup or venture firm. Having someone have oversight on you and [push] you to do excellent work and [help] you understand why it matters… High quality output can help you gain so much trust.” — Jaclyn Freeman Hester
  20. “LPs watch the movie, but don’t read the book.” — Ben Choi
  21. “If it’s not documented, it’s not done.” — Lisa Cawley
  22. “If somebody is so good that they can raise their own fund, that’s exactly who you want in your partnership. You want your partnership of equals that decide to get together, not just are so grateful to have a chance to be here, but they’re not that great.” — Ben Choi
  23. “When you bring people in as partners, being generous around compensating them from funds they did not build can help create alignment because they’re not sitting there getting rich off of something that started five years ago and exits in ten years. So they’re kind of on an island because everybody else is in a different economic position and that can be very isolating.” — Jaclyn Freeman Hester
  24. “Neutral references are worse than negative references.” — Kelli Fontaine
  25. “Everybody uses year benchmarking, but that’s not the appropriate way to measure. We have one fund manager that takes five years to commit the capital to do initial investments versus a manager that does it all in a year. You’re gonna look very, very different. Ten years from now, 15 years from now, then you can start benchmarking against each other from that vintage.” — Kelli Fontaine
  26. “We are not in the Monte Carlo simulation game at all; we’re basically an excel spreadsheet.” — Jeff Rinvelt
  27. “A lot of those skills [to be a fund manager] are already baked in. The one that wasn’t baked in for a lot of these firms was the exit manager – the ones that help you sell. […] If you don’t have it, there should be somebody that it’s their job to look at exits. ” — Jeff Rinvelt
  28. “Getting an LP is like pulling a weight with a string of thread. If you pull too hard, the string snaps. If you don’t pull hard enough, you don’t pull the weight at all. It’s this very careful balancing act of moving people along in a process.” — Dan Stolar
  29. “Going to see accounts before budgets are set helps get your brand and your story in the mind of the budget setter. In the case of the US, budgets are set in January and July, depending on the fiscal year. In the case of Japan, budgets are set at the end of March, early April. To get into the budget for Tokyo, you gotta be working with the client in the fall to get them ready to do it for the next fiscal year. [For] Korea, the budgets are set in January, but they don’t really get executed on till the first of April. So there’s time in there where you can work on those things. The same thing is true with Europe. A lot of budgets are mid-year. So you develop some understanding of patterns. You need to give yourself, for better or worse if you’re raising money, two to three years of relationship-building with clients.” — David York
  30. “Many pension plans, especially in America, put blinders on. ‘Don’t tell me what I’m paying my external managers. I really want to focus and make sure we’re not overpaying our internal people.’ And so then it becomes, you can’t ignore the external fees because the internal costs and external fees are related. If you pay great people internally, you can push back on the external fees. If you don’t pay great people internally, then you’re a price taker.” — Ashby Monk
  31. “You need to realize that when the managers tell you that it’s only the net returns that matter. They’re really hoping you’ll just accept that as a logic that’s sound. What they’re hoping you don’t question them on is the difference between your gross return and your net return is an investment in their organization. And that is a capability that will compound in its value over time. And then they will wield that back against you and extract more fees from you, which is why the alternative investment industry in the world today is where most of the profits in the investment industry are captured and captured by GPs.” — Ashby Monk
  32. “I often tell pensions you should pay people at the 49th percentile. So, just a bit less than average. So that the people going and working there also share the mission. They love the mission ‘cause that actually is, in my experience, the magic of the culture in these organizations that you don’t want to lose.” — Ashby Monk
  33. “The thing about working with self-motivated people and driven people, on their worst day, they are pushing themselves very hard and your job is to reduce the stress in that conversation.” — Nakul Mandan
  34. “I only put the regenerative part of a wealth pool into venture. […] That number – how much money you are putting into venture capital per year largely dictates which game you’re playing.” — Jay Rongjie Wang
  35. “When investing in funds, you are investing in a blind pool of human potential.” — Adam Marchick

Photo by Andre Taissin on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

The Limited Partner Game Show | Beezer Clarkson & Chris Douvos | Superclusters | S2 Post Season Episode

Beezer Clarkson leads Sapphire Partners‘ investments in venture funds domestically and internationally. Beezer began her career in financial services over 20 years ago at Morgan Stanley in its global infrastructure group. Since, she has held various direct and indirect venture investment roles, as well as operational roles in software business development at Hewlett Packard. Prior to joining Sapphire in 2012, Beezer managed the day-to-day operations of the Draper Fisher Jurvetson Global Network, which then had $7 billion under management across 16 venture funds worldwide.

In 2016, Beezer led the launch of OpenLP, an effort to help foster greater understanding in the entrepreneur-to-LP tech ecosystem. Beezer earned a bachelor’s in government from Wesleyan University, where she served on the board of trustees and currently serves as an advisor to the Wesleyan Endowment Investment Committee. She is currently serving on the board of the NVCA and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School.

Chris Douvos founded Ahoy Capital in 2018 to build an intentionally right-sized firm that could pursue investment excellence while prizing a spirit of partnership with all of its constituencies. A pioneering investor in the micro-VC movement, Chris has been a fixture in venture capital for nearly two decades. Prior to Ahoy Capital, Chris spearheaded investment efforts at Venture Investment Associates, and The Investment Fund for Foundations. He learned the craft of illiquid investing at Princeton University’s endowment. Chris earned his B.A. with Distinction from Yale College in 1994 and an M.B.A. from Yale School of Management in 2001.

You can find Chris and Beezer on their socials here.

Connect with Beezer here:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/beezer232
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/elizabethclarkson/

Connect with Chris here:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cdouvos
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/chrisdouvos/

And huge thanks to this episode’s sponsor, Alchemist Accelerator: https://alchemistaccelerator.com/superclusters

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

Brought to you by Alchemist Accelerator.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[03:07] Beezer’s childhood dream
[04:29] How Chris was let go from his $4.15 job at Yale
[08:09] Concentrated vs diversified portfolios
[09:30] First fund that Beezer and Chris invested
[11:42] Funds that CD and Beezer passed on and regret
[16:07] Favorite term in the LPA? Or not?
[19:18] What piece of advice did a GP in their portfolio share with them?
[23:15] What’s something that Beezer/CD said to a GP that they regret saying?
[28:06] What’s the most interesting fund model they’ve seen to date?
[33:20] What fund invested in 2020-2021 inflated valuations that they’ve reupped on?
[40:18] Events that they went to once but never again
[44:24] Life lessons from CD & Beezer
[54:02] The founding story of Open LP
[55:02] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring!
[57:58] If you learned something new in this episode, it would mean a lot if you could drop a like, comment or share it with your friends!

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

“If you’re overly concentrated, you better be damn good at your job ‘cause you just raised the bar too high.” – Beezer Clarkson

“Conviction drives concentration, and that you should be so concentrated as to be uncomfortable because otherwise you’re de-worsified, not diversified.” – Chris Douvos

“[David Marquardt] said, ‘You know what? You’re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.’ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.” – Chris Douvos

“Sometimes I treat GPs like I treat my teenage children which is: Every word out of a teenager’s mouth is probably a lie designed to make them look better or to hide some malfeasance.” – Chris Douvos

“May we be blessed by a weak benchmark.” – David Swensen

“Miller Motorcars doesn’t accept relative performance for least payments on your Lamborghini.” – Chris Douvos (citing hedge fund managers)

“At the end of the day, the return on an asset is a function of the price you paid for it and the capital it consumes.” – Chris Douvos

Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

Posted on

The Proliferation of LP Podcasts

I am under no illusion that there is a hell of a lot of interest in the LP landscape today. Not only from GPs who are realizing the difficulties of the fundraising climate, but also from aspiring and emerging LPs who are allocating to venture for the first time. The latter of which also have a growing set of interests in backing emerging GPs. And in the center console in this Venn diagram of interests lies the education of how to think like an LP.

I still remember back in 2022 and prior, we had Beezer’s #OpenLP initiative, Ted Seides’ Capital Allocators podcast, Notation Capital’s Origins, and Chris Douvos’ SuperLP.com. Last of which, by the way, can we start a petition to have Chris Douvos write more again? But I digress. All four of which trendsetters in their own right. But the world had yet to catch storm. Or maybe, the people around me and I had yet to feel the acceleration of interest.

Today, in 2024, we have:

There is no shortage of content. LPs are also starting to make their rounds. You’ll often see the same LP on multiple podcasts. And that’s not a bad thing. In fact, that’s very much of a good thing that we’re starting to see a lot more visibility here and that LPs are willing to share.

But we’re at the beginning of a crossroads.

A few years back, the world was starved of LP content. And content creators and aggregators like Beezer, Ted, Nick, and Chris, were oases in the desert for those searching. Today, we have a buffet of options. Many of which share listenership and viewership. In fact, a burgeoning cohort of LPs are also doing their rounds. And that’s a good thing. It’s more surface area for people to learn.

But at some point, the wealth of information leads to the poverty of attention. The question goes from “Where do I tune into LP content?” to “If I were to listen to the same LP, which platform would I choose to tune into?“

After all, we only have 24 hours in a day. A third for sleep. A third for work. And the last competes against every possible option that gives us joy — friends, hangouts, Netflix, YouTube, hobbies, exercise, passion projects and more.

In the same way, Robert Downey Jr. or Emma Stone or Timothée Chamalet (yes, I just watched Dune 2 and I loved it) is going to do multiple interviews. With 20, 30, even 50 different hosts. But as a fan (excluding die-hard ones), you’re likely not going to watch all of them. But you’ll select a small handful — two or three — to watch. And that choice will largely be influenced by which interviewer and their respective style you like.

While my goal is to always surface new content instead of remixes of old, there will always be the inevitability of cross-pollination of lessons between content creators. And so, if nothing else, my goal is to keep my identity — and as such, my style — as I continue recording LP content. To me, that’s the human behind the money behind the VC money. And each person — their life story, the way they think, why they think the way they think — is absolutely fascinating.

In closing

There’s this great Amos Tversky line I recently stumbled upon. “You waste years by not being able to waste hours.” And in many ways, this blog, Superclusters, writing at large, and my smaller experiments are the proving grounds I need to find my interest-expertise fit. Some prove to be fleeting passions. Others, like building for emerging LPs, prove to be much more.

Photo by Jukka Aalho on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

Big If True

baby

I wrote a blogpost last year, where I went a level deeper into my NTY thesis. In short, in what situations and in front of what kind of ideas do I ask founders: Why now? Why this? And why you?

Plausible IdeaWhy this?
Possible IdeaWhy now?
Preposterous IdeaWhy you?
For the deeper dive, check out this blogpost.

But let’s go a step deeper. As I’m writing another blogpost slated to come out next year, I’ve had the chance to sit down with some amazing multi-cycle investors. And a common thread across all those conversations has been that they chose to be the first check in companies that would be big, if true.

Which got me thinking…

If ‘big if true’ is for the preposterous ideas out there, then possible ideas would be ‘big when true.’ And plausible ideas would be ‘big AND true.’

Let’s break it down.

Big AND true

Not too long ago, the amazing Chris Douvos shared with me that the prerequisite to being “right and alone”, where fortune and glory lie, is to be “wrong and alone.”

Imagine a two-by-two matrix. On one axis, right and wrong. On the other axis, alone and in the crowd. You obviously don’t want to be wrong and in the crowd. But you do want to be in the right and alone quadrant. Because that’s where fortune and glory are at. Most people think that to get there, you must first start in the right and in the crowd quadrant. But it’s important to note, that once you’re in the crowd, and you get the dopamine hits of validation, it’s really hard to stray away from the crowd. So really, the only way to get to fortune and glory is to be wrong and alone. To be willing to go against the grain.

Unfortunately, for big AND true, you’re in the crowd. And while you can usually make money on the margins, it’s hard to be world-defining. ‘Cause you’re too late.

The thing to be wary of here if it is any investor’s strategy to deploy capital here is to not be the last money in. Hype and compounding are dangerous. And for many companies that exist here, they have a short half life. If you’re the last one holding the bag, that’s it.

Big WHEN true

You know that saying, “It’s a matter of when, not if…” it’s just as true in the innovation space. There are some things in life that are bound to happen. Recessions. Hype cycles. Rain. First snowfall. Summer heat. Progress. Maturity. When one’s baby teeth fall out. Wrinkles. Gray hair. Some with more predictability than others.

These ideas are defined as those with early commercial traction, likely with a niche audience or only your 1000 true fans. And that’s okay. Usually happens to be some of the toughest pre-seed and seed rounds to raise. There’s clearly traction, but no clear sense of rocket ship growth.

Timing matters. Is the larger market ready to adopt the beliefs and culture and habits of the few?

For some investors, it’s why they target quality of life improvements to the wealthy made ready for the masses. Living a wealthy lifestyle is, after all, aspirational for many. On the flip side, if you have a niche audience and are looking to expand, are there underlying beliefs and traits that the broader market has but has instead applied those beliefs and habits in other parts of their life?

Big IF true

Sam Altman put out a blogpost just yesterday, titled “What I Wish Someone Had Told Me.” And out of the 17 lessons he shares, one in particular resonated the most with me:

“It is easier for a team to do a hard thing that really matters than to do an easy thing that doesn’t really matter; audacious ideas motivate people.”

While the stories of Airbnb or Coinbase or Canva seem to suggest that these are nigh impossible ideas to raise on, anecdotally, I seem to find that the most transcendent companies with CEOs who are able to acquire world-class talent to their companies have less trouble fundraising than the ‘big when true’ ideas. But more difficulty raising than the ‘big and true’ ideas.

That said, instead of many smaller checks, you just need to find one big believer. In other words, the Garry Tan for your Coinbase or the Fred Wilson for your Twitter. One way to look at it, though not the only way, is what Paul Graham puts as the “reasonable domain expert proposing something that sounds wrong.” Crazy, but reasonable. Simply, why you?

Photo by Jill Sauve on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

Why No One’s Marking Down Their Portfolio

In one of the recent All-In podcast episodes, Bill Gurley shared that both VCs and LPs aren’t marking down their portfolios. For GPs, inflated numbers helps you raise the next fund. For LPs, they’re given their “bonus on paper marks. So, they don’t have an incentive to dial around to their GPs and say, ‘Get their marks right.’ ‘Cause it’s actually going to reflect poorly on them if they were to roll those up.”

The last few years, enterprise value has been largely based on multiple expansion. The truth is we’re not going to see much of it in the incoming years. Even AI that’s exploding right now will see a contraction of their multiples in due time.

Companies that should not be in business today will see their ultimatum too in the next few years. Hunter Walk recently wrote “they’re 2017-2021’s normal failures clustered into current times.”

So, while some GPs do pre-emptively mark down their portfolio by 25-30% — we’re seeing this behavior more so in pre-seed and seed funds — the only people in this whole dance that are incented to mark down portfolios are new LPs trying to figure out if they want to commit to a new fund.

Charles Hudson recently shared a beautiful chart:

Source: Charles Hudson’s The number one piece of advice I give to new VCs launching their investing careers

And while the advice applies to newer VCs, the same is true for experienced investors. Of course, most investors aim to be in the upper right-hand corner, but that’s really, really hard. In truth, most notable investors fall in two cohorts: marketers and tastemakers.

Marketers:

  • Share a high volume of deal flow,
  • Lower quality opportunities,
  • Have relatively low conviction on each deal compared to their counterparts, the tastemakers,
  • Have comparatively diversified portfolios,
  • And could have adverse effects on branding and positioning in the market.

Tastemakers, on the other hand:

  • Share a lower volume of deals,
  • Usually higher quality opportunities,
  • Higher conviction per deal,
  • Have comparatively more concentrated portfolios.
  • And the downside may simply be the fact that their volume may not warrant raising a fund around, and might be better off as an opportunistic investor.

And speaking of concentrated versus diversified, the interesting thing, as Samir Kaji shared on his recent podcast episode, is that “at 85 companies [in the portfolio], you had over 90% chance of getting a 2X. But a very low chance at getting anything above a 3X. And with smaller portfolio sizes [between 15-25 companies], there was much higher variance — both on the top and bottom. Higher chance that you perform worse than the median. But a much higher chance of being in the top quartile and even beyond that, in the top decile.”

It’s also so hard to tell what high quality companies look like before the liquidation event. Naturally, high quality funds are even harder to tell before the fund term. It’s ’cause of that that a few LPs and I wrote the post last week on early DPI. But I digress. At the end of the day, many, for better or worse, use valuation and markups as a proxy for quality.

But really, the last week’s valuation in this week’s market environment. Rather than chasing an arbitrary number, a lot more LPs when evaluating net new fund investments, and GPs making net new startup investments, care about the quality of the businesses they invest in. It’s not about the unicorns; it’s about the centaurs. The $100M annualized revenue businesses.

Samir Kaji’s words in 2022 ring true then as they do today. “Mark-downs of prior vintages are starting to occur but will take some time given valuation and reporting lags.” We’re still seeing many who have yet to go back to market. As many say, the flat round is the new up round. But until folks go back to market, there are many who won’t jump the gun in writing down their portfolio. But they are cautioning themselves, so that hopefully they won’t make the same mistakes again. The goalposts have changed.

I’m reminded of Henry McCance’s words channeled through Chris Douvos. “When an asset class works well, capital is expensive and time is cheap. What we saw in the bubble was that capital got cheap and time got expensive.”

We’re now back at a time when capital is expensive and time is cheap.

Photo by Frank Zinsli on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

The Science of Selling – Early DPI Benchmarks

The snapshot

Some of you reading here are busy, so we’ll keep this top part brief, as an abstract sharing our top three observations of leading fund managers.

Generally speaking, don’t sell your fast growing winners early.

Except when…

Selling on your way up may not be a crazy idea.

  1. You might sell when you want to lock in DPI. Don’t sell more than 20% of your fund’s positions unless you are locking in meaningful DPI for your fund. For instance, at each point in time, something that’s greater than 0.5X, 1X, 2X, or 3X of your fund size.
  2. You might consider selling when you’ve lost conviction. Consider selling a position when you feel the market has over-priced the actual value, or even up to 100% if you’ve lost conviction.
  3. You might consider selling when one is growing slower than your target IRR. If companies are growing slower and even only as fast as your target IRR, consider selling if not at too much of a discount (Note: there may be some political and/or signaling issues to consider here as well. But will save the topic of signaling for another blog post).

Do note that the above are not hard and fast rules. Every decision should be made in context to other moving variables. And that the numbers below are tailored to early-stage funds.

Net TVPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15
Net DPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15

Let’s go deeper…

On a cloudless Friday morning, basking in the morning glory of Los Altos, between lattes and croissants, between two nerds (or one of whom might identify as a geek more than a nerd), we pondered one question:

How much of selling is art? How much is science?

Between USV selling 30% of their Twitter stake, Menlo selling half of their Uber, Benchmark only selling 15% of their Uber pre-IPO shares, and Blackbird recently selling 20% of its Canva stake, it feels more like the former than the latter. Then when Howard Marks says selling is all about relative selection and the opportunity cost of not doing so, it seems to reinforce the artistic form of getting “moolah in da coolah” to borrow a Chris Douvos trademark.

Everyone seems to have a financial model for when and how to invest, but part of being a fiduciary of capital is also knowing when to distribute – when to sell. When RVPI turns into DPI. And we haven’t seen many models for selling yet. At least none have surfaced publicly or privately for us.
The best thought piece we’ve seen in the space has been Fred Wilson’s Taking Money “Off the Table”. At USV, they “typically seek to liquidate somewhere between 10% and 30% of our position in these pre-IPO liquidity transactions. Doing so allows us to hold onto the balance while de-risking the entire investment.”

Source: Fred Wilson’s Taking Money “Off The Table”

In aggregate, we’ve seen venture fund distributions follow very much of the power law – whether you’re looking at Correlation’s recent findings…

Source: Correlation Ventures

Or what James Heath has found across 1000+ firms’ data on Pitchbook.

Source: James Heath

As such, it gave birth to a thought… What if selling was more of a science?

What would that look like?

Between two Daves, it was not the Dave with sneakers and a baseball cap and with the profound disregard to healthy diets, given the fat slab of bacon in his croissan’wich, who had the answer there.

“To start off, in a concentrated portfolio of 30 investments, a fund returner is a 30x investment. For a 50-investment fund, it’s 50x. And while hitting the 0.5x DPI milestone by years 5-8, and a 2x DPI milestone by years 8-12, is the sign of a great fund, you shouldn’t think about selling much of your TVPI for DPI unless or until your TVPI is starting to exceed 2-3x.” Which seems to corroborate quite well with Chamath Palihapitiya’s findings that funds between 2010 and 2020 convert have, on average, converted about 25% of their TVPI to DPI.

“Moreover, usually you shouldn’t be selling more than 20% of the portfolio at one time (unless you’re locking in / have already locked in 3X or more DPI). You should be dollar-cost averaging – ensuring time diversity – on the way out as well. AND usually only if a company that’s UNDER-growing or OVER-valued compared to the rest of your portfolio. Say your portfolio is growing at 30% year-over-year, but an individual asset is growing slower at only 10-20% OR you believe it is overvalued, that’s when you think about taking cash off the table. Sell part (or even all) of your stake, if selling returns a meaningful DPI for the fund, and if you’re not capping too upside in exchange for locking in a floor.”

Meaningful DPI, admittedly, does mean different benchmarks for different kinds of LPs. For some, that may mean 0.25X. For others that may mean north of 0.5X or 1X.

“On the other hand, if a company is outperforming / outgrowing the rest of the portfolio, generally hold on to it and don’t sell more than 10-20% (again, unless you’re locking in meaningful DPI, or perhaps if it’s so large that it has become a concentration risk).”

I will caveat that there is great merit in its counterpart as well. Selling early is by definition capping your upside. If you believe an asset is reaching its terminal value, that’s fine, but do be aware of signaling risk as well. The latter may end up being an unintended, but self-fulfilling prophecy.

So, it begged the question: Under the assumption that funds are 15-year funds, what is meaningful DPI? TVPI? At the 5-year mark? 7.5 years in? 10 years? And 12.5 years?

The truth is the only opportunities to sell come from the best companies in your portfolio. And probably the companies, if anything, you should be holding on to. By selling early, you are capping your downside, but at the same time capping your upside on the entire portfolio. When the opportunity arises to lock in some DPI, it’s worth considering the top 3-5 positions in your fund. For instance, if your #2 company is growing quickly, you may not be capping the upside as much.

Do keep in mind that sometimes it’s hard to fully conceptualize the value of compounding. As one of my favorite LPs reminded me, if an asset is growing 35% year-over-year, the last 20% of the time produces 56% of the return. Or if an asset is growing 25% YoY, if you sell 20% earlier (assuming 12 year time horizons), you’re missing out on 45% of the upside.

As a GP, you need to figure out if you’re IRR or multiple focused. Locking in early DPI means your IRR will look great, but your overall fund multiple may suffer.

As an LP, that also means if the gains are taxable (meaning they don’t qualify for QSBS or are sold before QSBS kick in), you need to pay taxes AND find another asset that’s compounding at a similar or better rate. As Howard Marks puts it, you need to find another investment with “superior risk-adjusted prospective returns.”

And so began the search for not just moolah in da coolah, but how much moolah in da coolah is good moolah in da coolah? And how much is great?

Net TVPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15
Net DPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15

Some caveats

Of course, if you’ve been around the block for a minute, you know that no numbers can be held in isolation to others. No facts, no data points alienated from the rest.

Some reasons why early DPI may not hold as much weight:

  • Early acqui-hires. Usually not a meaningful DPI and a small, small fraction of the fund.
    • There’s a possibility this may be the case for some 2020-2021 vintages, as a meaningful proportion of their portfolio companies exit small but early.
    • In other words, DPI is constructed of small, but many exits, rather than a meaningful few exits.
  • TVPI is less than 2-3x of DPI, only a few years into the fund. In other words, their overall portfolio may not be doing too hot. Obviously, the later the fund is to its term, the more TVPI and DPI are alike.
  • As a believer in the power law, if on average it takes an outlier 8 years to emerge AND the small percentage of winners in the portfolio drive your return, your DPI will look dramatically different in year 5 versus 10. For pre-seed and seed funds, it’s fair to assume half (or more) companies go to zero within the first 3-5 years. And in 10 years, more than 80% of your portfolio value comes from less than 20% of your companies. Hell, it might even be 90% of your portfolio value comes from 10% of your companies. In other words, the power law.
  • GPs invested in good quality businesses. Some businesses may not receive markups, but may be profitable already, or growing consistently year-over-year that they don’t need to raise another round any time soon.
  • Additionally, if you haven’t been in the investing game for long, persistence of track record, duration, and TVPI may matter more in your pitch. If you’ve been around the block, IRR and DPI will matter more.
  • As the great Charlie Munger once said, “selling for market-timing purposes actually gives an investor two ways to be wrong: the decline may or may not occur, and if it does, you’ll have to figure out when the time is right to go back in.” For private market investors, unless you can buy secondaries, you’ll never have a time to go back in until the public offering. As such, it is a one-way door decision.

Some LPs are going to boast better portfolios, and we do admit there will be a few with portfolios better than the above “benchmarks.” And if so, that’s a reason to be proud. In terms of weighting, as a proponent of the power law, there is a high likelihood that we’ve underestimated the percent of crap and meh investments, and overestimated the percent of great investments in an LP’s portfolio. That said, that does leave room for epic fund investments that are outliers by definition. 

We do admit that, really, any attempt to create a reference point for fund data before results speak for themselves is going to be met with disagreement. But we also understand that it is in the discourse, will we find ourselves inching closer to something that will help us sleep better at night.

One more caveat for angels… The truth is as an angel, none of the above really matter all that much. You’re not a fiduciary of anyone else’s capital. And your time horizons most likely look different than a fund’s. It’s all yours. So it’s not about capping your downside, but more so about capping your regret. In other words, a regret minimization framework (aka, “spouse regret/yelling minimization insurance”). 

That will be so unique to you that there is no amount of cajoling that we could do here to tell you otherwise. And that your liquidity timelines are only really constrained by your own liquidity demands.. For instance, buying a new home, sending kids to college, or taking care of your parents (or YOU!) in their old age.

But I do think the above is a useful exercise to think through selling if you had a fund. You would probably break it down more from a bottoms up perspective. What is your average check size? Do you plan to have a concentrated portfolio of sub-30 investments? Or more? Do you plan to follow on? How much if so? And that is your fund size.

In closing

Returning above a 3x DPI is tough. Don’t take our words for it. Even looking at the data, only 12.5% of funds return over a 3x DPI. And only 2.5% return three times their capital back on more than 2 separate funds.

In the power law game we play, as Michael Mauboussin once said, “A lesson inherent in any probabilistic exercise: the frequency of correctness does not matter; it is the magnitude of correctness that matters.” Most will return zero, or as Jake Kupperman points out: More than 50%.

Source: Jake Kupperman’s The Time Has Come to Modernize the Venture Capital Fund of Funds

But it’s in the outliers that return meaningful DPI, not the rest. Not the acqui-hire nor really that liquidation preference on that small acquisition.

At the end of the day, the goal isn’t for any of the above to be anyone’s Bible, but that it’d start a conversation about how people look at early returns. If there is any new data points that are brought up as a result of this blogpost, I’ll do my best to update this thread post-publication.

Big thank you to Dave McClure for inspiring and collaborating on this piece, and to Eric Woo and all our LP friends who’ve helped with the many revisions, sharing data, edits, language and more. Note: Many of our LP friends chose to stay anonymous but have been super helpful in putting this together.

Footnotes

For the purpose of this piece, we know that “good” and “great”, in fact all of the superlative adjectives, are amorphous goalposts. And those words may mean different things to different people. This blogpost isn’t meant to establish a universal truth, but rather serve as a useful reference point for both LPs, looking for “benchmarking” data, and GPs to know where they stand. For the latter, if your metrics do fall in the “good” to “great” range, they’re definitely worth bragging about.

And so with that long preamble, in the piece above, we defined “good” as top quartile, and “great” as top decile. “Good” as a number on its own, enough for an LP to engage in a conversation with you. And “great” as a number that’ll make LPs running to your doorstep. Or at least to the best of our portfolios, leveraging both publicly reported and polled numbers as well as our own.

Our numbers above are also our best attempt in predicting steady state returns, divorcing ourselves from the bull rush of the last 3-5 vintage years. As such, we understand there are some LPs that prefer to do vintage benchmarking, as opposed to steady state benchmarking. And this blogpost, while it has touched on it, did not focus on the former’s numbers.

EDIT (Aug 18, 2023): Have gotten a few questions about where’s the data coming from. The above numbers in the Net DPI and Net TVPI charts are benchmarks the LPs and I agreed on after looking into our own anecdotal portfolios (some spanning 20+ years of data), as well as referencing Cambridge data. These numbers are not the end-all-be-all, and your mileage as an LP may very much vary depending on your portfolio construction. But rather than be the Bible of DPI/TVPI metrics, the purpose of the above is give rough reference points (in reference to our own portfolios + public data) for those who don’t have any reference points.

Cover Photo by Renate Vanaga on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

Venture Capital Is Not Made For Trillion-Dollar Businesses

fish, school, multiple, sea, ocean

Let me elaborate.

VCs win upon liquidity event. And that happens either via M&A or via going public. After that, the shares are transferred to the hands of the LPs and they choose how they’d like to liquidate or keep. To date, we have neither seen a trillion dollar acquisition nor a trillion dollar IPO. I’m not saying it’ll never happen. I’m sure it will, at some point. A combination of inflation and companies finding more liquidity when private markets are bullish.

As Charles Hudson suggests in his one of his latest posts, the venture world has been changing. What was once a cottage industry gave way to multi billion dollar funds. While there are still many small sub-$100M funds, LPs have started evaluating venture capital not as just one big industry, but segmenting it by size of fund. Small funds, sub-$100M. Medium-sized funds, $100-500M. And big funds, funds north of $500M assets under management (AUM for short). And as the Mike Maples dictum goes, your fund size is your strategy.

Returning a billion-dollar fund requires different kinds of investments and math for it to work compared to returning a $50M fund. And one day, as large funds continue to expand into multiple stages, check size, but also eventually into public markets, we might see them start to bet on trillion-dollar outcomes. Because to return a 11- or 12-figure fund, you need to do just that. But given the market we’re in now, I imagine that won’t be in the near future.

The 10,000-foot view

So the thing you have to gain conviction around, as a macroeconomist, is not how big a venture fund should be. Nor the debate on how many VC funds is too many. The number nor the size truly matter in the grand scheme of things.

For an illiquid asset class like venture, where you’re betting on the size of the home runs, not one’s batting average, what you have to gain conviction around is:

  1. How many truly great companies are there every year
  2. How much capital is needed to get these companies to billion dollar outcomes

For the latter, there are two main ways to get to billion dollar exits: going public or getting acquired. And while there are outliers, the best way is for these businesses to get to $100M of recurring revenue.

And everything else is downstream of that.

As an LP once told me, “In the 1990s, it took $7 million to get to first revenue. In the 2000s and into the early 2010s, it took $700K. Now it takes $70K.” With each era and each wave of technological development, founders become more capital efficient. There are less barriers to get to market. Now with AI, it might just be $7K to get to first revenue, if not sooner.

The question is how much capital is needed to get to $1M ARR. If we take a decent burn multiple of 1.5x, then we underwrite an assumption that it’ll take $1.5M to get to $1M ARR. And possibly $4.5M to get to $3M ARR. And somewhere in there, that founder will find product-market fit and turn on the growth engine. CAC (customer acquisition cost) falls. And lifetime value increases. Payback periods shorten. And if all goes well, founders may find themselves with a sub-one burn multiple. And after they hit $1M ARR, and they triple the first two years, double the next three, they’re at $100M ARR. Of course, I’m illustrating the above all in broad strokes. The best case scenario. But most things don’t go according to plan.

Then an investor has to figure out if one should only make net new investments or re-capitalize a select few of their existing investments.

Then as LPs, what is the minimum ownership percentages that can return funds at each differentiated stage and fund sizes? And due for possibly another blogpost altogether, how does a 7-8x multiple on forward-looking ARR impact round sizes and valuations across bull and bear markets?

All this admittedly is both art and science. But I will admit that larger fund sizes and playing the AUM game may not be the answer.

In closing

My friend recently sent me this letter that Sam Hinkie wrote when he retired as GM of the 76ers. In it, he quoted the great Sage of Omaha when he closed down Buffett Partnership. “I am not attuned to this environment, and I don’t want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don’t understand just so I can go out a hero.” And it’s for that same reason, Sam stepped down. The same reason Jerry Seinfield turned down $110 million to do another season of Seinfeld. Even though the sequel business does quite well.

There is no shame in knowing when to hang up the cleats. And there is great power in being disciplined. In fact, it’s one of the most sought-after traits in fund managers. If not, the most sought-after.

In VC, it comes in all sizes, ranging from:

  • Fund size discipline. There a lot of GPs out there who have gone on to raise 9- to 10-figure early stage funds. A mathematical equation that becomes increasingly harder to prove true, given outputs need to reflect inputs. In other words, larger funds are harder to return. There are a lot of VCs who would rather play the AUM (assets under management) game than stay disciplined on returns. Not just paper returns, but real cold hard cash. In the words of my friend Chris Douvos, “moolah in da coolah.” To quote another line from Chris, “OPM (other people’s money) is like opium. It’s addicting.” Something one too many investors have gotten addicted to.
  • Thesis discipline. As a friend who’s been a VC across multiple economic cycles once told me, it’s much better to turn down an off-thesis hot deal led by a top tier firm than to take it.
  • Career discipline. To echo the words of Sam Hinkie above.

And of course, knowing that we underwrite billion dollar outcomes, rather than trillion dollar ones. Then again, that’s just a subset of fund size and portfolio construction.

Photo by NEOM on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Posted on

The Anatomy of the Future

pinky promise, trust, future

There was a fascinating episode on the Tim Ferriss Show recently, where we get the inside baseball on how David Maisel, founder of Marvel Studios, raised half a billion on a promise for a company who’s public market cap at the time was only a fifth of a billion. Naturally, not only was he against a lot of headwind externally, but internally as well. According to the board at the time, they would only greenlight the idea of producing their own films (as opposed to licensing their IP out) if “Marvel had no risk. Not little risk, but no risk.”

On the cusp of Captain America and Thor being licensed away, David asked the board to give him six months. The “zero risk” pitch then came in the form of external funding, huge financial upside (if things worked out), market timing, and a promise.

Financial upside for Marvel

As David puts it:

“First to my board, the argument, was if we own our own studio, it means we get the full financial upside that they understood very well.” As opposed to licensing, their traditional business model. Where Marvel only got five cents on every dollar of profit. As was the case with SONY and Spiderman.

“Number two, we decide on greenlight when the movies get made that they also understood because they only sold toys really at the time, and the toys were contingent on a movie, which they then control the timing. Now when you’re doing a public company and you’re giving guidance every year, how can you give guidance if you don’t even know what movies are going to get made? And so controlling greenlight was important, full creative control.”

Moreover, the team was able to take 5% of revenues as the producer fee AND keep all non-film revenues (i.e. toys, video games, etc.). And even if four out of the five films lost capital, they’d still make $25M in revenue each. In other words, $100M in sum. Half of Marvel’s public market cap at the time. Whose cap was only based on toy sales.

Market timing

“The bond bubble of 2004 was happening,” as David shared, “so it was a time where there was loans being made that shouldn’t have been made. And a lot of people were enamored with Hollywood as they get enamored every few years.”

Zero downside

Instead of funding the studio off balance sheet, David would go out to fundraise from others. So what was the external pitch?

“Give me four at bats, and if one of them hits, then every movie’s a sequel after that.”

On top of all the above, to me, there were some interesting terms for the investment that helped sweeten the deal:

  • Merrill Lynch got a 3% success fee upon the $525M closing.
  • David got a low interest rate loan from Merrill by getting it insured by MPAC, therefore the debt became AAA debt, which “was easy to sell to pensions and easy to sell to individual investors” in case things went awry.

Now I’m not sure if this is standard Hollywood practice. But I imagine it’s not, at least back in ’03 and ’04. I’m a venture guy after all. And as one, the above is news to me.

That said, the banks David went to fundraise from were not taking equity. It was “pure debt. So very low interest rate. And the only collateral were the film rights to ten Marvel characters of which we could make for the movies.” Which, to me, ten characters sounds like a lot for a company whose business is characters. I also imagine these were characters that had some level of historical fanbase, so they weren’t random ones from the archives.

But David clarifies. “A lot of people misunderstand that they think we pledged ten of our characters as collateral. It wasn’t that at all because in the worst case scenario, it only got collected if we lost money on those first four movies. And then those six characters, we owned all the rights besides film. And if a film was ever made by the bank, whoever collected this collateral, we got the same license fee that we get if we just license it that day to a party. So there was no opportunity cost.”

And the promise

This is history now, but at the time, was a bold claim. The idea was borne out of frustration as an entertainment investor. That:

  1. Marvel couldn’t capture a large part of enterprise value through productions with just licensing
  2. The first movie business was horrible. Sequels, on the other hand, were a lot more predictable. So, the focus after the first movie would not be on predicting profit, but maximizing profit margins.

So David had a thought. “What if after the first movie, every movie after that was a sequel or a quasi-sequel, which required all the characters, or a lot of the characters, to show up in multiple movies?”

The idea of sequel snowballed into what we now know as the MCU — the Marvel Cinematic Universe.

Bringing it back to venture

It’s a nice corollary to raising a Fund I, where you’re also selling a promise. A world vision. A painting of the future. Nothing’s proven yet. You’re sure as hell not selling a repeatable strategy yet, and definitely not any returns. Since there’s a good chance you haven’t returned capital to LPs before.

And this is true for not just funders, but also founders. In the words of Mike Maples, “Breakthrough builders are visitors from the future, telling us what’s coming. They seem crazy in the present but they are right about the future.

“Legendary builders, therefore, must stand in the future and pull the present from the current reality to the future of their design. People living in the present usually dislike breakthrough ideas when they first hear about them. They have no context for what will be radically different in the future. So an important additional job of the builder is to persuade early like-minded people to join a new movement.”

Dissent is a luxury

The truth is loads of people will disagree with you. You’re not looking for consensus. In fact, it’s better to be wrong and alone than right and with the crowd if you’re in the venture world. Either as a founder or an emerging GP. It’s something I recently learned from the one and only Chris Douvos. If you imagine a 2×2 matrix… On one axis, you have right and wrong. On the other, you have with the crowd and alone. You want to be in the right and alone quadrant for sure. That’s where “fortune and glory” exists. It’s where alpha exists. It is how you become an outlier and achieved outsized returns.

But the prerequisite to be there is to have the guts to start in the wrong and alone quadrant. If you start from being right and in the crowd, you’re one among many. And that doesn’t give you the liberty to have independent thinking. You’re constantly trapped in noise.

It’s as Abhiraj Bhal says. “If you are a category-defining company, you will always have a TAM question, if the category is defined by somebody else, you will not have a TAM question.” You want people to question you. And as humans, we like to fit in. But to create something transcendent, external doubt is your best friend.

As such, your promise of the future must seem bizarre.

Don’t start with the product, start with your customers

When you have a promise, admittedly, the easiest way is to start engineering it right away. Without market validation. Without stress testing. Which pigeonholes a number of founders. I forgot the origination, but there’s a great line that says, “The only difference between a hallucination and a vision is that other people can see the latter.”

And in order to test that, you need to get in front of potential users and customers first. Max, someone I had the joy of working with, once wrote the below timeless tweet:

And I won’t go too deep into why I like it since I’ve written about it before. One way, like Max illustrated, is to write in public. Another is to sell without a product. It’s what Elizabeth Yin did back at LaunchBit.

As Elizabeth once shared: “We decided that we’d start with no product. We would not build anything. And, we just started selling ads. We manually brokered deals with publishers and advertisers and took a cut in between. We got our customers by emailing people and setting up the copy and links ourselves. People would pay me through my personal PayPal account. It was only when we realized we were onto something that we started building technology to remove bottlenecks.”

On the investor side, it’s building a thesis where great investments fall into. It’s a way of looking at the world in a perspective that may seem foreign to others, but almost obvious in retrospect. The thesis should elicit the response, “Why didn’t I think of that first?” But no matter how obvious, you are the best positioned to bring the thesis to life. That doesn’t mean you need returns yet. Although good graduation rates certainly help as a leading indicator.

In that regard, it’s quite similar to how David Maisel foretold of the Universe to come. Obvious once explained, yet still met with resistance from legacy players.

Photo by alise storsul on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Proudly powered by WordPress