John Felix is the Head of Emerging Managers at Allocate where he leads manager diligence and product innovation within the emerging manager ecosystem. Prior to joining Allocate, John worked at Bowdoin College’s Office of Investments, helping to invest the $2.8 billion endowment across all asset classes, focusing on venture capital. Prior to Bowdoin, John worked at Edgehill Endowment Partners, a $2 billion boutique OCIO. At Edgehill, John was responsible for building out the firm’s venture capital portfolio, sourcing and leading all venture fund commitments. John started his career at Washington University’s Investment Management Company as a member of the small investment team responsible for managing the university’s now $15 billion endowment. John graduated from Washington University in St. Louis with a BSBA in Finance and Entrepreneurship.
[00:00] Intro [02:35] The band that started it all [08:43] How did a band of 3 become a band of 5? [10:39] What bands served as inspiration for John? [13:37] Lessons on building teams and trust [19:48] The mischance that led John into the endowment world [22:34] What John learned under 3 different CIOs [26:20] What does concentration mean for Washington University’s endowment? [33:53] Portfolio construction perspectives at an endowment [36:26] The flaws of GP commits [41:25] How has John’s approach to emerging managers changed over the years? [44:17] What is key person risk? [47:06] One of the biggest challenges emerging managers face [50:45] Balancing over- and under-diligencing an emerging manager [56:28] What are traits that GPs think are unique but actually aren’t? [1:03:36] What makes a great cold email? [1:08:40] As a sports fan, do the highs or lows hit harder? [1:11:53] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:12:54] Let me know if you enjoyed this episode with a like, comment or share!
“Being too dogmatic about things or having too black or white views will prohibit a lot of LPs from making really, really good investments.” – John Felix
“The biggest leverage on time you can get is identifying which questions are the need-to-haves versus nice-to-haves and knowing when enough work is enough.” – John Felix
In a late night conversation with my high school friend last week, I picked up a fascinating Japanese phrase from her. Koi no yokan.
The best translation of it that I found was ‘the premonition of love.’ It serves as the antithesis to the notion of love at first sight. It’s love that takes time to grow on you. Slow, but steady. A seemingly acquired, yet inevitable sense of fate. It’s a feeling that begins when you meet someone you’ll eventually fall in love with.
It’s a remarkable concept with no direct English parallel. It sits in rarified air between words like hiraeth, hyggelig, and yūgen. All of which have inextricable meaning behind a seemingly simplistic string of letters. While I’ll leave the afore-mentioned three to your own rabbit holes, as you might imagine, I’ve been having quite a field trip across the linguistic landscape.
Koi no yokan.
It’s a concept that’s often applied to the enamor between humans. This may just be me being a sacrilegious foreigner, but I find the same linguistic beauty with passions.
In many ways, my love for the emerging GP and LP world was the same. If you told me back in college, that I’d want to spend a few decades of my life obsessed over demystifying the space, I’d have called your bluff. Might have even called you bonkers.
And while I’d been hovering like a satellite around the space for a while, it wasn’t till I started writing The Non-Obvious Emerging LP Playbook that I realized there was an inkling of a yearning there. Answers only led to more questions. Each insight I learned was always paired with another punctuated with a question mark. And it honestly was a really fun exercise. I didn’t write that blogpost for anyone else. Just myself. Like a public diary that encapsulated my intellectual expedition in the LP world. Even before I published it, even before any other feedback I got for it, it felt special. All catalyzed by an opportunity to back a first-time fund manager I’d been honored to see grow as the last check in.
At that point, I still had neither committed to the idea of really being a capital allocator nor to the promise of more of such content.
And when that blogpost finally saw daylight, and a number of readers responded in kind, a tenured investor asked if I was going to write a book. It seemed only fitting that a non-fiction 200-page book be the successor to the 12,500 word blogpost. So pen met paper.
I revisited old and forged new relationships off the momentum of the blogpost. And around 80 pages into the manuscript, I ran out of things to write. I didn’t know how to continue. It felt both lacking and comprehensive at the same time. I could add in more examples. Case studies. Or just superfluous language. The equivalent of turning “my dad” into “my wife’s father-in-law.” The latter of which I swore to myself I wouldn’t do.
So I stopped.
Put it aside. And went on with the rest of my life.
But time and time again, I’d find myself staring at the ceiling at night, journaling, or writing on my whiteboard in the shower about the afore-mentioned topics. It became borderline annoying that my mind kept circling back to it and I was doing nothing about it.
So frick that. As I once learned from Max Nussenbaum, who I got to work with sooner after, the fastest way to test out if there’s a market for your ideas AND if one’s interests are sustained across longer periods of time is to just write about it. And I did. Here, here, here, andmore.
At one point, my buddy Erik asked if I was going to start a podcast. At first, I dismissed the idea. Didn’t think I had the skillset or the personality for one. But man, I lost even more sleep in the ensuing weeks after he seeded the idea in my head. And so I started a podcast. (Which holy hell, I can’t wait to show you Season 3 on July 1st)
I realized much later, probably a year after I stopped writing the book, that the reason I couldn’t write anymore, despite asking so many really smart LPs for help, wasn’t that there was nothing more to share, there was still a lot… Hell, even each family office had a strategy so unlike the next. And as the saying goes, if you know one family office, you really only know one family office. So no, it wasn’t because there was nothing else to write. In one world, I could have just written an encyclopedia of strategies. It was that there was so much that had yet to be written, ever, about allocating into emerging managers.
Venture as an asset class was not the Wild West, still an alternative and still risky, but there have been predecessors who’ve productized the practice. But allocating to Fund I’s and II’s without proof of a track record was a horizon most had yet to cross.
Hell, I wrote a LinkedIn post just yesterday on how I think about evaluating Fund I track records without relying on TVPI, DPI, and IRR. And why I think more funds of funds should exist.
Simply put and in summary, there’s a complexity premium on not just venture capital, but specifically on evaluating Fund Is and IIs. And I don’t mean the big firm spinouts who have a portable track record. I mean the real folks who are truly starting to build a firm (not just a fund) for the first time.
I don’t have all the answers. Sure, as hell, I hope to have more in the near future. But I’m ridiculously excited to find answers (and more nuanced questions) — putting science to art — as an emerging LP.
If you couldn’t tell yet… I think I’m in love.
And if you’re interested, I’d love to have you join me on this ride.
#unfiltered is a series where I share my raw thoughts and unfiltered commentary about anything and everything. It’s not designed to go down smoothly like the best cup of cappuccino you’ve ever had (although here‘s where I found mine), more like the lonely coffee bean still struggling to find its identity (which also may one day find its way into a more thesis-driven blogpost). Who knows? The possibilities are endless.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Recently I’ve been hearing a lot of power law this, power law that. And you guessed right, that’s VC and LP talk. Definitely not founder vocabulary. Simply, that 20% of inputs lead to 80% of outputs. For instance, 20% of investments yield 80% of the returns.
Along a similar vein… what about questions? What 20% of questions lead to 80% of answers you need to make a decision? Or help you get 80% of the way to conviction in a deal?
‘Cause really, every question after those delivers only marginal and diminishing returns. And too much so, then you end up just wasting the founder’s or GP’s time. As the late Don Valentineonce said, “[VC] is all about figuring out which questions are the right questions to ask, and since we don’t have a clue what the right answer is, we’re very interested in the process by which the entrepreneur get to the conclusion that he offers.”
While I can’t speak for everyone, here are the questions that help me get to 80% conviction. For emerging GPs.
I’m going to exclude “What is your fund strategy?” Because you should have either asked this at the beginning or found out before the meeting. This question informs if you should even take the meeting in the first place. Is it a fit for what you’re looking for or not? There, as one would expect, you’d be looking into fund size, vertical, portfolio size, and stage largely. Simple, but necessary. At least to not waste anyone’s time from the get go.
Where are you at as a GP by Fund III? What does Fund I and II look like by Fund III?
Discipline. In the first 4 years of a fund, you’re evaluated on nothing else except for the discipline and the prepared mind that you have going in. All the small and early DPI and TVPI mean close to nothing. And it’s far too early for a GP to fall into their respective quartile. In other words, Fund I is selling that promise. The prepared mind. Fund II is selling Fund I’s strategy and discipline. Fund III, you’re selling the returns on Fund I.
Vision. Is this GP thinking about institutionalizing a firm versus just a fund? How are they thinking about creating processes and repeatability into their model? How do they think about succession and talent? And sometimes I go a few steps further. What does Fund V look like? And what does the steady state of your fund strategy look like?
What value do you bring to your portfolio companies?
This is going to help with reference calls and for you to fact check if an investor actually brings that kind of value to their portfolio companies. So, in effect, the question to portfolio companies would be: How has X investor helped you in your journey?
On the flip side, even during those reference calls, I like asking: Would you take their check if they doubled their ownership? And for me to figure out how high can they take their ownership in a company before the check is no longer worth it. There are some investors who are phenomenal $250K pre-seed/seed checks for 2.5-5% ownership (other times less), but not worth their value for $2-3M checks for the same stages. To me, that’s indicative of where the market thinks GP-market fit is at.
I also love the line of questioning that Eric Bahn once taught me. “How would you rate this GP on a scale of 1 to 10?” Oftentimes, founders will give them a rating of 6, 7, 8, or if you’re lucky 9. And the follow up question then becomes, “What would get this investor to a 10?” And that’s where meaty parts are.
Of course, it’s important to do this exercise a few times, especially with the top performers in their portfolio to truly have a decent benchmark. And the ones that didn’t do so well. After all, our brand is made by our winners. And our reputation is made by those that didn’t.
In the trifecta of sourcing, picking, and winning, this is how GPs win deals.
How do you resolve conflict or disagreement in the partnership?
This is really prescient in a partnership. Same as a co-foundership. If someone says, we never disagree, I’m running fast in the other direction. Everyone disagrees and has conflicts. Even twins and best friends do. If you don’t, you either have been sweeping things under the rug or one (or both or all) of you doesn’t care enough to give a shit. Because if you give a damn, you’re gonna have opinions. And not all humans have the same opinions. If everyone does, realistically, we only need one of you.
Hell, Jaclyn Freeman Hester even goes a step further and asks, How would you fire your partner?
Jaclyn on firing partners and team risk
Personally I think that last question yields interesting results and thought exercises, but lower on my totem pole (or higher if you want to be culturally accurate) of questions I need answers to in the initial meetings.
How are you finding companies? How are you building your pipeline?
This is always a question I get to, but especially valuable, when I ask it to spinouts. Building a repeatable and scalable sourcing pipeline is one of the cruxes of being a great fund manager. But in the age when a lot of LPs are shifting their focus to spinouts from top-tier funds, it’s an important reminder that (a) not all spinouts are created equal, and (b) most often, I find spinouts who rely largely on their existing “brand” and “network” without being able to quantify the pillars of it and how it’s repeatable.
For (a), a GP spinning out is evaluated differently than a partner or a junior investment member. A GP is one who manages the LP relationships, and knows intimately the value of what goes in an LPA, on top of her/his investing prowess. And the further you go down the food chain, the less visibility one gets of the end to end process. In many ways, the associates and analysts spinning out need the most help, but are also most willing to hustle.
Which brings me to (b). Most spinouts rely on the infrastructure and brand of their previous firm, and once they’ve left, they lose that brand within a year’s time. Meaning if they don’t find a way or have an existing way to continue to build deal flow, oftentimes, they’ll be left with the leftovers on the venture table. This question, for me, gives me a sense of whether an investor is a lean-in investor or a lean-back investor. The devil’s in the details.
What are the top 3 reasons I shouldn’t invest?
This is a test to see how much self-awareness a founder/GP has. The most dangerous answer is saying “There are no reasons not to invest.” There are always reasons not to. The question is, are you aware of them? And can you prioritize which risks to de-risk first?
In many ways, I think pitching a Fund I as illustrating the minimum viable assumption you need to get to the minimum viable product. And Fund II is getting to the minimum lovable strategy (by founders and other investors in the ecosystem). And with anything that is minimally viable, there are a bunch of holes in it.
Another way to say the above is also, “If halfway through the fund we realize the fund isn’t working, what is the most likely reason why?”
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Beezer Clarkson leads Sapphire Partners‘ investments in venture funds domestically and internationally. Beezer began her career in financial services over 20 years ago at Morgan Stanley in its global infrastructure group. Since, she has held various direct and indirect venture investment roles, as well as operational roles in software business development at Hewlett Packard. Prior to joining Sapphire in 2012, Beezer managed the day-to-day operations of the Draper Fisher Jurvetson Global Network, which then had $7 billion under management across 16 venture funds worldwide.
In 2016, Beezer led the launch of OpenLP, an effort to help foster greater understanding in the entrepreneur-to-LP tech ecosystem. Beezer earned a bachelor’s in government from Wesleyan University, where she served on the board of trustees and currently serves as an advisor to the Wesleyan Endowment Investment Committee. She is currently serving on the board of the NVCA and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School.
Chris Douvos founded Ahoy Capital in 2018 to build an intentionally right-sized firm that could pursue investment excellence while prizing a spirit of partnership with all of its constituencies. A pioneering investor in the micro-VC movement, Chris has been a fixture in venture capital for nearly two decades. Prior to Ahoy Capital, Chris spearheaded investment efforts at Venture Investment Associates, and The Investment Fund for Foundations. He learned the craft of illiquid investing at Princeton University’s endowment. Chris earned his B.A. with Distinction from Yale College in 1994 and an M.B.A. from Yale School of Management in 2001.
You can find Chris and Beezer on their socials here.
[00:00] Intro [03:07] Beezer’s childhood dream [04:29] How Chris was let go from his $4.15 job at Yale [08:09] Concentrated vs diversified portfolios [09:30] First fund that Beezer and Chris invested [11:42] Funds that CD and Beezer passed on and regret [16:07] Favorite term in the LPA? Or not? [19:18] What piece of advice did a GP in their portfolio share with them? [23:15] What’s something that Beezer/CD said to a GP that they regret saying? [28:06] What’s the most interesting fund model they’ve seen to date? [33:20] What fund invested in 2020-2021 inflated valuations that they’ve reupped on? [40:18] Events that they went to once but never again [44:24] Life lessons from CD & Beezer [54:02] The founding story of Open LP [55:02] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [57:58] If you learned something new in this episode, it would mean a lot if you could drop a like, comment or share it with your friends!
Tom Landry (who’s actually the correct attribution for the quote: “A coach is someone who tells you what you don’t want to hear, who has you see what you don’t want to see, so you can be who you have always known you could be.”)
“If you’re overly concentrated, you better be damn good at your job ‘cause you just raised the bar too high.” – Beezer Clarkson
“Conviction drives concentration, and that you should be so concentrated as to be uncomfortable because otherwise you’re de-worsified, not diversified.” – Chris Douvos
“[David Marquardt] said, ‘You know what? You’re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.’ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.” – Chris Douvos
“Sometimes I treat GPs like I treat my teenage children which is: Every word out of a teenager’s mouth is probably a lie designed to make them look better or to hide some malfeasance.” – Chris Douvos
“May we be blessed by a weak benchmark.” – David Swensen
“Miller Motorcars doesn’t accept relative performance for least payments on your Lamborghini.” – Chris Douvos (citing hedge fund managers)
“At the end of the day, the return on an asset is a function of the price you paid for it and the capital it consumes.” – Chris Douvos
At the end of last week, an LP told me something quite provocative. That right now in 2024, we’re in a low-risk environment.
And in all fairness, I thought he was completely bonkers. Fear is high. Investments have slowed their pace, especially in the private markets. Markets have really yet to recover. Some believe we’ve hit the bottom and will bounce around the bottom a few times. Others think we’ve yet to see the worst of it. Hell, just yesterday, Eric Bahn tweeted the below:
These articles were published by the same company within hours of each other… pic.twitter.com/k9TPc2Si5a
Wars are raging across the world. Currency is fluctuating on a global scale. Hell, even for the average person, prices are going up at a rate unfamiliar to most people’s memory.
But his next line really made me pause. “You’re right. There’s geopolitical risk, currency risk, market risk, and valuation/pricing risk. And we can identify every single one of them. In fact, the actual risk of investing today is really low, but the perceived risk is really high. Risk is highest when you can’t tell what the risk is. That was 2020 and 2021, when you couldn’t put a finger on what kinds of risk were out there.”
And that really stuck with me. To underscore again, risk is highest when you can’t tell what the risk is.
And so paved way for this blogpost. Albeit, that last line was the punchline.
He later told me that the concept wasn’t original, but that its origin traces its way back to Ken Moelis. Regardless of the attribution, it’s worth doing a double take on.
There’s that famous Peter Drucker line, “You can’t manage what you don’t measure.” And in many ways, it is just as true for risk as it is for tasks and KPIs and OKRs.
The family office for a well-known luxury brand once told me that they like to pay the complexity premium on esoteric alternatives. To them, venture is one of those esoteric alternatives. In addition, they’re also happy to overpay during bull markets. Access to a volatile and nascent asset class, to them, deserves a premium.
But taking a step back, there may be more wisdom to it than I initially thought. In bear markets, when the risk is real and discrete, there is no complexity premium to pay. After all, you can begin to manage what you do measure. On the flip side, in a bull market, where no one really knows who will win or what the macro risks are, a premium can be and often is paid as a bet on a company’s future and insurance against a margin of error that is hard to define.
Of course, one can say that the premium is often hype-driven instead of risk-driven. But really, hype is just long-term risk donned with a new set of clothes. A short-term luxury with a buy-now-pay-later tag that comes in quarterly installments of belt-tightening and regret.
While I personally have always believed that as an investor it’s better to be disciplined and to “dollar cost average” across vintages vis a vis time diversification, there are several great investors who believe price is a trap. At the top of my head, Peter Fenton and Keith Rabois. The latter shared his thoughts earlier this year on why. At least for seed and Series A. That in summary, there is no limit on how much you pay for a great company at the seed and Series A (likely the pre-seed as well) that won’t return you multiple-fold back. And that debates on price really are leading indicators on conviction or lack thereof.
The last part of which I agree to an extent.
All that to say, I think a useful exercise to go through whenever making a major (investment) decision is to take out a notepad and write down all the risks you can think of. If you can think of it, you can probably find a way to hedge against it. On the flip side, if you’re about to make a decision and you can’t think of any risks, that’s probably the biggest risk you’ll take.
As my mom told me since I was a kid, “There’s no such thing as a free lunch.”
But if you do come up with a good list, and the world around you is still scared, and you think there might be something special in the opportunity in front of you, sometimes it pays to be bullish when others are bearish.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Jaclyn Freeman Hester is a Partner at Foundry. She joined in 2016 with a passion for supporting the next generation of entrepreneurs and investors. Jaclyn leads direct investments in early-stage companies, often collaborating with Foundry’s partner funds. She loves working closely with founders to solve hard problems and think about the human elements of business. She invests across B2B and consumer companies that exhibit strong end-user empathy and use technology to empower individuals, unlock potential, and improve experiences.
Jaclyn helped launch Foundry’s partner fund strategy, building the portfolio to nearly 50 managers. Bringing her unique GP + LP perspective, Jaclyn has become a go-to sounding board for emerging VCs.
Jaclyn first fell in love with entrepreneurship while earning her JD/MBA at CU Boulder (Go Buffs!). There, she served as Executive Director of Startup Colorado, where she got to know Foundry and the incredible Boulder/Denver startup community the firm helped catalyze. In her brief stint as a practicing attorney, Jaclyn advised clients in M&A transactions and early-stage financings. She also witnessed the founder journey first-hand, working closely with her husband and his family as they built a B2B SaaS company, FareHarbor (acquired by BKNG).
Jaclyn loves the Boulder lifestyle, but her heart will always be on the East Coast, having grown up a New England “beach kid.” She is the proud mother of three humans and three dogs and is a blue-groomer-on-a-sunny-day skier and 9-hole golfer. In her glimpses of free time, you can find Jaclyn enjoying live music, especially at Red Rocks and in Telluride, two of the most magical places in the world.
[00:00] Intro [03:24] The significance of Kara Nortman in Jaclyn’s life [13:59] Lesson on recognizing effort from Dan Scheinman, Board Member at Zoom [18:27] The question to disarm GPs learned from Jonathon Triest at Ludlow Ventures [23:37] The differences between being a board member and an LPAC member [32:04] Turnover within institutional LPs [33:58] The telltale signs of team risk in a partnership [41:25] How to answer “How do you fire your partner?” [44:05] Foundry’s portfolio construction [53:22] What makes Lan Xuezhao at Basis Set so special? [59:59] What does Shark Tank get right about venture? [1:03:37] Jaclyn’s Gorilla Glue story [1:05:51] What keeps Jaclyn humble today? [1:12:11] What will Jaclyn do after Foundry’s last fund? [1:16:28] Jaclyn’s closing thought for LPs [1:18:10] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:20:46] If you enjoyed this episode, a like, a comment, a share will go a long way!
Ertan Can is the Founder of Multiple Capital, a fund of funds focused on investing in micro VC funds in Europe and has been a limited partner in top funds you’ve heard of including Entrepreneur First and Angular Ventures, just to name a few. He’s done his tour of duty in the asset management world at JP Morgan to covering investor relations topics at Thomson Reuters to investing in startups at a family office. Ertan is also a founding member of 2hearts, a community dedicated to building tomorrow’s tech society with cultural diversity.
He is also a proud MBA graduate from the ESCP Business School and a long time student of finance and law catalyzed by his time at Frankfurt and London.
[00:00] Intro [02:21] Ertan’s childhood [05:36] Why Luxembourg? [15:03] Which countries do European GPs set up their funds? [19:46] How did Ertan switch the family office strategy from direct to fund investing? [24:42] How has Ertan’s underwriting process evolved over time? [28:04] Do similar pitch deck formats make it easier or harder to make investment decisions? [30:34] Referrals and warm intros ranked by source [36:10] Geographies that Multiple Capital invests in [37:44] Red flags for Multiple Capital [43:48] How do solo GPs build sounding boards to check their blindside? [49:04] The (un)predictability of outlier investments [1:00:41] How does Ertan think about bringing on Venture Partners in a fund of funds? [1:08:25] The decision-making framework behind an “angel” LP investment and a FoF check [1:12:01] Where Ertan shares his unfiltered thoughts [1:20:14] Ertan’s experience around giving GPs feedback [1:27:05] Cockroaches and superheroes [1:34:08] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:36:44] If you enjoyed this episode, it would mean the world to us if you gave us a like, comment, or share!
“Our work is to increase the probability of having some of the outliers as early as possible in as small as possible funds because like a fund, that will lead to a power law in our portfolio.” – Ertan Can
Aram Verdiyan is a Partner at Accolade. Previously, he worked on the investment team at Andreessen Horowitz. Before that, Aram worked in BD, sales and marketing at Aviatrix, a cloud native enterprise software company. Aram worked at Accolade from 2012 to 2015 as a Senior Investment Associate and at Deloitte Consulting LLP. He holds an M.B.A from the Stanford Graduate School of Business (GSB) and a B.S. from the George Washington University.
[00:00] Intro [02:36] How did Pejman Nozad influence the way Aram thinks about people [04:06] Aram’s ‘distance traveled’ [05:45] What did imposter syndrome look like in Aram’s life? [06:36] How Aram cold emailed his way into Accolade Partners [09:03] The first case study Aram did at Accolade [10:10] When track record is NOT just TVPI, DPI, or IRR [15:05] The case for concentrated fund of funds’ portfolio construction [22:42] Telltale signs of “great” deal flow [26:32] When does due diligence start for prospective funds for Accolade? [27:50] Primary sources of data for Accolade [29:00] The variables that impact fund of funds’ team size [30:24] How many fund investments should each individual FoF partner have? [35:13] The case for consistent check sizes [36:20] The common mistake GPs make when it comes to LP concentration limits [41:27] How Accolade started investing in blockchain funds [44:52] Blockchain engineering talent as a function of bear markets [47:15] Time horizons for blockchain funds [50:38] Luck vs skill [53:41] Aram’s early fundraising days at Accolade [57:38] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:00:14] If you enjoyed the episode, drop us a like, comment or share!
“[When] you’re generally looking at four to five hundred distinct companies, 10% of those companies generally drive most of the returns. You want to make sure that the company that drives the returns you are invested in with the manager where you size it appropriately relative to your overall fund of funds. So when we double click on our funds, the top 10 portfolio companies – not the funds, but portfolio companies, return sometimes multiples of our fund of funds.” – Aram Verdiyan
“We don’t have varying levels of conviction.” – Aram Verdiyan
Two weeks ago, Ted Seides put out a great blogpost titled: The Investment Office Playbook – What Managers Don’t See. It’s the truth behind the veil of “It’s not you, it’s me” answer that LPs give. And that the best time for managers to be approaching CIOs at institutions happens to be:
1-2 years after they’re just sworn in (in other words, after they’ve figured out their strategy)
Up to 2-4 years after that period when they’re deploying against that strategy
And around years 11-13 where they’re now restructuring their portfolio after their previous portfolio has been optimized and reached maturity
Last week, Sequoia’s Jess Leeshared a fascinating product-market fit framework. Probably the best breakdown of solutions to problems mapping I’ve seen of late. It echoes much of what I’ve writtenbefore, but more eloquently put.
And the reason I bring this up is not to induce whiplash as you’re reading this blogpost. But that it relates back to when to raise from large LPs. As most of us know, there’s a strong correlation between fundraising as a founder and fundraising as a GP.
The first step is to have a product that large LPs can invest in. As a matter of fact, you need to have a specific product (aka fund strategy) for the LP you wish to court. For example, if a large LP’s minimum check size is $20M and their maximum ownership is 10%, and you’re a $50M fund, you don’t have what they’re looking for. That’s okay. You should never resize your fund purely on an LP’s check size and ownership.
The second is to understand their deployment timeline. In the case of large LPs, like endowments and pensions, that’s usually 2-4 years after a new CIO is sworn in. And years 11-13 when they’re rebalancing their portfolio. For other institutions, like some corporates, it’s actually in the bylaws that every three years, there’s a new Head of Investments. Hell, at Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) — the largest sovereign wealth fund, or at least one of the largest ones — a new CEO is sworn in every five years. So the clock is always ticking.
To the second point, for a large LP:
Years 1-2
When the new CIO is just sworn in, in many ways, that might be the best time to pitch a new paradigm. When the strategy has yet to fully shape up. Will you get many checks during that period? Likely not. Unless you’re a pre-existing trusted relationship of the CIO. But even if you do convince the CIO/team, they’re likely only allocating a very small percentage to that field, which for the most part, should work for you.
The goal of the value proposition, and subsequently the onboarding and tutorial, is to give people the activation energy needed to overcome the customer mindset. As such, it means one’s product can’t just be 10-20% better, but 10X better.
For instance, to get over the “yeah, right” and the “it is what it is” mindset, in the words of NFX’s Omri Drory, “the best way to manipulate energy, and get what you want, is to remove that ‘imagination barrier.'”
As such, the CIO must believe in the new paradigm. In all fairness, this takes more validation and big headlines for a tenured CIO to usually begin to believe these.
Years 2-4 (and 11-13)
They’re deploying against a top-down approach. And just as in years 11-13, they’re looking for the best in class solutions for each vertical. Meaning they’ll talk to hundreds of managers and look through thousands of pitches to pick just a few. Processes are long because they dig deep on these multi-fund relationships, but this is also an opportunity for them to increase the surface area for luck to stick.
While we all know past performance isn’t an indicator of future results, there is a reliance on metrics and the consistency of such metrics. For instance, if one were to take the top 2 investments in your portfolio and bottom 2 investments and throw them out, what does your remaining track record look like?
Or if some of your funds have yet to have meaningful distributions, graduation rates become rather important. Not just that on average, 30% of seed stage deals graduate to Series A. And 30% of Series A to B. But how many of your deals graduate past more than one subsequent round? For example, do more than 10% of your seed deals graduate to Series B? Although, to play my own devil’s advocate, vintages post-2019 have yet to really learn the true impact of loss ratios.
In closing
The truth is it’s hard to tell when the best time is. And oftentimes, it’s just a matter of luck. For one to have the right fund a specific LP is looking for at a time when liquidity is good.
But in many other ways, like Ted suggests in his blogpost, it’s the ability to think from the perspective of an LP that is invaluable and greatly appreciated as an LP.
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Jaap Vriesendorp is one of the managing partners of Marktlink Capital, an investment manager from the Netherlands investing over $1b into private equity and venture capital funds. Marktlink Capital’s LPs are almost exclusively Dutch (tech) entrepreneurs from companies such as Booking.com, Adyen and Hellofresh. At Marktlink Capital Jaap focusses on selecting venture and growth funds across Europe and the US. Before Marktlink Capital, he spent the majority of his time at McKinsey where he was one of the leaders of McKinsey’s practice for Venture Capital, Unicorns & Startups in Europe. Besides work, Jaap enjoys sports, mountains, technology, comic books, music and art.
He holds an MBA from INSEAD and is a guest lecturer at the Rotterdam School of Management (Erasmus University). He occasionally shares his views on private market investing on Medium.
[00:00] Intro [03:04] The significance of Mount Pinatubo in Jaap’s life [06:23] One Shell Jackets [08:45] The entrepreneurial gene in the Vriesendorp family that dates back to Jaap’s grandfather [14:32] The 1-year time constraint of starting Welt Ventures [17:43] What did the transition to becoming an investor look like for Jaap [20:28] The 3 traits that define a community [24:03] How often does Jaap host events? [25:30] How does Marktlink Capital have 1000 LPs? [27:15] What was Marktlink’s pitch to their LPs? [28:32] What is the typical individual LP’s allocation model to VC/PE? [29:41] Why is VC/PE uncorrelated to the public markets? [35:10] The 3 facts that define Welt Ventures’ portfolio construction model [38:28] Exit windows matter more than entry windows [42:15] Diversification in PE = Concentration in VC [47:42] 3 types of emerging GPs that deliver alpha [49:35] Which European fund has a really unique thesis? [51:44] Which school did Jaap apply to but not get in? [53:55] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [56:31] If anything resonated with you in today’s episode, we’d be honored to earn a like, comment, or share!
“We set out to achieve three things with the community:
We wanted people to have fun with each other. And when entrepreneurs meet entrepreneurs, good stuff happens even if you don’t bring any content.
We wanted to bring the absolute best type of propositions. So in terms of sales, it means sales almost without being sales where you offer something that people really want.
Organized knowledge in a way that nobody does.” – Jaap Vriesendorp
“85% of returns flow to 5% of the funds, and that those 5% of the funds are very sticky. So we call that the ‘Champions League Effect.’” – Jaap Vriesendorp
“The truth of the matter, when we look at the data, is that entry points matter much less than the exit points. Because venture is about outliers and outliers are created through IPOs, the exit window matters a lot. And to create a big enough exit window to let every vintage that we create in the fund of funds world to be a good vintage, we invest [in] pre-seed and seed funds – that invest in companies that need to go to the stock market maybe in 7-8 years. Then Series A and Series B equal ‘early stage.’ And everything later than that, we call ‘growth.’” – Jaap Vriesendorp
