Winter Mead is the Founder and Managing Member of the investment firm Coolwater Capital, which exclusively focuses on emerging managers and technology investments. Coolwater is an academy for training, building and scaling emerging managers, a curated community of VC investors and early-stage investment specialists, and an investment firm. Coolwater has helped launch over 175 emerging managers, establishing strong ties and trust with these managers, who form the foundation of the Coolwater community. Winter is also the author of “How To Raise A Venture Capital Fund”.
Prior to Coolwater, he played a key role in an evergreen investment fund at SAP, co-founded the LP transparency movement called #OpenLP, and served on the committee for the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA), which sets the standards for the private equity industry. Winter’s extensive experience includes private equity and venture capital roles in San Francisco, institutional fund investments, direct technology investments, and angel investing.
He also served as junior faculty at Stanford Graduate School of Business, holding degrees from the University of Oxford and Harvard University, and now resides in Utah with his family, passionately solving business challenges.
[00:00] Intro [03:14] Why Winter biked across Spain with a flask of maple syrup in his back pocket [05:55] How did Amy Lichorat change Winter’s career? [07:15] How did Winter get into Hall Capital Partners? [10:34] What makes Hall Capital Partners special? [13:49] How office design affects the team’s ability to learn [23:49] The value of living in the Bay Area [27:17] Where to meet founders and VCs in the Bay Area [33:35] Institutional checks vs angel checks [38:58] Two of Winter’s decision-making frameworks for angel investments [41:58] How to build an LP investment thesis [52:53] The interplay of fear and diligence [59:44] Two rookie mistakes that emerging LPs make [1:05:34] The chip on Winter’s shoulder [1:09:03] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:11:39] If you enjoyed this episode, consider subscribing and/or sharing!
Seemingly, everyone these days – from Twitter to podcasts to blogposts (including mine) – talk about buying and investing in startups. What are best practices for investment theses? How do I pick the best companies to invest in? Conversely, how do I get picked or get allocation into hot startups? But people rarely seem to be talking about selling positions. So, if you know me, I hit up two of the smartest people I know – one early-stage, the other growth-stage. Both of whom might be familiar faces on this blog. So I asked them:
How do you think about selling a position? How much does DPI matter for your investors?
The below insights include minor edits for clarity.
The notice that you’ve all seen a million times
None of this is investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Shawn Merani (Parade Ventures)
Shawn was instrumental in my early career growth in venture. When I met him years ago, he was still running Flight Ventures, where he wrote early checks into Dollar Shave Club and Cruise Automation and was one of the first syndicates on AngelList. There he led a network-based model of syndicate leads, which I’ve heard been described by others as a “venture partner program on steroids.” Now he’s the solo GP at Parade Ventures, a seed stage venture fund investing in enterprise-themed companies.
“I would preface all of this with the fact we have never fully exited a position before a traditional liquidity event, but more so, have managed our position given the duration of our ownership and to generate returns for our LPs and manage risk.
“We talk to founders all the time, and foster a relationship that grows. When I was writing check sizes for 1-5% of ownership, my engagement then is very different from my engagement with founders now, where we take more concentrated bets.
“When it comes to selling, it’s about influence and information. The larger our ownership, the more information we have access to. And if a company is doing well, we don’t think about selling. In fact, it’s the exact opposite; we buy more. If things are working, we take our pro rata. In some cases, we take more than my ownership target. And founders are willing since we’ve been helping them from the beginning. We know when there’s going to be a 3-4x uptick every 12-18 months. Compounding is powerful.
“Our investors back the fund because they trust us. They don’t talk to the founders as often as we do. They trust our decision when we say we should buy more or keep our shares. There are two ways to talk about DPI:
1. Making money for your current investors, and 2. Telling the story.
“Selling is really a case-by-case scenario, and it really depends on my relationship with the founder. All the equity in which I sold so far has been before Parade. But if we know the company is doing well, we buy more. There are also holding periods to consider under QSBS, which has huge tax benefits.”
For those that are unfamiliar with the terminology, DPI means distributions to paid-in capital. Effectively, how much money you actually return to your investors versus “paper returns”. QSBS, or qualified small business stock, tax exemption allows investors in qualified businesses to avoid 100% of the capital gains tax incurred if they hold their stock for more than 5 years.
Ratan Singh (Fort Ross Ventures)
I posed the same question to someone I’ve been a huge fan of the day I met him – Ratan Singh, Partner at Fort Ross Ventures. He’s an investor in some of the most recognizable businesses today, including the likes of Rescale and Clearcover, as well as holds board seats at Blueshift and Ridecell. You may remember Ratan from a previous essay about speed as a competitive advantage for investors. And you’ll likely see him a lot more on this blog. He summed it up best in our chat when he said, “There are two reasons why an investor needs to care about DPI: time horizon and fund strategy.” Both of which are variables, not constants, between early- and growth-stage investments.
“The true metric at the end of the day is DPI. DPI is turning in money to your investors. And there are two reasons why an investor needs to care about DPI: time horizon and fund strategy.
“Let’s start with time horizon. For a seed stage fund, as you get close to the end of your fund cycle, that’s when DPI matters. What type of vintage is the fund in? In 2021, it’s going to be the 2010 and 2011 funds.
“For the majority of the time, you want to ride your winners. At the end of your time horizon, ask for a one- to two-year extension. Usually LPs want more money or their shares distributed. They’ve already waited 10 years. Two more won’t make a difference, especially if you have some big fund returners in the making.
“For fund strategy, did you meet the objectives for your LPs already? If you have, and you want to sell some of your winnable deals in your portfolio to help raise your Fund II because those are the same LPs that would re-up in your next fund, then you might consider selling.
“The worst reason to sell is that you want to take the wins you currently have since you think the market is overvalued. ‘I’m at the peak.’ Or ‘I want to take chips off the table because there’s something bad that will happen, but that is very hard to predict.’
“There were a bunch of funds at the beginning of this year that sold their entire positions. They were desperate to lock in a win. They sold because they thought the market was at the top. And, they were wrong. I’m against it. Selling early doesn’t fully realize the strategy you have put forth. For us, at the growth stage, we shoot for 48 months to an exit. If it takes longer, did we underwrite it wrong? But even if it does, the case may be that the company is growing a little slower than expected.
“At the early stage, all funds will say 2 to 3x cash-on-cash in the LP presentation. Most funds return 1 to 1.5x, on average, with most funds total DPI at 1.2 to 1.5x, which barely returns the fund. Before your time horizon, everyone likes to cite unrealized gains and mark ups because TVPI’s all they have.
“DPI matters most for funds in the top quartile – the top returners, funds with more than $500 million, or nowadays, $1 billion mega-funds. For the bottom majority of funds, early DPI won’t matter. They would be limiting their upside.
Author’s Note: Notice that 65% of financings lost money for their investors. Source: Correlation Ventures
“The new interesting commentary is that – where the job is getting harder – a lot of crossover funds are making binary bets. Finding the one deal that’s the next Salesforce – the next industry-defining company. And putting a lot of capital to find that one or two companies. Tiger and Coatue, still maintain that 10-12% IRR, but spend a lot to find the company that’ll be the next Databricks. Every generation has their industry-defining companies. And, they’re willing to lose it all to find that one.
“You usually don’t see this at the growth stage. It’s bad for innovation. Everyone is trying to find investments that are scaling. 1000 investments in the past year became unicorns. And there are 3000+ unicorns. Yet, the top five to seven companies are still undercapitalized.”
In closing
As we closed the selling part of our conversation, Ratan shared a great quote from an Economist article:
“Flush with cash amid a deal frenzy, what is the industry to do? One option would be to liquidate portfolios, that is, to sell more assets than it buys, in effect trying to cash in some chips when prices are high. As yet, however, this does not seem to be happening. Take the figures for three big managers, Blackstone, Carlyle and KKR. So far this year for every $1 of assets, in aggregate, that they have sold, they have bought $1.30. Although Carlyle is being more cautious than the other two firms, these figures indicate that the industry overall thinks the good times will roll on.”
In fairness, as the saying goes, the high risk, high reward. Data does show that the funds with the greatest track records have more deals that lose money than those make them more money than they invested.
Interestingly enough, there’s also a huge differential between the world’s most valuable and most funded startups. According to Founder Collective, “the most valuable companies raised half as much capital and produced nearly 4X the value!” All of which echo Ratan’s words. “The top five to seven companies are still undercapitalized.”
The public often looks towards invested capital as a proxy of startup performance. But the data suggests that isn’t the case. In the words of the team at Founder Collective, “capital has no insights.” One of my favorite lines from Ashmeet Sidana of Engineering Capitalframes it is still: “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation.”
But when DPI boils down to selling on multiples at the end of the day, I often reference Samir Kaji‘s tweet on the return hurdles expected of different stages of investors. As you might guess, the return expectations of each type of fund varies based on fund strategy.
Since it was asked, return hurdles for LPs are for different types of funds:
Nano-Fund (<$20MM)- 5-7X+ Traditional Seed Fund – 3-5X+ Series A: 3X+ Growth – 2-2.5X+ Crossover/late growth – IRR driven – 10-12%+
As all things in the world, exiting is just as nuanced and complicated as entering. Hopefully, the above insights will be another set of tools for your toolkit.
If this essay has inspired more questions, here are some further reading materials, courtesy of Ratan:
Thank you Shawn and Ratan for reading over early drafts.
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