Back when I was still swimming competitively, one of the drills our swim coach always had us do was a set of hypoxic drills. The two that left the most indelible marks were:
10 sets of 100 yards, broken down by 25 yards. Lap 1, breathe every 5 strokes. Lap 2, every 3 strokes. Lap 3, every 7 strokes. And Lap 4, every 9 strokes.
20 sets of 55 yards. You start with a flip turn into the wall. First 25 yards (Lap 1), no breaths allowed. Second 25 (Lap 2), you’re allowed to only take one breath.
Naturally, those drills usually left me the most exhausted. Not only did I find myself catching my breath, we also had to swim those on specific intervals, which left less than five seconds of rest at best, while swimming at 80% our max speed.
All that to say, it was a set of exercises that trained us to hold our breath. We had less oxygenated blood. Naturally, it was harder to exert our max strength and endurance. But it tested our ability to weather exhaustion.
Just like today.
Our venture ecosystem needs oxygen. The whole industry is holding their breath. For IPOs. like Stripe’s. Which may be unlikely to happen in the near future given Sequoia’s recent share acquisition. Software acquisitions have also hit an all-time low, leaving LPs starved for liquidity from the major private market exit paths.
And of the few “acquisitions” that are happening, they’re done to circumnavigate anti-trust laws. As Tomasz points out, “they hire the core team [in other words the founding team], license the technology, but the majority company continues to operate as a separate entity.” In addition, a number of companies also need to get re-priced in the market, having raised in 2020 and 2021 on over three-year runways. Which to their credit, was the common advice given by VCs during that era.
Election season does not make this Mexican standoff any less strenuous. How will it impact the global economy? And who’s the last to hold the bag with all these hot AI deals? We all know AI has low margins and requires and immense amount of compute to deliver the results that we expect, but how much longer will this need to go on?
Who knows?
At least until we get to breathe again. The consensus seems to be Q1 2025. But until we have oxygen again, this is the hypoxic training that our world will have to endure for the foreseeable future.
In the words of my coach, “focus on distance per stroke.” In other words, executional discipline. Do more with less.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
One of my favorite Pat Grady lessons is the one he shares about his wife, Sarah Guo. The short of it is that while Pat was just enjoying his weekend down the wine country, Sarah had used that same car ride over to make several phone calls and several messages over the weekend. A time that most VCs take off for themselves, their family, or their hobbies. But Sarah took to get to know the founders, the team, key executives and everyone who was at the company.
For a deal that Sequoia, a16z, and Benchmark were also fighting over, the firm that won the deal was Greylock. And it was because of Sarah. She had spent so much time with said founders that they couldn’t imagine working with any other partner except for her.
Similarly, rumor has it that Mark Zuckerberg was able to buy Instagram also because of a flurry of conversations over Easter weekend in 2012, when no one else was expecting to be working. And while one can argue the ethics behind how the deal went down (i.e. the intensity of communication, threats or that Zuck was driven by paranoia), the fact stands that Facebook acquired that 13-person company with no revenue at a time when Twitter had offered supposedly $500M to acquire the photo-sharing company, and that Sequoia had also offered to mark the company at half a billion. But when literally anyone else could have won the deal, Facebook did.
I wrote about responsiveness being a telltale sign of excellence earlier this month. So this one is more or less an expansion of that.
I’ve always appreciated the ability in others who are able to make things happen. The hustle. Time doesn’t wait for you to wake up. From my buddy Andrew flying across the nation to close a candidate to Blake Robbins who cold emailed Nadeshot three times per week and bought him tickets to the Cavs NBA Finals game to win the chance to fund 100 Thieves. I hear about these stories every so often, from simple things, like flying to meet a founder and not expecting the founder to fly to the Bay, to more wilder stories to a lawyer cold emailing his way to Elon to get an exec position at SpaceX or sending fan mail to a music artist to put a song into outer space. And I can’t help but feel an immense amount of respect (also often inspired to take action myself).
The truth is most people don’t. Not because they physically can’t send an email on the weekend or jump on a phone call at 10PM. But because they won’t.
As an LP, one of the wavelengths I measure emerging GPs on is their ability to win deals. Too often these GPs brag about their networks and operating experiences. More often than not, not differentiated. I kid you not. Like 99% of the time. But in an age, where every GP has a podcast or a newsletter. Or a community. Hell, every GP knows someone who knows an Elon or a Bill Gates or a Jensen Huang (or they know them themselves).
Admittedly, they all start looking the same. But every so often, I meet a GP or a founder who can’t boast a crazy network or crazy set of prior exits. And the only thing they can boast is their hustle. And they are able to show for it. Those are the folks who I think will change the world.
I will admit, hustle is hard as hell to share in a pitch deck. In many ways, I advise GPs and founders to not include it because there is almost no way that a deck is the best platter to share one’s hustle. Then again, the people who are the greatest hustlers don’t need me to tell them that.
They know. And as the Nike slogan goes, they “just do it.”
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Inspired by John Felix in our recent episode together, as LPs, we often get pitches where GPs claim they’re an N of 1. That they’re the only team in the venture world who has something. Usually it’s the fact that they have brand-name co-investors. Or they run a community. Or they have an operating background, like John says below. And it isn’t that unlike the world of founders pitching VCs.
The truth is most “unfair advantages” are more commonplace than one might think. Even after one hears 50 GP pitches, one can get a pretty good grasp of the overlap.
For the purpose of this blogpost, the goal is to help the emerging LP who has yet to get to 50-100 pitches. And for the GP who hasn’t seen that many other pitches to know what the rest of the market is like. Obviously, the world of venture shifts all the time. What’s unique today is commonplace tomorrow.
For the sake of this post, and to make sure I’m not using some words too liberally, let’s define a few terms I will use quite often in this blogpost:
Product: A fully differentiated edge that an emerging manager/firm has. In other words, a must-have, if the firm is to succeed.
Feature: A partially differentiated edge, if at all, an edge. In many cases, this may just be table stakes to be an emerging manager today. In other words, a nice-to-have or expected-to-have.
Networks
Product
Feature
Differentiated community (high/consistent frequency of engagement)
Alumni network (school or company)
Downstream investors that prioritize your signals
In-person events
Keeper test
Virtual events
Co-investors
Networks, in many ways, are synonymous with your ability to source. It’s the difference in a lot of ways from co-investing versus investing before anyone else (versus investing after everyone else). The latter of which is least desirable for an LP looking for pure-play venture and risk capital.
The quickest check is simply an examination of numbers. LinkedIn or Twitter followers. Newsletter subscribers. Podcast subscribers. Community members. While it’s helpful context, it’s also simply not enough.
Here’s a simple case study. Someone who has 5,000 followers on LinkedIn with hundreds of people engaging with their content in a meaningful way is usually more interesting than beat someone who has 20,000 followers on LinkedIn, who only has 10s of engagements. Even better if one generates a substantial amount of deal flow with their content alone.
One thing that is hard to evaluate without doing an incredible amount of diligence is your founder network referring other founders to you. From one angle, it’s table stakes. From another, true referral flywheels are powerful. In the former, purely having it on your pitch deck without additional depth makes that section of the deck easily skippable.
One of my favorite culture tests is Netflix’s Keeper test. That if a team member were to get laid off or fired, would you fight to keep them or be relieved? The best folks, you would fight to keep. And as such, one of my favorite questions during diligence to ask the breakout / top founders in each GPs’ portfolios is: If, gun to head, you had to fire all your investors from your cap table and only keep three, which three would you keep and why?
Do note I differentiate breakout and top founders. They’re not mutually exclusive, but sometimes you can be brilliant and do everything right and things still might not work out. But smart people will keep at it and start a new company. And maybe it was a smaller exit the first time, but the second or third time, their business may really take off. Of course, sometimes I don’t have the same amount of time to diligence each GP as an LP with a team, so I generally ask the question: If all of your portfolio founders were to drop what they’re currently doing regardless of outcome, and start a new business, who are the top 2-3 people you would back again without hesitation?
At the end of the day, for networks, it’s all about attention. It’s not about who you know, but about how well you know them AND who you know that TRUSTS what you know. In an era, where there is more and more noise and information everywhere, a wealth of information leads to a poverty of attention. But if you have a strong foothold on founders’ and/or investors’ attention in one way or another, you have something special.
Experience/expertise
Product
Feature
Early hire at a unicorn company + Grew a key metric by many multiples
Hired top operators who’ve gone on to change the world
Experience at a larger firm where you didn’t lead rounds / fight for deals
Independent board member
Experience only matters here where there are clear differentiations that you’ve seen and can recognize excellence. In a broader sense, having an operating background is unfortunately table stakes. As John mentioned, any generalities are.
While strong experiences help you source, its main draw is that it impacts the way you pick and win deals. Only those who have experience recognizing excellence (working with or hiring) know the quality in which A-players operate. Others can only imagine what that may look like. That’s why if you’re going to brag that you’re a Xoogler (or insert any other alumni), LPs are going to care which vintage you were at Google. A 2003 Xoogler is more likely to have that discerning eye than a 2023 Xoogler. The same is true for schools. Being a college dropout from a Harvard and Stanford is different from dropping out of college at a two-year program. Not that there’s anything wrong with the latter, but you must find other ways to stand out if so.
Given a large pool of noise when it comes to titles, it’s for that reason I love questions like: “What did you do in your last role that no one else with that title has done?”
Additionally, when it comes to references, positive AND negative references are always better than neutral references. Even better is that you stay top of mind for your founders regularly. A loose proxy, while not perfect, is roughly 2-3 shoutouts per year in your founders’ monthly updates. It takes a willingness to be helpful and for the founders to recognize that you’ve been helpful.
Process
Product
Feature
Response time/speed
Some generic outline of an investment process
Evidence of a prepared mind
Doing diligence
Asking questions during diligence most others don’t know how to
Yes, response time (or speed in getting back to a founder, or anyone for that matter) is a superpower. It’s remarkably simple, but incredibly hard to execute at scale. By the time, you get to hundreds of emails per week, near impossible, without a robust process. One of my favs to this day happens to be Blake Robbins’ email workflow who’s now at Benchmark.
Now I’m not saying one should rush into a deal, or skip diligence, but making sure people aren’t ghosted in the process matter immensely. As my buddy Ian Park puts it, it’s better for a founder or an LP to know that a GP is working on it than to not feel heard.
You’ve probably heard of the “prepared mind.” The idea that one proactively looks for solutions for a given problem as a function of their lived experiences, research, and analyses over the years.
Its origin probably goes as far back as Louis Pasteur, but I first heard it popularized in venture by the folks at Accel. Anyone can say they have a prepared mind. From an LP’s perspective, we can’t prove that you do or don’t have it outside of you just saying it in a pitch meeting. That’s why a trail of breadcrumbs matter so much. Most people describe it as a function of their track record or past operating experiences. Unfortunately, there may be a large attribution to hindsight bias or revisionist’s history. Being brutally honest with yourself of what was intentional and what was lucky or accidental is a level of intellectual honesty I’ve seen many LPs really appreciate. As an example, I’d really recommend you hearing what Martin Tobias has to say on that topic.
But the best way to illustrate a prepared mind is easier than one thinks. But it also requires starting today. Content. Yes, you can tweet and post on social media or podcast. But I’d probably rank long-form content at the top.
Public long-form writing (or production in general) is arduous. The first draft is rarely perfect. Usually far from it. With the attentive eye and the cautious mind, you go back to the draft again and again until it makes sense. Sometimes, you may even get third parties to comment and revise. Long-form is like beating and refining iron until it’s ready to be made into a blade. And once it’s out, it is encased in amber. A clear record of preparation.
In closing
Pat Grady had a great line on the Invest Like the Best podcast recently. “If your value prop is unique, you should be a price setter not a price taker, meaning your gross margins should be really good. A compelling value prop is a comment on high operating margins. You shouldn’t need to spend a lot on sales and marketing. So the metrics to highlight would be good new ARR/S&M, LTV:CAC ratios, payback periods, or percent of organic to paid growth.”
In a similar way, as a venture firm, if your value prop is truly unique, you’re a price setter. You can win greater ownership and set valuation/cap prices. If your value prop is compelling, the quality of your sourcing engine should be second to none, not just from being present online, but from the super-connectors in the industry, be it other investors, top-tier founders, or subject-matter experts.
Of course, all of the above examples are only ones that recently came to mind. The purpose of this blog is for creative construction and destruction. So if you have any other examples yourself, do let me know, and I can retroactively add to this post.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Recently I’ve been hearing a lot of power law this, power law that. And you guessed right, that’s VC and LP talk. Definitely not founder vocabulary. Simply, that 20% of inputs lead to 80% of outputs. For instance, 20% of investments yield 80% of the returns.
Along a similar vein… what about questions? What 20% of questions lead to 80% of answers you need to make a decision? Or help you get 80% of the way to conviction in a deal?
‘Cause really, every question after those delivers only marginal and diminishing returns. And too much so, then you end up just wasting the founder’s or GP’s time. As the late Don Valentineonce said, “[VC] is all about figuring out which questions are the right questions to ask, and since we don’t have a clue what the right answer is, we’re very interested in the process by which the entrepreneur get to the conclusion that he offers.”
While I can’t speak for everyone, here are the questions that help me get to 80% conviction. For emerging GPs.
I’m going to exclude “What is your fund strategy?” Because you should have either asked this at the beginning or found out before the meeting. This question informs if you should even take the meeting in the first place. Is it a fit for what you’re looking for or not? There, as one would expect, you’d be looking into fund size, vertical, portfolio size, and stage largely. Simple, but necessary. At least to not waste anyone’s time from the get go.
Where are you at as a GP by Fund III? What does Fund I and II look like by Fund III?
Discipline. In the first 4 years of a fund, you’re evaluated on nothing else except for the discipline and the prepared mind that you have going in. All the small and early DPI and TVPI mean close to nothing. And it’s far too early for a GP to fall into their respective quartile. In other words, Fund I is selling that promise. The prepared mind. Fund II is selling Fund I’s strategy and discipline. Fund III, you’re selling the returns on Fund I.
Vision. Is this GP thinking about institutionalizing a firm versus just a fund? How are they thinking about creating processes and repeatability into their model? How do they think about succession and talent? And sometimes I go a few steps further. What does Fund V look like? And what does the steady state of your fund strategy look like?
What value do you bring to your portfolio companies?
This is going to help with reference calls and for you to fact check if an investor actually brings that kind of value to their portfolio companies. So, in effect, the question to portfolio companies would be: How has X investor helped you in your journey?
On the flip side, even during those reference calls, I like asking: Would you take their check if they doubled their ownership? And for me to figure out how high can they take their ownership in a company before the check is no longer worth it. There are some investors who are phenomenal $250K pre-seed/seed checks for 2.5-5% ownership (other times less), but not worth their value for $2-3M checks for the same stages. To me, that’s indicative of where the market thinks GP-market fit is at.
I also love the line of questioning that Eric Bahn once taught me. “How would you rate this GP on a scale of 1 to 10?” Oftentimes, founders will give them a rating of 6, 7, 8, or if you’re lucky 9. And the follow up question then becomes, “What would get this investor to a 10?” And that’s where meaty parts are.
Of course, it’s important to do this exercise a few times, especially with the top performers in their portfolio to truly have a decent benchmark. And the ones that didn’t do so well. After all, our brand is made by our winners. And our reputation is made by those that didn’t.
In the trifecta of sourcing, picking, and winning, this is how GPs win deals.
How do you resolve conflict or disagreement in the partnership?
This is really prescient in a partnership. Same as a co-foundership. If someone says, we never disagree, I’m running fast in the other direction. Everyone disagrees and has conflicts. Even twins and best friends do. If you don’t, you either have been sweeping things under the rug or one (or both or all) of you doesn’t care enough to give a shit. Because if you give a damn, you’re gonna have opinions. And not all humans have the same opinions. If everyone does, realistically, we only need one of you.
Hell, Jaclyn Freeman Hester even goes a step further and asks, How would you fire your partner?
Jaclyn on firing partners and team risk
Personally I think that last question yields interesting results and thought exercises, but lower on my totem pole (or higher if you want to be culturally accurate) of questions I need answers to in the initial meetings.
How are you finding companies? How are you building your pipeline?
This is always a question I get to, but especially valuable, when I ask it to spinouts. Building a repeatable and scalable sourcing pipeline is one of the cruxes of being a great fund manager. But in the age when a lot of LPs are shifting their focus to spinouts from top-tier funds, it’s an important reminder that (a) not all spinouts are created equal, and (b) most often, I find spinouts who rely largely on their existing “brand” and “network” without being able to quantify the pillars of it and how it’s repeatable.
For (a), a GP spinning out is evaluated differently than a partner or a junior investment member. A GP is one who manages the LP relationships, and knows intimately the value of what goes in an LPA, on top of her/his investing prowess. And the further you go down the food chain, the less visibility one gets of the end to end process. In many ways, the associates and analysts spinning out need the most help, but are also most willing to hustle.
Which brings me to (b). Most spinouts rely on the infrastructure and brand of their previous firm, and once they’ve left, they lose that brand within a year’s time. Meaning if they don’t find a way or have an existing way to continue to build deal flow, oftentimes, they’ll be left with the leftovers on the venture table. This question, for me, gives me a sense of whether an investor is a lean-in investor or a lean-back investor. The devil’s in the details.
What are the top 3 reasons I shouldn’t invest?
This is a test to see how much self-awareness a founder/GP has. The most dangerous answer is saying “There are no reasons not to invest.” There are always reasons not to. The question is, are you aware of them? And can you prioritize which risks to de-risk first?
In many ways, I think pitching a Fund I as illustrating the minimum viable assumption you need to get to the minimum viable product. And Fund II is getting to the minimum lovable strategy (by founders and other investors in the ecosystem). And with anything that is minimally viable, there are a bunch of holes in it.
Another way to say the above is also, “If halfway through the fund we realize the fund isn’t working, what is the most likely reason why?”
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Two weeks ago, Ted Seides put out a great blogpost titled: The Investment Office Playbook – What Managers Don’t See. It’s the truth behind the veil of “It’s not you, it’s me” answer that LPs give. And that the best time for managers to be approaching CIOs at institutions happens to be:
1-2 years after they’re just sworn in (in other words, after they’ve figured out their strategy)
Up to 2-4 years after that period when they’re deploying against that strategy
And around years 11-13 where they’re now restructuring their portfolio after their previous portfolio has been optimized and reached maturity
Last week, Sequoia’s Jess Leeshared a fascinating product-market fit framework. Probably the best breakdown of solutions to problems mapping I’ve seen of late. It echoes much of what I’ve writtenbefore, but more eloquently put.
And the reason I bring this up is not to induce whiplash as you’re reading this blogpost. But that it relates back to when to raise from large LPs. As most of us know, there’s a strong correlation between fundraising as a founder and fundraising as a GP.
The first step is to have a product that large LPs can invest in. As a matter of fact, you need to have a specific product (aka fund strategy) for the LP you wish to court. For example, if a large LP’s minimum check size is $20M and their maximum ownership is 10%, and you’re a $50M fund, you don’t have what they’re looking for. That’s okay. You should never resize your fund purely on an LP’s check size and ownership.
The second is to understand their deployment timeline. In the case of large LPs, like endowments and pensions, that’s usually 2-4 years after a new CIO is sworn in. And years 11-13 when they’re rebalancing their portfolio. For other institutions, like some corporates, it’s actually in the bylaws that every three years, there’s a new Head of Investments. Hell, at Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) — the largest sovereign wealth fund, or at least one of the largest ones — a new CEO is sworn in every five years. So the clock is always ticking.
To the second point, for a large LP:
Years 1-2
When the new CIO is just sworn in, in many ways, that might be the best time to pitch a new paradigm. When the strategy has yet to fully shape up. Will you get many checks during that period? Likely not. Unless you’re a pre-existing trusted relationship of the CIO. But even if you do convince the CIO/team, they’re likely only allocating a very small percentage to that field, which for the most part, should work for you.
The goal of the value proposition, and subsequently the onboarding and tutorial, is to give people the activation energy needed to overcome the customer mindset. As such, it means one’s product can’t just be 10-20% better, but 10X better.
For instance, to get over the “yeah, right” and the “it is what it is” mindset, in the words of NFX’s Omri Drory, “the best way to manipulate energy, and get what you want, is to remove that ‘imagination barrier.'”
As such, the CIO must believe in the new paradigm. In all fairness, this takes more validation and big headlines for a tenured CIO to usually begin to believe these.
Years 2-4 (and 11-13)
They’re deploying against a top-down approach. And just as in years 11-13, they’re looking for the best in class solutions for each vertical. Meaning they’ll talk to hundreds of managers and look through thousands of pitches to pick just a few. Processes are long because they dig deep on these multi-fund relationships, but this is also an opportunity for them to increase the surface area for luck to stick.
While we all know past performance isn’t an indicator of future results, there is a reliance on metrics and the consistency of such metrics. For instance, if one were to take the top 2 investments in your portfolio and bottom 2 investments and throw them out, what does your remaining track record look like?
Or if some of your funds have yet to have meaningful distributions, graduation rates become rather important. Not just that on average, 30% of seed stage deals graduate to Series A. And 30% of Series A to B. But how many of your deals graduate past more than one subsequent round? For example, do more than 10% of your seed deals graduate to Series B? Although, to play my own devil’s advocate, vintages post-2019 have yet to really learn the true impact of loss ratios.
In closing
The truth is it’s hard to tell when the best time is. And oftentimes, it’s just a matter of luck. For one to have the right fund a specific LP is looking for at a time when liquidity is good.
But in many other ways, like Ted suggests in his blogpost, it’s the ability to think from the perspective of an LP that is invaluable and greatly appreciated as an LP.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Last week, Youngrok and I finally launched our episode together on Superclusters. In the midst of it all, we wrestle with the balance between the complexity and simplicity of questions to get our desired answer. Of course, we made many an allusion to the DGQ series. One of which, you’ll find below.
In many ways, I started the DGQ series as a promise to myself to uncover the questions that yield the most fascinating answers. Questions that unearth answers “hidden in plain sight”. Those that help us read between the lines.
Superclusters, in many ways, is my conduit to not only interview some of my favorite people in the LP landscape, but also the opportunity to ask the perfect question to each guest. Which you’ll see in some of the below examples.
Asking Abe Finkelstein about being a Pitfall Explorer and how it relates to patience (1:04:56 in S2E1)
What Ben Choi’s childhood was like (2:44 in S1E6) and how proposing to his wife affects how he thinks about pitching (1:05:47 in S1E6)
How selling baseball cards as a kid helped Samir Kaji get better at sales (45:05 in S1E8)
In doing so, I sometimes lose myself in the nuance. And in those times, which happen more often than I’d like to admit, the questions that yield the best answers are the simplest ones. No added flare. No research-flexing moments. Where I don’t lead the witness. And I just ask the question. In its simplest form.
For the purpose of this essay, to make this more concrete, let’s focus on a question LPs often ask GPs.
“Tell me about this investment you made.“
In my mind, ridiculously simple question. Younger me would call that a lazy question. In all fairness, it would be if one was not intentionally aware about the kind of answer they were looking to hear OR not hear.
The laziness comes from regressing to the template, the model, the ‘what.’ But not the ‘why’ the question is being asked, and ‘how’ it should be interpreted. For those who struggle to understand the first principles of actions and questions, I’d highly recommend reading Simon Sinek’s Start with Why, but I digress.
Circling back, every GP talks about their portfolio founders differently. If two independent thinkers have both invested Company A, they might have different answers. Won’t always be true, but if you look at two portfolios that are relatively correlated in their underlying assets AND they arrive at those answers in the same way, one does wonder if it’s worth diversifying to other managers with different theses and/or approaches.
But that’s exactly what makes this simple question (but if you want to debate semantics, statement) special. When all else is equal, VCs are left to their own devices unbounded from artificial parameters.
Then take that answer and compare and contrast it to how other GPs you know well or have invested in already. How do they answer the same question for the exact same investment? How much are those answers correlated?
It matters less that the facts are the same. Albeit, useful to know how each investor does their own homework pre- and post-investment. But more so, it’s a question on thoughtfulness. How well does each investor really know their investments? How does it compare to the answer of a GP I admire for their thoughtfulness and intentionality?
(Part of the big reason I don’t like investing in syndicates because most outsource their decision-making to larger logos in VCs. On top of that, most syndicate memos are rather paltry when it comes to information.)
The question itself is also a test of observation and self-awareness. How well do you really know the founder? Were you intentional with how you built that relationship with the founder? How does it compare to the founder’s own self-reflection? It’s also the same reason I love Doug Leone’s question, which highlights how aware one is of the people around them. What three adjectives would you use to describe your sibling?
Warren Buffett once described Charlie Munger as “the best thirty-second mind in the world. He goes from A to Z in one go. He sees the essence of everything even before you finish the sentence.” Moreover in his 2023 Berkshire annual letter, he wrote one of the most thoughtful homages ever written.
As early-stage investors, as belief checks, as people who bet on the nonobvious before it becomes obvious, we invest in extraordinary companies. I really like the way Chris Paikdescribes what we do. “Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence
And just like there are certain companies that can’t be described in a single sentence — not the Uber for X, or the Google for Y — their founders who are even more complex than a business idea cannot be described by a single sentence either. Many GPs I come across often reduce a founder’s brilliance to the logos on their resume or the diplomas hanging on their walls. But if we bet right, the founders are a lot more than just that.
Of course, the same applies to LPs who describe the GPs they invest in.
In hopes this would be helpful to you, personally some areas I find fascinating in founders and emerging GPs and, hell just in, people in general include:
Their selfish motivations (the less glamorous ones) — Why do this when they can be literally doing anything else? Many of which can help them get rich faster.
What part of their past are they running towards and what are they running away from?
All the product pivots (thesis pivots) to date and why. I love inflection points.
If they were to do a TED talk on a subject that’s not what they’re currently building, what would it be?
Who do they admire? Who are their mentor figures?
What kind of content do they consume? How do they think about their information diet?
What promises have they made to themselves? No matter how small or big. Which have they kept? Which have they not?
How do they think about mentoring/training/upskilling the next generation of talent at their company/firm?
The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I know I just wrote a blogpost on how LPs assess if GPs can win deals. But after a few recent conversations with LPs in fund of funds, as well as emerging LPs, I thought it would be interesting to draw the parallel of not only proxies of how GPs win deals, but also proxies of how LPs win deals. And as such, coming back with a part two. Maybe a part one and a half. You get the point.
The greatest indicator for the ability to win deals as a VC is to see what the largest check (and greatest ownership target) a world-class founder will take from you. (That said, if you are only capable of winning deals based on price, you might want to consider another career. You should have other reasons a brilliant founder will pick you.) And even better if they give you a board seat.
The greatest indicator for the ability to win deals as an LP is to see what the smallest check a world-class GP will take from you. And even better if they give you a seat on the LPAC.
In the world where capital is more or less a commodity, the more capital one can provide (with some loose constraints on maximums), the better. But if someone who has no to little trouble raising is willing to open doors in a potentially over-subscribed fund for you, that’s something special.
An LP I was chatting with recently loves asking the question, “How big of a check size would you like me to write?” And to him, the answer “As much as you can.” Or “I’ll take any number.” is a bad answer. According to him, the best GPs know exactly how much they’re expecting from LPs, and sometimes as a function of how helpful they can be, especially in a Fund I or II. But always as a function of portfolio construction. Your fund size is after all your strategy, as the Mike Maples adage goes. While I don’t know if I completely agree with this approach, I did find this approach intriguing, and at least worth a double take.
I’m forgetting the attribution here. The curse of forgetting to write things down when I hear them. But I was listening to a podcast, or maybe it was a conversation, where they used the analogy that being a VC is like watching your child on the playground. You let your child do whatever they want to. Go down the slides. Climb the monkey bars. Sit on the swings. And so on. You let them chart their own narratives. But your job as the parent is once you see your kid doing something dangerous, that’s when you step in. When they’re about to jump off a 2-story slide. Or swing upside-down. But otherwise your kid knows best on how to have fun. In the founders’ case, they know how to build an amazing product for an audience who’s dying for it.
Excluding the fact that you’re a good friend or family that go way back, you likely have something of great strategic value to that GP — be it:
Network to other LPs
Operational expertise and value to portfolio companies (to a point where you being an LP will help the GP win deals with founders)
Operational expertise to the GP and the investment team
Investment expertise to help check the GP’s blindside
Access to downstream capital
Deal flow, or
Simply, mentorship
At the same time, ONSET Ventures once found that “if you had a full-time mentor who was not part of the company’s management team, and who had actually run both a start-up and a larger business, the success rate increased from less than 25% to over 80%.” (You can find the case study here. As an FYI, the afore-mentioned link leads to a download of the HBS case study.)
That’s the role of the board. The LPAC. Of the advisory board. For a founder or emerging GP, the full-time availability of said board members or LPAC members is vital.
A proxy of a mentor’s availability is pre-existing relationships between founder/emerging funder and said investor or advisor. Another is simply the responsiveness of the investor or advisor. Do they take less than 12 hours to reply? Or 3-5 business days? It’s for that latter reason Sequoia’s Pat Gradyonce lost out on an investment deal to his life partner, Sarah Guo. Being responsive goes a long way.
In sum, for LPs in fund of fund managers, small things go a long way.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.
The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.
But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!
As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!
While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.
The year was 1997.
Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.
Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”
Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.
If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.
And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.
But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.
So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”
Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”
You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:
“You have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.
What is value?
To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.
Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:
The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence
On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.
We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.
Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
But I digress.
Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.
In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.
For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:
E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.
Graduation rates
What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.
On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.
Valuation step ups
How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.
It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:
Have a real chance at the championship title.
Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.
… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.
The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.
Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?
Dilution
If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?
Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?
Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.
How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.
How does one use the appreciation value equation?
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.
And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.
If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.
But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.
The model
The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.
It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.
Take for instance…
Energy
Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.
Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.
Biotech
Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.
In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.
In closing
All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:
Is your entry point a good entry point?
Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?
For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.
For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.
If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
On Wednesday this week, I hosted an intimate dinner with founders in the windy backdrop of San Francisco. And I’m writing this piece, I can’t help but recall one founder from that evening asking us all to play a little game she built. A mini mobile test to see if we could tell the difference between real headshot portraits and AI-generated ones based on the former. There were 15 picture. Each where we had to pick one of two choices: real or AI.
10/15. 6/15. 9/15. 11/15. 8/15… By the time it was my turn, having seen the looks of confusion of my predecessors, I wasn’t confident in my own ability to spot the difference. Then again, I was neither the best nor the worst when it came to games of Where’s Waldo? 90 quick seconds later, a score popped up. 10/15. Something slightly better than chance.
Naturally, we asked the person who got 11/15 if he knew something we didn’t. To which, he shared his hypothesis. A seemingly sound and quite intellectual conjecture. So, we asked him to try again to see if his odds would improve. 90 seconds later, 6/15.
Despite the variance in scores, none were the wiser.
Michael Mauboussin shared a great line recently. “Intuition is a situation where you’ve trained your system one in a particular domain to be very effective. For that to work, I would argue that you need to have a system, so this is the system level, that it’s fairly linear and stable. So linear in that sense, I mean really the cause and effect are pretty clear. And stable means the basic rules of the game don’t change all that much.”
For our real-or-AI game, we lacked that clear cause and effect. If we received individual question scores of right or wrong, we’d probably have ended up building intuition more quickly.
Venture is unfortunately an industry that is stable, but not very linear. In many ways, you can do everything right and still not have things work out. That same premise led to another interesting thread I saw on Twitter this week by Harry Stebbings.
Today I got asked a fantastic question:
Have you ever been involved with a startup that achieved true product-market fit and still failed?
In a bull market, and I was guilty of this myself, the most predictable trait came in two parts: (a) mark-ups (and graduation rates to the next round), and (b) unicorn status. In 2020 and 2021, growth equity moved upstream to win allocation when they needed it with their core check and stage. But that also meant they were less price-sensitive and disciplined in the stages preceding their core check.
The velocity of rounds coming together due to a combination of FOMO and cheap cash empowered founders to raise quickly and often. Sometimes, in half the funding window during a disciplined market. In other words, from 18 months to 9 months. Subsequently, investors found themselves with 70+% IRR and deploying capital twice or thrice as fast as they had promised their LPs. In attempts to keep up and not get priced out of deals. Many of whom believed that to be the new norm.
While the true determinant of success as an investor is how much money you actually return to your investors, or as Chris Douvos calls it moolah in da coolah, the truth is all startup investors play the long game. Games that last at least a decade. Games that are stable, but not linear. The nonlinearity, in large part, due to the sheer number of confounding variables and the weight distribution changing in different economic environments. A single fund often goes through at least one bull run and one bear run. So, because of the insanely long feedback loops and venture’s J-curve, it’s often hard to tell.
In fact, in recent news, Business Insider reported half of Sequoia’s funds since 2018 posted “losses” for the University of California endowment. We’re in the beginning of 2023. In other words, we’re at most five years out. While I don’t have any insider information, time will tell how much capital Sequoia will return. For now, it’s too early to pass any judgment.
The truth is most venture funds have yet to return one times their capital to their investors within five years. Funds with early exits and have a need to prove themselves to LPs to raise a subsequent fund are likely to see early DPI, but many established funds hold and/or recycle carry. Sequoia being one of the latter. After all, typical recycling periods are 3-4 years. In other words, a fund can reinvest their early moolah in da coolah in the first 3-4 years back into the fund to make new investments. There is a dark side to recycling, but a story for another time. Or a read of Chris Neumann’s piece will satiate any current surplus of curiosity.
But I digress.
In the insane bull run of 2020 and 2021, the startup world became a competition of who could best sell their company’s future as a function of their — the founders’ — past. It became a world where people chased signal and logos. A charismatic way to weave a strong narrative behind logos on a resume seemed to be the primary predictors of founder “success.” And in a market with a surplus of deployable capital and heightened expectations (i.e. 50x or higher valuation multiples on revenue), unicorn status had never been easier to reach.
As of January of this year — 2023, if you’re a time traveler from the future, there are over 1,200 unicorns in the world. 200 more than the beginning of 2022. Many who have yet to go back to market for cash, and will likely need a haircut. Yet for so many funds, the unicorn rate is one of the risks they underwrite.
I was talking with an LP recently where he pointed out the potential fallacy of a fund strategy predicated on unicorn exits. There have only been 118 companies that have historically acquired unicorns. And only four of the 118 have acquired more than four venture-backed unicorns. Microsoft sitting at 12. Google at 8. And Meta and Amazon at 5 each. Given that a meaningful percentage of the 1200 unicorns will need a haircut in their next fundraise, like Stripe and Instacart, we’re likely going to see a slowdown of unicorns in the foreseeable future. And for those on the cusp to slip below the unicorn threshold. Some investors have preemptively marked down their assets by 25-30%. Others waiting to see the ball drop.
The impending future is one not on multiples but one of business quality, namely revenue and revenue growth. All that to say, unless you’re growing the business, exit opportunities are slim if you’re just betting on having unicorn acquisitions in your portfolio.
So while many investors will claim unicorn rate as their metric for success, it’s two degrees of freedom off of the true North.
In the bear market we are in today, the world is now a competition of the quality of business, rather than the quality of words. At the pre-seed stage, companies who are generating revenue have no trouble raising, but companies who don’t are struggling more.
As Andy Rachleff recently pointed out, “Valuations are not the way you judge a venture capitalist, or multiples of their fund. […] The way that I judge a venture capitalist is by how many companies did they back that grew into $100M revenue businesses.” If you bring in good money, whether an exit to the public market or to a partner, you’re a business worth acquiring. A brand and hardly any revenue, if acquired, is hardly going to fetch a good price. And I’ve heard from many LPs and longtime GPs that we’re in for a mass extinction if businesses don’t pivot back to fundamentals quickly. What are fundamentals? Non-dilutive cash in the bank. In other words, paying customers.
Bull markets welcome an age of chasing revenue multiples (expectation and sentiment). Bear markets welcome an age of chasing revenue.
The latter are a lot more linear and predictable than the former.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Last Friday, one of the greatest operators and super-connectors I know, who also moonlights as an angel investor, asked me: How do I know if I should professionalize as an investor?
Undeniably, a great question. But before I share my answer to her question, I thought it’d be best if I first elaborated on what “professionalize” means in this context. It’s a term we have used more than once here at On Deck Angels. And as a result, it has spilled over into the vocabulary I use even outside of venture. But in the context of investing, professionalize is where one would go from an amateur, part-time investor to a full-time investor. Either working at a fund, starting their own syndicate or fund, or as a full-time angel.
The thing is, to be a career startup investor, you have to be lucky. The capital required to have a seat at the poker table is high. While there are many platforms — from Republic to Wefunder to Titan Invest — that are working to democratize access, the truth, for now, still is that to access the best deals, you’re either lucky as a network leader or as a capital allocator. In other words, do you know the best and most entrepreneurial talent? And do you have a frick-ton of money?
And given that some element of luck on top of skill is table stakes, I felt the best response I could give wasn’t in the form of a statement or opinion, but in the form of five questions.
Why do you invest? What compels you to continue investing?
What are two positive adjectives you would use to describe your sibling*? What are two negative adjectives you would use to describe your sibling*?
*Or life partner, or someone you know really really well.
Have you ever laid someone off and regretted it? Why did you regret it? And at point after the event did you notice your regret?
If not… as an investor, have you ever said no to a founder and regretted it? Why did you regret it? And at point after the event did you notice your regret?
Of the five people you hang out with most, what are common traits that at least two of them have? List as many as you can.
If you were to start a fund or syndicate tomorrow, what would you call it?
So before you keep reading, I would recommend pausing. And to pull out a notepad and jot your own answers down to the questions above. It’s a useful exercise I ask myself, and evidently others as well, if you’re looking to professionalize as an investor.
When you’re ready, keep reading beyond the below image, as I’ll share my rationale behind the above questions.
*Author’s Note: Effectively, I was trying to space out the questions from the rationale of why I ask them below as much as I could, so that the below text wouldn’t influence your thinking (if you plan on doing this exercise).
Motivation – Why are you an investor? The underlying motivation matters. Are you in it for money? To pay it forward? To prove someone or some notion wrong? How fleeting is your motivation? Raising a fund is a decade-long relationship. Raising three is two-decades long of a relationship. So, the question is how deep is your motivation. Can it last multiple decades?
Strengths/weaknesses – This question is adapted from Doug Leone’s. People often describe others in comparison to themselves. For example, if I say Joanna is funny, by transitive property, I believe Joanna is funnier than I am. If I say Kai is smart, I believe Kai is smarter than I am. I often find this question to be much more useful in understanding a person than just asking for their strengths and weaknesses. After all, adjectives are, by definition, comparative words.
Standards – This question is a riff on Matt Mochary’s. If your answer to the question is no, then you don’t know your bar for excellence. Why does your bar matter? There’s a saying that A-players hire other A-players because they know just much it takes to win. B-players, on the other hand, know they’re not as good as A-players, but on average, still want to feel superior, so they hire C-players. A-players can stand B-players, but can’t stand C-players. So eventually, the A-players leave your company. Why does this matter for an investor? You need to be able to differentiate between an A-player and a B-player. The difference between a great founder and a good founder is a fine line, and most people miss it. If you want to have a chance at being a top decile investor, you need to know. After all, people often learn more from loss than from gain. For the second part of the question, being a great investor — or to be fair, a great anything — is all about the velocity in which you learn. Speed and direction.
Deal flow – This question is a proxy of where you’re going to the majority of your early deal flow, and likely who and where you’re connected the most with. The follow up would be do you get enough quality deal flow from people with these traits. In other words, if you had the capital, are you confident you could put at least $250K to use every quarter? If not, stay a scout or raise a syndicate instead of a fund. Until you can build up to this.
Legacy – Building a fund is multi-generational. Just three funds would be a 20-year relationship. And the best funds often outlive the founder(s) themselves. So the biggest question here is what kind of legacy are you trying to build? Or are you trying to build one? This legacy, founded upon your values, determines how you plan for succession and who you raise to be your firm’s next leaders.
In closing
Of course, the five questions aren’t an end-all-be-all. There’s still the ability to think through fund strategy and portfolio construction. There’s fund admin. The back office. Tech stack. Picking strategic markets where you have an unfair advantage. That said, if you can answer the above questions well, you’ll have a compelling narrative to either fundraise from LPs or join a larger fund.
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Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
