Beezer Clarkson leads Sapphire Partners‘ investments in venture funds domestically and internationally. Beezer began her career in financial services over 20 years ago at Morgan Stanley in its global infrastructure group. Since, she has held various direct and indirect venture investment roles, as well as operational roles in software business development at Hewlett Packard. Prior to joining Sapphire in 2012, Beezer managed the day-to-day operations of the Draper Fisher Jurvetson Global Network, which then had $7 billion under management across 16 venture funds worldwide.
In 2016, Beezer led the launch of OpenLP, an effort to help foster greater understanding in the entrepreneur-to-LP tech ecosystem. Beezer earned a bachelor’s in government from Wesleyan University, where she served on the board of trustees and currently serves as an advisor to the Wesleyan Endowment Investment Committee. She is currently serving on the board of the NVCA and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School.
Chris Douvos founded Ahoy Capital in 2018 to build an intentionally right-sized firm that could pursue investment excellence while prizing a spirit of partnership with all of its constituencies. A pioneering investor in the micro-VC movement, Chris has been a fixture in venture capital for nearly two decades. Prior to Ahoy Capital, Chris spearheaded investment efforts at Venture Investment Associates, and The Investment Fund for Foundations. He learned the craft of illiquid investing at Princeton University’s endowment. Chris earned his B.A. with Distinction from Yale College in 1994 and an M.B.A. from Yale School of Management in 2001.
You can find Chris and Beezer on their socials here.
[00:00] Intro [03:07] Beezer’s childhood dream [04:29] How Chris was let go from his $4.15 job at Yale [08:09] Concentrated vs diversified portfolios [09:30] First fund that Beezer and Chris invested [11:42] Funds that CD and Beezer passed on and regret [16:07] Favorite term in the LPA? Or not? [19:18] What piece of advice did a GP in their portfolio share with them? [23:15] What’s something that Beezer/CD said to a GP that they regret saying? [28:06] What’s the most interesting fund model they’ve seen to date? [33:20] What fund invested in 2020-2021 inflated valuations that they’ve reupped on? [40:18] Events that they went to once but never again [44:24] Life lessons from CD & Beezer [54:02] The founding story of Open LP [55:02] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [57:58] If you learned something new in this episode, it would mean a lot if you could drop a like, comment or share it with your friends!
Tom Landry (who’s actually the correct attribution for the quote: “A coach is someone who tells you what you don’t want to hear, who has you see what you don’t want to see, so you can be who you have always known you could be.”)
“If you’re overly concentrated, you better be damn good at your job ‘cause you just raised the bar too high.” – Beezer Clarkson
“Conviction drives concentration, and that you should be so concentrated as to be uncomfortable because otherwise you’re de-worsified, not diversified.” – Chris Douvos
“[David Marquardt] said, ‘You know what? You’re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.’ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.” – Chris Douvos
“Sometimes I treat GPs like I treat my teenage children which is: Every word out of a teenager’s mouth is probably a lie designed to make them look better or to hide some malfeasance.” – Chris Douvos
“May we be blessed by a weak benchmark.” – David Swensen
“Miller Motorcars doesn’t accept relative performance for least payments on your Lamborghini.” – Chris Douvos (citing hedge fund managers)
“At the end of the day, the return on an asset is a function of the price you paid for it and the capital it consumes.” – Chris Douvos
I am under no illusion that there is a hell of a lot of interest in the LP landscape today. Not only from GPs who are realizing the difficulties of the fundraising climate, but also from aspiring and emerging LPs who are allocating to venture for the first time. The latter of which also have a growing set of interests in backing emerging GPs. And in the center console in this Venn diagram of interests lies the education of how to think like an LP.
There is no shortage of content. LPs are also starting to make their rounds. You’ll often see the same LP on multiple podcasts. And that’s not a bad thing. In fact, that’s very much of a good thing that we’re starting to see a lot more visibility here and that LPs are willing to share.
But we’re at the beginning of a crossroads.
A few years back, the world was starved of LP content. And content creators and aggregators like Beezer, Ted, Nick, and Chris, were oases in the desert for those searching. Today, we have a buffet of options. Many of which share listenership and viewership. In fact, a burgeoning cohort of LPs are also doing their rounds. And that’s a good thing. It’s more surface area for people to learn.
But at some point, the wealth of information leads to the poverty of attention. The question goes from “Where do I tune into LP content?” to “If I were to listen to the same LP, which platform would I choose to tune into?“
After all, we only have 24 hours in a day. A third for sleep. A third for work. And the last competes against every possible option that gives us joy — friends, hangouts, Netflix, YouTube, hobbies, exercise, passion projects and more.
In the same way, Robert Downey Jr. or Emma Stone or Timothée Chamalet (yes, I just watched Dune 2 and I loved it) is going to do multiple interviews. With 20, 30, even 50 different hosts. But as a fan (excluding die-hard ones), you’re likely not going to watch all of them. But you’ll select a small handful — two or three — to watch. And that choice will largely be influenced by which interviewer and their respective style you like.
While my goal is to always surface new content instead of remixes of old, there will always be the inevitability of cross-pollination of lessons between content creators. And so, if nothing else, my goal is to keep my identity — and as such, my style — as I continue recording LP content. To me, that’s the human behind the money behind the VC money. And each person — their life story, the way they think, why they think the way they think — is absolutely fascinating.
In closing
There’s this great Amos Tversky line I recently stumbled upon. “You waste years by not being able to waste hours.” And in many ways, this blog, Superclusters, writing at large, and my smaller experiments are the proving grounds I need to find my interest-expertise fit. Some prove to be fleeting passions. Others, like building for emerging LPs, prove to be much more.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.
The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.
But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!
As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!
While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.
The year was 1997.
Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.
Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”
Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.
If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.
And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.
But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.
So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”
Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”
You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:
“You have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.
What is value?
To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.
Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:
The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence
On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.
We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.
Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
But I digress.
Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.
In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.
For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:
E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.
Graduation rates
What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.
On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.
Valuation step ups
How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.
It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:
Have a real chance at the championship title.
Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.
… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.
The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.
Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?
Dilution
If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?
Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?
Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.
How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.
How does one use the appreciation value equation?
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.
And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.
If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.
But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.
The model
The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.
It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.
Take for instance…
Energy
Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.
Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.
Biotech
Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.
In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.
In closing
All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:
Is your entry point a good entry point?
Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?
For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.
For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.
If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
The other day, I had a super insightful conversation with one of my awesome teammates here at Alchemist Accelerator about access and exposure. The difference between accelerators and emerging early-stage managers.
I’ll preface that for investors, particularly emerging managers, the three things you need to win are sourcing, picking, winning. And to be a GP, you need at least two of the above three. But for the purpose of this blogpost, I’m only focusing on sourcing.
I’ll also preface with the fact that I may be biased. I started in venture at SkyDeck, an accelerator. Additionally, I advise at a bunch of studios, incubators and accelerators. Moreover, I worked at On Deck when we launched our accelerator. And now, I’m here at Alchemist Accelerator.
I truly love early-stage programs. The earlier the better.
Instacart’s recent IPO is a clear example of venture returns compared to the public market equivalent as a function of stage. The earlier you invest, the more alpha you generate to your most liquid comparable.
It’s the difference between a market maker and a market taker. A price maker and a price taker.
Though admittedly, one day, this too may become saturated, just like how venture capital went from 50-60 funds in ’07 and ’08 to now over 4000 in 2023. Do fact check me on exact numbers, but I believe I’m directionally accurate.
Let me give a more concrete example. Harvard is a phenomenal institution. And there’s a Wikipedia page full of breakout Harvard alums. But as an LP, if 50% of your managers, despite having different theses, all have half their portfolio as Harvard alums, then you as the LP are overexposed to the same underlying asset. The same is true for Stanford. Or seed or Series A funds investing in YC founders. All great institutions, but you’re not getting your buck’s worth of diversification.
The only caveat here is if you’re not looking for diversification. After all, the best performing fund would be the fund that invested a 100% of their fund in Google at the seed round. AND holding it till today. Realistically, they will have had to distribute on IPO.
The question is are you a fisher? Or are you a digger? One requires a fishing rod; the other a shovel. The latter requires more work, but you’re more likely to be the first to gold. Like Eniac was for mobile. Or Lux to deep tech.
So how do you know you’re fishing in someone else’s pond?
Easy. Your deal flow includes someone’s else’s brand. Whether that’s Sequoia or YC or SBIR. It’s not your own. You don’t own that pipeline. A lot of people have access to it. It’s no longer about proprietary deal flow, but about proprietary access to deals to borrow a framing from the amazing Beezer.
If your deal flow pipeline looks something like the graph below, you probably don’t have a sourcing advantage.
Now that’s not to say there aren’t a lot of nonobvious companies coming out of YC or these startup accelerators. Airbnb, Sendbird, Twitch (the last of which Ravi who I work with here at Alchemist happened to be one of the first institutional investor for, so have heard some of these stories), and more were all non-obvious coming out of YC. And have also seen the same for companies coming out of Techstars, 500, and Alchemist, where I call home now. But that’s a picking advantage, not a sourcing one.
The flip side is, how do you know you’re excavating your own pond?
I’ll preface by saying having your own Slack or Discord “community” is not enough. Or having your own podcast.
I put community in quotes simply because having XXX members in a large group chat isn’t indicative that their presence is really there. Is their seat warm or cold?
I love using a stadium analogy. Imagine you sold a couple thousand season tickets to a team. You can name whatever sport it is. Football (yes, the rough American kind). Soccer. Basketball. Baseball. You name it. But despite all the tickets you sell, a solid percentage of your seats each game is empty. Can you really say that your team has fans? All you did was sell a couple of cold seats.
You can make the same analogy with likes or comments on Instagram. Which seems to be a problem these days, when an influencer with a couple thousand likes per post starts hosting their fan meetups, only to realize they rented out an empty hall. In case, you’re wondering for the IG example, it’s due to bots.
All that said, I like to think about excavation in the lens of competition for attention. Everyone only has 24 hours in a day. 7 days in a week. 365 days in a year. And as someone who is expecting any level of engagement from others, you are fighting for attention with every other product, person, and habit out there.
Perks of being a consumer investor, I think about this a lot. But in the same way, having an unfair sourcing advantage is the same.
Is the greatest source of your deals tuning into you at least four of the seven calendar days in a week? Or if you have a professional audience (i.e. only product people, or only execs), are they engaging at least 3 workdays per week or 8 workdays per month? Are they spending more time reading/listening/engaging with you than with their best friend?
If you have a community, do you have solid product-market fit? Is your daily active to monthly active over 50%? You don’t need a massive audience, but for the people who are primary sources of your deal flow, are you top of mind? As Andrew Chensays, at that point, “it’s part of a daily habit.”
Is it easy for them to share your content, what you’re doing, who you are with others? Does sharing you or your content generate dopamine and social capital for them? Do you embody something aspirational? Is your viral coefficient greater than 0.5? Even better if it’s 1, then you’re ready to go viral.
And do people stick around? Do the seats stay warm? Is your community self-propagating? Is your content evergreen? Or do you produce content at a voracious pace that it doesn’t have to be? Do you live rent free in people’s brain?
And once you do invest, are you the weapon in the arsenal of choice? For instance, 65% of Signalfire’s portfolio use their platform weekly to learn and get advice. But more on the winning side in a future essay.
In closing
To truly have a sourcing advantage, you need to be building your own platform that is impressionable and regularly take mind space from the founder audience. But if you don’t, that’s okay. You just need to be really good at picking and winning.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I’m sure every founder has heard that line at least 50 times every time they’re in fundraising mode. Hell, even outside of it. Pshhh, I’m guilty of saying it myself, while I do try to catch myself when I do. You’d think being helpful is table stakes as an early-stage investor. Surprisingly, being helpful as an investor is actually a huge differentiator.
Most investors are only as helpful as their check size, despite pitching their value-adds a million and one times. Some investors are extremely helpful only within the funding window(s) they are participating in. For instance, a seed investor is largely helpful during the 12-18-month funding window between the seed and the Series A. Others are helpful when they are asked. And a small handful of investors are true champions by being proactively helpful.
One of my favorite stories when I was interviewing LPs for the emerging LP playbook was when Brent invested in a GP who had a track record for being proactively helpful. This GP “was one of [Brent’s] first investors. He would often come into our office, and without being prompted, proceed to write code against our APIs.” Unprompted. Unsolicited, but insanely helpful.
Earlier this week, I was also reading the October investor update from a founder I love, and in it, he was talking about how much he loved the team at Sequoia (who have yet to invest), and shared that he had learned more about product in the last “3 days than [he had] in the last 3 months.”
A big part of the reason I joined the On Deck Angels team last year was to be a part of a community bringing the world’s most helpful investors together. As such, I’ve been lucky enough to be a student to our community on how they’re helpful — whether they choose to invest or not. Some examples include:
Writing a 3-5 page bug report for every founder you take a meeting with. This teaches an investor two things: 1/ to be judicious of one’s time and only take meetings with founders that you are truly likely to invest in, since these take a while to research and write up, and 2/ to always think in a “give first” mentality.
Record a Loom breakdown of why you decided to pass and what would get you over the fence. I’ve shared this before, but one of my favorite VC quotes and has been since the day I learned of it is: “There is no greater compliment, as a VC, than when a founder you passed on — still sends you deal-flow and introductions.”
Being able to admit how you can’t be helpful. As an investor, you don’t have to be good at everything, just really, really good at one thing, or a small handful of things.
Sharing their memos publicly on why they’re excited about a startup. This helps build a startup’s reputation, and also your own brand as a thought leader.
Sharing your deal memos and founder asks with your LPs (if you run a fund or syndicate). For this, admittedly, it’s best to get the founders’ approval, given the confidential nature of certain details.
Make an intro for every pitch meeting you take. Intros are often extremely high leverage. It takes you 1-2 minutes to write something up and send a double-opt-in intro. And oftentimes, can save the founders from at least tens of thousands of dollars worth of decision-making mistakes or costs. Of course, that requires you to have either photographic memory (which I don’t have) or a really good CRM. For the latter I use Airtable, and I track small details like: ideal catch-up frequency, preferred medium of communication, chill factor (yes, some of my intro emails can get a bit wonky depending on the person), and what makes them the best dollar on a founder’s cap table.
Many of the above aren’t necessarily hard to do, but just requires a consistent commitment to do them well. And of all the many ways one can help, they all fall into three buckets:
Introductions
Strategy, decision-making, and tactical advice
Downstream and co-investment capital
The last is the most obvious. The second is easy to understand, but often the hardest to execute on, and often comes from being an active or former operator yourself. Hunter Walk of Homebrew has this line, “Never follow your investor’s advice and you might fail. Always follow your investor’s advice and you’ll definitely fail.” Advice is just as helpful as it is dangerous. Something I’ll likely dive into in a future blogpost.
But for the purpose of this one, I’ll focus on introductions.
Network liquidity
I was recently reading Shawn’s chronicled reflections from his time as a Partner at On Deck — someone I am deeply fortunate to have worked alongside. In it, one line immediately grabbed my attention:
“Network liquidity is table stakes. […] This refers to how successful we are at connecting founders to people that are relevant to their needs and asks. The most important dimensions to consider are accuracy (how relevant was an introduction) and speed (how fast did you deliver).”
In 2022, and I imagine even more so, in the next few decades, it’s not about who you know — ’cause frankly, everyone will know everyone else. Social media, the metaverse, web3, the Zoom-ification of everything, and the rush back to IRL will only make this easier. I don’t believe any investor — or in fact, anyone, period — will have a “proprietary network.” So instead of who you know, it’s about how well you know them, and your ability to leverage that relationship.
We see this especially in the venture markets. In my recent blogpost, Sapphire’s Beezer shared: “We have felt for a number of years now (including pre-COVID) that the concept of ‘proprietary deal flow’ is not really a thing. Proprietary access however is something we think is true, powerful and not simple to achieve (hence why powerful ).”
I wrote quite a relevant essay a few months ago about how to write email forwardables. In order to tap into someone else’s network liquidity, there are two things you must establish:
Your rapport with the person you’re asking it from
Their rapport with the person you want to get to know
Requester and matchmaker rapport
I can’t speak for everyone, but my willingness to make intros depends strongly on both of the above, especially the former. Selfishly speaking, even if I don’t know the person who will receive the intro nearly as well, to put it bluntly, if I know I can look good to that person when I make it, that’s a strong motivator to do so. For that to happen, I need to fall in love with something about you — the person who would like to be introed. It could be you (usually the greatest motivating factor) and your passion. Even better if your passion is contagious. It could be your product. Or your insight. Usually, it’s some permutation of the afore-mentioned.
I meet with 10-15 net new founders per week. 25-30, if it’s accelerator season. Given my job description, almost every single founder asks me for intros. Sometimes, even without context.
Matchmaker and intro recipient rapport
The other side of the equation is the rapport I have with the person you want to get to know. The truth is the world of intros is like any other asymmetric game. The most well-known, busiest, and often hardest-to-reach people are the ones bombarded with the most intro requests. But like any other human being on this planet, they only have 24 hours in a day.
As a matchmaker myself, I have to cognizant not to overwhelm incredibly busy individuals with a flood of intro requests. And it is my job to triage requests. Sometimes, it’s also helping, in the case of fundraising, founders recognize not what they say they want, but to help them figure out what they really need.
In making requests to famous friends
There are times when the busiest people I know are the only people are capable of fulfilling the ask. So, it also comes down to your accumulation of social capital with the intro recipient. I have two columns in my Airtable CRM, labelled:
Why I am useful to them
Is my usefulness a priority to them? (on a scale of 1-5)
With the former, have I given before I have taken? Have I helped them before? Additionally, is the intro request more of a give or a take? A great startup with a strong team and traction for an investor is more of a ‘give.’ It’s deal flow from them. On the flip side, a founder asking for free advice is more of a ‘take.’ In general, ‘takes’ require more social capital than ‘gives.’
With the latter, priorities change. You may be useful in one phase in their life, but no longer so, in another. For example, when an emerging manager is fundraising for their Fund I, I am someone who is extremely top of mind for them, but when they’re not, I slip in importance. But regardless of the phase in their life, if someone is kind and thoughtful AND you’ve helped with a major decision or inflection point in their life, they’ll always be around. That said, I never try to abuse that goodwill. Personally, I hate being in debt and having others be in my debt.
You can also be “useful” in many different ways. For instance, doing interesting things is one way. One of the most famous people I know with millions of followers across his socials is willing to entertain any ask I ask of him under the condition I invite him to every social experiment I host in LA.
In closing
The more relevant an ‘ask’ is to the recipient, the more likely they’ll respond positively. The more top of mind you are and the more social capital you have with someone, the faster they’re likely to respond. We live in a saturated market of attention. Everything in the world is asking for ours — social media, kids, friends, work, portfolio companies, chores, Netflix, and sleep. And by no means all encompassing.
As you scale yourself as an investor, it’s important to think critically about who is in your network and how well you know them. If you’re a syndicate lead with 500 LPs, how many of them are passive capital? How many of them want to actively help your portfolio?
If you’re an investor who’s a Xoogler and wants to leverage the Google network, who do you know will go out of their way to help you? How many of them have you on speed dial? Which vintage were you a part of?
The great Richard Feynman once said, “You must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.” One of the greatest fallacies an investor or even a founder can make is to assume they have a larger leverageable network than they actually do. Only to realize that when you do need to draw on these connections, you’re unable to.
So, if you have the time this weekend or the next, sit down with a critical eye and ask yourself: How liquid is your network?
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Before we dive into this blogpost, I’ve been asked by my legal friends to include the below disclaimer. I have a version of this at the bottom of every blogpost, but nevertheless, it doesn’t hurt to reiterate it again.
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Back in the hallowed halls of my elementary school, I had a principal whose presence was always larger than life. He was often the optimist and, with words alone, could figuratively turn water into wine, and any mistake into an opportunity. Ironically, there was a sign that hung above the door to his office that read: Opportunity is nowhere. An odd sign that seemed to be the Hyde to his Jekyll.
I spent a whole year contemplating why. And on the last day of third grade, I finally mustered the courage to ask him.
“Mr. M, why do you have that sign above your door?”
“What sign?”
“The sign that says ‘Opportunity is nowhere.'”
He paused and chuckled, “David, it looks like I bought the wrong sign. It’s supposed to say ‘Opportunity is now here.’ But now that you mention it, you could say the only difference between no opportunities and endless opportunities is just one small space.”
In the venture market, that small space blossomed in late 2020. In a flurry of SPACs, secondary markets, and tech IPOs, exit opportunities for venture-backed companies were flourishing. There were multiple paths to liquidity. Tech employees saw their net worth grow, and more accredited investors were minted by the day. Alumni syndicates grew in membership and deal volume.
With a surplus of capital in the market, the money had to go somewhere. Not to savings accounts. But to goods and services. Crypto and NFTs. Startups. And other capital allocators.
Adjacently, the COVID days saw the (re)emergence of new markets. Ecommerce. Fintech. Remote work. Future of work. Web3 and the metaverse. Just to name a few.
In 2021, VC fundraising activity surpassed $100B in funds raised for the first time. $128.3 billion across 730 funds, to be exact. Carta also saw a massive jump in the number of Fund I’s created last year. More than ever before, there was an abundance in opportunities to invest in venture funds.
Anecdotally, in my work at On Deck Angels and at DECODE, I’ve seen a rise in the number of opportunities to invest into funds as well. Via various other platforms as well:
Revere — where you can discover and evaluate venture fund managers through a unique rating framework. They’ve also recently launched explorevc.com for those curious about who’s in their pipeline;
Allocate — an end-to-end platform that covers everything from discovery to capital calls and keeping track of your portfolio;
Arlan Hamilton famously raised $5M of her fund via Republic, an equity crowdfunding platform. More recently, Cathie Wood announced the opportunity for non-accredited investors to invest in the ARK Venture Fund through Titan.
There was and still is a wealth of noise, but a poverty of “signal” — a word that may have lost its true meaning in these past few years. When signal is everywhere, it is nowhere. So more than ever before, more than opportunities, what the world needs more of are frameworks. Frameworks on how to differentiate for yourself signal from noise.
There is a wealth of content and discourse in the broader world for investors, which include advice on personal finance, investing in stocks, option trading, and of course, quite a bit, in the world of startup investing. But surprisingly little in the realm of investing in venture funds. The only ones I could find were OpenLP and SuperLP, which if you know me I had to ask both of their authors for their latest insights here as well.
As we were wrapping up our conversation on a sweltering late summer day, Martin Tobias, founding partner at Incisive Ventures, told me:
“Somebody should write a book like Jason Calacanis’ Angels, but for LPs.”
And he’s completely right. While that is a larger endeavor altogether, hopefully, this blogpost serves as a preamble for a greater conversation.
Who is the emerging LP?
An LP, or a limited partner, in the context of this essay, is someone who invests indirectly, rather than directly into startups. While investors in syndicates and SPVs are also counted as LPs, for the purpose of this piece, I’ll focus on people who invest in funds.
If you’re an emerging LP, you’re most likely writing checks into Fund I’s. Maybe Fund II’s, if you’re lucky, can write larger checks ($250-500K+), you have something a GP wants, or some permutation of the above.
Effectively, this blogpost is dedicated to the investor looking to invest in fund managers who have yet to prove their institutional track record. And just like investing into a pre-seed founder, searching for product-market fit, the checks you are writing are… belief capital.
If it’s belief capital, assuming the GP has the underlying mechanics down (portfolio construction, fund strategy, etc.), it’s all about people. And if it’s all about people (I’m overgeneralizing), how you win as an LP is determined by your ability to differentiate the top decile from the top quartile. Part of that requires some level of intuition. But I am ill-equipped to speak on LP intuition, as opposed to VC intuition. So, I had to ask folks with more miles on their odometer.
Asher Siddiqui shared it best in our conversation from the perspective of an emerging fund manager:
“Here’s the problem that I have. Imagine you’re an emerging fund manager and you think you’re hot shit. How long do you think it takes before you figure out if you are?
“The average deployment period is 2-3 years. You launch Fund I in Year 1 and launch Fund II between Year 2 and 3. You close the second fund around Year 4. By Year 7-8, you now have some DPI from Fund I, early DPI from Fund II, and are now writing your first checks from Fund III.
“The truth is no one knows if you’re a great fund manager until you’re eight to ten years in. That means if you’re meeting a great manager, you’re meeting them when they’re already at Fund III, or when they’re raising Fund IV.”
Similarly, the truth is as an emerging LP, you probably don’t have the opportunity to invest in “hot shit.” Why?
Top-tier funds are oversubscribed, and have a waitlist to even get the chance to invest.
And if you could, due to the size of their funds, you need to be able to write checks on the magnitude of 7-figures and up.
Rather the buffet you have before you is the opportunity to support the best before they’re the best. So instead of looking for lagging indicators, like TVPI, DPI, and IRR, the conversations that sparked this blogpost is intended to look for leading, predictive indicators. But as you might guess, there is no one right answer in foresight. But I do hope the below serve as tools in your toolkit as you grow your arsenal of frameworks for investing in GPs.
As a quick note, wanted to share some quick definitions I wish I knew at one point in my life:
TVPI: Total-value-to-paid-in capital, aka paper returns
DPI: Distributions-to-paid-in capital, aka the actual money you get back, or Chris Douvos calls it: “the moolah in the coolah”
IRR: Internal rate of return, aka how fast your money appreciates per year
Net IRR: your IRR after fees, carry, expenses are accounted for, and what LPs care about more than gross IRR
GP: General partner of a VC firm, aka the head honcho at a firm
Finding the best LPs
The world of fund investing is, for lack of better words, opaque. There’s no public Rolodex of limited partners. If you stick around the venture world long enough, there are familiar names that regularly pop up in fund pitch decks or during VC happy hour. And outside of the big institutions who write $5M+ checks that you might find on ad hoc expeditions into the world of the internet, the two best places I’ve found so far for information on LPs is Sapphire Partners’ OpenLP.com. And scouring AngelList’s syndicates and PCN (Private Capital Network) for their LP networks, neither of which are public either.
At the same time, most individual LPs don’t go “shopping” for deals. They invest opportunistically into people they know and trust or alongside people they trust. In a way, this blogpost is also designed to help the individual LPs below shop for deals. By sharing the fact they LP publicly, my sell to them was that maybe this blogpost will the earliest semblances of fund deal flow to them.
Just as a fund manager brings smaller LPs on for very specific reasons, an LP should have a similar rationale to why they are investing in a GP. It’s a two-way street.
Methodology and a table of contents
I’m going to preface by saying: This isn’t an academic research paper. So as such, I may not have followed all the best practices in doing academic research. Nevertheless, I promise you won’t be disappointed. The below found its genesis scratching a personal itch that grew into:
How can I best support emerging GPs?
A first step into demystifying the black box of LP investing
Help individual LPs build thought leadership and discoverability, aka deal flow
And, building an investing playbook for pre-product-market fit funds
To each individual, I asked just four questions:
Apart from TVPI and IRR, what are leading indicators that differentiate the great GPs from the good GPs? In other words, the top decile from the top quartile?
In fairness, I iterated on the wording of this question the most because a few LPs I asked early on only had one answer: track record. And track record — in other words, TVPI and IRR, especially DPI, are lagging indicators.
Any red flags about emerging GPs that new LPs should be aware of?
What common pieces of advice should emerging LPs ignore, if any?
This was one that either completely hit or completely missed. The latter due to the fact, that there isn’t much advice, period, that is shared between LPs who don’t already know each other. One of the main reasons I believe this blogpost should exist.
Anything else you think first-time LPs should be aware of?
Some shared over text. Others over email. And a handful of others across calls and coffee.
As such, I’ve segmented this blogpost into five main sections:
In the words of my friend and colleague Gautam, “A big part of direct early-stage investing is more than just financial return. The same holds true as an LP, especially as an emerging LP. Be very clear about why you’re an LP. An investor who invested in the same fund as I did called his LP commitment the most expensive newsletter subscription he’s ever been a part of.”
Why you should be an LP
“The most important question to answer is why do you want to be an LP? To me, there are three reasons:
You want to build a career in this space – potentially a fund of funds, or manage someone’s family office.
You’re not the best at picking individually good startup deals to invest in, and you want to be strategic. For example, if David has the best deal flow in web3*, and I don’t, I want to invest in David.
This manager also has access to top deals – top deals that would otherwise be impossible for you to get into. If you invest in the fund, you also get access to the fund’s pro rata rights.”
— Shiva Singh Sangwan, 1947 Rise *Author’s Note: I don’t have the best deal flow in web3, but am flattered to be the example.
“I’m also a startup investor myself. My goal is still to uncover the best investments out there. So, there are 5 reasons as to why I invest in funds:
Investing in outliers: I invest in funds who have access to opportunities I may have missed myself. I don’t want to miss the next Gong.
Knowledge and network expansion: I want to expand my knowledge and network of what and who is out there. To become a better fund manager and uncover what’s happening out there in the market, I read other GP’s investor updates. I learn from what they learn.
Expanding my deal flow: I invest in others’ funds to get to invest in the companies they’ve invested in, and earning my right to, by being as valuable as an LP as possible.
Learning: I’m able to learn about areas that I’m very interested in. For example, I’ve spend the past year trying to learn more about web3, so I invested in web3 funds. I read the GPs’ investor updates and have effectively built a braintrust of GPs who are experts in web3.
Regional coverage: I LP into funds in emerging markets, namely, India, Southeast Asia, and Europe. I want to back someone who’s just starting with a Fund I, in a region I don’t have coverage on.”
— Sriram Krishnan, Kearny Jackson
Why you should NOT be an LP
“Venture isn’t a winning strategy for retail investors. Many investors cite that new funds outperform the S&P 500 or Russell 2000, but the truth is most venture funds have a low probability of beating the NASDAQ. Those that say otherwise are ignorant. Venture, as an asset class, is worse than the best public market alternative ($QQQ) unless you are getting the best outcomes. You need to be in the quartile, by looking for the top decile. Only then can you beat the public markets.
“If you don’t fully understand what that game is – one you’re not going to get your capital back for 10-12 years, then stick to public markets and small checks angel investing to satisfy startup investing curiosity. People are often insular to what they see and believe, especially on Twitter. Everyone is talking their own book. Do your homework.”
— @Cashflow_Cowboy
“Adjust expectations. People think that they’re going to always make 10x on their money, but I’m reminded of a story from early in my career.
“In the aftermath of the dotcom bubble, a time during which a looooottt of people made a lot of money, a big endowment that had one of the top venture portfolios looked at their relationships in their totality and found that only three of their managers exceeded a TVPI of greater than 2.5x for the whole of their relationship (across all the funds). And if you look at VC as a whole, returns have only very rarely met the lofty expectations that most people have. We’re looking back at an extraordinary time, but I think that when people look back, especially at a landscape littered with dilettante funds, that we’ll say that as the TVPI matured into DPI (the ‘moolah in da coolah’) times were pretty good, maybe even great, but not all the trees grew to the sky like some thought they would.”
— Chris Douvos, Ahoy Capital
“My biggest piece of advice for this audience is to actually not invest in venture. Most of the entrepreneurial network over-indexes investments to venture capital or start-ups. But our career is probably already over-indexed to this high risk asset class. I encourage entrepreneurs who start to invest to look at real estate, stocks, private equity, or private debt/BDCs. You can actually buy private debt on the public markets, called BDCs – business development corporations – that are loans out of companies and pay 10-15% yield. Or mid-market private equity generates ~20% IRR’s with far higher confidence than a venture fund. Asset allocation across these different profiles are key.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
What Makes a Phenomenal GP (As Opposed to just a Good One)
For the purpose of this section, I’m going to depart from the usual metrics – like a 3x net multiple, or a 25%+ IRR for funds longer than 5 years. Why? Since (a) if those metrics exist, these funds are no longer non-obvious, and the likelihood of you having access to these funds as an emerging LP is slim (and fund performance speaks for itself), or (b) if they don’t exist, you’re going to rely on qualitative measures — just as you would investing in most early-stage startups pre-PMF.
Consistent, clear, and preemptive communication
“Most managers are not that great when it comes to transparency around fund operations. Things like: What are your latest investments? What’s the thesis behind some of those investments? How are they performing over time?
“Some of these things get answered, if I’m lucky, on a quarterly basis, but often on an annual basis or less. So if you find a team that’s consistent about sharing progress on a monthly or at the very least on a quarterly basis and are really responsive to answering your emails and any phone calls, that’s a good sign behind a team that’s working very hard to serve the interest of its LPs and treating the job like a fiduciary.
“I’ll put a little bit of side note here. This kind of behavior is great with founders, too. When founders are really great about communications, it correlates very well to their performance over time.”
— Eric Bahn, Hustle Fund
“The six funds that I’ve invested in so far (listed here if that’s helpful) have all been communicative, stayed true to their thesis, and given me opportunities to learn and help to the extent that I had hoped for.”
— Rebekah Bastian, OwnTrail
“Sometimes things don’t perfectly line up — a GP might discover new opportunities or areas of interest as they start investing in a fund. Or increased competition. If strategy changes have occurred, ideally the GP would have been flagging this to their LPs over the course of the two years but for a new prospective LP being able to speak to the changes is important.”
— Beezer Clarkson, Sapphire Partners
The best have a unique perspective
“As an LP who also invests directly into startups, we seek GPs who have something unique – some kind of insight. It’s not always about having the highest net return. These days, there’s not enough GPs who have a unique angle on the market. It could be how they diligence deals, how they set their investment strategy, or what top investments look like.”
— Anonymous LP, $30B AUM Fund
“The funds we have known that are top decile have a point of view, this can be expressed as being thesis driven, but doesn’t have to be. It does though provide a reason for why they invest in what they do and why an entrepreneur picks them.
“They have also, in our experience, have had multiple fund returners within one fund. Not always, if an exit is large enough with respect to the size of the fund, it is possible to have a top decile fund with just one fund returner. The power law is alive and well in the top decile funds we’ve seen. This means swinging for the fences with respect to a fund’s investments as well as supporting this with a portfolio allocation and management strategy that enables a significant exit to provide for strong returns.”
— Beezer Clarkson, Sapphire Partners
“Every investor claims to have a value. There are very few cases where investors pitch otherwise. Sector specific funds may have a real value add for very early stage startups.
Uniqueness is not about investing into a vertical or type of technology, but about their ability to measure the size of an idea. Great managers know how to identify big ideas that others aren’t seeing. Even more true if you run a big fund; you must be investing in even bigger outcomes.”
— Itay Rotem, EdRITECH
Is this strategy repeatable?
“Differentiating between ‘top decile’ and ‘top quartile’ is really just going to be luck, for the most part. If you’re simply measuring and assessing ‘good GPs’ from the great ones, by track record, here would be my top few:
“What % of the portfolio comes from the top 1, 2 or 3? If you can deliver a top-quartile return WITHOUT your one winner / ‘lucky bet’, that’s really good.
What % of companies successfully got funded from investment to the next round?
Seed —> Series A should be >35%
Series A —> Series B should be >50%
Series B —> Series C should be >50%
Series C —> Series D+ should be >60%”
— Aman Verjee, Practical VC
“For GPs with young track records, we look at what the contributing companies are. Who are the fund returners? And can they replicate the same strategy? When diligencing GPs, we also talk to the founders they invest in. Essentially, whether there is founder/GP fit.”
— Anonymous LP, $30B AUM Fund
“I look for someone who’s very consistent. They have the integrity to stick to their word. They’re not deal-chasing, deploying all their capital in less than two years, and trying to raise their next fund too quickly. Typically, you’re signing up for multiple funds. If the deployment window is very small, the GP makes frequent capital calls, which means you’re committing more capital in less time.”
— Sam Huleatt, On Deck
“TVPI and IRR tend to be lagging indicators, not leading ones (for many reasons — including irrelevance of these metrics earlier than 5 years, changing motivations, engagement, and so on for investors, and shift in fund size/strategy, noting the Maples Dictum that your fund size IS your strategy).
“For me, the thing that tilts the odds in favor of a manager having the potential to be ‘great’ is that they are leveraging some sort of ecosystem. That can be an ecosystem built on years of success (Sequoia) or ‘prepared mind’ like Accel back in the day, or deep entrenchment in a mafia (Founders Fund). Additionally, some people build fertile ecosystems like First Round or True by investing time and attention in targeted and intentional ways. I try to look for people that are entrenched in some kind of robust ecosystem and match the moment when their upward-sloping line of experience as an investor intersects the (generally) downward sloping line of hunger. For more specifics on my thought process, see the most recent (five years old LOL) post on Super LP.”
— Chris Douvos, Ahoy Capital
“Over the long run of course, it’s DPI, but it’s about consistency of returns, which typically is a byproduct of them understanding where their definable edges (finding product/market fit), and ruthlessly exploiting those edges through building repeatable processes on sourcing, decision making, team building, etc.”
— Samir Kaji, Allocate
“This portfolio can’t be a one-hit wonder. Is there enough gold in the middle after you take the top two and the bottom two investments out?
“There’s a Rome in everyone’s future. You go up and then you go down. There are many funds that generated outsized alpha in the last decade but are not what they used to be.
“If you’re leveraging a network, is that alumni network today the same as it was yesterday. Did most of the smart, driven people leave? Are you borrowing or are you using that network? Were you there at the right vintage?
“Also, bet on people who do what they said they would do. Where did the returns come from? If the top returns came from their 20% discretionary funds, and not their 80% core fund, is that something worth betting on again as an LP? I would rather back a 3x return from an on-thesis fund than someone who gave me a 6x who came from off-thesis. The latter is because it came from sheer dumb luck. The question is, what do they do with that dumb luck? Do they pivot and learn, or continue to go rogue / play the roulette?
“Think about why LPs give money to GPs. Anyone can go into Vegas and play the roulette. The best GPs can do something I cannot do and they do it repeatedly.”
— Asher Siddiqui, Sukna Ventures
Access > proprietary deal flow
“We have felt for a number of years now (including pre-COVID) that the concept of ‘proprietary deal flow’ is not really a thing. Proprietary access however is something we think is true, powerful and not simple to achieve (hence why powerful ).”
— Beezer Clarkson, Sapphire Partners
“I look for emerging managers who have a highly differentiated platform offering or differentiated deal flow. In addition, for someone who has won before, like winning great deals, they’re likely to win again.”
— Sriram Krishnan, Kearny Jackson
“For an emerging GP, it’s all about access. Do I have the confidence that the best founders will seek out this GP?
How I evaluate access for a solo GP is different from how I evaluated a platform. For platforms, their external brand plays a big role. What are other founders saying about them? I talk to founders they’ve backed because ultimately, founders are their customers.
For solo GPs, I evaluate the GP on their personal brand, and his or her own insight on how they are thinking about the fund as a product. Here, I think of it as more of a bet on the founder of the firm, and not a fund bet.”
— Gautam Shewakramani, Inuka Capital
“GPs also need to be able to quantify that unique access. I’m an LP in a fund that puts on a regular conference and runs a community of 30,000 [redacted job title]. Their thesis was that they’re going to fund the best ideas that come out of their [redacted] community.
“The same is true for Packy McCormick. His thesis is: ‘I help startups tell their stories. I have all these readers who are VCs and founders, and they’re going to invite me into their deal.’ So, the quantitative thing is how big is his mailing list and how fast is it growing.
“It’s the ability to quantify things that you as the GP think are proprietary about your particular access to this market segment. It’s more than just how many LinkedIn friends you have or how many Twitter followers you have; it’s specific to your thesis.
“For my thesis, I get referred deals because I’m an LP in 17 funds. I invest in deals that are too early for these other funds, and I can get them follow-on financing because I know directly the LPs in the follow-on funds. And the fact that I’m an LP in 17 funds gives credibility to that thesis.
“One of my theses is that I’m a really good pre-seed investor because my companies get a higher percentage of follow-on financing than your average VC. Mine is 72%. Techstars is 30%. I’m two and a half times better than Techstars at getting follow-on financing.”
— Martin Tobias, Incisive Ventures
“I’m an LP in 17 venture capital funds, and it’s very clear what separates the best from the good. Deal flow.
“I also think we are entering a new era where you’ll see specialized, smaller funds that will generate great performance because of domain expertise and proximity to the nucleus of innovation. I get really excited about this group, and think some of these <$50M funds could generate 5x+ returns.
“For this group, I look for two things:
The team climbing the hill: Why is this team special in being able to attract great deal flow? Examples could be knowledge expertise, distribution, prior experience, geographic coverage, but a compelling edge is critical.
The hill that team is climbing: Ultimately, macro matters a lot. We like to attribute performance to skill, but timing, sector, and luck play a large part of success. The worst manager in crypto in 2015 probably did pretty well. The worst fintech manager in 2010 probably crushed it. I think about what will be the area in 2030 that everyone wishes they had exposure to today.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
They don’t have to ask “How can I help?”
“Most investors are not helpful. I started a company, raised some VC money, then some from angels. And I realized that our most helpful investors were angels. I came to understand that there are two kinds of helpful investors:
Reactively helpful
Proactively helpful
“For the former, you would have a problem, reach out to your investor, and they would really help you. For the latter, it’s Alex. Alex was one of our first investors. He would often come into our office, and without being prompted, proceed to write code against our APIs. And I thought, if I were to be a VC one day, I wanted to be just like him — very hands on. I knew he would be a real value-add investor.”
— Brent Goldman, Lancelot Ventures *Alex is a fictitious name of a real person.
“It boils down to three questions that are all interrelated:
Does this fund manager have a brand?
Does he/she have access? Do founders need them more than the manager needs the founders?
And does he/she have something unique to provide to founders?”
— Shiva Singh Sangwan, 1947 Rise
“At the pre-seed level, where I invest, a great fund manager is someone who gets a startup to a ‘real’ round of funding. I think it’s like fording a river: a good fund attracts founders to their boat, then ferries them across to the other side. For this service, they are rewarded with allocation in a round that’s underpriced once they reach the shore.
“Great funds are ones that have a sustained, repeatable process for attracting founders and a reliable methodology to get them across. This can look like focusing on a geography, focusing on a sector, focusing on an underserved founder market, acting as a scout for a larger fund who likes your deals, or some combination of the above.
“The returns from pre-seed are really about getting early and cheaply enough to have made the risk worth it.”
— Paul Griffiths, 15 & Change
Are they hungry?
“I work with some good fund managers, but why are they not great? Why are they only in the top quartile, and not the top decile? They have all the ingredients of being great. They have amazing pedigree, and they went to the right high school, the right college, and worked at all the top startups in their vintage. But… they’re not hungry. They haven’t had enough adversity in their life.
“I have seen prospective LPs only look at a GP’s career history, and not their life history. You need that extra data point, that context. To take a holistic view of the unique set of experiences of a human being, and not just the professional. You look at their thesis, and their history; you look at it from birth to today; you look at their whole life and career history, and look at their thesis. If the thesis doesn’t make complete and perfect sense, then I don’t think this is a ‘great‘ fund manager. If it fits like a glove, then yes, they could be.
“I don’t believe in luck. I believe you create your own luck. How do you create your own luck? You create chaos, which creates opportunities — you then leverage your past experience and your drive to capitalize on that opportunity….”
— Asher Siddiqui, Sukna Ventures
The devil is in the details of their portfolio construction model
“They need to have thought about deployment (schedules) and fund size. One of the quotes we both like is ‘Your fund size is your strategy.’ A fund of $10 million should have a very different strategy than a $50 million or $100 million fund.”
— Sam Huleatt, On Deck
“To us, the difference between good and very good is portfolio management. How do they think about reserves to follow on? Do they look to increase allocation into the winners?
“There’s a big difference between managing a $5 million fund and a $20-30 million one and $500 million one. How you look at portfolio management and allocation is different. Everyone tells you they can give you a 5x return, but I only need 3x DPI! Even the best firms out there struggle to return 3x on certain funds.
“Your size is your strategy. We take into account the geography you invest into. In Israel, we don’t have decacorns. And because the exits are lower, the fund size should also be lower.”
— Itay Rotem, EdRITECH
Mixed references are not as bad as you think
“I’ve backed a lot of funds across the private markets, in both private equity and venture capital, and great investors may have divisive personalities. You want to back special talents, and they may rub people the wrong way. That said, there is a difference between a prickly personality and a bad actor not treating founders right, and not being ethical in their dealings.”
— Anonymous LP, Private Wealth Management Firm
Does the GP have investor-market fit?
“Success builds upon success in venture. I’m never going to attract the best talent in the neobank or fintech space. They don’t know who I am and I don’t have true domain expertise. But if you’re doing something in retail or in hardware, I can really help and you likely know what Tide Cleaners is. Folks in retail find a way to get in front of me, and likewise, I can meaningfully help these companies. Product market fit applies to VC’s, too. And we don’t talk about this enough, but also LP’s.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
The best have long time horizons
“Luck aside, I index greatly on energy, fire, thoughtfulness, and passion. Some founders or operators raise a fund after an exit because they don’t know what to do next and have money in the bank. LPs need to discern as best as possible how committed these people are to the job of investing. How much does the GP resonate with the founders they’re backing?
“GPs who are only building, but don’t understand roughly what they’re building towards tend not to resonate with me. GPs who have founder friendliness talking points, but few examples of hard conversations with founders don’t resonate with me. I get concerned when GPs don’t appear to have an understanding of what kind of bet they’re actually making. The great GPs have long-run perspectives and are willing to adapt. Startups have to execute miracles to achieve great financial outcomes. I want to see GPs have a rough mathematical understanding of their bets based on their assumptions and stories. What’s a reasonable amount of capital to startups to their milestones, knowing your home runs are going to go much further than your initial projections? What does SaaS multiples going down from 10-15x to around 8x mean? Was the GP banking on elevated multiples persisting for the math to work?”
— @Cashflow_Cowboy
“I want to invest in people who are going to build multiple funds, so the long-term commitment to the space is critical.
“Every fund thinks they’re solving a unique problem – most are not. A happy outcome is backing a GP that you believe in, so I’d prioritize character over potential returns. At the end of the day, you’re getting into a decade-long relationship, so you’d better like the GP as a person, not just the asset class.”
— Paul Griffiths, 15 & Change
Luck is a skill
“The thing is everyone’s smart, and between the top decile and quartile, luck is a big differentiator.”
— @Cashflow_Cowboy
“The difference between top quartile and top decile is one of luck. I believe that it is impossible to predict ex ante.”
— Chris Douvos, Ahoy Capital
“Outlier performance is a combination of luck and skill (luck is needed for massive outlier funds), but the best fund managers require less luck to consistently outperform because they have well constructed operating frameworks.”
— Samir Kaji, Allocate
“In my early days in venture, I spoke with several investors on the Midas list. And every single one of them attributed their success to luck and timing. They still view themselves as learning and actively track their anti portfolio to see what they missed. They’re humble, and still suffer from imposter syndrome. When I ask them these two questions:
Which were the startups that you thought were going to be winners?
What startups put you on the Midas list?
“There will be some overlap, but more often than not, it’ll be a different set of names. Investing in GPs is a bit like startup investing. It’s a bit of a roulette wheel. What you’re doing is improving the odds. Any LP or GP who says otherwise is full of shit.”
— Asher Siddiqui, Sukna Ventures
The best change the status quo
“I believe great GPs aren’t just impacting the success of their portfolio companies and their LPs, but are changing entire systems that are historically pretty broken in the VC ecosystem. The vast majority of LPs, VCs and funded founders have tended to be pretty homogenous in terms of the identities they hold and approaches they take to building & funding companies. By breaking through those biases and pattern matching, not only will a new kind of emerging fund manager see better returns, but they’ll also dismantle a lot of the systemic inequities that have prevailed. TL;DR: Good managers see healthy returns, great managers see those returns and leave things better than they found them. (I wrote a bit about some of those inequitable systems here if you’d like to link to it)”
— Rebekah Bastian, OwnTrail
GP Red Flags
Logo and trend shopping
“There is a concept of just logo shopping. A lot of decks are loaded up with a bunch of logos of great companies that the GPs have invested in the past.
“There are people who say they’re seed investors were able to get a slice of allocation of some hot company at the Series C or Series D for a $5,000 or $10,000 check. There’s nothing inherently wrong with that as an investor. But the way that it’s framed often looks like that they were seed investors in these hot companies as well.
“So, there’s some of that window dressing. I think that is a red flag. It just is on the edges of honesty that I’ve never really liked.”
— Eric Bahn, Hustle Fund
“When GPs claim to invest in a deal, one red flag is when they were only an angel in a syndicate, and the founders don’t even know the investor by name. We also look at deal attribution for GPs from bigger funds. How involved were they in winning deals at their last fund? So, we do backchannel checks.”
— Anonymous LP, $30B AUM Fund
“I’m wary of trend followers. People who follow trends without having anything unique to add to founders building in the space.”
— Martin Tobias, Incisive Ventures
Not playing the long game
“Another [red flag] is when GPs change the terms when fundraising. As a GP gets more interest, we’ve seen some GPs change the terms – from 2% fees to 2.5 or 3%. It raises some concerns that they are opportunists which might be viewed as a sign that they weren’t committed to building a long, durable fund.”
— Anonymous LP, $30B AUM Fund
“There is never a full alignment between LPs and GP. There are many potential conflicts when it comes to VC management. You don’t want to invest in people who will not hesitate to screw you. Don’t invest in people you don’t trust. There’s a thin line between greediness and discipline. We don’t invest in investors who are too opportunistic. Discipline and strategy consistency (with an amount of flexibility) is important.
— Itay Rotem, EdRITECH
“Too many GPs today are obviously dilettantes. The average fund lasts twice as long as the average American marriage, so it’s a long-term commitment to your partners. I get the sense that a lot of new GPs are becoming VCs in the same way a lot of college kids end up going to law school: it just seemed like the next obvious thing to do/the path of least resistance.”
— Chris Douvos, Ahoy Capital
“This is personal for each LP. I believe the GP’s job is to maximize returns for their LPs. So, there’s a tradeoff between GPs playing the long game and having a fiduciary responsibility to return money in the short run. So, a red flag for me is when the GPs don’t play the long game.
“There’s this weird nobility in venture, especially in the pre-seed. Sajith Pai wrote a great piece on this. Your first investor is almost like a priest. As the first check into a company, you should be a good priest. Is this person someone who will be a strong supporter of the founder, which could come at odds with short-term financial return? I won’t get immediate distributions. But at the same time, over a fund life, this could generate better financial returns across a portfolio of founders or in the form of access to better deals driven by reputation or founder friendliness.”
— Gautam Shewakramani, Inuka Capital
“People say they’re going to deploy over the next 2.5 years. But guess what everyone did in 2021. They deployed their entire fund. So LPs are asking, ‘What are you doing? We had all of this scheduled out, but you deployed so quickly, and so now we’re out of money. We can’t do your re-ups for next year, or we can’t back new managers right now.’ It’s been a real issue that has kept so much money on the sidelines.
“Saying you’re going to do something, then not doing it is a huge red flag. Do what you say you’re going to do. This is a relationship game. If you’re breaking trust, you’re playing the short game instead of the long game.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
Small funds, big reserves
“I’m wary of small funds with big reserves. For example, a $50 million fund with 50% reserves. What it means is you’re getting less shots on goals. For Fund I’s, it’s all about shots on goals.”
— Martin Tobias, Incisive Ventures
They lack honesty and self-awareness
“A big one is a lack of openness of what didn’t go right. Some GPs exhibit a lot of arrogance. They claim they’re great at everything. That’s not possible, and definitely not true. Everyone has flaws, but the inability to share them is a red flag for me.
“Good GPs are also very self aware of what they are and what they aren’t. These GPs manage their time well. They find partners to build a team that has complementary skill sets to their own. When I ask: Why are you not winning deals?, they have a great answer. If they can’t answer that, they probably have work to do understanding their own pitch. Moreover, the best GPs are consistent with their stories while open and willing to evolve.”
— @Cashflow_Cowboy
“For funds I declined to invest in, it came down to the person. They often take credit than share credit. I doubted their skills and ability to follow through. A lot of projects were often started but never finished.“
— Brent Goldman, Lancelot Ventures
“Managers that don’t appreciate that this is a journey, not a sprint. It’s the same as assessing a startup founder. We look for behavioral cues: approachability, willingness to accept feedback, and ability to go through pivots.
“At Revere, we share our ratings for GPs with our GPs. Say I give someone a four out of five on team, and they come back and insist on five out of five across the board. How receptive the GP is to constructive feedback (and address it) is a very telling indicator.“
— Eric Woo, Revere VC
“Usually GPs are really good at (typically) 2 or at most 3 of the following 6 things, in order to be top-decile:
Portfolio construction & management
Access to deals / networking
Ability to win deals
Company selection / financial analysis / assessing PMF and future value accretion
Active management to “add value” to those companies
Exits
“… And maybe fundraising / cost of capital.
“But if they aren’t aware of what they’re good at, that’s troubling. Once they know what they do to excel (and what they won’t) they usually become very good at focusing on what matters.
“Here are some examples:
Potential GP: ‘I am really good at all 6 GP characteristics above!’ Me: ‘Don’t call me, I’ll call you.’
Potential GP: ‘I am really good being a board member, I’m the best. I can make any shit company successful once I’m involved. I did this for three eCommerce companies in the 1980s, and I really think I can ‘turn around’ and exit eCommerce, adtech, fintech, digital health, AI / ML, beauty and fashion, etc. They’re all the same.’ Me: ‘Ummm…’
Potential GP: ‘I am great at deal sourcing from XXX network, and I specialize in AI. But vertical-wise, I see a lot of stuff, so I do a lot of stuff.’ Me: ‘Cool.’
“I also like to see more focused funds. A lack of ability to zero in on a particular thesis (e.g. B2B SaaS with certain characteristics) is at least a yellow flag, though if the GP’s core competencies support a generalized approach that’s fine.”
— Aman Verjee, Practical VC
The GPs are too founder-friendly
“Emerging GPs tend to be too founder-friendly. A great VC is like a personal trainer, not a cheerleader.”
— Chris Douvos, Ahoy Capital
There’s no follow-on strategy
“Another red flag is not having a follow-on strategy. If you’re a small fund, you are funding companies that will never get to profitability with the money you gave them. So they all have to raise additional financing. If you don’t have reserves in your fund, you need to prove that you know other funds or have an SPV or angel network that can fund your companies. If you don’t have an answer for how you’re going to be able to fund the companies in the next round or at least introduce them, that’s a flag.”
— Martin Tobias, Incisive Ventures
The follow-on SPVs take management fees
“They’re charging excessive fees on SPVs to LPs. Many LPs who invest in small emerging managers are in part doing so because they want the co-investment opportunities. And those co-investment opportunities should be at fairly favorable terms. The most favorable terms I’ve seen are zero and ten. I’m not saying everyone has to do it at that, but I have seen VCs try to do it at three and thirty – at premium terms relative to the fund. I think it’s a flag on the emerging manager if he/she is proposing to charge management fees on SPVs at all.”
— Martin Tobias, Incisive Ventures
They lack communication skills
“GPs sometimes don’t follow up with what the LP asked for. The follow up is very generic. For example, if the LP wants to co invest in XYZ sector, can you send names in the portfolio that might be interesting to them?”
— Anonymous LP, $30B AUM Fund
“Bad communicators who only answer with curt and short responses is a red flag.”
— @Cashflow_Cowboy
They don’t know the numbers or the rules of the game
“Plenty, but to extract one, we’ve found that managers that don’t know the numbers (i.e. what enterprise value within your portfolio will you need to get to a 3x+) is a huge red flag and leads to poor portfolio construction and decision-making. Saying you are going to return a 5X+ easily is not respecting how difficult it is, and probably comes with a lack of understanding of basic fund math.”
— Samir Kaji, Allocate
“Managers that don’t understand basic portfolio construction and fund modeling. You would be amazed how many don’t even have a spreadsheet that tracks current investments.”
— Eric Woo, Revere VC
“Emerging GPs tend to overestimate the value of prior experience and underestimate the value of investing skills like portfolio construction and discipline (not just on things like price, but also on things like security selection — for instance, not understanding the problems with SAFEs).”
— Chris Douvos, Ahoy Capital
“If they are carrying companies at valuations that seem out of whack, or indefensible (or if they can’t really articulate their valuation policy) that’s no bueno. That is ALWAYS a signal that the GP is not going to be aligned with me… I’ve known some very strong investors who have played this game and it’s a real problem for me personally.”
— Aman Verjee, Practical VC
They play the AUM and management fee game
“I think fund size is a real issue. The law of funds is really interesting. If you get a million-dollar allocation early on into a unicorn and it’s a smaller fund, you can return the fund multiple times over. If you do that with a $400 million fund, it’s harder to make those numbers work.
“So as an investor, you can play one of three types of games:
You can spit out rapid funds.
You can raise massive funds.
Or you can make massive carry.
“The amount of funds and management fees that have been raised recently are out of control. If you can think about taking 2% management fees on a $500 million fund – and obviously you got costs and expenses – you’re bringing home an annual income of $10 million. And that’s just one fund, and you do another and another. So, are you trying to create value or play the AUM game? And that is a red flag for me. I like small, steady, disciplined managers who are deeply passionate about early-stage and a certain sector. That typically means they won’t scale to a $1B fund.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
No investing experience
“Just like the only way to get good at wine is to drink a lot of wine. The only way to get good at investing is to see a lot of deals. A red flag would be a GP with no investing experience.”
— Lo Toney, Plexo Capital
Common Advice To Ignore
While far les prominent than investors advising founders on how they should run their business or startup investing advice at broad, there’s a small handful of commonly shared pieces of advice that new LPs often get. Certain pieces of advice might serve larger LPs who work with a different set of parameters than you do. The important part is understanding the why.
Having artificial timelines
“LPs also shouldn’t give artificial timelines. Most family offices and individuals don’t have deployment schedules. A big endowment, like Harvard, does.”
— Anonymous LP, $30B AUM Fund
The same is true for LPs as it is for GPs: Chasing logos
“Just because you spun out of a big firm doesn’t mean you’re going to do well as a new firm. These emerging managers are going to look good on paper, but they might not necessarily know what it’s like living in a chaotic environment. It’s not the same environment they grew up in when they were at a16z, or had another great name behind them. Different resources, different support, so different mentality. Connection with founders is incredibly important and you want to understand how that applies in a different environment.”
— @Cashflow_Cowboy
“I don’t know if this is advice that is shared, but many LPs over-index things like logos, GP commits, and early fund performance (which means very little within the first 3 years).”
— Samir Kaji, Allocate
“A big one is around geographic and pedigree bias. There is a trope that’s formed that if you’re a founder of GP that’s based in the San Francisco Bay Area — maybe went to Stanford or Harvard or MIT, that will position you into the very best networks to be successful.
“I’m not saying that just because you possess those characteristics that you can’t be successful. In fact, there are plenty that are. But there are also are a lot of really talented people outside of those networks too.
“I think a lot about this Warren Buffett rule: ‘To make a lot of money, you have to be both contrarian and right.’ Look a bit more widely in your funnel and invest in managers who don’t look like yourself and come from non-traditional networks and backgrounds. They’re identifying founders who may be working on some pretty amazing stuff that’s being overlooked.”
— Eric Bahn, Hustle Fund
Diversification for the sake of diversification
“Many emerging LPs are told to look for differentiation, but some things are differentiated in how bad (or mediocre) they are. Hedge fund managers say they’re seeking alpha, but sometimes you find it and it has a negative sign in front of it. What really matters is sustainable competitive advantage. How do you demonstrate and articulate your SCA? What is your unfair advantage in an extremely noisy market (and it’s gotta be more than just: ‘we’re part of the SF cool kid crowd/look at our AngelList track record of $50k checks’).”
— Chris Douvos, Ahoy Capital
Should you bet on emerging GPs?
“‘Stay away from Fund I/II.’ This is the wrong advice. Don’t underestimate new GPs. Being a new GP is like being a founder; it’s a long-term commitment. And two, stay away from GPs who don’t have resilience and are not hungry to win.”
— Cindy Bi, CapitalX
Do ownership targets matter?
“There’s a lot of surface level ‘buyer beware.’ Everyone talks about ownership targets. ‘Are you hitting your ownership targets?’ For large funds, that 15-20% ownership matters. You want the proceeds of the outcome to meaningfully impact the fund. Ownership is less important for a first or second time fund, which are smaller funds where a single great outcome, even at low ownership, can return the fund.“
— Eric Woo, Revere VC
Using fund-of-funds to get into emerging funds
“I would encourage a lot of emerging LPs to not go into fund-of-funds. As an emerging manager, I want fund-of-funds to invest in my fund. But as an LP, you get double-feed. If you’re going to invest into venture funds, invest directly in the manager yourself.
“What the fund-of-funds will tell you is that they can get you into funds you can’t get into. I’m also starting to see fund-of-funds for emerging managers, which I think is a great thing. For incredibly large LPs, I think it makes sense. They get access to someone else who’s going to do all the diligence on emerging managers. But that’s not for an emerging LP whose check size is $250K to a million dollar LP commitment. Fund-of-funds are for people with a billion dollars who are already invested in Sequoia and are writing $5-10 million checks.
“Typically you would pay one and ten for fund-of-funds. Then that fund-of-funds pays two and twenty. So you’re three and thirty behind as a fund-of-funds LP.
“For emerging LPs, it’s a good exercise to invest directly in emerging managers because it’ll help with your direct investment practices as well. If you invest in fund-of-funds, you’re never going to have those co-investment opportunities because you never build a relationship with the manager.“
— Martin Tobias, Incisive Ventures
Additional Tactical Tips
The below are tips that everyone were kind enough to share, but didn’t fit into the above categories. Nevertheless, I find them to be powerful in expanding how you think about being an LP.
You’re never too good to reach out.
“I will say about a third of my LP investments were into fund managers I never worked with before. I hear of these new GPs from talking with my network. If I like what they do, I’ll reach out via Twitter.”
— Sriram Krishnan, Kearny Jackson
“For every fund I’ve been in, I reached out to them, not the other way around. Every time I invest in a fund that’s either because I know the GP personally, or I know someone who knows the GP.”
— Brent Goldman, Lancelot Ventures
See if the GP has flexibility on the minimum check size
“One thing that can be helpful to know for first-time LPs: GPs often have some flexibility on their minimum check size. I’m a pretty small check (particularly since I’ve been living on a founder salary!), but I can bring other things to the table to help the GPs I invest in (e.g. I highlighted Janine Sickmeyer from Overlooked Ventures in my Forbes column, I’m an advisor to Zecca Lehn from Responsibly Ventures, I send them deal flow from my AuthenTech community of founders). I’ve had luck with reaching out and saying ‘I really believe in what you’re doing. Please let me know if you get enough large checks and have room for some smaller LP investments.’ They’ll usually need to get enough big investments first since there are SEC limits on how many LPs they can have, and then they can let in some smaller, value-add LPs.”
— Rebekah Bastian, OwnTrail
There are multiple ways to do reference checks
“There’s a two-part reference call check that I love that I learned from Scott Cook, who is the founder of Intuit. You ask, ‘I want you to tell me about David. Rate him from 1 to 10. 10 being absolutely perfect, and 1 being horrific.’ And you can basically ignore everything that is said. Most people say 8 or 9. You know they have their answer prepared.
“But then the second question is, ‘What will get David to a 10?’ And that’s where you hear the truth. That’s where you can pay attention.”
— Eric Bahn, Hustle Fund
“Investing into a fund is much like investing in startups. Why does this person have an unfair advantage over everyone else? I talk to the founding GP. I read VC Guide – think Yelp reviews for investors by founders. And if I think the team has an unfair advantage, I invest.”
— Brent Goldman, Lancelot Ventures
“Ask to talk to other current LPs – you can learn a lot about how you will be treated once the fund has your money.”
— Paul Griffiths, 15 & Change
“Being an LP is a ground game. It requires talking to founders and co-investors, and you won’t get much from surface-level reference checking.
“There’s no specific number that I shoot for. I once heard an LP claim to have completed 80 reference checks for one commitment. To me, that seemed like they were doing diligence for the sake of doing diligence. You could have gotten to the same answer well before 80. I reached close to 20 checks in diligence on a fund once, but I often need far less than that. The more important thing is you’re answering the questions you have that pop up in your diligence, that you only do whatever references that you need to get to a yes or no.”
— Anonymous LP, Private Wealth Management Firm
“We are all operating in the business of emotions and trust. It’s best to build trust by word of mouth or references. I’ve never invested in a fund without talking to another manager or entrepreneur in the portfolio. This is across the stack. Top $100B asset managers do 20 back references on $100M venture capitalists. $100M venture capitalists do 20 back references on $10M start-ups. And $10M start-ups do back references on employees. Together, with the bond of trust, this system creates an impact on the world.
“In practice, for example, I don’t have a lot of domain expertise in web 3, but I have plenty of friends who do. So before I invested in [name redacted], I called four people and they all told me this manager was one of the top five.
“This is the under-pinning of asset allocation, but unfortunately this also leads to systematic issues. In fact, I would say this referral network is part of the issue of neglected founders, industries, and geographies not being able to get funded. It’s a huge issue in our country that 2% of women get all VC dollars. That’s horrendous and that means that >50% of our population only gets 2% of funding. That isn’t right. We need more capital to flow to underrepresented or neglected founders or industries or managers. These new managers may not have the network to build traction, but I’m loving all the new amazing, specialized emerging managers doing great work with new strategies popping up.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
“Do reference calls. Talk to some founders they’ve invested in. Talk to startups in their anti-portfolio. And talk to some of the founders that didn’t work out. For the latter, how did they manage that? What do the founders think of them? If you only talk to the winners in their portfolio, they look like cheerleaders who got lucky and got into some great companies.”
— Asher Siddiqui, Sukna Ventures
Follow-on investors aren’t as big of a differentiator as you might think.
“Top-tier follow-on investors in the past 48 months are no longer a differentiator. Existing managers all talk about mark-ups. Most managers that aren’t incompetent have markups and brand name follow-on investors over the last three years.”
— @Cashflow_Cowboy
Get granular with a fund’s follow-on investors
“A lot of LPs act like they care about which funds are making investments alongside emerging managers. But who those follow-on investors and co-investors are will mean different things to different people based on the following factors.
Which partner at that established fund is actually leading the deal? Is it someone with a track record or a more junior partner?
Which fund are they investing from? Is it their core fund, or a satellite one they’re experimenting with?
“You ultimately need to get to know the people behind every investment decision.”
— Anonymous LP, Private Wealth Management Firm
March 30th is more important than you think
“Ask when you will get your K-1s and insist that it is before March 30th, otherwise you will be stuck extending every year and that’s just a pain.”
— Paul Griffiths, 15 & Change
Don’t rush into investment decisions
“We don’t rush into investment decisions. It takes us time to reach conviction. Unlike early stage VC, in a fund-of-funds, you expect returns from all your investments. Conviction is required to reach trust. We might not rush into the first vintage, but based on how well we get to know the fund manager, might jump into the second vintage.”
— Itay Rotem, EdRITECH
“There are also a lot of venture funds out there, take your time and meet with a range of GPs before you invest to get a feel for what the investment opportunities are and what feels right for you for your LP program.”
— Beezer Clarkson, Sapphire Partners
“Yes, meet at least 20-30 managers before you make an investment, or use a partner. Like anything, at first you will like almost everything, but it takes reps to truly start to build pattern recognition, and manager investing is a probability based exercise; meeting just a few won’t provide enough data points to have a good sense of what meaningful differentiation looks like (i.e.. meaningful differentiation increases the probability of consistent success, much like counting cards in blackjack. It doesn’t guarantee a payout, but you want someone that has their own version of ‘counting cards’.”
— Samir Kaji, Allocate
“Emerging LPs shouldn’t be taking any advice or making any decisions until they’ve met with at least 100 investment firms (and as many different types of firms as they can).
“The reality is that LPs don’t help each other as much as they should. There’s this cooperation versus competition dynamic, this friendly competitiveness, and LPs will be more helpful in less access-constrained deals. That’s something you need to understand as a new LP.”
— Anonymous LP, Private Wealth Management Firm
TVPI hides good portfolio construction
“When I do portfolio diligence, I don’t just look at the multiples, but I look at how well the portfolio companies are doing. I take the top performer and bottom performer out and look at how performance stacks up in the middle. How have they constructed their portfolio? Do the GPs know how to invest in good businesses?
“I’m not just bothered by my TVPI. I also try to look at the companies and the revenue they’re bringing in. Some of a fund’s portfolio companies that haven’t raised a subsequent round, which may not look as good in TVPI, but they may not have needed to raise any subsequent capital to scale further. The point is to assess the quality of the underlying portfolio of ‘businesses’ — so factor that in and look at likely exit opportunities for those companies.”
— Asher Siddiqui, Sukna Ventures
Don’t invest in ESG for the sake of ESG
“Avoid ‘ESG’ if they reduce financial returns, are comprised of unaudited made-up metrics that won’t get reported (e.g. ‘we love the environment, and will only invest in ‘green’ companies’ but the LPA doesn’t provide mention of reportable, audited environmental goals or KPIs, or define what ‘green’ means).”
— Aman Verjee, Practical VC
Past performance is not indicative of future performance
“It takes three funds worth of track record to make it meaningful. But even then, it’s even more complicated. Your strategy and risk-to-return profile for a $5 million Fund I will look meaningfully different than yours for a $150 million Fund III. I wouldn’t recommend relying on these blunt instruments for the emerging manager category. So the advice here is that LPs cannot rely on past performance of earlier funds if the latest fund’s strategy has shifted.”
— Eric Woo, Revere VC
Have an LP thesis
“LPs should have a portfolio construction model. What percent are you investing in generalist funds? What percent in thesis-driven ones? And also, what stages? Pre-seed? Seed? A- and B-funds? Multi-stage?
“You should take the total amount you want to put into funds and separate it with a portfolio construction model that makes sense for your risk tolerance.
“Is your portfolio allocation driven by financial returns or certain goals you have? A lot of LPs might want to invest for non-financial reasons – could be diversity, geographic coverage, verticals, or stage. They might want to support female founders, or ESG. Just like I encourage angels to have a thesis, LPs should have one too. Why am I doing this?”
— Martin Tobias, Incisive Ventures
Why are you helpful as an LP?
“As an LP, you also have to think of your unique value-add. If you have a brand, your name helps with credibility of the fund and helps the GP reach more LPs. On the other hand, you have to think about what kind of LPs a GP would offer their pro rata rights to? For an SPV strategy, those are LPs who:
Backed and believed in the GP from Day 1.
Has written big checks, and/or
Can help the fund’s portfolio companies.”
— Shiva Singh Sangwan, 1947 Rise
“We did have several of those established, persistent performers in the PE/VC portfolio in my prior role though, and that’s because those GPs look for more than just money. They may be looking for someone who’s strategic to their portfolio, but more so they’re looking for kindred spirits. Show why you’re also a convicted investor, like them, because they’re really just looking for true believers.”
— Anonymous LP, Private Wealth Management Firm
Don’t put your eggs in one basket.
“Putting money into an early-stage fund is a very, very high-risk alternative asset category. Every normal family office puts maybe 10 to 15% of their total net worth behind this asset category. Don’t concentrate behind a single manager. Spread it across five, possibly ten, managers who have truly varied networks.”
— Eric Bahn, Hustle Fund
“Invest in a larger number of fund managers than you might think is appropriate. Focus on smaller, tightly managed micro-VCs (I’m assuming that the LP can’t get into the Sequoia / Founders Fund / Benchmark types). Really dig into their strategy, their edge, and their pipeline. And, spend time with them and learn the trade, get into their co-investment program and be ready to execute!”
— Aman Verjee, Practical VC
“Does it make sense to have 17 funds all in web3? Or 17 funds in fintech? Or even 8 in web3 and 9 in fintech? My own fund is counter-cyclical, and I think an LP needs to build a portfolio of top managers across the economy. Healthcare, IoT, fintech, web 3, and other differentiated strategies can comprise an excellent portfolio.
“If an entrepreneur is building in climate tech, there are 10 amazing funds out there who really know climate tech. If you’re building in web3, there are several funds that are so close to the nucleus of innovation and that’s what it matters. But if you’re building in hard industries, we’re trying to become one of the ten. A portfolio that consists of a basket of these top ten funds makes a lot of sense if you believe in investing in venture.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
“LPs can get very excited about tech and venture. They still need to remember this is a high-risk asset class. They should have clarity of what their expectations are. Venture used to traditionally be 5% of private equity. This is funny money – play money. It’s less so now, but still is. LPs do it because it has the potential to provide outsized, risk adjusted, returns.”
— Asher Siddiqui, Sukna Ventures
Patience is a virtue
“It may take seven to ten years (or longer) to see any real return, so be patient.”
— Cindy Bi, CapitalX
“The reason I chose a lot of managers is also so I can start tracking data. I won’t do re-ups right away because I want to see how they’ll perform over a couple decades or even over 6 years.”
— Vijen Patel, 81 Collection
In closing
The above is by no means all-encompassing as you refine your craft as an LP. Nevertheless, if you’re looking to dive deeper into the art of investing in non-obvious capital allocators, I hope this blogpost serves as a launchpad for your career. Make new mistakes rather than old ones. The world is better off learning from and supporting each other.
If you learned something from the above, I urge you to reach out to any of the above legends and share your appreciation with them. And if you employ any of their tactics, let them know how empowering it was.
Trust me, it’ll go a long way.
*I’ve made light edits to the above quotes for clarity and since my hand can only take so many notes per second.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
These past two years, we’ve seen many investors and founders alike lose their pricing discipline. A number of whom believed anything north of a 10-15x multiple was the new normal. Expectedly, it wasn’t here to last. And I fear there may be an overcorrection to revert back to the mean.
Signal was heavily weighted on the names of other investors, whereas it’s now weighted on strictly traction and revenue. As Samir Kajipublished not too long ago, “The market reset provides a return to a rational environment where underwriting of deals has shifted away from a “growth at all costs” mentality, and inclined toward fundamental metrics such as margins, capital efficiency, and the current public market comps.”
The pandemic years
I’ve written before why it’s better to get 70% conviction, than 50 or 90%. 50% is a gamble. And for the past two years, investors made many more and much larger gambles than would have been kosher. When capital became a commodity and we saw a convergence of value adds in the early-stage investing world, one of the only differentiators between firms became more capital, better terms, or more introductions. Quantity became the selling point rather than quality. Subsequently, that also bolstered many a founder to take bigger risks.
Companies were overcapitalized. Companies then hired more talent than they needed, which meant, on average, each employee needed to do less work than previously required. It wasn’t rare that we saw the best talent out there working more than one job. In fact, in a study by Nielsen, over 50% of talent worked for two companies without either knowing. As such, we’ve the trimming of fat over the past few months with massive company layoffs.
Very few investors were going to spend an extra week or two to dig deeper – do a little more homework to get the extra 20% conviction. Why? Because if they did, they’d miss the funding window. They’d miss the opportunity to invest in the next big thing.
I also saw many founders working on 10% improvements and features, rather than building robust, 10x, non-cyclical products. Founders rushed to product-market fit, followed by massive injections to put fuel on the fire, as opposed to taking time to A/B test for channel-market fit and minimum lovable products. Founders also became less scrappy with the surplus of capital. Growth at all costs was revitalized as the memo of the future. We were left with a world that too quickly forgot the importance of cash in the bank in the few months from March of 2020 till the summer.
Where is money after the market correction?
Today, investors are going for 90%, much of that on fundamentals, rather than a technical analysis on markets. People have become more focused on the beta portfolios than the alpha in portfolios – not saying the latter isn’t important. It still is.
The good news is that there are still many more dollars to deploy. The nine- and ten-figure funds aren’t going anywhere. The bad news is while there’s technically already money allocated to invest in early-stage companies, they’re getting deployed more slowly. But we’ve seen a slowdown in the deployment of capital. And while capital calls are usually leading indicators of capital deployment schedules, they became lagging indicators in March’s slowdown.
What are capital calls? No LP keeps a massive amount of money parked in a checking account with 0% interest, aka a VC fund. So, capital calls are a VC’s legal right to call forth a portion of the money promised to them by LPs. Usually capital calls are made semi-annually.
From 2015 to 2018, this metric hovered in the 20% range, however a step change came into effect in 2019 and we’ve been sitting in the 30% range ever since. pic.twitter.com/fF3kOWMGe9
Last year we saw capital call schedules rise from 20% to 32%. As such, timelines were compressed. Funds were deployed in 1.5-2 years. I even saw one-year deployment periods. Today, I’m anecdotally seeing funds revert to a 3-4 year timeline.
What does that mean for founders?
You should prepare for the worst. Things may turn out differently, and that’ll be great, but don’t expect it will. Over the next two years, there will only be a third to half as much capital to deploy into private companies. That also means your competition has increased two- to three-fold.
Focus on your gross margins, your customer acquisition costs (CAC), and your burn multiples. For software companies, aim for greater than 50% gross margins. Your CAC payback periods should be at most a year. And get your burn multiple to one. In other words, you bring back a $1 for every $1 you’re spending. If you’re south of that, great! Instead of raising venture money, see if you can use non-dilutive capital, aka revenue, to help you grow. For those, that are still growing north of three times per year on ARR after you hit $1M ARR, then venture capital is a very viable option.
If you’re raising a new round, show that you’ve hit your milestones and that you have a road to your next set of milestones to raise your next round in 12-18 months. If you’re raising a bridge (or preemptive) round, you’re on a tighter schedule. You need to show you can hit milestones deserving of a new round within six months or less.
Sometimes even when you have all the above, investors still won’t bat an eye. So, at the end of the day, I always go back to the sage advice my friend shared with me. Teach your investor something new. Mike Maples Jr calls it the earned secret. a16z calls it spending time in the idea maze. I don’t care what you call it. Investors pay their tuition to work alongside the best. If you want investors fighting over you, you need to show them value from Day 1.
One reason investors are more willing to express unconventional opinions than people running other businesses is that they don't mind alienating fools. A cookie company boycotted by fools would lose a lot of money. Whereas a VC boycotted by fools would be better off.
In the past two years, when people became bullish, I became bearish. I didn’t trust myself to find signal in hot markets. For example, while I believe in the amazing potential of blockchain and the future of web3, I intentionally chose to look at consumer solutions that were not tied to the chain, unable to justify for most ideas, why the chain was necessary to solve the problem. I found many founders stumbling on a solution, then finding a problem to fit in the solution. Rather than the other way around.
Today, I’m more bullish than ever (when others are bearish). An investor will generate much more outsized alpha being in the nonobvious and non-consensus than being in the consensus. And we’re swimming in an ocean of non-consensus today. As Keith Raboistalked about earlier this year, don’t focus on just optimizing for the beta where you’ll only be optimizing for incremental returns. Focus on the alpha.
Innovation is secular to the macro-economic trends. It’s exactly in this time that I’m excited to uncover the next world-defining teams. That said, I’m looking for world-defining insights I’ve never heard of or seen before.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Seemingly, everyone these days – from Twitter to podcasts to blogposts (including mine) – talk about buying and investing in startups. What are best practices for investment theses? How do I pick the best companies to invest in? Conversely, how do I get picked or get allocation into hot startups? But people rarely seem to be talking about selling positions. So, if you know me, I hit up two of the smartest people I know – one early-stage, the other growth-stage. Both of whom might be familiar faces on this blog. So I asked them:
How do you think about selling a position? How much does DPI matter for your investors?
The below insights include minor edits for clarity.
The notice that you’ve all seen a million times
None of this is investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Shawn Merani (Parade Ventures)
Shawn was instrumental in my early career growth in venture. When I met him years ago, he was still running Flight Ventures, where he wrote early checks into Dollar Shave Club and Cruise Automation and was one of the first syndicates on AngelList. There he led a network-based model of syndicate leads, which I’ve heard been described by others as a “venture partner program on steroids.” Now he’s the solo GP at Parade Ventures, a seed stage venture fund investing in enterprise-themed companies.
“I would preface all of this with the fact we have never fully exited a position before a traditional liquidity event, but more so, have managed our position given the duration of our ownership and to generate returns for our LPs and manage risk.
“We talk to founders all the time, and foster a relationship that grows. When I was writing check sizes for 1-5% of ownership, my engagement then is very different from my engagement with founders now, where we take more concentrated bets.
“When it comes to selling, it’s about influence and information. The larger our ownership, the more information we have access to. And if a company is doing well, we don’t think about selling. In fact, it’s the exact opposite; we buy more. If things are working, we take our pro rata. In some cases, we take more than my ownership target. And founders are willing since we’ve been helping them from the beginning. We know when there’s going to be a 3-4x uptick every 12-18 months. Compounding is powerful.
“Our investors back the fund because they trust us. They don’t talk to the founders as often as we do. They trust our decision when we say we should buy more or keep our shares. There are two ways to talk about DPI:
1. Making money for your current investors, and 2. Telling the story.
“Selling is really a case-by-case scenario, and it really depends on my relationship with the founder. All the equity in which I sold so far has been before Parade. But if we know the company is doing well, we buy more. There are also holding periods to consider under QSBS, which has huge tax benefits.”
For those that are unfamiliar with the terminology, DPI means distributions to paid-in capital. Effectively, how much money you actually return to your investors versus “paper returns”. QSBS, or qualified small business stock, tax exemption allows investors in qualified businesses to avoid 100% of the capital gains tax incurred if they hold their stock for more than 5 years.
Ratan Singh (Fort Ross Ventures)
I posed the same question to someone I’ve been a huge fan of the day I met him – Ratan Singh, Partner at Fort Ross Ventures. He’s an investor in some of the most recognizable businesses today, including the likes of Rescale and Clearcover, as well as holds board seats at Blueshift and Ridecell. You may remember Ratan from a previous essay about speed as a competitive advantage for investors. And you’ll likely see him a lot more on this blog. He summed it up best in our chat when he said, “There are two reasons why an investor needs to care about DPI: time horizon and fund strategy.” Both of which are variables, not constants, between early- and growth-stage investments.
“The true metric at the end of the day is DPI. DPI is turning in money to your investors. And there are two reasons why an investor needs to care about DPI: time horizon and fund strategy.
“Let’s start with time horizon. For a seed stage fund, as you get close to the end of your fund cycle, that’s when DPI matters. What type of vintage is the fund in? In 2021, it’s going to be the 2010 and 2011 funds.
“For the majority of the time, you want to ride your winners. At the end of your time horizon, ask for a one- to two-year extension. Usually LPs want more money or their shares distributed. They’ve already waited 10 years. Two more won’t make a difference, especially if you have some big fund returners in the making.
“For fund strategy, did you meet the objectives for your LPs already? If you have, and you want to sell some of your winnable deals in your portfolio to help raise your Fund II because those are the same LPs that would re-up in your next fund, then you might consider selling.
“The worst reason to sell is that you want to take the wins you currently have since you think the market is overvalued. ‘I’m at the peak.’ Or ‘I want to take chips off the table because there’s something bad that will happen, but that is very hard to predict.’
“There were a bunch of funds at the beginning of this year that sold their entire positions. They were desperate to lock in a win. They sold because they thought the market was at the top. And, they were wrong. I’m against it. Selling early doesn’t fully realize the strategy you have put forth. For us, at the growth stage, we shoot for 48 months to an exit. If it takes longer, did we underwrite it wrong? But even if it does, the case may be that the company is growing a little slower than expected.
“At the early stage, all funds will say 2 to 3x cash-on-cash in the LP presentation. Most funds return 1 to 1.5x, on average, with most funds total DPI at 1.2 to 1.5x, which barely returns the fund. Before your time horizon, everyone likes to cite unrealized gains and mark ups because TVPI’s all they have.
“DPI matters most for funds in the top quartile – the top returners, funds with more than $500 million, or nowadays, $1 billion mega-funds. For the bottom majority of funds, early DPI won’t matter. They would be limiting their upside.
Author’s Note: Notice that 65% of financings lost money for their investors. Source: Correlation Ventures
“The new interesting commentary is that – where the job is getting harder – a lot of crossover funds are making binary bets. Finding the one deal that’s the next Salesforce – the next industry-defining company. And putting a lot of capital to find that one or two companies. Tiger and Coatue, still maintain that 10-12% IRR, but spend a lot to find the company that’ll be the next Databricks. Every generation has their industry-defining companies. And, they’re willing to lose it all to find that one.
“You usually don’t see this at the growth stage. It’s bad for innovation. Everyone is trying to find investments that are scaling. 1000 investments in the past year became unicorns. And there are 3000+ unicorns. Yet, the top five to seven companies are still undercapitalized.”
In closing
As we closed the selling part of our conversation, Ratan shared a great quote from an Economist article:
“Flush with cash amid a deal frenzy, what is the industry to do? One option would be to liquidate portfolios, that is, to sell more assets than it buys, in effect trying to cash in some chips when prices are high. As yet, however, this does not seem to be happening. Take the figures for three big managers, Blackstone, Carlyle and KKR. So far this year for every $1 of assets, in aggregate, that they have sold, they have bought $1.30. Although Carlyle is being more cautious than the other two firms, these figures indicate that the industry overall thinks the good times will roll on.”
In fairness, as the saying goes, the high risk, high reward. Data does show that the funds with the greatest track records have more deals that lose money than those make them more money than they invested.
Interestingly enough, there’s also a huge differential between the world’s most valuable and most funded startups. According to Founder Collective, “the most valuable companies raised half as much capital and produced nearly 4X the value!” All of which echo Ratan’s words. “The top five to seven companies are still undercapitalized.”
The public often looks towards invested capital as a proxy of startup performance. But the data suggests that isn’t the case. In the words of the team at Founder Collective, “capital has no insights.” One of my favorite lines from Ashmeet Sidana of Engineering Capitalframes it is still: “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation.”
But when DPI boils down to selling on multiples at the end of the day, I often reference Samir Kaji‘s tweet on the return hurdles expected of different stages of investors. As you might guess, the return expectations of each type of fund varies based on fund strategy.
Since it was asked, return hurdles for LPs are for different types of funds:
Nano-Fund (<$20MM)- 5-7X+ Traditional Seed Fund – 3-5X+ Series A: 3X+ Growth – 2-2.5X+ Crossover/late growth – IRR driven – 10-12%+
As all things in the world, exiting is just as nuanced and complicated as entering. Hopefully, the above insights will be another set of tools for your toolkit.
If this essay has inspired more questions, here are some further reading materials, courtesy of Ratan:
Thank you Shawn and Ratan for reading over early drafts.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
