Jeff is a partner at Renaissance Venture Capital an innovative venture capital fund of funds. Jeff’s diverse background in venture capital and technology and his experience working in various start-up ventures uniquely position him to advise startups. In addition, Jeff is quite active in the Michigan start-up community, volunteering his time to mentor young entrepreneurs, judge pitch competitions, and guest lecture student classes and organizations. Through Jeff’s work on the Fund, his volunteer efforts, and his role as the chair of the Michigan Venture Capital Association’s board of directors, his passion for fostering a productive environment for venture capital investment in the State of Michigan is evident.
Martin Tobias is the Managing Partner and Founder of Incisive Ventures, an early-stage venture capital firm focused on investing in the first institutional round of technology companies that reduce friction at scale.
Martin was previously at Accenture and Microsoft and is a former Venture Partner at Ignition Partners. Martin is a 3X venture-funded CEO rising over $500M as CEO with two IPOs who has also invested in hundreds of companies and is a limited partner in over a dozen VC funds. Martin was an early investor in Google, Docusign, OpenSea, and over a dozen Unicorns.
Martin is the father of 3 daughters, a cyclist, surfer, poker player, and life hacker. Martin tinkers with motorcycles on the weekends. He writes about Venture Capital on Incisive Ventures blog and Twitter.
[00:00] Introducing Jeff Rinvelt and Martin Tobias [04:14] What was Jeff’s pitch to their LPs for Renaissance Capital? [06:30] Why did Jeff pivot from being a founder to an LP? [08:10] Renaissance Capital’s portfolio construction model [13:00] Jeff’s involvement in non-profits [15:56] How did Martin become an angel investor? [18:03] The big lesson from being an LP in SV Angel’s Fund I and II [20:10] Why is Martin starting a fund now? [26:07] A lesson on variable check sizes [28:53] What is Martin’s value add to founders? [33:29] What stood out about Martin’s deck and email when it arrived in Jeff’s inbox? [35:43] The 2 biggest worries Martin had in sharing his deck with Jeff [36:47] What does Jeff think about generalists? [40:49] What held Jeff back from making an investment in Incisive Ventures? [42:37] What kinds of conversations does Martin usually have with LPs? [47:05] One of the greatest professional lessons Jeff picked up as a manager [49:07] Martin’s greatest lesson from his days as a CEO [51:57] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [54:33] Like, comment and share if you enjoyed the episode
“One of the things a lot of investors don’t do is go back and be honest about where they got fucking lucky and where they had a thesis that they could potentially replicate in future investments.”
In the process of catching up with a number of fund managers this week, I was reminded of two things:
That I still have an outstanding blogpost on intuition and discipline sitting on my desk, having gone through more revisions than I would like
That Fund I’s mostly start by drawing trendlines in your previous portfolio’s winners.
Now it’s not my job to call anyone out, but many of those I caught up with this week, told me in confidence (no longer in confidence now that I’m writing about it) that their best investments were simply due to being in the right place at the right time. That they were lucky. Others invested often off-thesis to accommodate for a brilliant founder that looked and sounded like nothing they had seen before. Then retroactively, went back to LPs in a subsequent fundraise armed with the knowledge to account for their previous outlier.
Chris Paik once wrote, ““Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence
Josh Wolfe said last year, “We believe before others understand.” And sometimes the investor themselves may not fully grasp what makes someone special other than that person is special.
Other times the company in which you initially bet on may not look like the company that earns you the most capital. As Mike Maples Jr. once said, “90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.
Of course, many LPs don’t want to hear that. They want to hear that you know exactly what you’re doing. That you can predict the future. But you can’t. In many ways, VCs invest in what stays the same. Not what changes. Human nature. Great hires. Network effects. Talent pools. Intellectual curiosity. Rigor. It’s a long list.
An amazing VC once told me. The job of a VC is to:
Have a wide enough aperture so enough light can come in
But have a fast enough trigger finger to catch the light, the reflections, the shadows just at the right time so that you get a good enough shot.
The rest is all done in the editing room, where you massage the photo with your expertise and experience to help it stand out.
I love that line. But simply put, the job of a VC is to:
Cast a wide enough net so that you can see as many great companies as you can,
Have the ability and awareness to know a great company when you see it.
After all, as an investor, you don’t have to invest in every great company, but every company you invest in must be great. Big anti-portfolios don’t mean much in this world if you can still get great returns.
All that to say, the job of an angel is to increase the surface area for luck to stick. And once enough do, a thesis blossoms.
A thesis, at the end of the day, is retroactive. And the best thing a fund manager can do is that the thesis the fund ends on is as close as possible to the initial. As LPs, it is our job to bet on the future of the thesis and the discipline of the fund manager. Both are equally as important. If things do change, a fund manager must preemptively communicate strategy drift and do so in the best interest of their investors.
It’s not ideal in many cases. For individual LPs and smaller family offices, strategy drift matters less. For large institutional LPs, it matters more. Because the latter don’t want you to be investing in the same underlying asset as other funds they’re invested into are.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Samir Kaji is the CEO and Co-Founder of Allocate, a private markets technology company that pairs origination with portfolio management tools to allow investors to efficiently construct and manage their alternatives portfolios.
Prior to Allocate, Samir spent 22 years in venture banking between SVB and First Republic Bank and closely worked with and advised over 700 venture capital and private equity firms. During this time, he completed over $12B in structured debt transactions and has invested personally in over 75 funds and companies, including early-stage investments into Carta (seed), Side (seed), PolicyGenius (Series A), and FanDuel (Series B) as well as Growth investments into Reddit, Alto Pharmacy, and Carbon Health. He has also invested in over 40 funds across various investment types.
Samir completed a finance undergraduate degree at San Jose State University, a finance MBA from Santa Clara University, and completed the prestigious Kauffman Fellows venture program in 2017. Samir is also the host of Venture Unlocked, a top venture capital podcast available on Itunes, Spotify, and Substack.
[00:00] Intro [04:15] What will be the biggest change in the next decade for the LP universe? [08:45] Portfolio allocation for emerging LPs [12:32] How has Samir’s LP investment strategy evolved over the years? [16:04] Why Samir invested in Bullpen Capital’s Fund I [17:43] GP-business model fit [19:40] GP red flags [21:00] The one question Samir asks to see if GPs understand how to do portfolio math [23:31] The art of asking good questions [29:44] What is the Minimum Viable Fund? [36:14] How to pick 10 funds out of 4000 VC funds [42:19] How did Samir pitch Allocate to his investors? [48:11] The first hires at Allocate [50:53] How Samir defines work-life integration [56:38] The first two emerging fund managers Samir backed at First Republic Bank [59:41] The lesson Samir’s father shared with him when he thought about leaving SVB [1:02:41] What happens when you overanalyze [1:07:27] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:10:02] If you liked it, give us a like or share!
“When you think about investing in any fund, you’re really looking at three main components.
It’s sourcing ability. Are you seeing the deals that fit within whatever business model you’re executing on?
Do you have some acumen for picking?
And then, the third is: what is your ability to win? Have you proven your ability to win, get into really interesting deals that might’ve been either oversubscribed or hard to get into? Were you able to do your pro rata into the next round because you added value?
“And we also look through the lens of: Does this person have some asymmetric edge on at least two of those three things?”
“When you’re investing in a fund, especially when you’re making an ex ante decision, meaning you’re not buying a secondary, you’re actually just looking at what’s the probability of success in the future. You want to focus on process, more than just outcomes in the past. The process is how they think.”
As people were coming back from the holidays, I had the chance to catch up with two friends earlier this week on two different occasions. One who built a company hundreds strong. The other is someone who’s seen the rise and fall of civilization again and again.
The former told me, “The greatest litmus test of a leader is their ability to train another leader.”
The latter told me something they had learned from a successful founder. “I lift as I climb.”
Both equally as profound. But to take it one at a time…
To train another
I’ve mentioned on this blog before that A-players hire A-players. And that B-players hire C-players. C’s hire D-players. And so on. A-players can tolerate working with B’s, but not C’s and D’s. So at the end of the day, the A’s leave, and all you’re left with are B’s and below.
While that statement makes sense in broad strokes, the truth is from an investor’s perspective — hell, just an outsider’s perspective — no one knows if you’re an A-player or not at first glance. Or at least it’s really hard to tell. Maybe there are people who are smarter than me out there who can tell at a glance. At the end of the day, seeing others execute is a great way to tell, but that takes more than one meeting usually.
And sometimes the easiest way to see is in doing reference checks. Seeing who else is on the team that they hired and trained. Seeing who they hired in previous roles. And if those other folks they’ve trained have gone to do amazing things, that’s usually a good sign that the person in question knows what an A-player looks like. And if it’s consistent enough, knows how to mint stellar leaders.
I lift as I climb
One of the greatest red flags I often see are founders hiring experienced (often expensive and brand-name) executives, sales reps, and product managers super-early in the startup lifecycle. Especially before product market fit. And often the biggest expectation for these early hires is to do:
What they themselves couldn’t do
And/or what they themselves don’t want to do
Both happen to be cardinal sins at the early stage. Why does the above matter?
Because if you’ve never done the job yourself, specifically building/managing the product and getting to your first customers:
You don’t know how to set realistic targets and benchmarks for that role
Given how crucial early customer feedback is to the product and the company, you’ll miss out on key customer insights if you’re not in the trenches yourself.
The goal of the afore-mentioned early hires is to refine your playbook, not build the playbook from scratch. And if that doesn’t appeal to you as the founder, then you might not be ready to be one.
And this is the exact reason I love the line “I lift as I climb.” For every time you figure something out, an inflection point for the company, a key customer discovery/insight, a sales script that closes twice as well as the last one, your rising tide raises all boats. But you cannot lift if you don’t climb first.
In closing
For those of you tuning in from the video and audio universes, you know I’ve been thinking a lot about succession planning as of late. Largely motivated by my conversations with Ben from Next Legacy.
So naturally, when I was catching up with both of my friends, their words found refuge in the questions I was seeking answers to.
And when all’s said and done, what I look for in a founder who’ll create a multi-generational company is the same in what I look for in an emerging manager who’s planning to build a multi-fund firm. And in a way, what a young professional might look at when betting their career on a startup.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Our tiny blue marble has spun yet another lap around its closest star. From a job change to starting a podcast, between visiting Japan for the first time (and holy frick is Japan amazing!) and blacksmithing my own santoku chef knife while I was there, and from building the most unlikely friendships that will last for decades to come to realizing life rarely goes according to plan — a good reminder of Mike Tyson’s line: “Everybody has a plan until they get punches in the face.” — and from attempting to convey my year in one sentence to realizing this is the longest run-on sentence I’ve written on my blog to date, it’s been a great year.
While I wasn’t aware of this till recently — courtesy of doom-scrolling on Instagram, this year’s been a year where I’ve “used the difficulty.” To echo the amazing Sir Michael Caine. For those unfamiliar with the phrase, I highly recommend listening to the full 2002 interview, but at least this.
In short, you can’t always control the situation you’ve been given, but you can control how you react to it. If you want your life to play out like a comedy. If you want it play out as a drama. Or if you want it to play out like a feel-good movie. Use the difficulty to your advantage and act accordingly.
By the numbers
Interestingly enough, despite writing whatever I find fascinating on a weekly basis — in other words, not optimized for search engines — just under half of my blog’s views come from search engines. Primarily, and I mean 95% of which from Google. Followed by LinkedIn (which accounts about a third of my views) then Twitter (~7%).
As many other aspects of life, the viewership of my blogposts also have a Pareto distribution, where they seemingly follow the power law. With my top blogpost winning more than twice the views of the second highest. And the second highest with double the audience of the third highest, before the views plateau out across all the rest of my essays. Even for this year alone, my most popular blogpost is eight times more popular than my second most popular.
And every week I feel honored that I have readers like you who tune in to my weekly musings and our family has only grown since.
Something I’ve noticed when looking at the numbers is that I seem to have the most readers arrive at this humble piece of virtual real estate every October, barring 2021. And I wonder if it’s a function of the market’s interest crests then or that I just happen to write better pieces around then.
In addition I’ve started measuring my habits since October, only to realize, holy hell, I am inconsistent with them. While I’d love to blame travel and work, the simple truth is it’s hard to manage what I didn’t measure before. Hopefully in 2024, we’ll see a lot more consistency.
P.S. the last day, aka today, is down, since the day’s just started and I haven’t logged in anything yet. And for those curious, I’m tracking this all on a Notion dashboard.
But my favorite thing that I started measuring, is that little trophy icon in the first column of the “Evening” section. And that little trophy stands for: “Was today truly worth it?” Defined by me learning a new skill. Gaining a brand new insight about the world. Or created a core memory. And I’m happy to say that that box gets checked about two times per week. 🙂
Post publish edit: The last icon is often how I take a cold dunk/shower, as opposed to a hot one. Having friends, former housemates, and my partner exclaim and tell me “I know you shower more often than that” made me realize that icons don’t do some things justice.
2023’s Most Popular
The Science of Selling – Early DPI Benchmarks — One of my favorite lines from Jerry Colonna’s book Rebootis: “It’s buy low, sell high. Not buy lowest, sell highest.” In the world of VC, we spend a lot of time talking about when to buy, how to buy, and who to invest in. But rarely about the other side of the playbook, selling. Or exiting positions. And while different investors have shared the what behind selling — in other words, the exact percentage they sold at, how much they sold when they could — this blogpost was one of the first, and maybe first (who knows), to explore the why and how behind selling positions in portfolio companies as a private investor.
The Non-Obvious Emerging LP Playbook — The blogpost that set me down the path I am now on. To explore how I can help the next generation of capital allocators is investing into the innovation economy. Simply put, the emerging LPs.
Five Tactical Lessons After Hosting 100+ Fireside Chats — In fairness, had no idea this blogpost was going to do as well as it did. And luckily, I am now able to stress-test and get better at asking questions and hosting interviews through not only what I continue to do in the world of venture, but also through my new podcast, Superclusters. Where you’ll see some of my learnings above in action.
10 Letters of Thanks to 10 People who Changed my Life — In all honesty, it still befuddles me to this day how this blogpost consistently ranks this high. I don’t namedrop here, and I don’t use any clever SEO techniques, yet every day this blogpost seems to find organic interest. Nevertheless, I’m glad it has. And if it empowers people to be more grateful to the people around them, I’ll have done my job. There’s also a deficit of content and knowledge here for sure, but I’m still trying to figure out what that something is.
How to Think about LP Construction — Not all LPs are created equal. It’s something I’ve known for a while. Both in conversation with other LPs and GPs, but also in learning of the different types of motivations to be an LP. For some, VC is an access class, not an asset class. For others, it’s the exact opposite. The latter is more likely to be a large institution. Nevertheless, that’s one example of many. And it was incredibly rewarding to hear GPs I really respect share what they’ve learned across multiple funds.
All-Time Most Popular
The Science of Selling – Early DPI Benchmarks — Turns out you all love tactical frameworks, so my goal is to share a lot more with you in 2024. I have a couple in the works as we speak (or as I write this).
10 Letters of Thanks to 10 People who Changed my Life — If anything, I hope this inspires people to write one note or letter or record a voice note of thanks to someone who’s helped you become the person you are today.
99 Pieces of Unsolicited, (Possibly) Ungooglable Startup Advice — Don’t worry already in works of many more iterations of this. And while I can’t promise when the next one will come out since it’s I’m really only including what I think are the best pieces and most tactical pieces of advice, I will say it’s a matter of when not if. I’m 20 in for the founder one. And 12 in for the investor one.
How to Pitch VCs Without Ever Having to Send the Pitch Deck — Back in 2021, I knew that this blogpost was going to hold an evergreen spot up here. And I’m pretty sure it’ll flirt around here even longer. While it’s only been two years since, and while there’s also a mountain of public resources on how to pitch, strangely, most people still struggle to connect to the people they want to. And it’s true for both founders and VCs. Ya, the latter seems ironic, until you see that founders are pitch judges, juries and executioners as well. For them, from talent. Until you also see that our parents are often the harshest critics of our decisions. Yet some have no experience working in the world in which we do. All that to say, oftentimes it’s easier being the judge than the judged. I can’t claim much of the insight here as original, but rather have to thank the fact I have really smart friends. Smarter than me at least. The flip side to the wild performance of this essay may just be one of the closest titles I have to being clickbait-y.
2023’s Most Memorable
In all honesty, the most memorable each year to me were ones where I was scratching my own itch. Some, by the numbers, perform better than others. But for me, each of the below represent the greatest delta in either knowledge acquisition or insight development. Of course, not mutually exclusive to each other.
The Science of Re-upping — I enjoyed writing this one in particular not only because I got to work with Arkady and Dave on this — two minds I greatly admire, but it also became the perfect opportunity to learn more about the world of professional sports beyond the players and scores themselves. Two birds with one stone. I’ve always admired folks who are able to pull from various, seemingly disparate topics and analogize them to venture. And while I still have many more miles on my odometer to go, this was one of the amazing opportunities to take a stab at marrying two different worlds through stories.
How to Think about LP Construction — I will admittedly take any opportunity I can to talk to my favorite people. And this was another one of them. That said, to get them all in the same metaphoric room to talk about the same topic, where the energy of one inspired another, now that’s something special. Funnily enough I did the vast majority of these interviews for this blogpost asynchronously, but upon sharing the final product with the group the week before publication, there was an incredible amount of energy (gratitude, stand up comedy routines, and so on) in the group. And all this was over email.
The Science of Selling – Early DPI Benchmarks — This, in many ways, was an accidental piece. Not only did it come up in conversation over Friday brunch quite randomly (serendipity at its finest), it also took, at least compared to the above two, the least amount of time to write. The first draft was ready in about an hour. And including all the edits, it came out to about two hours of work. It’s a gentle reminder that sometimes your best pieces are the easiest to write.
My Ever-Evolving Personal CRM — I wrote this blogpost after some coercion from a small group of friends who’ve been fascinated by how I stay in touch with people. And when they saw how I did it on Airtable, they asked if I would sell them my template (not that I had one at the time). Nor am I selling now. But nevertheless, the web of what we do, who we talk to, who we grow with, and why we do things is increasingly complicated and so far, there hasn’t been a great product out there that tracks this (and yes, I’ve used all the CRM tools out there). And so I created my own.
#unfiltered #83 There Doesn’t Have to be a First Place — I really enjoyed writing this one. Inspired by a podcast appearance by Simon Coronel, I learned that in the world of magic competitions, first place isn’t always granted. If the judges feel like a magic act isn’t on par with previous years, even if it is the best one that competition, they choose not to award a first place. Similarly, I think the world in a lot of ways has lost itself in the noise. That our definition for quality has fallen in the past decade. And I’m sure the older generations will harken back further. But I do believe a heuristic like this keeps us honest and that as a society, we move forward together, not just optimizing for short-term maximizations.
#unfiltered #78 The Gravitational Force of Accumulated Knowledge — Another fun piece to write about the power of how knowledge compounds. Not only in isolation, but also collectively. While that is a rather obvious fact, I loved the reframing of how to look at it from Seth Godin and Bill Gurley’s public interviews.
How to Retain Talent When You Don’t Have the Cash — One of the biggest lessons I learned at On Deck was that the team was amazing — in fact, world-class — at acquiring the best talent, but was shy on retaining the world’s best talent. To this day, I believe I have never worked in a higher concentration of brilliant talent than I did when I was at On Deck. And this blogpost is an homage to my former team, how brilliant they were, but also the lessons we took away from that experience.
7 Lessons from My Time at On Deck — And in the theme of On Deck, and how much I treasure the people I work with and the experience I had while I was there, last but not least, the culmination of lessons I took away from an 18-month period that I would never trade for any other experience.
And I started a podcast. Superclusters. (Or here’s on Spotify or Apple Podcasts if you prefer). It’s still too early to tell how Season 1 will do, with only six episodes in (the most recent of which here). But by next year, I should have more than enough to share about my learnings here. But early data seems to suggest that people love true stories more than they do tactics.
Until the next, stay awesome! And see y’all in the new year!
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Earlier this week, I was listening to a fascinatingly thoughtful conversation between Tim Ferriss and Kindred’s Steve Jang, where Tim said one line that stood out in particular: “I’ve been paying a lot of attention, but I’ll be honest, I don’t know how to pay proper attention.”
And well, it got me thinking. About the difference between knowing what to look at and knowing how to look at it.
One of my favorite TED talks is by Will Guidara (quite honestly I think it deserves more views on YouTube than it has). Will is probably best known for co-founding one of New York’s hottest fine dining restaurants, Eleven Madison Park, and for writing the book, Unreasonable Hospitality. And in it, he talks about how just listening to the conversations that are happening at the tables and delivering these small, unexpected pockets of joy can create experiences that transcend money and time.
In the afore-mentioned talk, he talks about how there are four diners at Eleven Madison Park. That they went to all the top restaurants in NYC. Le Bernardin. Per se. And so on. And Eleven Madison Park was the last on their to-do list. But the only regret they had was that they never got to try a New York hot dog. Of course, upon hearing that, Will storms out the door to buy a $2 dog, brings it back to the kitchen and convinces the chef to serve it over the aged duck that took years to perfect. And when he finally delivered the next course on the menu as the hot dog he just bought, the four guests went bonkers. That despite on the multiple courses and the brilliant food, that their favorite dish was the NYC hot dog.
That it was because Will paid proper attention to his guests that he was able to deliver a truly unforgettable experience.
The truth is how to pay proper attention to anything that deserves our attention is the million-dollar question.
Paying proper attention
There’s the famous selective attention test, where viewers are asked to count the number of times the ball is being passed between the players, only to fail to realize that there is gorilla that walks across the screen. We’re told to pay attention to the ball passes, but only by paying proper attention to the purpose of why the test is being administered, do we catch what is hiding in plain sight.
Similarly, Raymond Joseph Teller (or better known for being half of the dynamic magic duo Penn & Teller) did a fascinating talk a decade and a half ago about the illusion of expectation. That magic in all of its novel facets feeds off of the expectations of its onlookers. When one tries to pay attention to the coins that are “magically” jumping from one hand to the next, you might fail to catch the sleight of hand in between. But only after he reveals his secrets is the simple magic act all the more impressive. In other words, in the second half, he teaches you how to pay proper attention.
If you have eight minutes in your day, would highly recommend watching the below video.
I can’t speak for every topic, industry, relationship, and so on out there, but at least for the cottage industry of venture capital, why I choose to write an angel or an LP check is similar. I don’t really look for what will change. ‘Cause damn, it’s so hard to predict what will change and how things will change. If I knew, and if one day, I know, please invest in my public markets fund, which will be the best performing fund of all time. But I don’t. We, as pundits sitting around the table, might draw predictions. But even the smartest of us (not sure why I say us, ’cause not sure if I can put myself in that category yet) would be lying if we knew what would happen in foresight.
Instead, I look at what doesn’t change.
What doesn’t change?
The great Charlie Munger passed away last week at the age of 99. And without question, a great loss to the world we live in today. Just half a year prior, he and Warren Buffett were hosting their 2023 annual meeting. And just two weeks prior, he was still doing CNBC interviews. And one of my favorite lines from that May annual meeting was:
“Well, it’s so simple to spend less than you earn, and invest shrewdly, and avoid toxic people and toxic activities, and try and keep learning all your life, et cetera, et cetera, and do a lot of deferred gratification because you prefer life that way. And if you do all those things, you are almost certain to succeed. If you don’t, you’re going to need a lot of luck. And you don’t want to need a lot of luck. You want to go into a game where you’re very likely to win without having any unusual luck.”
In reducing the requirement to need luck, one of the most effective ways to find what is constant in life. That despite changing times and technologies, these stay true. Or as Morgan Housel and Naval Ravikantput it, If you lived your life 1000 times, what would be true in 999 of them? In investing jargon, pattern recognition. Across my investments and more, where have I seen outperformance? What characteristics do they all share? What about human nature won’t change?
In fairness, pattern recognition gets a bad rap. And for a lot of investors, that’s because they choose to only invest in their comfort zone, and what they know best. Their former colleagues. Their Stanford GSB classmates. People who look like them, think like them, act like them. But recognizing thematic threads stretch across all facets of our life. We learn that not brushing our teeth well can lead to cavities. We learn that after stubbing our toe on the kitchen counter numerous times, we take a wider turn before turning into the kitchen. And we learn that eating piping hot foods kills your tastebuds for the next few days.
The venture corollary
In venture, we’re always taught to look at the team, product, and market. And that all are important. But if you tell a new grad or an ex-founder or an emerging angel to do just that. To them, that means nothing. They wouldn’t know how to judge. They have no benchmarks, nor do they know what’s right versus wrong. Now I don’t want to sound like a broken record, but I do believe previous blogposts like this and this are quite comprehensive for how I pay proper attention as an investor.
Emerging LPs are not immune to the lack of perspective as well. My hope and my goal is for how to be just as important if not more than the what. And for the why to be just as or more important than the how. It’s because of that, I write essays like this and this. And of course, it’s why I started Superclusters because I, too, am looking for how to pay proper attention to the next generation of venture investors. (Stay tuned for the coming Monday for episode four where we unpack the bull and bear case of early distributions in a fund!)
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.
The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.
But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!
As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!
While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.
The year was 1997.
Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.
Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”
Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.
If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.
And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.
But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.
So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”
Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”
You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:
“You have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.
What is value?
To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.
Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:
The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence
On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.
We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.
Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
But I digress.
Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.
In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.
For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:
E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.
Graduation rates
What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.
On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.
Valuation step ups
How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.
It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:
Have a real chance at the championship title.
Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.
… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.
The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.
Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?
Dilution
If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?
Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?
Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.
How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.
How does one use the appreciation value equation?
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.
And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.
If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.
But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.
The model
The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.
It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.
Take for instance…
Energy
Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.
Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.
Biotech
Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.
In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.
In closing
All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:
Is your entry point a good entry point?
Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?
For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.
For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.
If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I first heard this question from Morgan Housel quoting a Navalism (for the uninitiated, that means has its source tracing back to the one and only Naval Ravikant). And it makes you think, that in the multiverse, where each version of you lives a different life and makes different choices, what would stay constant?
These are things that are not attributed to luck. And as Morgan mentioned, “those are the things you want to focus on in life.” When predicting the future, many try to predict what will change, but the best bets with long time horizons are on those that don’t change. Things that aren’t attributed to luck. Or chance. In this world we live in, you’d be quite surprised the number of small, accidental decisions we make that lead to life-changing events.
Like you being 10 minutes late to a party meant that you somehow just showed up at the same time as your future spouse. And it was because of that, that led you to have a two-hour long conversation with him/her. Otherwise, you’d have spent the entire party hanging with your college friends.
Or because you forgot to bring your umbrella on a day it rained, it made you run into a hotel for shelter, where you stumbled upon the investor who led your Series A round. Because he/she too forgot to bring an umbrella.
Of course, I could play hypotheticals forever. Although I find it’d be a fun exercise to really examine how much of your most life-changing moments were due to serendipity.
As someone who makes their living on attempting to predict the future, that means we have to go back to first principles. For instance, human nature. Reid Hoffman’s framework that all great consumer products tap into one of the seven deadly sins. Something that despite innovation is timeless. Anecdotally, I do find some of the greatest investors — LPs and GPs alike — to be avid students of history, philosophy or psychology.
“Email is a wonderful thing for people whose role in life is to be on top of things. But not for me; my role is to be on the bottom of things.”
In life, while catchy and interesting and the talk of the town for that brief moment, sometimes it’s better to get to the bottom of things than to stay on top of things. After all, you only have so many letters on your tombstone.
The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
There’s this line I love in Jerry Colonna’s Reboot, and I’m loosely paraphrasing just because I’m travelling and I don’t have the book in front of me, “The saying is buy low, sell high; not buy lowest, sell highest.”
The reason I bring up that line is that I’ve been hearing a lot of investors talk about timing the market. At least that was the case before this wonderful trip I’ve been taking across the Pacific, as I sip my hojicha atop my hotel in the backdrop of the Kyoto evening metropolis. When’s a good time to sell? What price makes sense on the secondary market? Should I be investing now? When’s a good time to re-up? Is it a good idea to re-up? Should I be generating DPI for my investors now? Or should I hold? When should I start my fund? When should I begin fundraising?
Now, I don’t pose the above questions as if I have all the answers. In fact, I don’t. I try to. But I don’t. Although I’ve heard 50-60% is the discount secondary buyers have been able to get for great companies that became overvalued in the pandemic days. On the flip side, while Dave and I did published a blogpost not too long ago on early DPI, the truth is there are different ways to make money. Ed Zimmerman shared some of his investments’ data recently to illustrate that exact point.
Another obvious truth is that as investors for an alternative asset class — hell for any asset class, our job is to make our LPs money. Ideally, more money than we were given. For other asset classes, it’s measured in percentages. For venture, it’s multiples. And because of that raison d’être, it’s our job to think not only about the upside, but also the downside protection. Hence, why early DPI matters in some of your best outliers. It always matters.
But from what I’m seeing and hearing, it matters more in a bear market, like today. Than the bull we were in yesterday. Why?
Liquidity is a differentiator.
Because of the point 1, giving LPs some liquidity back makes it easier to get to conviction as you raise your next fund.
Point 2 holds the most weight if you’re an emerging manager on Funds I through III, or have sub $100M AUM. Although Funds I and II, you have little to go off of. As such, sticking to your strategy may be more important to some LPs. In other words, consistency.
Also seems to matter more if your LPs are investing off balance sheet. For instance, corporates.
While I was in Tokyo earlier this trip, I caught up with a colleague. We spent the evening chatting about fund managers and current deployment schedules. (In case you’re wondering, no, we didn’t spend the whole time talking the biz.) And we see a lot of folks slowing down their pace of deployment. Could be the case of deal flow contraction, as Chris Neumann recently wrote about. Could be the case of loss of conviction behind initial fund strategy. We’ve also seen examples of VCs stretching their deployment schedule as their fundraises have been extended to 2024. All in all, that means VCs’ bar for “quality” has gone up.
But let me explain in a bit why I put “quality” in quotation marks.
So, timing comes down to two things:
Entry point
Exit point
I’ve seen a plurality of investors consider exit options as a means to *crossing fingers* convince existing LPs to re-up to the next fund. Debatable on how effective it is. As many LPs I’ve chatted with are “graduating” a lot more of their GPs than years prior. In other words, fancy shmancy word for they’re not re-upping on certain existing managers. Some LPs say it’s an AUM problem (but I’ve also seen them make exceptions). Others say it’s strategy drift. But more so say that certain GPs haven’t been a good fiduciary of capital, which ends being a combination of:
High entry points
Faster than promised deployment schedules (i.e. 1-1.5 years instead of 2-4 years)
Investing in a company where the preference stack is greater than the valuation of the company (similar to the first bullet point)
Reactive communication of strategy drift, instead of preemptive and proactive
Logo shopping which led to strategy drift
All that to say, there are a good amount of LPs who, though appreciate the extra liquidity from partial exits, are not re-investing in existing managers. In addition, they’re holding off until on new ones till earliest Q1 next year to build the relationship earlier. Especially those $5M+ checks.
So, quality, for both GPs and LPs, is this new sugar coating of a term to account for time it takes to figure out where they want to put the next dollar. Investors on both sides are waiting to pull the trigger at 90% conviction, instead of the usual 70%. And realistically, for pre-product market fit companies and firms (i.e. pre-seed, seed startups and Funds I-III), 90% usually never comes until it’s too late. Meaning one misses their entry point.
I have no doubt (as well as many if not all my peers) that the greatest companies of the next generation are being built today. But only a small handful will make it out the gauntlet of fire. Even good companies won’t make it, unfortunately.
So, for the one building, the importance of communicating focus and discipline will be more powerful than ever. My buddy Martin also recently tweeted by an unrelenting focus on a niche audience may serve more useful than targeting a seemingly large TAM.
For the one investing, there is no good time. Our job is to buy low, sell high. Not buy lowest, sell highest. Waiting for the right moment will only have you miss the moment. In the surfing analogy, where the market is the wave, the product is the board, the team is the surfer, and you need all three to be a great surfer, you don’t want to be on the shore when the wave hits. It is better to be paddling in the water before the wave hits than on the shore when the wave does hit. Timing is only obvious in hindsight, never in foresight.
There’s also a great Chinese proverb that the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago, the next best time is today.
So in this flight to quality, consider what quality actually means. Is it a function of you doubting your original thesis? Then re-examine what caused the doubt. Was your thesis founded on first principles? For consumer, which is where I know a little bit more about, is it founded on the basis and habits of the human condition? Is it secular from technological and hype trends?
Is quality waiting on numbers or external validation? That’s fine if you’re a growth or late stage investor. You’re never going to get it if you’re a true pre-seed and seed. If you’re waiting on a large amount of traction, you’re not an early-stage investor. Round-semantics aside.
You built a fund around a 10-15 year vision. Deploy against that. Or… although we don’t see this much these days, return any remaining capital back to your LPs.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
One of my recent favorite soundbites is Rich Paul‘s. For the uninitiated, he’s the agent behind LeBron James and Draymond Green. And in his recent Tim Ferriss episode, he said: “Some people define the business card and some people are defined by their business card, and so I don’t carry a business card.”
Some of the most exciting conversations I’ve been having as of late have been in the world of family offices. There’s this shift in generational wealth transfer, but often times without sufficient knowledge transfer. At the same time, there are many next gens leaning more into risk and philanthropy. Many want to increase their exposure to venture and private equity as an asset class, but are still learning how to underwrite such risk.
My conversations echo a lot of what Citi’s been seeing as well. Two in five family offices wanted to increase their exposure to illiquid asset classes, namely the PE and VC asset classes. And while many bucket VC and PE in the same asset class, the truth is the assets operate very differently. Even within venture, underwriting the risk and performance of a sub-$40M fund versus a $40-100M fund versus a $100-500M fund versus a $500M+ VC fund are completely different. Some LPs may disagree on the exact benchmarks (for instance, sub-$100M funds and everything else), but the reality of assessing an emerging manager and an established manager are different. But I digress.
The rest are either rebalancing or figuring out their re-up strategy. Yet, as I’m sure GPs are seeing today, that shift in strategy, requires time, research, and confidence before family offices can pull the trigger. Many are waiting to Q1 next year, but engaging in conversation today.
I’ve also written before about one of my favorite lines from Engineering Capital’s Ashmeet Sidana, “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation. In other words to take a concrete example, Google is a great company. Google is not a great company because Sequoia invested in them. Sequoia is a great venture firm because they invested in Google.”
And I’m seeing a similar vein with family offices. The next gen don’t want to be defined by their predecessor’s goals and records. They want to define their own legacy.
There’s also the saying: If you know one family office, you only know one family office. So any broad-stroke generalizations are loosely correlated at best. That said, anecdotally, having talked with about a hundred or so family offices, here’s what I’ve come to notice.
My crudely drawn 1D scale of whether venture capital is an asset class or an access class
Smaller and/or emerging LPs see VC as an access class. Larger and more sophisticated and established LPs see VC as an asset class.
The Mendoza line — the line that separates the emerging LPs from the established ones —seems to be around 20-30 managers or over 6-7 years of venture data. For the latter, that means, you’ve seen Fund I’s and II’s graduate to Fund III’s and IV’s.
So the question for many of the next generation leading family offices has flipped from: Are you defined by your surname? To: Do you define your surname?
For those that pursue the latter, they’re a lot more proactive than previous generations. They participate in communities. Go to events. Seek education on the matter. Network with their existing managers to discover new ones. Some have also built covenants to co-invest in their manager’s breakout winners. Quite a few are building emerging manager programs or would like to. They’re hungry. Hungry to learn.
The problem I’m seeing with many managers is that they’re seeking transactional relationships. The urgency to get to their first or final close leads them to optimize for LPs who can close fast. And I get it, that’s been the game historically. But it’s leaving a massive opportunity in the market for those who have the time and are willing to educate their and prospective LPs. Who are willing to spend time building a relationship through giving first.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
