Tag: questions

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The Currency of Trust

Recently, I had three conversations about trust. So forgive me, but that’s the soup du jour today, as their comments are still swimming in my mind.

I spent some time with the Head of Investor Relations at a high nine-figure AUM firm. And he said something that echoed much of the reality of fundraising these days. “Fundraising is all about trust. It’s not about the performance metrics. It’s about who believes in you.”

Then, immediately after, I caught up with an LP friend, who said, “Investor relations is a wasted job title in VC. They’re glorified note takers and relationship managers. I won’t invest in any fund where I haven’t met the GP.” Only to later share how much we both admired a certain Head of IR at a large multi-stage fund.

At first glance, the irony is blinding. The funny thing is that both are equally as true. GPs have a bank account where they can deposit trust. They withdraw trust every time they make an ask. Whether it’s for capital or special terms on the term sheet or for a certain ownerships target or for a guest speaker for an event they’re hosting. Before a GP starts a firm, they need to bank a lot of trust. They should give more than they take. And to run a firm, there are three types of primary customers you need to bank trust with:

  1. Founders,
  2. Co-investors,
  3. And LPs.

You also can’t take a loan on trust (in other words, outsource trust) before you’ve deposited enough trust in your own bank account. Or else, you’ll be in debt. If you’re in too much debt (i.e. have a negative balance), your reputation takes a hit. But when you’ve banked enough trust, you can have a separately managed trust account managed by others. An IR professional who manages the trust account with LPs. A community/platform person with co-investors and talent. And so on.

Having others manage these accounts too early in the firm lifecycle means taking debt and impacting reputation. So when my buddy who’s the LPs says he doesn’t like most IR folks, it’s because before the IR person was hired, the GP didn’t bank enough trust.

And the truth is trust is built not in grand gestures and one-off deals. It’s in the small interactions. How fast do you respond? Even when you’re busy, do you make time for people important to you? Do you remember what you talked about last time? Do you close the loop on advice you get from LPs—whether you use it or not? Do you remember their answer to ‘What did you do last weekend’ 15 weekends ago? Do you follow through with what you promise—even if it’s a restaurant recommendation you mentioned in the call?

In a conversation with a Fund I GP yesterday who successfully raised his 8-figure fund in 8 weeks (and yes, part of that duration was over the holidays), he said something I really liked: “Every LP is looking for returns. That’s a given. But every LP is also looking for returns plus X. Your job during the fundraising process is to find out what X is, and it may be less obvious than you think it is.” For some, X is undoing boredom. For others, it’s the front row seat to learn. Others still, it’s the prospect of social capital that will come with making an investment. And you can’t find any of these out, if you don’t spend the time to build trust with the other party.

Photo by Marek Piwnicki on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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Diligence on a GP’s Social Media Presence

social media

A lot of what I will say applies similarly to assessing founders and with senior talent, but for the sake of this blogpost, I’m going to focus primarily on doing diligence on GPs.

Sequoia’s Pat Grady co-wrote a piece on AGI that’s been making its rounds the last few days. FYI, this post has nothing to do with AGI, so don’t get your hopes up. But in it, he shares:

Source: Pat Grady’s X post on AGI

Note the highlights above are all around how to better understand an individual’s internet presence. While not all-encompassing, understanding someone’s brand via their social media is more than just how many followers, likes, comments, and shares. As my good YouTuber friend once told me, “Not all subscribers are created equal. English-speaking personal finance content get paid the most per impression.” Analogously, the same is true for LinkedIn or Twitter/X content.

Just because you have 25K followers, how often are you just resharing your employer’s content? Or your portfolio company’s content? How often do you share your thought leadership? Do people follow you because of your perceived status or do people follow you because of the weight of your ideas? There’s a great Simon Sinek talk about the former Under Secretary of Defense on this, which I won’t bore you with the details, but if you want the full story, it’s here. In summary, if you no longer held the job title you do today, would people engage with you differently?

That’s what I’m trying to figure out.

The first filter is: What is your insight per post ratio? This includes reshares and comments they make on other people’s posts. At a high level, do you recognize what good content looks like?

The second filter is: What is your original insight per post ratio? How much of your activity is original ideas? Is that what people engage with? Or do they engage more with your reshared content? When they do engage, how?

  • Level 1 is a like. The least number of clicks to engage with you.
  • Level 2 is a reaction other than a like. It takes a second longer to do so, but is more intentional. To be fair, a spam-like content (i.e. “LFG”, “Proud of you”, “Excited”, etc.), I also put in this tier.
  • Level 3 is a thoughtful comment that you can’t use on any other post. They’ve read and thoughtfully engaged back. Also on this tier is a quick reshare.
  • Level 4 is a thoughtful reshare. Or on Twitter (still not easy to call it X), a “quote retweet.” You’re staking not only your personal brand and reputation with your own followers, but you’re also letting others know how you’ve thought about the content being shared.

It’s not a perfect scorecard, but I do keep a rough mental tally (which goes into my own memo) of what a GP’s social brand is. And at what point was there an inflection in their thinking and/or following. Usually quite correlated with each other.

Other things I find interesting to observe, but cannot be understood in isolation:

  • Most frequent commenters and reshare your content
  • Reactions-to-follower count ratio
  • Connections-to-follower ratio
  • How similar/different their content on LinkedIn vs Twitter/X vs Instagram/TikTok vs podcast platform is
  • AI-search optimization (AEO): What keywords and/or questions do certain GPs own in search traffic? How does it compare across ChatGPT vs Claude vs Gemini? And in incognito AI search.
  • Frequency of getting tagged by others on social media outside of viral periods
  • Endurance of content even when little to no engagement, usually for podcasts, blogs and newsletters. And why do they continue doing so even when it’s not producing the results they desire (more of a qualitative understanding on the personality traits of a GP)
  • Frequency of guest appearances on others’ content channels and how do those appearances’ views compare to said influencer’s average view-to-subscriber ratio

Photo by dole777 on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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What is Adverse Selection?

directions, adverse selection, sunset

One of the most interesting self-reflective questions I think GPs should ask is: If someone else had the exact same strategy and offered the exact same terms, why would someone not pick you over another VC? That’s adverse selection.

One of the three pillars (or five pillars, depending on who you ask) of underwriting a venture fund is winning. The others being seeing and picking (and supporting and selling). But sometimes what’s more interesting than underwriting why a GP wins is understanding all the reasons they won’t win.

It’s an interesting thought exercise I like working through with a GP. “Why won’t a founder let you invest?” or “Assuming you wanted to invest, why would you lose out on a deal?”

The most common answers are always:

  • “I missed the timing.”
  • “There was no more space left.”
  • “They weren’t raising at the time.”

In my opinion, while possibly true, all cop-out answers. Then I follow up: “Assuming you wanted to invest, and there’s space left, and they’re currently raising, why would a founder say no to you?” Or “Why wouldn’t you be able to invest?” More often than not, I get an answer along the lines of: “I win (almost) every deal I want.” Or “I have yet to raise my fund.”

Even if true historically, it doesn’t answer the question. It’s like asking a job candidate: “Tell me about your weakness.” And they respond with, “I’m too honest.” Or worse, “I have no weaknesses.”

What I’m trying to get at in these questions is not the “right” answer. There is none. But rather what are the reasons you’ll fail to win a deal. Which of those reasons are areas where you would like to improve upon? Which of those reasons are areas where you will continue to be unrelenting on? What will you not change? Only then can I get a better understanding of the GP you will become 2-3 funds from now. And if so, does it make sense to do business with each other today?

There’s a Fund I GP I ended up investing in. When I first asked him the question above, he reached the conclusion that his pitch and value-add resonated more with second-time founders than first-time founders at the pre-seed stage. And given that he wanted to grow into a lead investor eventually, what he had to figure out was how to build a strong enough brand with first-time founders, requiring both education and intentional positioning. For me as an LP, it became easy for me to see how he would grow into a Fund II GP. Between then and his next fundraise, I’d just track how many first-time founders he invested in, try to spend time with them at events, and ask why did you take this GP’s check and what did you really want from him.

There is no right answer as to what founders wouldn’t want to work with you. It’s just an exercise of self-awareness, so you can figure out what’s worth working on and what’s not. Adverse selection reasons I’ve heard in the past, in no particular order, include:

  • Political alignment
  • Naming a firm after their own name instead of an ideal (yes, that is a real answer I’ve gotten before)
  • Speed to make a decision
  • High ownership targets
  • Response time, including taking the holidays/weekends off when their peers might still be dealmaking
  • Lack of brand awareness
  • No founding experience
  • No experience at a large established firm
  • No relationships with key potential customers
  • Values shared publicly / controversial opinions
  • Personality (i.e. too nice, people pleaser, argumentative, arrogant, name-dropping/logo-shopping, too humble, etc.)
  • Lack of talent networks
  • Having invested in a competitor
  • A homogenous partnership
  • A rumor that is widespread but may not have real credence
  • A single remark from an influencer in the ecosystem (or a close friend), then what’s more interesting is why someone would say something like that
  • The way a GP dresses (especially important in certain geographies outside of the US)
  • The initial outreach was done by a junior team member or a broker/dealer
  • Subsequent conversations done by a junior team member
  • A reference call with their network done in poor taste
  • Someone with no board experience asking for a board seat
  • Having someone else on the team take the board seat even though you did the deal and the founder wanted you
  • Aggressive term sheet terms (1X+ liquidation preferences – participating and preferred)
  • Having no respect for prior round investors (especially, in relation to their most helpful investors so far, often related to their pro rata)
  • Badmouthing their existing investors and/or teammates

Photo by Javier Allegue Barros on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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How Trees Fall

lumberjack, felling a tree, axe, emerging lp

I caught up with a single family office over the holidays. Let’s call him Mark. Mark told me that he had caught up with a Fund I GP that I had passed on. Let’s call her Susan. In that conversation with that GP, he told Susan that I introed him to another GP “Charlie” whom she knew and whom I invested in, which he eventually passed on. And Susan asked Mark why I invested. That it made no sense. That Susan herself would have never invested in Charlie. As such, she didn’t know why I would invest in Charlie and not her. After sharing that last line, with no explicit question that plead for an answer, Mark looked at me, waiting to see how I’d respond.

I stared back at him. And he to I. And I to him.

As he felt seemingly unsatisfied with my reaction, I asked him, “If I put both of these GPs on a report card, how would you score each?”

He followed up, “Susan is more experienced. She’s done X and Y. And she came from Z.”

“You’re right. Susan is all of that. In fact, on a report card, it’s fair to say that her GPA is a solid B+, maybe an A-.”

He concurred.

I went on. “And Charlie would probably score a B, maybe B-, if we were really critical. But to you, did anything about Susan jump out at you?”

“Not exactly.”

“What about Charlie?”

“Well, there’s that…”

“I agree. For me, and you don’t have to agree with my assessment, Charlie is on paper a lower GPA than Susan, but Charlie spikes in very particular areas. Areas I personally believe puts him in a position to do really well. That he will have a good chance to outperform. Susan is factually better in almost every area than Charlie is, but she doesn’t spike in any area. At least it’s not obvious to me. I like her thesis. I think she has a great GP-thesis fit. And I do believe that her thesis has a really good chance of being right, but I’m not sure she’s the only person in the world who can do that, much less the best person in the world to do it. In fact, I can think of two other GPs who spike in that thesis area where she doesn’t.”

It’s harsh criticism. And it’s not my place to give non-constructive criticism. So what I said when I passed was that we had other deals in the pipeline that were a lot more interesting to us. Which is true. But it’s not my place to say “I don’t think you’re good enough.” And she probably felt my pass was unsatisfying. Because in her shoes, I’d probably feel the same.

I don’t invest in all-rounders. There’s a time and place and industry for those. But I don’t believe it’s venture. Even less early stage emerging managers. There’s a line I’ve long liked in the F1 world. “In Formula 1 it’s nearly impossible to go from 13th to 1st on a sunny day, but it’s possible on a rainy day.” In the uncharted territory of true early, early stage investing, it’s always a rainy day. And to go from 13th to 1st, you need to make bold decisions. Measured, well-timed, but risky decisions. You need to make certain sacrifices to do so.

To me, that meant comparatively lower grade-point averages, but much, much higher select individual subject grades. In fact, only an A++ would suffice. A spike must be at least three standard deviations from the mean. As an emerging manager LP, who plans to be an active participant in the journey, naturally with the GP’s permission, it falls on me and my peers to help our GPs raise their overall GPAs, but we can’t help them spike. But in that, we must know and recognize their flaws.

One of the most interesting spectacles I’ve always marveled at is how lumberjacks fell trees. The first cut is the notch cut that indicates the direction the tree will fall. The second is the felling cut that catalyzes the tree to fall, acting as the hinge.

In many ways, the GP spikes (and flaws) makes the first cut. Whether you count it as nature or nurture. The GP’s job is to figure out which direction they’d like to fall. Or to borrow a line from Mark Manson’s most important question of your life: “What pain do you want in your life? What are you willing to struggle for? How do you choose to suffer?” To further borrow, “What determines your success isn’t ‘What do you want to enjoy?’ The question is, ‘What pain do you want to sustain?’ The quality of your life is not determined by the quality of your positive experiences, but the quality of your negative experiences. And to get good at dealing with negative experiences is to get good at dealing with life.” All in all, it’s a GP’s job to make that choice. An LP cannot make that choice for the GP. And it is a function of the flaws they’re willing to overcome, and how they want to double down on their spikes.

The second cut is for investors, board and advisory members to nudge our investees towards the direction they so chose. As the great Tom Landry once said, “A coach is someone who tells you what you don’t want to hear, who has you see what you don’t want to see, so you can be who you have always known you could be.” But the prerequisite for the second cut is the first. The first requires intentional and special people.

Along a similar vein, my buddy Henry wrote a post recently I really liked.

“Is this founder special?” That’s probably the only question that has to be asked in every non-obvious investment decision. Maybe every investment decision. But especially true under imperfect information conditions. And special isn’t just about getting a high GPA.

Photo by Radek Skrzypczak on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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The Most Disappointing Podcast You’ll Ever Listen To (ft. Allie Garfinkle) | Superclusters | S6PSE2

allie garfinkle, david zhou, superclusters

Warning: This is a brief-ish, but hopefully entertaining intermission from the usual Superclusters programming. When we passed the 50th episode mark more than a few episodes ago, Tyler (my editor) and I thought it’d be interesting to record an episode where I change seats. Instead of me asking the questions, someone else would ask me questions. And I couldn’t imagine any better person to do so than my good friend, Allie, who in my humble opinion, is one of the best interviewers alive today.

Allie Garfinkle is a senior finance reporter for Fortune, covering venture capital and startups. She authors Fortune’s weekday dealmaking newsletter Term Sheet, hosts the Term Sheet Podcast, and co-chairs Fortune Brainstorm, a community and event series featuring an annual retreat in Deer Valley, Utah. A regular contributor to BBC’s Business Matters podcast, Allie is also a frequent moderator at major conferences such as SXSW. Before joining Fortune, she covered Amazon and Meta at Yahoo Finance and helped produce Emmy-nominated PBS Frontline business documentaries, including Elon Musk’s Twitter Takeover and The Power of the Fed. A graduate of The University of Chicago and New York University, Allie currently resides in Los Angeles.

You can find Allie on her socials here:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexandra-garfinkle1/
X / Twitter: https://x.com/agarfinks

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[02:01] Art
[09:39] Competition
[17:49] Paleontology
[18:14] Allie’s Tiki mugs
[22:49] How has VC evolved?
[29:41] Evaluating risk
[43:04] Why is it important for VCs to stay in touch?
[47:10] Are there reliably good investors?
[53:09] Young GPs in market
[54:58] How useful is education that come via public talks?
[57:50] Does your niche fund size make sense for the market?
[1:01:16] Is there too much venture capital?
[01:05:24] How much of VC is art vs science?
[1:07:18] What’s going on in Allie’s world?
[1:09:45] Post-credit scene: Receipts

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

I’m intentionally keeping this section void of the things that I said since I hate the idea of quoting myself.

“Part of the point of this [investing job] is that you want to be anonymously, asymmetrically correct. And you can’t necessarily be that by saying or doing the same thing as everyone else. That being said, the worst nightmare for a VC is that no one wants to back a company they’ve backed.” — Allie Garfinkle

“If it eventually doesn’t become consensus, you were wrong.” — Allie Garfinkle

Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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The Third Leg of Firm-Building

marathon, race, third leg

Five years ago, I wrote a piece about the third leg of the race. From my time as a competitive swimmer, the lesson our coach always had for us was if you’re swimming anything more than two laps, the most important part of every race is the third leg. Everyone’s tired. Everyone’s gasping for air. Yet everyone wants to win. The question is who wants it more. And by the time you get to a decently high level, everyone’s athleticism is about the same. All that matters is the mentality you have on that third segment of four of each race.

We often say, that starting a company or a fund is a marathon, not a sprint. True in a lot of ways. But also, it’s a series of sprints within a marathon.

We put out an episode last week with the amazing Ben Choi, which I really can’t stop recommending. Just because I learn something new every time I talk with Ben, and this time especially so. But that’s my own bias, and I get it. But more interestingly, he said something that I couldn’t get out of my mind since we recorded. “The first three funds—not just the first two, the first three—are that ‘working-out’ process. Most pragmatically, there’s very little performance to be seen by Fund III. So it’s actually Fund IV for us to hold up the manager as no longer emerging and now needs to earn its own place in the portfolio.” The timestamp is at 16:21 if you’re curious.

And it got me thinking… is Fund III that third leg of the race?

When most GPs raise Fund III, they’re usually four, maybe five years, out from their Fund I. And that’s assuming they started deploying as soon as they raised their fund. And within five years, not that much changes. Usually, that’s two funding rounds after your first investments. But lemons ripen early, so only a small, small subset move to Series A or B. Most have raised one or less subsequent round since the GP committed capital.

Even accounting for two funding rounds later, that’s usually too early to consider selling into the next round. And if one does (unless it’s a heavily diversified portfolio and the GP has no information rights, and somehow is so far removed from the company that no one at the company talks to the GP anymore), then there’s signaling risk. Because:

  1. No matter what portfolio strategy you run, not staying in touch with your best performing companies is a cardinal sin. Not only can you not use those companies as references (which LPs do look for), you also can’t say your deal flow increased meaningfully over time. No senior executive or early employee knows who you are. So if they leave the company and start their own, they wouldn’t pitch you. Your network doesn’t get better over time. See my gratitude essay for more depth here.
  2. Not having any information rights and/or visibility is another problem. Do the founders not trust you? Do you have major investor’s rights? How are you managing follow-on investment decision making—whether that’s through reserves or SPVs? Are the blind leading the blind?
  3. And if you do run a diversified portfolio, where optically selling early may not be as reputationally harmful to the company, you are losing out on the power law. And for a diversified portfolio, say a 50-company portfolio. You need a 50X on an individual investment to return the fund. 150X if you want to 3X the fund. As opposed to a concentrated 20-company portfolio, where you only need 20X to return the fund and 60X to 3X. As such, selling too early meaningfully caps your upside for an asset class that is one of the few power law-driven ones. As Jamie Rhode once said, “If you’re compounding at 25% for 12 years, that turns into a 14.9X. If you’re compounding at 14%, that’s a 5. And the public market which is 11% gets you a 3.5X. […] If the asset is compounding at a venture-like CAGR, don’t sell out early because you’re missing out on a huge part of that ultimate multiple. For us, we’re taxable investors. I have to go pay taxes on that asset you sold out of early and go find another asset compounding at 25%.” Taking it a step further, assuming 12-year fund cycles, and 25% IRR, “the last 20% of time produces 46% of that return.” And that’s just the last three years of a fund, much less sooner.
  4. Finally, any early DPI you do get up to Fund I t+5 years is negligible. Anything under 0.5X, and for some LPs, anything sub-1X, isn’t any more inspiring to invest in than if you had absolutely no DPI.

Yet despite all of the above, the only thing you can prove to LPs are the inputs. Not the outputs. You can prove that you invested in the same number of companies as you promised. You can prove that you’re pacing in the same manner as you promised. And you can prove that founders take the same check size and offer the same ownership to you as you promised. And that is always good. As you raise from friends and family and early believers in Fund I, Fund III’s raise usually inches towards smaller institutions, but larger checks than you likely had in Fund I.

  1. Fund-of-funds care about legibility. Logos. Outliers. Realistically, if you didn’t have any before Fund I, the likelihood of you having any while raising Fund III is slim. They need to tell a story to their LPs. A story of access and getting in on gems that no one else has heard of, but if everyone knew, they’d fight to get in.
  2. Any person you pitch to who has any string of three to four letters (or is hired to be a professional manager) attached to their name (i.e. MBA, CAIA, CFA, CPA, etc.) has a job. For many, their incentive unless their track record speaks for itself (likely not, given how long venture funds take to fully return capital) is to “not get fired for buying IBM.” Some of their year-end bonuses are attached to that. Some lack the bandwidth and the team members to fully immerse themselves in the true craft of emerging manager investing. Many times, the incentive structure is outside of their immediate hands. For every bet they make that isn’t obvious, they risk career suicide. At least within that institution.

I’m obviously generalizing. While this may be true for 90%+ of LPs who fit in these categories, there are obviously outliers. Never judge a book by its cover. But it’s often helpful to set your expectations realistically.

As such, despite not much changing from your investment side, from the eyes of most LPs, you are graduating to larger and larger LP checks. Usually because of the need to provide more proof points towards the ultimate fund strategy you would like to deploy when you’re ‘established.’ But to each new set of LPs, prior to an institutional 8-year track record, you’re still new. On top of that, as your fund size likely grows a bit in size from Fund I, to some LPs, you are drifting from your initial strategy by no longer being participatory and now leading and co-leading. You also might have added a new partner, like Ben talks about in the afore-mentioned episode. And a new strategy and a new team requires new proof points related to on-thesis investments. So, Fund III is where you begin to need to whether the storm. For some, that may start from Fund II. Altos Ventures took four years to raise their Fund II. Many others I know struggled to do the same. But if you really want to be in VC long term, this is the third leg of the race.

And this is when a lot of GPs start tapping out. Will you?

Photo by Victoire Joncheray on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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Timeless VS Just-In-Time Lessons | Earnest Sweat & Alexa Binns | Superclusters | S6PSE1

earnest sweat, alexa binns

The holiday season has always been a great time to celebrate the movers and shakers in our world. This season we’re celebrating my personal favorites in the LP world. To start this mini-holiday series off, Earnest Sweat and Alexa Binns runs one of the most popular podcasts on venture capital limited partners, Swimming with Allocators. I was also fortunate enough to be on their podcast as well as a bonus crossover episode.

You can find Earnest on his socials here:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/earnestsweat/
X / Twitter: https://x.com/EarnestSweat

You can find Alexa on her socials here:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexabinns/
X / Twitter: https://x.com/alexabinns

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[02:09] Alexa’s earliest relationship with money
[03:28] Earnest’s earliest relationship with money
[04:45] Earnest’s first major purchase
[06:41] Alexa’s first major purchase
[08:25] The difference between public speaking and interviewing
[12:19] Memorable guests on the SwA podcast
[14:46] To do or not to do in-person interviews
[18:05] Evolution of YouTube titles
[20:04] Why err towards evergreen content?
[22:30] Was SwA designed for LPs or GPs?
[24:12] How did Earnest and Alexa meet?
[24:56] How did Swimming with Allocators start?
[27:21] The Pandora’s Box of intros
[28:02] Alexa’s 3 buckets for LP investing
[30:12] What is ‘coming soon’ for Earnest and Alexa?
[36:58] Post-credit scene: Spider-Man & Investors as Avengers

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

“Having done my investment philosophy, I’ve got three buckets. There is the ‘Let it ride, you can’t beat the market’ bucket. That’s the majority of what I’m working with. That’s 90[%] plus. There is a bucket where I’ve worked as a VC, I’ve managed a bunch of LP investments, I am better suited to vet deals than the average person. I believe in my ability to pick winners in this very thin layer of finance. Just in angel investing and GP selection where I’ve got lived experience and then my network. And then there’s a bucket for other ways capital can make your life richer.” — Alexa Binns

Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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When Do You Know If You’ve Grown Up as a VC? | El Pack w/ Ben Choi | Superclusters

ben choi

Ben Choi from Next Legacy joins David on El Pack to answer your questions on how to build a venture capital fund. We bring on 3 GPs at VC funds to ask 3 different questions.

Gilgamesh Ventures’ Miguel Armaza, also host of the incredible Fintech Leaders podcast, asks Ben what is the timing of when a GP should consider raising a Fund III.

Similarly, but not the same, Strange Ventures’ Tara Tan asks when an LP backs a Fund I, how do they know that this Fund I GP will last till Fund III.

Arkane Capital’s Arkady Kulik asks how one should think about building an LP community, especially as he brings in new and different LP archetypes into Arkane’s ecosystem.

Ben manages over $3.5B investments with premier venture capital firms as well as directly in early stage startups. He brings to Next Legacy a distinguished track record spanning three decades in the technology ecosystem.

Ben’s love for technology products formed the basis for his successful venture track record, including pre-PMF investments in Marketo (acquired for $4.75B) and CourseHero (last valued at $3.6B). He previously ran product for Adobe’s Creative Cloud offerings and founded CoffeeTable, where he raised venture capital financing, built a team, and ultimately sold the company.

Ben is an alum and Board Member of the Society of Kauffman Fellows (venture capital leadership) and has also served his community on the Board of Directors for the San Francisco Chinese Culture Center, Children’s Health Council, Church of the Pioneers Foundation, and IVCF.

Ben studied Computer Science at Harvard University before Mark Zuckerberg made it cool and received his MBA from Columbia Business School. Born in Peoria, raised in San Francisco, and educated in Cambridge, Ben now lives in Los Altos with his wife, Lydia, three very active sons, and a ball python.

You can find Ben on his socials here:
X / Twitter: https://x.com/benjichoi
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bchoi/

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[05:05] Ben’s 2025 Halloween costume
[06:44] Jensen Huang’s leather jackets
[07:24] Jensen Huang’s answer to Ben’s one question
[10:05] Enter Miguel, Gilgamesh Ventures, Fintech Leaders
[14:43] What are good signals an LP looks for before a GP raises a Fund III?
[22:35] Why does Ben say ‘established’ starts at Fund IV?
[25:08] Who’s the audience for Miguel’s podcast?
[27:52] In case you want more like this…
[28:32] Enter Tara and Strange Ventures
[32:46] How does Ben know a Fund I will become a Fund III?
[36:53] How does Ben know if a GP will want to build an enduring career?
[40:58] How does Tara share a future GP she’d like to work with to Ben?
[42:43] Marriage and divorce rates in America
[43:34] What should a Fund I do to institutionalize?
[46:28] Should you share LP updates to current or prospective LPs?
[48:57] Enter Arkady and Arkane Capital
[51:09] How does one think through LP-community fit?
[1:01:31] What’s Arkady’s favorite board game?
[1:03:08] Ben’s last piece of advice to GPs
[1:09:50] My favorite Ben moment on Superclusters

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“The dance of fundraising is when you do have [your thesis], the LP has to figure out is this a rationalization of the past or is it actually what happened? Was this known at the time? Because if it was, we can have some confidence in the future going forward. But if it was just a rationalization of some randomness, then it’s hard to know if Fund IV or V or VI will benefit from the same pattern.” — Ben Choi

On solo GPs bringing in future partners by Fund III… “The future unidentified partner is the largest risk that we have to decide to accept. So there actually isn’t a moment where we decide this GP is going to be around for Fund III. It’s actually the dominating risk we look at and we get there, but it’s a preponderance of other things that we need to build our conviction so high that we’re willing to take that risk.” — Ben Choi

“It’s brutal. It’s a 30-year journey. For any GP who raises a single dollar from external LPs, it’s a 30-year journey.” — Tara Tan

“I don’t think anyone goes into this business to raise capital, but your ability to raise capital is ultimately what allows you to be in this business.” — Ben Choi

On community… “Your core question is how much diversity—in the technical term of diversity—can you tolerate before you lose the sense of community.” — Ben Choi

“Most letters from a parent contain a parent’s own lost dreams disguised as good advice.” — Kurt Vonnegut

“Fundraising is a journey of finding investors who want what you have to offer; it’s not convincing somebody to do something.” — Ben Choi

Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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“Venture Should Play More Like Moneyball” | Carson Monson | Superclusters | S6E9

carson monson

“The limiting downside is actually something a lot of emerging managers don’t think about. If you can turn all of your portfolio companies that don’t hit that exit velocity, if you can find a soft landing for those companies versus that’s a writeoff and they’re dead and done, that’s extra effort, but that’s an extra turn on your fund’s performance.” — Carson Monson

Carson Monson is a seasoned allocator with nearly a decade of experience backing emerging and spinout GPs across large institutions, government entities, and family offices. After stints at Greenspring, SITFO, and building a fund of funds strategy for a large European single family office, he now runs the fund of funds at CrossRange, which focuses on supporting top-tier emerging and spinout GPs.

Carson has backed everything from micro funds to high-profile managers spinning out of tier-one firms. He is deeply committed to being a thought partner and strategic resource to the GPs he supports, helping them navigate the complexities of fund building and long-term success in the VC industry.

You can find Carson on his socials here:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/carson-k-monson/
X / Twitter: https://x.com/Monsson_

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[02:08] Wildlife and wholesome trouble
[06:03] The journey to being an LP
[10:54] How did Carson join Greenspring?
[13:55] Lessons across Greenspring
[15:46] How many deals did Greenspring do per year?
[18:46] An example of a qualitative metric worth measuring
[20:16] How many off-thesis bets is a VC allowed to make?
[21:25] When do GPs move from thematic bets to opportunistic bets?
[25:45] How much AUM should any one GP have?
[29:46] Why does Carson liked concentrated portfolios?
[30:32] The case for concentrated portfolios
[36:40] Relationships with GPs should stay at the LP partner level
[39:49] Fund strategy at Fund (n) vs Fund (n + 1)
[45:19] What the hell is ‘critical node theory?’
[49:54] Examples of great references
[52:58] The halo effect of mega funds
[58:48] How does Carson get to inbox zero
[1:02:09] Why is CrossRange different?
[1:08:17] The last time Carson had a pinch-me moment
[1:10:17] Carson’s ricotta gnocchi
[1:12:28] Post-credit scene: Ramen, gluten, Tokyo, and Tonkatsu Suzuki Pt 2

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SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

On if 20% of the fund is focused on opportunistic bets… “Wealthy is a nice word. I would say [20% is] egregious. […] 10%, it’s not like it’s the right number, but it’s the number most LPs won’t contest.” — Carson Monson

“In the past, there have been GPs who are truly excellent at one thing or a couple of things, whether that’s a thesis, strategy, or an approach. And that approach makes a ton of sense at the fund size that they’re operating at or maybe a little bit larger. In the 20-teens especially, people were able to raise more and more, and strategy drift became a huge issue. That is something managers have to face the music on now. It’s almost like the idea of being a professional baseball player and grinding and working your way up and becoming excellent and an all-star baseball player. Then being, ‘Well, the motion is similar in cricket, so I’ll just go play cricket now.’ Ya some of the motions are similar, but it’s a fundamentally different sport. Strategy drift, fund size drift; it can be a really easy trap to fall into. The motions are similar, but you lose that competitive edge when you start to play a different sport.” — Carson Monson

“If you’re more concentrated, there is an ability to impact outcomes more meaningfully. I like GPs that play a critical role in the ecosystem in which they operate in. If you play a critical role—whether that’s in go-to-market motions, whether that’s in commercialization, whether that’s in branding and storytelling—there are so many ways you can play that role. Those types of GPs tend to have an ability to move the needle for their founders more—both on the upside and limiting the downside.” — Carson Monson

“The limiting downside is actually something a lot of emerging managers don’t think about. If you can turn all of your portfolio companies that don’t hit that exit velocity, if you can find a soft landing for those companies versus that’s a writeoff and they’re dead and done, that’s extra effort, but that’s an extra turn on your fund’s performance. There is a skillset in identifying that there’s still good in a company, even if it’s not going to have this massive outcome.” — Carson Monson

“Venture should play more like Moneyball. If you can get your companies on base and limit strikeouts, that is actually so impactful at a fund level. More emerging managers should try to think like CIOs, and less like individual investors, like being a portfolio manager and managing outcomes. Obviously, venture is a game of minority positions. You do not have sole control. Playing that role for your founders, it impacts performance. It impacts reputation and, in fact, your ability to win in the future.” — Carson Monson

“You cannot say, ‘I’m going to be SV Angel today, so I can be USV tomorrow.’” — Carson Monson

“A multi-billion dollar mega fund has to have a portfolio of companies whose aggregate equity value outstrips the GDP of most small nations on this planet.” — Carson Monson

Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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Underwriting Things That Don’t Change

sequoia tree, does not change

One of the most interesting lines I heard on a podcast that Mike Maples was on was: “90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.” Which I first wrote here. Then here. It’s a line that lives rent free in my mind. Ideas, startups, roadmaps, and goals change all the time. I get it. That’s life. Very, very few folks are folks who unilaterally pursue one thing their entire lives. And of those who do, they’re not all successful.

Another friend of mine whose track record speaks for itself, having invested and involved herself in multiple boards before those companies became unicorns and even after, once told me that the idea she invests in is irrelevant. As long as it has grounds and can be adjacent to a large market. The primary thing she looks for is the founding team.

Early-stage investors obsess about people. They’re not wrong. Some are misled by these “VC-isms.” Others still have their own way of underwriting them. I don’t have a crystal ball. I’m also not the smartest person to be dishing out predictions. I have a rough idea of what will change, though I may not always be right. But I don’t know how they’ll change. Or when. So I’ve lived an investing career obsessing over things that don’t change. Or as Naval Ravikant puts it: “If you lived your life 1000 times, what would be true in 999 of them?”

I’ve written about flaws, limitations and restrictions before. But to quickly surmise:

  • Flaws are things you can overcome. Limited track record. Never managed a team. Never scaled a product. Limited access to capital.
  • Limitations are imposed by others and/or the environment. Gravity dictates that objects don’t fall upward. There are only 24 hours in a day. If you’re not based in the Bay Area, it’s harder to raise capital. Certain investors prefer co-founders and partnerships. Certain investors care about warm intros. The list goes on.
  • Restrictions are rules imposed on yourself by yourself. Batman can’t kill. You only invest in solo founders. You only invest in healthcare. You don’t invest in anyone outside the Ivy League schools. But some restrictions go deeper. You’ll never hire from a job portal again. You never hire or invest outside of your network. You won’t invest or hire having never met someone in person. You need to meet their spouse before you make a hiring decision. You don’t invest in single parents. You don’t hire anyone who doesn’t read at least one book per month. You micromanage. You don’t hire anyone who cannot curse. And yes, I’ve heard all of the above and more. My curiosity is always: Why do you impose such restrictions on yourself? What is the story you’re not telling me? Is out of a fear or admiration?

All that to say:

  • Flaws will and can change if it is a priority. But won’t change if they’re not.
  • Limitations might change, but it’s outside of your and my control. And I don’t get paid to pray to the weather gods.
  • Restrictions often don’t change.

Whether you admit it or not, certain habits are hard to change and unlearn. It’s possible. But that requires you to not only be aware of it, but also actively want to change it. Other habits are second nature. How you treat others. How you start each conversation. Why you look both ways before crossing even an empty street. Why you’ve sold yourself a particular personal narrative. Why you have to invest a certain thesis.

The world seems to always be trying to stay on top of things, but there seems to be far less dialogue around how to get to the bottom of things. To me, when it’s underwriting a person and their team, it’s about underwriting what doesn’t change rather than underwriting what could.

Photo by Hc Digital on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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