How to Pick Emerging Managers in 2026

Pavel Prata asked me if I was interested in writing a guest post on his blog a few months back. To which I responded with the fact, that I’m not sure there was much for me to add to the LP ecosystem that I haven’t written about already. And bless how supported he is, but he challenged me to write an updated summation of everything I’ve learned about investing in emerging managers as a progression of how much I’ve learned since I first wrote my initial blogpost that put me on the map in LP-GP land. Which to this point, I hadn’t written something public-facing on that. So eventually, after much inspiration, I finally did.

Now a few months later, I’m finally glad to share it here as well on this blog. I’m not going to include the nice formatting and graphics that Pavel and his team made, so if you want to check those out and for potentially, easier readability, check out my post here.

But without further ado, and thank you Pavel for the inspiration, voila!


david zhou, cup of zhou, superclusters
Author’s note: God, I put on some weight for this photo.

The preface

In many ways, I sit in a place of privilege. I grew up in the Bay Area, and while I was not born into a household of tech, nor did I have any relatives who were deep in the tech ecosystem, I was fortunate to have friends who were and are far more tech forward than I was.

I remember being in elementary school in โ€˜05 and my best friends were deadset on trying to get an account on this new-ish website called Thefacebook. And the primary reason was that we got bored of Club Penguin. The site needed us to be 18 or older (or at least we needed to be some age that we werenโ€™t. We were still living out our best single-digit lives), but I donโ€™t think anyone was really checking. Three misfits. One of us usually received detention for getting in fist fights. His brother would receive principal office visits for making other kids cry. Blunt guy. If your drawing was ugly, heโ€™d be sure you knew. But both were and are good people.

The first would get in fights defending his friends from getting bullied. The second, while lacking social cues, would always sit down with you to help you improve your skills. And me, the supposed โ€œgoody-two-shoesโ€ of our misfits who would follow rules, yet get in trouble trying to get them out of detention. And frankly, none of us were good with our words. Then and maybe still now. Yet nevertheless, one of my buddies found his way to a .edu email address from volunteering at the school library. And that was all we needed to get into the โ€œbig kids club.โ€

I went to a school in the Bay Area, due to it being the far cheaper alternative of the schools I would have loved to go to. There I got involved in the startup ecosystem really early on because of my zealotic obsession with free food in college. (Story for another day.) I became a startup investor because the accelerator was short on hands, and it was through the first startup I was with that I knew they existed as a non-profit at the time. I became an LP because of a community I was helping run and someone asked me to invest as an individual LP for only $1,000 to his oversubscribed fund that โ€œI [had] been really helpful in building.โ€ To this day, I still donโ€™t think I did anything. Then, I somehow built a network of LPs and GPs because I wrote one blogpost that was supposed to be my personal how-to-be-an-LP 101 that went serendipitously further than I expected.

And I say all of that to preface that:

  1. My life is full of accidents and being lucky at the right place at the right time with the right people.
  2. As a caveat that you should take all the words that will populate below with the biases that I may be coming to the table with.

That said, I do believe that life is all about increasing the surface area for luck to stick. Thereโ€™s a line I really like that I came across a few years ago by Qi Lu, who created Bing, Microsoftโ€™s search engine and is the former COO of Baidu: โ€œLuck is like a bus. If you miss one, thereโ€™s always the next one. But if youโ€™re not prepared, you wonโ€™t be able to jump on.โ€

When Pavel asked me to write a step-by-step guide on how to choose managers in 2026, my immediate thought was that I couldnโ€™t ever write it from the stance I have today, but if I were starting all over from nothing, except capital to invest, where would I begin?

Yet knowing what I know now, with the network I have now, with the brand I have nowโ€”though I still have a long way to go, how is investing in emerging managers today different from the last few years?

As such this essay will be split in two overarching sections:

  1. For the LP whoโ€™s just reached the block
  2. For the LP whoโ€™s been around the block

A big thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading, guiding and helping me frame early drafts of this piece.

For the emerging LP

One of my good friends described investing in venture funds in the 2020s as โ€œexpert modeโ€, as opposed to when he started in 2001 as โ€œthe tutorial.โ€ He said that in 2001, there were 200 firms in total in the market. That he met with half of the firms in the market. Then invested in two-thirds of the firms he met with. And that resulted from three vintages that returned 5X net on his venture fund portfolio. According to him, every fund he invested in was an emerging manager. The whole asset class was an emerging asset class.

Today is undeniably harder than itโ€™s ever been to be a venture fund LP. Thousands of firms in-market. Everyone tells you theyโ€™re the greatest fund since sliced bread. Or in their words, theyโ€™re top quartile, if not top decile. Everyone tells you they have unique access. Yet most people generally have access to the same โ€œlegibleโ€ deals. Or at least, โ€œlegibleโ€ founders which include a river of backwards bias. So, who has โ€œbetterโ€ access? Time horizons are realistically 12-15 years, instead of the 10 years people pitch you. Plenty of GPs quietly โ€œretireโ€ after 2-3 years to go work at a portfolio company or โ€œget acquiredโ€ by a larger platform. IPO markets havenโ€™t fully opened yet, and there just isnโ€™t enough private capital to deploy into the largest companies. 2025 has been an interesting year of one of the lowest years in dollars raised, but one of the highest, with respect to dollars deployed. Six-layer SPVs, where the individual who manages the sixth layer has no idea who actually owns the underlying asset, just a forward contract towards the stock.

The first question you need to ask yourself, and likely the most important question, you need to ask yourself is if someone pitches you their fund, and itโ€™s Wonderbread, why are you so lucky?

How are you luckier than the most established institutions whoโ€™ve done this for decades? How are you luckier than people who are college roommates with Sam Altman? How are you luckier than multi-stage venture funds who have a strong brand AND an active fund-of-funds program that invests in managers sharing their deal flow with them? How are you luckier than content creators who get pitched VC guests all the time? How are you luckier than the owner of Buckโ€™s or Coupa or the real estate firms who own buildings on Sand Hill Road?

More likely than not, youโ€™re not. Iโ€™m not.

A long-time private equity allocator friend of mine has this great line, โ€œThere are only two kinds of people who make money. Really smart people and dumb people who know theyโ€™re not smart enough to beat the market. Everyone in between has just enough knowledge to make dumb decisions.โ€

Thereโ€™s a great line by the legendary Richard Feynman. โ€œThe first principle is that you must not fool yourselfโ€”and you are the easiest person to fool.โ€ Remember that.

So, after all those disclaimers, do you just not invest?

If the above scares you, probably not. Youโ€™re more likely to generate consistent returns by investing in the indices. But if youโ€™re willing to put in the blood, sweat and tears, maybe the below might be of value to you.

The first step is to see a lot of deals. You have no idea what quality looks like until youโ€™ve seen quality. Otherwise youโ€™re spending a good chunk of time imagining what could be and what should be, but not is. Just like the GPs we evaluate need to prove they can โ€œsee, pick and winโ€, we as LPs have to do the legwork to see the best deals, to build the framework to pick them, and to win the deals that are hard to come by. But first, on seeingโ€ฆ

Itโ€™s like dating for the first time. I donโ€™t know about you, and this might be TMI (too much information). Before I dated my first girlfriend, I had all these ideas implanted in me from Hollywood, Hallmark movies, Matthew McConaughey, Sandra Bullock, Anne Hathaway, Hugh Grantโ€”you get the point. I had these faint, rose-tinted ideas of how my future partner should, would, could act. But when I finally started dating, reality was wildly different from expectations.

The same is true when you look at funds. Whether itโ€™s media, podcasts, or newsletters, they all tell you a warped perception of the reality of the market, told through the lens of a world that is most beneficial to their incentives. You need to figure it out your own. And when you do in the first year, maybe a bit longer, you will inevitably talk to more noise than signal. Accept that fact.

To get inbound, you need to do a combination of a few things. Pick your battles here:

  • Put โ€œLPโ€ on LinkedIn. You will have random GPs find you in their search engines and reach out. Almost all will be noise here, unfortunately.
  • Go to events that attract GPs (i.e. EMC Summit, RAISE Global, Bridge Funding Global, SuperVenture, FII, Upfront Summit, etc.). Your priority here is to go to the side events that arenโ€™t publicly disclosed that have LPs and GPs. If you canโ€™t get in there, go find the LP/GP Happy Hours and dinners that are shared on Eventbrite, Luma, and/or Partiful. And if still you canโ€™t get in, at these events, there are occasional speed dating breakout sessions.
  • Reach out to LPs and ask to buy them coffee as you are learning to be an LP. You can find these LPs either on:
    • Podcasts (i.e. Swimming with Allocators, Origins, Venture Unlocked, How I Invest, Superclustersโ€”mentioning my friendsโ€™ platforms before my own)
    • Reacting to LP and emerging manager content. There are a few LP โ€œinfluencersโ€ out there. Note not only who reads and comments on these posts, but whether the original poster also replies back to those comments (which is a loose indicator on the depth of their relationship and if that commenter is somewhat respected in the ecosystem). FYI, donโ€™t use me as a barometer, since I try to reply back to everyone. But a couple โ€œinfluencersโ€ that might help you kickstart your search. Beezer Clarkson, David Clark, John Rikhtegar, Meghan Reynolds, Endowment Eddie (on X), Dan Gray, James Heath, Matt Curtolo, and so on. Occasionally, Hunter Walk, Charles Hudson, Rick Zullo, Peter Walker and a few other VCs also post good LP content. OpenLP is also a great platform that captures the most interesting thoughts regularly, as well as what Pavel is building now too.

Now, that you have a list of GPs and your calendar has a few meetings set up, you ideally get GPs to share their decks with you before the meeting. Although, understandably, it is harder for GPs to trust you with their decks if you havenโ€™t yet built up social capital and trust.

If you can get the deck, I look for a few things. At least one interesting thing on the deck that can help the GP see more deals, pick better deals, or win competitive deals. And (b) is that โ€œthingโ€ an insight that the GPโ€™s prior background would have made explicit or obvious to that GP? For me, thatโ€™s enough to take a first meeting. Do note that most decks look the same. And if you canโ€™t tell one deck from another (thatโ€™s okay, I started like that too), ask the GP before the interview, something along the lines of: โ€œOf everything that is on your deck about the fund, is there one thing about you or your fund you hope that I catch that youโ€™re really proud of but thereโ€™s a chance I might not notice?โ€

Naturally, you can ask that question, even if you donโ€™t have the deck, and if their answer impresses you, take the meeting. I call that โ€œsuspense.โ€ Partial information that I am privy to that elicits further questions and curiosity. To engage with any GP, I need that first.

So then I share my calendar. I use Calendly, but youโ€™re welcome to use any alternative. And I include the below text along with the calendar invite to set expectations.

calendly

Do note that the meeting is only 15 minutes long. You donโ€™t have to do this, but I find it useful because Iโ€™ve seen a number of GPs already. My CRM tells me just under 1000 that Iโ€™m actively tracking. But there are definitely more in the universe. All that to say, Iโ€™ve come to realize for myself that I figure out if I want to continue a conversation with a GP or not within the first 5-10 minutes.

The only thing Iโ€™m looking for in the meeting is โ€œsurprise.โ€ Is there something I can learn from the GP that I didnโ€™t know before? About them? About the industry? About the technologies? Ideally, you also consume quite a bit of information outside of each conversation. For instance, I read research papers, talk to people I think are smart, listen to podcasts, read newsletters, and build things here and there. The more information you consume outside, the higher your bar for โ€œsurpriseโ€ will be over time.

And if I learn something, only then, do I actually start doing homework around the fund opportunity. And spending more time with a GP.

Diligence

For the purpose of this section, Iโ€™m going to prioritize diligence as it relates to people. Iโ€™ll talk about portfolio sizing and construction in the section below. Iโ€™m also going to assume you donโ€™t have the ideal network to diligence the opportunity. What does the ideal network look like?

A small selection of A-players (founders, operators, co-investors, and LPs) that you trust AND they trust you to withhold judgment about them, as well as keep what they tell you in the highest level of confidence.

Admittedly, this will take time to build. Some longer than others. Your mileage may vary from multiple months to many years, sometimes decades. And this will be a part of your job as an LP to continually refine.

But in lieu of that, hereโ€™s where Iโ€™d start:

  1. Find who are A-players. Needless to say, before you can build a relationship with A-players, you must first be able to recognize A-players. Admittedly, this is a lot of legwork. And everyone approaches this part differently. For me, I have to consume a large amount of information from disparate knowledge networks, talk to different people and see who they respect, listen to a lot of podcasts, read a lot of books and content, in hopes of triangulating clarity of thought, as well as executional discipline. I donโ€™t have a silver bullet here unfortunately, but here are a few traits Iโ€™ve seen over the years that seem to have moderate to high correlation with A-players.
  2. Find out what motivates and drives them. What do they need? What do they want? What do most people fail to understand about them? This will also take time, potentially longer than the first step. Your job for now is to establish trust and rapport. โ€œWhat you share with me will never find its way back to the person I am calling about.โ€
  3. And as youโ€™re doing all the above, and still looking at deals. For people you know well and you can attest to their intellectual and executional rigor, ask them for their opinion. For everyone else, focus on asking about the facts. Youโ€™ll need to use the facts to piece together a narrative. Instead of โ€œWho do you likeโ€, ask โ€œWhen did you last talk to X?โ€ or โ€œHow many intros did this GP make for you? And how were you introduced?โ€

Naturally as part of diligence, you need to figure out and corroborate if a GP has an edge. Risks and weaknesses will always be present. Also, expect to get negative references. Any ambitious person is bound to ruffle feathers and rub people the wrong way. If you donโ€™t find any, youโ€™re either talking to the wrong people or you havenโ€™t given those people a safe space to talk. Also I want to note, as Cendanaโ€™s Kelli Fontaine once told me: โ€œNeutral references are worse than negative references.โ€

Negative referencesUnderstanding why itโ€™s negative is important. Is it merely a disagreement on perspective? Or is it evidence or an account of poor work ethic, abrasiveness, lack of open-mindedness, or poor morals?

For instance, โ€œGP didnโ€™t work that hard at our companyโ€ is not all bad, depending on their answer to โ€œWhat did they do outside of work?โ€ If the answer is โ€œI donโ€™t knowโ€, then your job is to find out what they did and if they worked hard there instead because working at their last company didnโ€™t align with their goals.

To give another example, a friend of mine once did a reference on a founderโ€”the lesson is the sameโ€”where a reference told him, โ€œI really hated how X always wore tank tops and sandals when the office culture required us to be put together.โ€ And many of his former colleagues all said the same thing. Yet no one ever complained about the work he did. Because despite his poor dress code, his output was in the top percentile on the team.

GPs, by nature of pitching a (hopefully) new narrative and charting their own path, will be controversial. Itโ€™s just part of the game. But obviously, it should not discount any bad behavior.

Other comments that belie a referenceโ€™s negative sentiment about someone:
โ€œThe GP is interesting.โ€ Interesting is usually a quiet opinion withheld. Itโ€™s always helpful in these situations to prod deeper.

โ€œI like the GP as a friend/human.โ€ Why donโ€™t you like this GP as an (investment) professional?
Neutral referencesNeutral references come in different shapes and sizes. Note that if you ask leading questions, youโ€™ll get safe answers. For example, โ€œDo you like X?โ€ leads to an answer of โ€œOh yes, I like X.โ€

The most common form of neutral references are often masked by positive, generic adjectives, but canโ€™t be substantiated by real examples. Other forms include not remembering who the GP was despite the GP being on the cap table, or working together. Also, on-list references who opt to text/email you about their commentary on a GP instead of call. Or taking a really long time to schedule time with you to talk about the GP, versus immediately leaping out of their chair to tell you about a GP. In addition to that, references (usually on-list or their most notable co-investors or founders) who didnโ€™t even know that the GP was raising a fund or what the GP would be investing into.
Positive referencesPositive ones luckily are the easiest to spot. And itโ€™s not just the words you hear, but the emotions you feel when someone tells you about the GP. These references, whether they say it explicitly or not, would go to war for the GP.

Peter Fenton at Benchmark recently shared a line I really like. “The highest accolade of a firm that they seek is a manifestation of a value system.” Most investmentsโ€”both at the level of an angel investment, but also a number of institutional investmentsโ€”are written as one-night stands. The majority, if not all, of the conversations happen T-3 months before an investment is made. Then as soon as the investment happens, outside of the monthly or quarterly updates, and maybe the board meetings, no other meaningful conversation happens post-investment. And the truth is if an investor hasnโ€™t built their value system (and for that matter, value-add system) before they start their firm, theyโ€™re not likely to change their behavior and their habitual cycles after they start their firm. Moreover, noting my bias, I prefer to invest in GPs where I am investing in the worst version of their firm on the day I invest. That itโ€™ll only get better. And to do so, certain things need to compound: brand, value, network, among others. In order for that to happen, they need to have built a relationship, as opposed to a one-night stand, with many of their investments, even beyond their best ones. So the point of doing diligence is to find evidence of their firmโ€™s value system before they start it.

Having shared the above, now that you have time with the GPs and some of their references, what do you ask?

Note that the below arenโ€™t all-encompassing nor exhaustive questions and that you usually get more from asking follow-up questions instead of building a checklist of questions to ask. Merely, the below serve as a point of inspiration as you do your own due diligence. As such, Iโ€™ve structured the below into categories on how I assess a GPโ€™s ability to see, pick and win through the reference calls I do, segmented by reference archetype.

Seeing

What does their sourcing engine look like? How much is inbound? How much is outbound? Do they have access to proprietary channels for deal flowโ€”even if momentarily? Do they know people who add value to the innovation ecosystem, but arenโ€™t well connected to the rest of the innovation ecosystem?

I will note that most GPs will say most of their deal flow comes from founder referrals.

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPHow do you find opportunities before anyone else?Are they fishing in new uncharted territories? Do they have non-redundant networks and access points?
FoundersHow did you first meet this GP? Do you remember the type of conversation you initially had with said GP?
If the GP met this person via an event: How often do you go to these events? Outside of meeting this GP, whoโ€™s the most memorable friend youโ€™ve made via the event?
If the two met via an intro: How often do you catch up with your mutual friend? Has your mutual friend introduced you to other investors?
Iโ€™m trying to understand how much of a GPโ€™s deal flow is inbound versus outbound. As well as how repeatable certain deal flow channels and nodes are.
Co-InvestorsHow is this GPโ€™s deal flow different from yours? Why havenโ€™t you pursued building out your own network in this field?Can [insert big firm] just do what this GP can? Is there a structural moat?
LPsFor the funds you were also looking at or have in your portfolio, who seems to have the same deal flow channels as this GP?Institutional LPs see a lot, and as a function, they likely see a lot of overlap in inbound channels. So for people who have the same channels, why does a certain GP capture value from it better than the rest?
Ex-colleaguesIn what situations do you typically find this GP to be proactive when you used to work with her/him?
What has this GP done that no one with her/his job title has ever done in the past?
How entrepreneurial is the GP? Is the new firm the first instance of their entrepreneurial nature or is this part of the GPโ€™s inherent nature?

Picking

Thereโ€™s a saying in the land of LPs. โ€œYou donโ€™t have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in has to be great.โ€

So the question comes down to: how do you know if someone is great?

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPWhy have you and havenโ€™t you put the most amount of capital behind your portfolioโ€™s greatest value driver?
If we could go through each of your past investmentsโ€”good and badโ€”can you enlighten me on why you invested in each?
The first question is figuring out if a GP understands how early and how much to put in their greatest outperformers. What signals do they rely on? Are they ready to invest with reserves?
The second question is to understand how the GPโ€™s ability to recognize excellence and insights has evolved. How quickly they ramp up. How many investments it takes for them to shift the way they think. At what point, do previous investments impact the way they make future investments?
FoundersWhat kinds of conversations did you have with the GP before they gave you a term sheet? How long did that journey take? Were you surprised at all? How did the conversations with this GP differ from the other ones you had?From the perspective of a recipient, how much of a GPโ€™s intention is well-understood before the GP embarks on a commercial relationship with the founder(s)?
Co-InvestorsHow often do you take intros the GP sends your way? Was that always the case?
How has your relationship with this GP evolved over time? Where do you foresee it evolving towards?
Do investors understand and value a GPโ€™s eye for people and opportunities?
With the second set of questions, Iโ€™m trying to understand how much a co-investor values this GPโ€™s deals. If the co-investor works at a multi-stage fund, have they ever tried to hire this GP into their firm? Or had them as a scout? Or is it a purely, โ€œitโ€™s nice to have you in our orbitโ€ kind of relationship?
LPsHow have you directly experienced the value of being an LP?Have the GPs provided any value to their existing LPs? Iโ€™m primarily looking at GPs who claim to offer co-invest opportunities. Do they (a) know the founders well enough to get allocation for people the founders likely donโ€™t know or trust yet, and (b) how much do they optimize for whatโ€™s best for the fund versus whatโ€™s best for the LPs?
With (b), itโ€™s not a bad thing to optimize for the fund, but setting expectations is important, instead of claiming to be helpful to LPs without actually being helpful.
Ex-colleaguesHas this GP hired anyone in the past that youโ€™ve genuinely impressed with? Why were you impressed by these individuals? Has this GP done anything to help these individuals succeed over time?Thereโ€™s no direct parallel between hiring and investing, but in terms of recognizing talent, there are some similarities.

Winning

Why do the worldโ€™s best founders want to work with you? What do you have to offer that others donโ€™t? Why would a world-class founder have you on the cap table when there are so many great options out there (and even when thereโ€™s that much inbound interest)?

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPWhat is your proudest piece of advice you gave a founder or the proudest thing you did for a founder?
What’s something you did for a founder or a piece of advice you give that didn’t work out? What’s something you did/piece of advice that did better than you expected?
Can I see every single version of your pitch deck to date? (If thereโ€™ve been previous vintages, ask for those as well.)
Iโ€™m primarily looking for specificity. Was it proactive or reactive? And when corroborating with said founder later on, will that founder reflect the same sentiment?
With regards to the second and third questions, do you measure when things deviate from expectationsโ€”good or bad?
My goal with the last question is to understand how the GPโ€™s thinking has evolved over time. How has the GPโ€™s ability to storytell changed? Do they have a better grasp of how they can add value and what founders actually want over time?
FoundersWhich other investors did you talk to before you took this GPโ€™s check?
Did you know that you were going to be a hot commodity? When and how did you know?
How did the GP help when things werenโ€™t going well? How did the GP react when things turned downwards?
Was there competition for the round? Itโ€™s neither good nor bad if there was. And if there was, why did they end up taking this GPโ€™s check? Would they still take it if this GP wrote double the check and asked for double the ownership?
Co-InvestorsWhat value does this GP bring to the table that seems to be a constant ask from your portfolio companies?Why will fellow investors fight for this GP to be on the cap table?
LPsWho were the most elucidating individuals you talked to best appreciate this GPโ€™s value-add?Are there people you should have talked to but have yet to? Or are there people you talked to but asked the wrong set of questions? Or whom youโ€™ve yet to build rapport with?
Ex-colleaguesWhat would you say is this GPโ€™s greatest asset/skillset? How have you seen it in practice?
Whoโ€™s the best person you know of for [insert what the GP claimed as value add]? Why? On that same scale, where this person is a 10, where does the GP sit? What would help this GP get to a 10?
A-players typically know other A-players, and understanding how they rank a GP among all the other practitioners they know is valuable intel.

Gravitational pull

To tie the above together, there is no perfect emerging GP. And if they are, theyโ€™re probably not an โ€œemergingโ€ GP. I look for emerging GPs who excel in two of the three areas (see, pick, win). One in isolation wonโ€™t help. If youโ€™re the worldโ€™s best sourcer, but you donโ€™t know how to pick the right one even when it falls on your lap, or you donโ€™t know how to get the founder to choose you over others, then sourcing alone is for naught.

I look for GPs to have an unfair advantage in two of the three areas. I need the cards stacked in their favor. Oftentimes, their unfair advantages are further accented by what first surprised me in the first meeting or two. Furthermore, gravitational pull comes from acknowledgement of their unfair strengths, as well as the constant refinement of the craft that increases the firmโ€™s leverage over time.

Partnership risk

One other important element to underwrite is partnership risk. To many experienced allocators, like Ben Choi once told me, this may even be the single biggest risk an LP has to underwrite. If youโ€™re investing in a partnership, chemistry really matters. They may look great on paper. They may have complementary skillsets. But do they talk about each other in ways that raise each other up? How are decisions made? Is there a power imbalance? How is compensation shared (salary and carry)? How much do they not only respect but adore the othersโ€™ strengths? How do they resolve conflict? Have they disagreed with each other before?

Portfolio construction and sizing

By the time you decide to invest in funds (or directly into startups too), you need to understand that youโ€™re building a portfolio. Unless your hands are blessed by a higher being or that you have the Midas touch, there is a ridiculously low chance you can pick 2-3 funds and expect theyโ€™ll outperform. Naturally, you want all the funds you do invest in to do well, but sometimes in this world, you can do everything right and have things still not work out. So expect, on average, most funds will return you 0.8-5X their money back to you.

So there are a few things you need to figure out:

  1. Assuming things go right, and youโ€™ve invested in this 5X fund:
    • Is a 5X net (which is roughly a little over 6X gross) return on your investment meaningful to you and your net worth?
      • If not, then the question comes down to: Is there something else you value from investing in this fund? Some value co-investment opportunities. I know of a number of venture funds, traditional fund-of-funds, and multi-family offices, who see their fund-of-fund program as a loss leader, with the primary goal of the fund-of-funds to generate deal flow for their direct investment practice. As an emerging LP, do consider that if you want co-investment opportunities, are you the largest (or at the minimum, one of the largest LP checks who care about co-investments)? If not, then consider the reality of why would the GP ever give you the best deal flow if youโ€™re not their greatest (monetary) supporter.
      • If so, great. But at the risk of it being a 0.8X net fund, meaning you not only lost money to decision-making, but also to inflation and the opportunity cost of investing in a public market index, can you stomach the loss 12-15 years from now?
        • If not, invest a smaller check size.
        • If so, great.
    • Whatever is needed to 5X the fund, what is the exit value necessary for that?
      • If a GP has no reserves and invests pre-seed/seed, assume 75-80% dilution by the time of exit for the fundโ€™s greatest value drivers. This does not account for acquisitions, which will have a little more nuance. This also assumes that there will be 5-6 rounds of investment after the one the GP invests in.
      • If a GP has reserves, depending on the industry, and how much they continue doubling down on the investment, itโ€™s safe to assume 55-60% dilution. If the GP plans to continue doubling down on pro-rata past the Series A, do account for how much of the overall fund is allocated in a singular deal. Usually limited partner agreements cap it at around 15% of the overall fund, to allow for minimum diversification at the portfolio construction level.
      • And assuming you know the exit and enterprise value thatโ€™s needed to 5X the fund, do you believe thatโ€™s possible? Your job is to go into the internet archives and find, if in the last few years, what percent of companies in that industry has exited for that size. And how likely will it be for future companies to exit at that size? And even if so, do you believe the GP is in the right information flows to capture that outcome?
    • Is the number of companies the GP wants allocation into, reasonable to you? Every person has a different level of tolerance in this regard. To make some gross assumptions, if a GP invests in 50 companies in a fund, then they need a single company to 50X to return your money back once (obviously Iโ€™m taking the gross, not the net numbers). And they need a single company to 150X to 3X the fund. At a $10M post-money valuation, a 150X would turn the company into a $1.5B company. Again, do open a spreadsheet for this. Iโ€™m not accounting for dilution, fees, recaps, and a bunch of other things. This is purely a back-of-the-napkin version of: Do you believe a $1.5B outcome in this sector of choice is possible?
      • Do also note that given that venture is a power law business, a single value driver for a fund usually accounts for at least 60% of the overall fundโ€™s returns. 1-2 companies account for another 20-30%. And the rest, the last 10%. I also want to play my own devilโ€™s advocate that almost nothing in this industry is โ€œusual.โ€

Miscellaneous thoughts

  1. Donโ€™t invest in the first 50 funds you see. You will miss great deals. Thatโ€™s okay. You donโ€™t have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in should be great.
  2. If youโ€™ve been out-of-market for more than a year, do the same. You need to know how people are hiding skeletons in their closet?
  3. Trust the data, but not the judgments of people who see a plethora of deals in venture. Have they seen other funds with the same strategy before investing in this one? What was different?
  4. Almost every fund you meet will say theyโ€™re top quartile or top decile. Be skeptical of benchmarking data, or for that matter, publicly available data that will suffer from availability and selection bias. Theyโ€™re either too opaque or delayed, and in the words of some institutional LPs, โ€œtotally fabricated.โ€
    • To borrow the words of my friend Peter Walker, whoโ€™s constantly cited for his Carta reports, โ€œโ€œYou should probably, if youโ€™re a founder, for instance, selectively ignore at least half of what Iโ€™m saying because it doesnโ€™t apply to you. And your job as a founder, your job as an investor, your job as a thoughtful person is to figure out which half.โ€
  5. Ignore the marketing jargon associated with โ€œselectโ€ track records GPs share with you. Ask for their schedule of investments (SOI), which should include all their investments to date, not just the ones they want you to see. Figure out your own valuation methodology, and prescribe that to their SOI.
    • For me, SAFE notes donโ€™t count as markups, only priced rounds. Any company that hasnโ€™t gotten reevaluated in the market for over 2 years receives a discount. The only exception is strong revenue growth since last round. Discount is based on public market comparables and their revenue multiples. Usually 7-8X on revenue for me. Not always.
    • If a GP gives you โ€œtargetโ€ or โ€œprojectedโ€ multiples, youโ€™re welcome to ignore the number outright. Whatโ€™s more interesting and important are what were the assumptions that led to the projection. What is the expected dilution? How many rounds is a company expected to raise before their projected exit? What is the assumed graduation rate per stage? What is the conservative estimate?
  6. Never trust the word of a GP. Spend more time on reference calls than you do with the GP. When doing references, if you know people really well AND believe they are the top 1% in what they do, ask for their opinion. Everyone else, ask for the facts.
  7. Make sure the data corroborates with the narrative. Is the data/track record repeatable? Being 0.1% on the cap table in three rocketship companies is very different from an investor co-founding a company. The relationship is different. In the former case, the founders, much less the executives, even remember a GP exists.
  8. When asking questions, roughly a third to a half of your questions should be the same across all managers, only then can you compare apples to apples.
  9. When spending time with the GP, find out what they donโ€™t want you to know. What are they scared of, that if you know, they think will look bad on them? Everyone has insecurities. Thatโ€™s okay. But only once you figure that out, can you better assess the information theyโ€™re telling you. And better yet, the information theyโ€™re not telling you. Which is what you eventually go to diligence.
  10. Sometimes thereโ€™s just no LP/GP fit. They might be a great fund, but you just donโ€™t feel the pull.
  11. Set expectations clear from the get-go. If youโ€™re in exploratory mode, say it. If youโ€™re actively deploying, say it.
  12. At any point in time, if you are no longer interested, and know that youโ€™re most likely not going to invest, say it. Itโ€™s better that a GP thinks youโ€™re not going to invest, then you do, than think youโ€™re going to invest, but you end up not.
  13. Be mindful of a GPโ€™s time. If youโ€™re not going to write the largest check as a function of a GPโ€™s fund, know you have limited time with them. Do not waste their time. Know you will have to do most of your homework without the help of the GP. If you want to be spoonfed diligence, this is the wrong asset class for you.

On spinouts, my primary concern is always: Were you successful because of your last firm or in spite of your last firm? If you no longer had the title you did last month or this month, would people engage with you differently? If youโ€™re the keynote for a large conference (i.e. SuperVenture, FII, iConnections, etc.) when you held your last position, will they still invite you back as a headliner when youโ€™re starting a new firm? When people talk about you behind your back about how amazing you are, do they talk in the past or present tense? Tactically, are you the ex-Redpoint partner or Tomasz? Are you ex-Greylock or Sarah? Are you ex-[insert big firm] or you?

As most insights, these will very rarely come out in conversation with the GP. More often than not, theyโ€™ll come out in diligence. Particularly off-list references. If you donโ€™t have the network, you have to rely on on-list references and maybe a few good friends, but know that there is no incentive for people to speak ill of someone else to a stranger. So diligence only the facts. Youโ€™re likely not going to get the honest โ€œopinionsโ€ you want to adequately understand an opportunity.

For established LP

If youโ€™re an established LP, you know most of the above. So instead, Iโ€™ll share a couple reminders that you may have heard before, but are paramount more today than before. Before I share them, hereโ€™s how Iโ€™m categorizing the difference between an emerging and an established, just because I know everyone has a different definition (i.e. AUM size, number of investments made, track record that extends for at least a decade, etc.). Do note, you donโ€™t have to check all the boxes. As long as you have most of the below traits of an โ€œestablished LPโ€, youโ€™re probably established. One of those touchy-feely things where when you see it, you know it.

Emerging LPEstablished LP
No prior network to lean onA robust network to source and diligence deals (meaning you get at least 5-10 quality referrals per month from legible people)
No brandA brand where people will start a conversation with you purely because of the jersey you have on
You need to go out hunting for deals. Show up/host events. Build a platform. Actively book time on peopleโ€™s calendars to find out whatโ€™s going on.(Related to the above) Inbound deal flow exceeds outbound, but with the understanding, to do your job well, you still need to do outbound.
You take time to deliberate on decisions. Understanding whatโ€™s going on takes time. If you were to look only at a pitch deck, outside of the metrics, you might struggle to understand whatโ€™s important. BTW, this is both good and bad. But good in the sense that you donโ€™t have prejudice. And youโ€™re more willing to uncover diamonds in the rough.You make fast โ€œnoโ€ decisions (at least internally). A function of the scar tissue and the training youโ€™ve had up to this point.
You invest opportunistically. You might not have the quality of deal flow to start a consistent deployment strategy. Thatโ€™s ok, BTW.You can invest opportunistically, but if you wanted, or have already, have capital and the network to deploy consistently against some schedule. Could be annually. Could be quarterly.
If you show up at any LP-only event, you might know the host and one other person at best.If you show up at a random LP only event, you know at least a few other LPs in the room by name.
Youโ€™re on an email basis, maybe LinkedIn basis with other allocators and investors. It will take time to build the relationships.Youโ€™re on a text/Whatsapp basis with other experienced LPs and they respond to you within a few hours, if not minutes.
You need to build out your systems for managing deal velocity and future volume. Easier to start when you have less volume. (Building out systems is an article to write for another day.)You have a system for tracking your deal flow pipeline, diligence, and keeping track of your portfolio and anti-portfolio investments.
Youโ€™re not intimately familiar with SEC (and others) regulations around the rules of engagement in LP land.You know exactly what compliance will let you and not let you say. And you know the right verbiage to dance around these topics.

So the reminders:

  1. Be open-minded. To have gotten this far in your investing career so far means youโ€™ve built biases to help you make better decisions. Likely, also faster decisions. Youโ€™ve probably used some phrase along the lines of โ€œThere will always be another train leaving the station.โ€ And youโ€™re right. Most are worth waiting on. But there will be a small, small select few that is worth breaking every rule you know for. The truly once-in-a-lifetime relationship (not just opportunity). Know that the greatest firms tomorrow do not look like the firms from before.
  2. To check your biases, ask yourself three questions:
    • What do you typically gravitate towards? Why? Was there a part of your past that led you to gravitate towards X?
    • What, for whatever reason, do you not like? What gives you allergic reactions? Why?
    • What, for whatever reason, do you not notice at all? Of all the skimming you do, what are the parts of the narrative that you most easily gloss over? Why?
  3. Numbers tell a very small part of the story.
  4. Whatโ€™s worth underwriting more than anything else is motivation. Motivation to outperform. Motivation why this upcoming fund means theyโ€™ll work harder than before. Motivation to get better at what they might already be good at. That means most of the work is qualitative, not quantitative.
  5. If youโ€™re an established institution, you already have a brand. You likely donโ€™t have to hunt for deals (regardless of what you tell your stakeholders). And itโ€™s probably all true. But you wonโ€™t always have that brand. So itโ€™s your job not to do a disservice to the brand. And almost always means you communicate expectations quickly and accurately.

There are two angles here.

  1. Do you want to play in emerging venture today?
  2. Do you want to re-up?

Emerging venture today is an asset class in and of itself. High attrition rates. Too many players. Lack of data. Lack of track record. Sometimes, even lack of network. The underwriting for someone who invests $250-500K checks is different from someone who typically leads rounds. The underwriting of a partnership potentially not yet fully formed until Fund N+2. Data rooms with missing data. A portfolio construction model that is a guestimate at best, completely made up at worst. Assuming youโ€™re reading this, you know that. And that it is a full-time job.

  1. How are you continually refreshing your networkโ€”both for sourcing and for diligence? Are you making sure your network isnโ€™t stale? All networks atrophy over time. How are you keeping your most helpful contacts fresh, incentivized, and willing to give you their honest thoughts? You donโ€™t need a lot here. It helps to optimize for at least 20 relationships, leaning largely into, and likely in the below order:
    • Fund-of-funds who see many deals and whose sole job is to evaluate emerging managers, and/or any institution who has a dedicated emerging manager program (i.e. Vanderbilt, Babson, Gresham, etc.)
    • Service providers (i.e. lawyers, fund accountants, fund admin) who get to know many emerging managers from a different angle
    • A select few hot founders who also angel invest and are superconnectors in their own right
    • Multi-stage fund GPs and partners who often co-invest with emerging managers. Focus on those who have dedicated event series and/or communities for emerging managers. I personally spend less time with venture funds with their own fund-of-funds programโ€”not because theyโ€™re not great, but theyโ€™re often biased to promote their own fund managers. Different story if I knew them before they launched their FoF program and I can get honest thoughts here. If you donโ€™t know who to target, thereโ€™s a select few namesโ€”say around 15-20โ€”that most active emerging managers love to have on their deck.

On re-ups:

  1. What are the incentives of the organization? Do your incentives as an institution still align as strongly with the GP as it did when you first invested?
  2. If not, have you communicated that pre-emptively with the manager?

In closing

Despite the surplus of information and the sheer number of venture funds (in the mid-to high thousands), none of us can do it alone. At least I donโ€™t believe we can. Why? Unlike the public markets where there is as close as we can get to parity of information. The private markets, especially early-stage investments, exhibit none of that. People win on asymmetry of information.

Jacob Miller once told me on the podcast that in investing, there are three things you need to understand. Inputs, frameworks, outputs. Outputs, you canโ€™t always control. But as long as you have good inputs and a great framework, your outputs should speak for themselves. With my blog, Iโ€™ve always tried to empower people with frameworks. With The Side Letter that Sam and I launched, weโ€™re trying to empower people with inputs you canโ€™t find anywhere else.

While Iโ€™d love to surmise all of LP investing in one fell swoopโ€”Pavelโ€™s given me quite the task at handโ€”the truth is I canโ€™t. The best I can do is to share the frameworks I use. The next step is for you to find the inputs that will drive your investment decisions. Those can come from leveraging a platform or community. Hell, even investing in other funds-of-funds. Or collecting asymmetric information yourself. Or a combination of both. Itโ€™s only a matter of how much time, attention, and energy you have on your hands.

As always, and I have to say this at the end of everything I write, the views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.


Again, a huge thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading early drafts of this piece to help me better refine my thoughts here. I wouldn’t be here without you.


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

If 198 Pieces of Unsolicited, (Possibly) Ungoogleable Advice for Investors Were Not Enough

yoda, advice, wisdom

Having been to a number of talks and panels, my biggest frustration with these occasions is when a moderator asks a VC: “So what do you invest in?”

And the VC would respond, “Good people, good markets.” Or “Ambitious founders tackling ambitious problems.” Or some cousin of it. Well, of course. I’m not saying they’re wrong, but no venture capitalist ever says, “I want to invest in bad people building in bad markets.” It’s the kind of advice and “insight” that’s equivalent to a large company saying their company culture is a “family.” Not wrong, but tells me nothing about what you actually want. The same is true for most advice for investors. And well, advice in the investing world is given quite liberally, without liability and responsibility most of the time.

So I made it a mission to collect pieces of advice that were actually tactical or differentiated. Advice that would make you turn your heads and actually pay attention. And under the right circumstances, actually useful. It’s why I wrote this blogpost’s predecessors:

This is the third one in this 99 series for investors. And, if by chance, you’re a founder reading this, to understand the mentality of a differentiated investor, you might also like the 99 series for founders. But I digress.

In no particular order other than the chronological order I found them, below is the third set of 99 pieces of advice for investors:

  1. Investing – Deal flow, theses, diligence
  2. Fundraising from LPs
  3. Fund strategy/portfolio construction/exiting
  4. Fund structure
  5. Portfolio support
  6. Governance/managing LPs
  7. Building a team
  8. Compensation
  9. Miscellaneous

Investing – Deal flow, theses, diligence

1/ “Any company that is pure execution risk without any market risk is not a suitable venture investment.” โ€” Chris Paik

2/ “[In the private markets,] I don’t think we’ve seen a 70% write down yet or 70% of these [private companies] worth less than the cash [they’ve spent to date].” Take public market comparables. To see how much public companies are worth as a function of the money they’ve spent to date, look at the “Cumulative Retained Earnings” (which tells you how much money they’ve burnt over their lifetime) compared to the “Enterprise Value” (or market cap minus the cash they have today). If their enterprise value is less than their cumulative retained earnings, that means they’re worth less than the money they’ve spent to date. โ€” David Friedberg (timestamped 4/21/2023, when he said there are 70% of public companies that are worth less than the cash they’ve spent to date, but we haven’t seen a 70% haircut to private market valuations)

3/ The first best use of any consumer product is crime. โ€” Pre-seed VC

4/ When looking for outliers, “Invest in companies that canโ€™t be described in a single sentence.” โ€” Chris Paik

5/ “Venture investing process as a two-stage process โ€“ the first where you ensure you avoid false negatives โ€“ that is, you ensure that there are no errors of omission, where you unwittingly pass on meeting a potential winner. The second stage is where you avoid a false positive or errors of commission, that is, picking the wrong company.” โ€” Sajith Pai quoting Karthik Reddy

6/ How a lawyer diligences AI companies:

  • “How are you using AI? Is it a third-party? Let’s see those terms, contracts, etc.
  • How are you using customer data? Prior agreements? Prior policies in place? Subsequent policies in place? You could lose the data, the models, and the algorithms. If found in violation by the FTC. States privacy laws like Texas, California, and Virginia also should be looked at.”

7/ “When it’s cooler to be in a startup than in a band, we’re at the top of the market.” โ€” A fund of funds General Partner

8/ “Buy when there is blood in the streets, and sell when there are trumpets in the air.” โ€” A Warren Buffett attribution

9/ Does this founder have 20 years of experience of 20 one-year experiences? Depth vs breadth. Which does the industry/problem they’re building for require?

10/ While there is no one “right” way to run a partnership meeting, beware of conviction-led deals (as opposed to consensus-driven), since partners are incentivized to go into sales mode to convince the rest of the partnership and may make it harder for them to see the flaws in the deal.

11/ In early stage venture, debates on price is a lagging indicator of conviction, or more so, lack thereof.

  • Price also matters a lot more for big funds than small funds.
  • Price also matters more for Series B+ funds.
  • Will caveat that thereโ€™s an ocean of difference between $10M and $25M valuation. But itโ€™s semantics between $10M and $12M valuation. How big your slice of the pie is doesnโ€™t matter if the pie doesnโ€™t grow.
  • Not saying that itโ€™s correlated, but it does remind me of a Kissinger quote: โ€œThe reason that university politics is so vicious is because stakes are so small.โ€

12/ โ€œJudge me on how good my good ideas are, not how bad my bad ideas are.โ€ โ€” Ben Affleck when writing Good Will Hunting. A lot of being a VC is like that.

13/ We like to cite the power law a lot. Where 20% of our investments account for 80% of our returns. But if we were to apply that line of thinking two more times. Aka 4% (20 x 20%) of our investments account for 64% of our returns. Then 0.8% account for 51.2% of our returns. If you really think about it, if you invest in 100 companies, we see in a lot of great portfolios where a single investment return more than 50% of the historical returns.

14/ “Early-stage investing is NOT about mitigating the possibility of failure Itโ€™s about discounting the probability of an outsized outcome – what is the size and likelihood of a HUGE win Investing in โ€œsafeโ€ companies due to fear of failure is the surest way to a mediocre returns.” โ€” Rick Zullo

15/ โ€œ[David Marquardt] said, โ€˜You know what? Youโ€™re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.โ€™ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos

16/ When calling a reference and asking about someone’s weakness, “If you were to hire someone under that person, what would be the top traits you’d look for?”

17/ Give founders a blank P&L statement. Tell them that is not their P&L statement; it is their customer’s. And ask them where do they/their product sit on their customer’s P&L statement. Those who are aware of who they are and who they need to sell to do better than those who don’t.

18/ No one has a crystal ball. Well, the pessimists do. They’re right 90% of the time.

19/ “I want the guy who understands his limitations instead of the guy who doesn’t. On the other hand, I’ve learned something terribly important in life. I learned that from Howard Owens. And you know what he used to say? Never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.” โ€” Charlie Munger

20/ “Instead of saying, ‘This risk exists,’ we reframe the risk and ask, ‘What do I have to believe for this to work?’ Doing this transforms risk from a source of fear and unknown into a set of clear assumptions to be systematically tested and de-risked.” For example, โ€œWe have to believe we can scale the hardware to XYZ performance metric by ABC date. What are the key engineering constraints bottlenecking that?โ€ โ€” Mike Annunziata

21/ Questions to ask investee (on-list and off-list) references by Graham Duncan:

  • How would you describe Jane to someone who doesnโ€™t know her?
  • Whatโ€™s your sample size of people in the role in which you knew Jane?
  • Who was the best person at this role that youโ€™ve ever seen?
  • If we call that person a โ€œ100โ€, the gold standard, whereโ€™s Jane right now on a 1-100?
  • Does she remind you of anyone else you know?
  • If Janeโ€™s number comes up on your caller ID, what does your brain anticipate sheโ€™s going to be calling about? Whatโ€™s the feeling?
  • Three attributes I like to keep in mind are someoneโ€™s hunger, their humility, and how smart they are about people.  If you were to force rank those for Jane from what she exhibits the most to least, how would you rank them?
  • What motivates Jane at this stage of her life?
  • If you were coaching Jane, how would you help her take her game up?
  • If you were going to hire someone to complement Jane doing the same activity (NOT a different role), what would they be good at to offset Janeโ€™s strengths and weaknesses?
  • How strong is your endorsement of Jane on a 1-10? (If they answer 7, say actually sorry 7s are not allowed, 6 or 8?  If the answer is an 8, โ€œWhat is in that two points?โ€)

22/ โ€œNeutral references are worse than negative references.โ€ โ€” Kelli Fontaine

23/ “If someone brags about their success or happiness, assume itโ€™s half what they claim. If someone downplays their success or happiness, assume itโ€™s double what they claim.” โ€” George Mack

24/ “Historians now recognize the Roman Empire fell in 476 – but it wasn’t acknowledged by Roman society until many generations later. If you wait for the media to inform you, you’ll either be wrong or too late.” โ€” George Mack

25/ “Joe Rogan and Warren Buffett are both entrepreneurs. But if you switched them, both businesses would fail. Rule of thumb: If a word is so broad that you can’t switch 2 things it describes, it needs unbundling.” โ€” George Mack

26/ Are the founders at the same stage on the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs? If not, how have they come to terms with different motivations outside of the scope of the venture itself?

27/ $100K contracts take about 70 days to close. So a founder becomes interesting if they figure out how to close faster. โ€” Gong State of Revenue Growth 2025 report

28/ Beware of “annual curiosity revenue.” “AI companies with quick early ARR growth can lead to false positives as many are seeing massive churn rates.” โ€” Samir Kaji

29/ Data suggests that “never following on” beats “always following on” 63% of the time. “Outperformance for the typical portfolio is 12% better when you don’t follow on (3.52X vs 3.14X).” โ€” Abe Othman

30/ “A successful reserve strategy depends both the chance of picking winners and the step up value at the next round. The stock price multiple * the probably of receiving funding = 1.” If the product of your variables is more than one, you should focus primarily on increasing your check size and ownership at entry. And as such, fewer to no reserves. If you’re below one, you’re better off with more reserves. โ€” Clint Korver

31/ Be aware of “seed-strapping” among AI startups. Your SAFEs may never convert. “Watch for any revisions to *YC’s* SAFE or *YC’s* side letter (note: YC has a secret SAFE and side letter documentation not available on on their website, so careful with conclusions).” โ€” Chris Harvey

32/ In underwriting AI companies in 2025, ARR and run rate are no longer signal. Instead, look at sales efficiency (how long it takes you to implement your product; if you charge more or double the price, will customers still buy your product?), the cost to acquire that revenue, and net dollar retention (gross churn, land and expand). โ€” Nina Achadjian

33/ “The ‘raise very little’ strategy only works if you’re in a market that most people believe (incorrectly) is tiny or unimportant. If other people are paying attention, you have to beat the next guy.” โ€” Parker Conrad

34/ Instead of asking founders/references what are their weaknesses, ask for 2-3 positive words that describe them and 2-3 positive words that DO NOT describe them.

35/ โ€œYou want to be pre-narrative. You want to position your capital in an area where the supply of capital increases over time and where those assets will be traded at a premium.โ€ โ€” Albert Azout

36/ “For Hard Tech companies, the only metric that matters before Series B is the ‘Speed of Hiring Impressive People’, aka the ‘SHIP’ rate.” โ€” Mike Annunziata

37/ Beware of co-CEOs and founders who used to be VCs where their past firm isn’t investing. โ€” Sriram Krishnan

38/ “If you donโ€™t pay great people internally, then youโ€™re a price taker.โ€ โ€” Ashby Monk

39/ โ€œBuying junk at a discount is still junk.โ€ โ€” Abe Finkelstein

40/ โ€œWhat do you do when you donโ€™t know anything, you havenโ€™t met anybody, you have no context, the human brain starts inventing rationale.โ€ โ€” Narayan Chowdhury

41/ โ€œThe bigger you get, the more established you get, the more underwriting emphasis goes into how this team operates as a structure rather than is there a star?โ€ โ€” Matt Curtolo

42/ โ€œPrice reflects the inefficiencies of the market.โ€ โ€” Albert Azout

43/ โ€œYou want to be pre-narrative. You want to position your capital in an area where the supply of capital increases over time and where those assets will be traded at a premium.โ€ โ€” Albert Azout

44/ โ€œWe donโ€™t want a slow no. A slow no is bad for everybody.โ€ โ€” Sean Warrington

45/ “Todayโ€™s world is unpredictable, and this is as stable as it will ever be again.” โ€” Seth Godin

46/ “Alfred is the worst e-commerce investor at Sequoia as he knows too much & I am the best biotech investor at Sequoia as I know nothing about biology.” โ€” Roelof Botha, quoted by Finn Murphy

47/ “Since the job is not about simple pattern-matching but about finding true outliers, seniority and experience don’t guarantee success.” โ€” Ian Park

48/ As your fund size grows, do be wary of investing in competing portfolio companies. While it’s always been a tradition in venture to not to, times may be changing. Be sure to be transparent and know how to separate church and state. “This is an issue where the business model for funds is at odds with what most founders want.” Ways you can do so. By Charles Hudson.

  • “Use a seed fund or scout strategy to meet as many promising, early-stage companies as you can.
  • “Focus on investing in Series A and Series B (instead of seed) rounds and pay up to get into the winners when itโ€™s clear which companies are working.
  • “Buy secondary positions in the companies that matter but that you missed.
  • “Invest in competitors but have different investors take board seats and create firewalls to limit information spillover.”

49/ โ€œI deeply subscribe to, โ€˜Thereโ€™s always another train leaving the station.โ€™โ€ โ€” Wendy Li

50/ โ€œAlphaโ€™s three things: information asymmetry, access, and, actually, taxes.โ€ โ€” Vijen Patel

51/ The worst mistake you can make as an early-stage investor is to believe you’re the smartest person in the room.

Fundraising from LPs

52/ “If you’re at 75-80% committed and then you say there’s a single close, that will drive urgency. If you’re at 10 to 30 to 40% committed, and you say there’s a single close, you have no catalyzing power. There’s just so much dirt to hoe. When I went out, when people would ask, ‘When are you closing?’ I would say, ‘We will close on this particular date and ideally it will be a single close. And here is where I am. I’ve closed X% of the pipeline and the total value of the pipe of interested investors was this amount of money.’ The goal was to show with a relatively small conversion rate, I could get to a single close.” โ€” Tomasz Tunguz

53/ What to prepare for the due diligence questionnaire (DDQ) with institutional LPs. โ€” Chris Harvey

  • Governance & Oversight
    • GP Removal Process
    • GP Conflicts of Interest Disclosures
    • GP Devotion of Time
    • Fiduciary Duties Owed by GP
    • Decision-Making Processes
    • LPAC Roles & Responsibilities
    • LP Reporting Guidelines
    • Deadlock Resolution (2 or 4 person GPs)
  • Economic & Tax Terms
    • Affiliated LPs (0 fees to GP team)
    • Capital Calls (Schedule/L. fees/Interest)
    • Distribution Waterfall
    • Fund Expenses/Cap vs. Mgmt Fees
    • Special Tax (ERISA, ECI, FATCA, etc)
    • Subscription Lines
    • Mandatory Tax Dist.
    • Warehoused Assets (QSBS)
  • Regulatory Compliance
    • IA ยงยง203, 206โ€”Code of Ethics, P2P, etc
    • CFIUS Compliance
    • VC & Private Fund Limitsโ€”ยง203(l)/(m)
    • NQI/Qualifying Investments (<20%)
    • Warehoused Investments (VC)
    • State ERA rules <$25M AUM
    • Look-through Rules & Beneficial Ownershipโ€”ยง3(c)(1)
  • Operations & Admin
    • Trademark Rights/IP
    • Vesting Schedules
    • Principal Office Location
    • List of Fund Assets + SPVs
    • Comp Policy for GP and Team
    • Verification of GP Track Record
    • Cybersecurity & Risk Management
    • Service Providers (Fund Admin, Ops, Tax, Legal)

54/ What Minal Hasan includes in the fund diligence room (specifically for Fund IIs)

  • Primary materials
    • Due Diligence Questionnaire
    • Pitch Deck
    • Appendix to Pitch Deck
    • Detailed Investment Thesis & Strategy
    • Term Sheet
    • LPA
    • Subscription Agreement
  • Legal
    • Incorporation Documents for LP, GP, and MC
    • Entity Org Chart
  • Team
    • Team Bios
    • Prior Partner Investment Performance
    • Hiring Plan
    • List of Advisors
    • List of References
    • List of Co-investors
    • List of Service Providers
  • Portfolio
    • One-pager on each company
    • Deal Pipeline
  • Governance
    • Board/Board Observer Seats
    • Policies
    • Sample Investment Memos
    • Sample Quarterly Report
    • Sample Capital Account Statement
    • Sample Capital Call Notice
    • Sample Distribution Notice
  • Financial Docs
    • Budget
    • IRR Spreadsheet
    • IRR Benchmarking
    • IRR Letter certified by accountant
  • Marketing
    • Press mentions
    • Authored thought leadership

55/ When fundraising, don’t share which other LPs you’re talking to. Even if LPs ask who you’re talking to. Unless money is in the bank, nothing counts. Tell the other LPs that you have non-disclosures with all your other LPs, but that you have a lot of interest. If you share the marquee names, the other LPs’ will base their decision on the closing of those LPs. If they commit, great. If not, it will materially impact how the new LPs view your fund.

56/ When working with overseas LPs, you should ask for their citizenship, where their capital is domiciled at, and who is the ultimate beneficial owner if not the person you are pitching? This would help you navigate CFIUS rules and knowing who you’re actually bringing on board.

57/ You should ask prospective overseas LPs what their citizenship is and who the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) is, if not the person you are talking to, as you are doing diligence on your prospective LPs.

58/ โ€œGoing to see accounts before budgets are set helps get your brand and your story in the mind of the budget setter. In the case of the US, budgets are set in January and July, depending on the fiscal year. In the case of Japan, budgets are set at the end of March, early April. To get into the budget for Tokyo, you gotta be working with the client in the fall to get them ready to do it for the next fiscal year. [For] Korea, the budgets are set in January, but they donโ€™t really get executed on till the first of April. So thereโ€™s time in there where you can work on those things. The same thing is true with Europe. A lot of budgets are mid-year. So you develop some understanding of patterns. You need to give yourself, for better or worse if youโ€™re raising money, two to three years of relationship-building with clients.โ€ โ€” David York

59/ โ€œGetting an LP is like pulling a weight with a string of thread. If you pull too hard, the string snaps. If you donโ€™t pull hard enough, you donโ€™t pull the weight at all. Itโ€™s this very careful balancing act of moving people along in a process.โ€ โ€” Dan Stolar

60/ “Things that break the rules have a bigger threshold to overcome to grab the reader’s attention, but once they do, they tend to have a stronger, and more dedicated following. Blandness tends to get fewer dedicated followers.” โ€” Brandon Sanderson on creative writing, but applies just as well to pitches

61/ In all great stories, the protagonist (in the case of a pitch, you) is proactive, capable, and relatable. Your pitch needs to show all three, but at the minimum two out of the three. โ€” Brandon Sanderson

62/ โ€œData rooms are where fund-raising processes go to die.โ€ Prioritize in-person and live conversations. When your investor asks you for documents, ask for 15 minutes on their calendar so you can “best prepare” the information they want. If they aren’t willing to give you that 15 minutes, you’ve lost the deal already. โ€” Mark Suster

63/ “Funds can start with a private offering, then move to 506(c) after the prior offering is completed without a waiting periodโ€”new Rule 152(b) allows for a quick switch, you just can’t do them at the same time or start with Rule 506(c) then move to 506(b).” โ€” Chris Harvey

64/ “Set your own agenda or someone else will.” โ€” Melinda Gates

65/ To address key person risk if the GP, or one of the GPs, has a debilitating health condition within the fund term, include the below in the LPA, by Shahrukh Khan:
Each Key Person shall, as a condition to their designation, represent and covenant to the Partners [inclusive of the GP and LPs] that, to the best of their knowledge, they are not currently experiencing any medical condition reasonably expected to materially impair their ability to perform their duties over the Term [usually 10-12 years] of the Fund.
If, during the Investment Period [when the fund is actively making investments], a Key Person is diagnosed with or undergoes treatment for a condition that materially impacts their ability to fulfill their responsibilities, the General Partner shall promptly disclose to the Limited Partners that a Health-Related Key Person Event [we could define this broadly] has occurred. The specifics of the health condition need not be disclosed [maybe except to the LPAC if there is one?].
Upon such notification, the Investment Period will be suspended and cannot continue without the express approval of the Limited Partners. [I feel like this could mean that no new investments can be made until LPs review and vote on whether to proceed with the fundโ€™s activities in light of the health-related situation.]

66/ When asking LPs what they invest in, sometimes what they don’t invest in is more helpful than what they say they invest in. Most LPs are trained to be generalists โ€” by sector, by stage, by asset class โ€” so asking what they do invest in often nets an answer like “We invest in everything” or “We only invest in the best,” which are often less helpful tells when you’re trying to figure out if you’re a good fit for them or not.

67/ If you have a 3(c)(1) fund, “if an investor owns >10% of your fund, the SEC’s look-through rule requires you to count ALL underlying beneficial owners toward your 100-investor limit.” The workaround is you create a side letter for large LPs that includes this statement: “The Investor’s Capital Commitment shall equal the lesser of [check size] or 10% of total fund commitments.” โ€” Chris Harvey

68/ At your AGM, talk about categories of VCs you admire. For instance, “inception funds” or “superscale funds.” And the logos you admire in each category. Then show the funds that actually follow after your capital. This builds rapport with your LPs and that you’re not just shooting from the hip, where it “just so happens” that some random awesome fund follows your capital. Inspired by Gil Dibner.

69/ “If an LP isnโ€™t following up with an ask for the data room, refs and lays out a path to a potential next meeting, then itโ€™s a pass. Hint โ€” donโ€™t offer the dataroom. I always say yes.” โ€” Endowment Eddie

70/ “[LPs] are underwriting your ability to create signal under uncertainty. If your fund slide canโ€™t do that, your deck is already leaking trust.” โ€” Thorsten Claus

71/ โ€œIโ€™m not here to tell you about Jesus. You already know about Jesus. He either lives in your heart or he doesnโ€™t.โ€ โ€” Don Draper in Mad Men

72/ On GPs answering questions on operational excellenceโ€ฆ โ€œThe best answer I could ask from a GP is for them to be super honest and say, โ€˜These are the people Iโ€™ve leaned on to help me understand what best practices look like.โ€™โ€ โ€” Nicky Sugarman

73/ When reporting numbers, it’s helpful to have more than one TVPI number. One number should represent last round valuation prices. Another should be the number you believe is authentic to you, which likely includes some companies that have been proactively written down and revenue multiples that reflect where the company is currently at. Nevertheless, always explain your rationale as to why.

74/ When you’re fundraising from institutions, expect “27 months from first meeting to wire, 4.7% of prospects commit,” and “annual costs [of] $2.1M+ in infrastructure.” โ€” Pavel Prata

75/ โ€œSpeed to fundraise does not always equate to a strong investor.โ€ โ€” Lisa Cawley

Fund strategy / portfolio construction / exiting

76/ If you have a follow-on strategy or a reserve strategy, track your “follow-on MOIC.” Return hurdles are 10x MOIC for initial capital. And 4-5x MOIC for follow-on capital. The more you invest in follow on, the less TVPI you’ll have. “If you’re going from pre-seed to seed, you’re tracking to a 5x MOIC. If you’re going from a seed to Series A, that goes down to 3x.” โ€” Anubhav Srivastava (timestamped Apr 7, 2023)

77/ The reasons Fund Iโ€™s and IIโ€™s outperform are likely:

  • Chips on shoulders mean they hustle more to find the best deals. They have to search where big funds arenโ€™t or come in sooner than big funds do.
  • Small fund size is easier to return than a larger fund size.
  • Rarely do they have ownership targets (nor do they need significant ownership to return the fund). Meaning theyโ€™re collaborative and friendly on the cap table, aka with most other investors, especially big lead investors.
  • Price matters less. Big funds really have to play the price game a little bit more since (1) likely to be investing in multiple stages with reserves, and price matters more past the Series A than before, and (2) theyโ€™re constrained by check size, ownership targets, and therefore price in order to still have a fund returner.

78/ “Strategy is choosing what not to do.” โ€” Peter Rahal

79/ “We expect GPs to have 1% ownership for every $10M in fund size.” โ€” Large multi-billion family office

80/ โ€œExiting a position in a company to return DPI to LPs is not a reflection of your stance on the company, but your stance on the market.โ€ โ€” Asher Siddiqui

81/ If you have more than $10M and are not a solo GP, consider separating your GP and management company entities. While there are about $5000-10,000 in costs per year, separating fund structures allows for more optimal tax planning, better liability protection, continuity across GP entities with future funds, and flexibility to adopt W2 employment for future employees which is hard to do under a partnership structure. โ€” Chris Harvey

82/ If you’re a GP at a large fund making >$1-2M in annual fees, consider two metrics: (a) AUM times management fee divided by number of GPs, and (b) NPV of potential future carry on that AUM divided by number of GPs. You never want (a) to be greater than (b).

83/ “Just because I have a front row seat at a championships [basketball game] doesn’t mean I can coach an NBA team.” โ€” Brian Chesky

84/ โ€œThe thing about working with self-motivated people and driven people, on their worst day, they are pushing themselves very hard and your job is to reduce the stress in that conversation.โ€ โ€” Nakul Mandan

85/ “The median value-add is about zero. The mean is less than zero. Most things work because they just work (right set of users wanted something at the right time) and the executive team builds the right culture to hire a great team to operate in that market, not because of what a VC does. Value-added service is ‘product as marketing’ for 90% of investors who pitch it.” โ€” Kanyi Maqubela

86/ Get access to as many different offices of your portfolio company’s potential customers as possible. Even better if you know them so well, they give you their office keys. โ€” John Gleeson

87/ “I find most meetings are best scheduled for 15-20 minutes, or 2 hours.  The default of 1 hour is usually wrong, and leads to a lot of wasted time.” โ€” Sam Altman

88/ โ€œProcess drives repeatability.โ€ โ€” Andy Weissman

89/ If you don’t know what to ask your LPAC, ask about extensions on fund length (i.e. past 10+2 years), exceeding limits on company concentration and recycling, investing in startups across funds, and early DPI. โ€” Hunter Walk

90/ At the annual summit… “When you speak on market/themes, I donโ€™t want to hear from the managing partners. Bring out your young guns and the members of the team who are your ground game/first line.” โ€” Endowment Eddie

91/ After the third extension to a fund, control and decision usually shifts from GPs and LPAC to general LP base consent. 93% of LPAs allow for at least 2 years of an extension. โ€” Runjhun Kudaisya, Natalia Kubik, Brian O’Neill, Thomas Howard (Goodwin)

  • “First extension: 63% of funds surveyed allow GPs to authorize the first extension at its sole discretion, typically for one year.
  • Second extension: 42% of funds surveyed require approval from the LPAC to authorize the second extension.
  • Third extension: 41% of funds surveyed require consent from the fund investors to authorize the third extension. Note that further extensions can always be approved by an amendment to the fund documents, but this would require consent from at least 50% and usually 75% of investors by commitment or interest.”

92/ โ€œToo many calls I get on, itโ€™s a re-hash of what the strategy is. Assume if Iโ€™m taking the call, I actually spent five minutes reminding myself of who you are and what you do.โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos

93/ โ€œOne thing I hate is when I meet with someone, they tell me about A, B, and C. And then the next time I meet with them, itโ€™s companies D, E, and F. โ€˜What happened to A, B, and C?โ€™ So Iโ€™ve told people, โ€˜Hey, weโ€™re having serious conversations. Help me understand the arc.โ€™ As LPs, we get snapshots in time, but what I want is enough snapshots of the whole scene to create a movie of you, like one of those picture books that you can flip. I want to see the evolution. I want to know about the hypotheses that didnโ€™t work.โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos

94/ โ€œEvery letter seems to say portfolios have โ€˜limited exposure to tariffs.โ€™ The reality is weโ€™re seeing potentially the breakdown of the entire post-war Bretton Woods system. And thatโ€™s going to have radical impacts on everything across the entire economy. So to say โ€˜we have limited exposure to tariffsโ€™ is one thing, but what they really are saying is โ€˜we donโ€™t understand the exposure we have to the broader economy as a whole.โ€™โ€ โ€” Chris Douvos

95/ “Bad performance is explainable, but operational failures erode trust and your LPs aren’t going to re-up.” โ€” Liz Ferry

96/ “You canโ€™t exceed one associate per partner and expect those associates to have real influence.” โ€” Mike Dauber

97/ โ€œScaling is not synonymous with increasing fund size. To me, scaling means youโ€™re increasing in sophistication. Youโ€™re increasing in focus. And thatโ€™s really a sign of maturity and fund size is a byproduct of that.โ€ โ€” Lisa Cawley

98/ In a 2024 survey, in regards to junior team members’ compensation, “AUM matters less than you think.” There’s only a 17% pay bump on base pay for associates between $1.5B funds and $156M funds. In addition, levers that can boost a GP’s take-home pay include GP staking and cashless contributions. โ€” Chris Harvey, with reference to Deedy Das and Venture5 Media

99/ โ€œNever sit alone at lunch.โ€ โ€” Alan Patricof

Photo by Emmanuel Denier on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Individuals as LPs and as GPs

alone, individual

Two friends independently pinged me for my reaction to two recent social posts while I was on vacation, and I felt so strongly about the below that I had to:

  1. Respond to both of my friends while I was out, and
  2. Write this blogpost after.

Caveat: I don’t tend to write time-and-place ephemeral blogposts, usually evergreen ones, but I feel this topic has been the soup du jour for the last few months, and I need to get it off my chest. I still think a lot of what I write below will stand the test of time, but some parts may not age as well five years from now.

One friend of mine who runs her family office texted me last week and asked what I thought about Harry Stebbings’ recent tweet and Jason Lemkin’s recent comment:

To which, I responded:

I agree with most of what’s said. 99% of people don’t truly understand venture. They see one of two polar extremes. Either it’s the thing that will make them rich and it’s all amazing or it’s overhyped and way too risky. They’re both right and wrong at the same time. In the context of those investing in VC funds, most individuals and new LPs see venture through rose-tinted lens.

That said, what the world needs isn’t ‘do this’ or ‘don’t do this,’ but why and how. That requires education. Not an oversimplification of ‘VC good’ or ‘VC bad.’ There’s a lack of unbiased education right now, but public discussions of such is step one. We need to put illiquidity into perspective. Yes, it’s 17+ years. That’s 4, going on 5, Summer Olympics. Or one and a half zodiacs. That’s another 2-4 American presidents. And that’s over 50 Marvel movies and 34+ Marvel TV series, assuming they stay on pace with what they’ve been putting out in the last 2 years. That’s a long frickin’ time. Time enough for you to have a baby AND send them off to college before you get all the money gained back.

Illiquidity is also at an all-time high. Lots of funds are long in the tooth. LP expectations used to be 10+2. Fancy lingo for 10-year funds with 2-year extensions, opportunistically. Now that companies are staying private for 10-12 years, instead of the old 7-8 years, funds are now 10+2+2. In other words, 10-year funds, with a 2-year extension by GP decision, and another 2 years by LP advisory committee majority vote. But really, it’s starting to become 10+2+2+1+… You can guess where the rest of the numbers come from.

Secondaries are only really popular among the marquee names. For instance, SpaceX, Anduril, Stripe, and so on as of now. Everything else is sold at a discount. Which, 30-50% seem normal. But if a company has raised their last round pre-2021, I’ve seen 60-80% discounts.

GPs are also now expected to actively understand and manage exits. Most GPs don’t know how to. And neither are exits in venture a classically-trained subject. Before it was primarily, IPOs and M&As. Now, this includes secondaries. Ask GPs about their exit strategies. It doesn’t have to be foolproof, but they better have thought of it. And compare what they say to what their best-in-class private equity counterparts say. If there’s a lack of intentionality in the former, things may get really tough in the future.

Venture, sure as hell, is opaque. 75% of VC managers will tell you their top quartile. Who’s right? Who’s wrong? Samir Kaji recently wrote something that rings increasingly true today: “People forget that quartile rankings in VC never account or adjust for valuation methodologies used by the Gps in the sample set.”

Some GPs are liberal with their marks. Marks that put them in the best light. Some even accounting SAFEs as markups, which is bad practice. Pretty sure illegal too, but many new first-time GPs aren’t even aware of it. All that to say, in the first first 5-6 years of a fund, when nothing is noticeably obvious yet, it’s easy to game numbers.

And even if a GP is in the top quartile, top quartile in VC sucks. Ok, it’s not THAT bad. Median definitely sucks in venture though. It’s really not worth putting money in an average VC. But you can put your money in the S&P 500 or the NASDAQ for the same vintage. Dollar-cost average in, once a year in the first four years. And hold it till Year 10. And in many vintages, your public indices will be between a 3X and 4X. Which is as good as most top quartile vintages. If not, it’ll only lag slightly, ever so slightly, behind. Which is a small price to pay for being a liquid asset. If you’re an LP in VC funds, out of thousands of funds, you need to be in the top 20 funds per vintage. Hands down. Not top quartile. And arguably top decile may not even cut it.

And the truth is, just by the numbers, most individuals and new LPs won’t have good access. When your mom, your cousin, that one drunk uncle from Thanksgiving, are all starting their own VC funds, we now and will continue to live in a world where knowing a VC will be as common as knowing someone who wants to start their own company. Whatever that may be. And to have a chance to be good at VC, the average VC must have both a non-redundant AND an economically important network AND knowledge advantage, to borrow a framework that Albert Azout recently said on my podcast. Most do not. Most will fail to compete with the super-scale firms. If you haven’t checked out Gib Dilner’s recent recording on kinds of firms in the ecosystem today, I highly recommend it.

What kinds of networks GPs need to be competitive in today’s market?

The truth is most large funds who will cannibalize smaller emerging managers don’t send their good deals to emerging managers. Although emerging managers do send their best deals to the large funds. Looks good for markups. Looks good at the annual meeting when they present to you. But clearly, this dynamic is unrequited. As such, it’s why I believe as an LP, you need to be in managers who go really, really early, where the large firms still cannot access or priced out of accessing. Managers who extend their thesis so that the net new checks coming out of their funds include seed and Series A (unless they can actively lead this and the next round):

  1. Lose out on access above a $250K check. These days, even above a $100K check. Because large funds want the whole round. It’s how they can make their economics work.
  2. Don’t have the war chest to provide the capital to founders so that they can weather the market. That said, a good friend of mine, Henry, created the Lean AI Leaderboard. It’s a great dashboard for companies who get to profitability with a lean team and often very little in external capital. And if they do, these companies are seed-strapped, meaning they raise a seed round with the goal of never raising another round again. For investors in these companies, the good news is that they retain most of their equity from entry. The bad news is that unless these companies have a clear exit path, your money as an LP doesn’t go anywhere. More so, most of the VCs investing invest on SAFE notes, with no maturity dates. On paper, revenue is up, but no markups and no exit path. After the $100M range, there are very few companies who would acquire any of these small players, especially after the AI craze. That said, it’s too early to tell. And I’m not sure I have the fortune cookie to tell you what happens next.

But also, as an FYI, if you’re investing in a large platform, don’t expect double-digit or even high single-digit returns, you’re likely going to get a solid 2.5-3X (optimistically), but it’s a stable machine. Still think if that’s the case though, you should be investing in buyout funds or private credit. If you don’t have access to those, just public equities.

Also, not every person needs to start a venture firm. Not every good investor needs to be a fund manager. Being a fund manager is tough. You need to worry about K-1s and reporting (yes, that’s chasing founders down for metrics even when you have information rights), fund admin, running a business, filing taxes, and knowing when and how to sell. It’s actually easier to be a great investor at another larger shop. It’s the same as not every smart person needs to start their own company.

All that said… I’m still bullish on venture. I think it truly is, one of the most promising asset classes we have available to us. And I mean venture in the raw, unfiltered first check, pre-seed play. Not the Series A+ play. At least for emerging managers. After the Series A, I can’t think of a sustainable way you won’t get outcompeted by the large ones. For true early stage exposure as first check, the large platforms often have no incentive to play. Given their large fund sizes, they’ve priced themselves out of that true first-check bucket.

Something that harkens back to a Chris Paik line. “Any company that is pure execution risk without any market risk is not a suitable venture investment.”

A few days later, another friend asked me if I saw this, and if I had any immediate thoughts. On LinkedIn, Pavel Prata had posted a reaction to Jared Friedman’s request for full-stack AI companies, saying that “80% of VC funds will be automated within 3 years.” To be fair, Pavel’s not wrong. Directionally, that is where the industry is heading. Having been to a few annual summits that VCs host so far this year already, every single โ€” oh yes, I mean, EVERY SINGLE โ€” one that I went to (I went to seven at the time of writing this post) talked about using AI to either or both source deals and/or qualify deals. Some also talked about supporting their portfolio using their digitally-twinned brain. Simply, AI is in.

That said, there were some things that Pavel suggested I disagreed with, or at least thought he was oversimplifying:

  1. “Process 100X more deals.” While there are firms that make investment decisions algorithmically, and while I do see this working past-Series A (where we enter growth), in true early-stage investing fashion, the best investors invest prior to data. Prior to traction. Prior to anything obvious enough to track. And while you, as a firm, can probably see and filter 100X more deals. As a human GP with only 24 hours in a day, and building a portfolio of 30 investments across 3-4 years, I still go back to a piece of advice I received early on in my career. “You don’t have to invest in every great company, but every company you invest in must be great.”
  2. “Maintain relationships with 1000+ founders.” I have my doubts here. Until I start seeing people build long-term friendships and happiness with AI, I’m still a strong believer that people trust people. And this rapid scaling of AI only further proves that. It’s hard to scale trust. To scale intimacy. There might be a world where this does happen one day. But I don’t think this is three years away. That said, I do think that you as a solo GP or a small team can support your portfolio as if you were a fully-staffed 20+ person team within three years though.
  3. “Deploy capital 5X faster.” There are some things in life where faster isn’t necessarily better. Like performing a surgery. Or simply, music. No one needs to listen to My Heart will Go On on 5X speed. Venture is one of them. While it’s unclear whether Pavel means shorter deployment periods or faster decision-making, to address both, shorter deployment periods may indirectly lead to more companies getting funded. Or more capital going to the same companies. We don’t need either. An LP shouldn’t index venture, nor should more capital go into companies where the preference stack exceeds the valuation of the companies or making companies financially impossible to 3-5X any of the companies’ investors. Faster decision-making may make sense if it’s a competitive round, but true venture is betting on the non-obvious. Most non-obvious bets don’t need capital 5X faster.

To be fair, I do agree with the vast majority of where Pavel thinks the venture industry will go.

Photo by Matthew Henry on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.