“This is one of the big issues of a bunch of data work on venture is insights from some periods don’t mean anything or are not translatable to present time. It’s really frustrating. So we go back to people, reputations, and experience.” – Narayan Chowdhury
Ritujoy Narayan Chowdhury is the co-founder and Managing Director at Franklin Park, where he focuses on private equity investment opportunities, monitoring clients’ portfolios and conducting industry research. He also plays a key role in the development and implementation of Franklin Park’s technology platform, and regularly interacts with clients on investment and portfolio matters.
Prior to Franklin Park, Narayan worked with Hamilton Lane and Public Financial Management. He is a CFA Charterholder and a member of the CFA Institute. Narayan received a B.A. in Mathematics and Economics from Bucknell University.
[00:00] Intro [02:27] Why my parents moved to the US [03:43] Narayan’s dad [08:54] The friction that Narayan has with his team [11:59] Why current analyst training creates bad habits [15:00] What Narayan does when his family goes to bed [16:37] When did Narayan first start playing with code? [17:34] Narayan’s entrepreneurial origins and how much he got paid [19:54] “Never sit alone at lunch” [22:54] The Mike Maples story [25:48] When Narayan realized VC is very different from PE [30:05] The difference between underwriting VC and buyout [34:28] What do you do when you’ve pigeonholed yourself in one industry? [37:02] How do you know if a GP is a core part of an alumni network? [38:32] A 2025 micro trend of misleading operating metrics [43:40] How has VC changed in the past few decades? [53:58] What do most people underappreciate about hockey?
“Every moment that [my daughter] is here and I’m not with her is a moment we’ll never get back.” – Narayan Chowdhury
“Every action should not be a wasted action, should not be duplicative, should be the best use of a person’s time. So any tool that we build that is contrary to that should be reevaluated constantly.” – Narayan Chowdhury
“What do you do when you don’t know anything, you haven’t met anybody, you have no context, the human brain starts inventing rationale.” – Narayan Chowdhury
“Never sit alone at lunch.” – Alan Patricof
“Looking backwards on track records in venture can be very scary decisions. It could be that the prior funds were completely passive throw-ins on a cap table where they were following some social cues in a ZIRP environment and perhaps they got lucky. Whether they were part of a giant outcome [or not], it sort of meaningless for the future because neither the syndicate nor the founder really know who that person ever was. And so, the go-forward benefit of that investment decision is zero versus ‘We were the trusted investor for that founder.’ Not all prior track records are the same. We have to go back to why, going forward, are founders going to seek out or accept those dollars.” – Narayan Chowdhury *ZIRP: zero interest-rate policy
“I’d rather go bankrupt than lose this AI race.” – Larry Page
“The problem is that the barriers to entry on that strategy [to deploy a lot of capital] are pretty low. And you get killed – death by a thousand cuts – when you’re not the only one trying to flood the market with capital and outcompeting on price.” – Narayan Chowdhury
“This is one of the big issues of a bunch of data work on venture is insights from some periods don’t mean anything or are not translatable to present time. It’s really frustrating. So we go back to people, reputations, and experience.” – Narayan Chowdhury
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
“The bigger you get, the more established you get, the more underwriting emphasis goes into how this team operates as a structure rather than is there a star?” – Matt Curtolo
Matt Curtolo, CAIA is a seasoned private markets investor and allocator with over two decades of experience at leading financial institutions. Throughout his career, he has been directly responsible for allocating more than $6 billion in commitments to private market investments and maintains relationships with hundreds of general partner relationships across the full spectrum of private capital strategies.
Most recently, as Head of Investments at Allocate, a venture-backed fintech startup. Matt built the investment capability from the ground up, broadening access to top-tier venture capital opportunities for the private wealth market. Prior to this, he served as a senior leader at MetLife, serving on the investment committee, co-managing their global alternatives portfolio and leading the firm’s US Buyout portfolio. Earlier in his career, Matt led all private equity activities as Head of Private Equity at Hirtle Callaghan, a large independent outsourced Chief Investment Officer (oCIO). Matt’s foundational experience was gained at Hamilton Lane during its early growth phase, before it became the world’s preeminent private markets allocator, in research, investment and client-facing roles. Matt currently holds several advisory positions that span start-ups, asset management firms and fund of funds. He also manages his own advice practice, providing GPs with strategic guidance on strategy, fundraising and investor relations.
[00:00] Intro [04:24] What town did Matt grow up in? [04:37] Why is that town significant from a sociological perspective? [08:43] Why is Matt fascinated with the Detroit Lions? [11:08] What is it like cheering for the underdog? [13:02] How does Matt break down deal attribution in partnerships? [18:04] GPs’ karmic bank account [21:29] What is the kindest thing anyone’s done for Matt? [23:24] How did tennis enter Matt’s life? [26:35] Historical examples of VC management/leadership structures [29:33] Underwriting track record between senior and junior investors [32:23] How Matt approaches diligence after reading the data room [39:30] How do you know when you’ve asked enough questions? [42:37] The three classes of questions for GPs that influence investment decisions [45:34] Remote culture [50:16] Cadence of in-person gatherings in remote teams [52:48] The two (and a half) types of conversations to always host in-person [58:37] The last great idea Matt had on a walk [1:02:05] The legacy Matt wants to leave behind [1:04:37] Post-credit scene
“Partnerships are incredibly hard to evaluate because not only are you evaluating each of the individual’s capabilities independently, but is it a one plus one equals three situation?” – Matt Curtolo
“The bigger you get, the more established you get, the more underwriting emphasis goes into how this team operates as a structure rather than is there a star?” – Matt Curtolo
“Data gives me questions, not answers.” – Matt Curtolo
“The dopamine you get from planning something versus the actual experience itself are wildly different.” – Matt Curtolo
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
This is my third iteration of the 99 series for founders. You can find the first two here and here. The premise for this series was simple. The best, most insightful, unsuspecting lessons are hidden in the deepest, darkest corners of the internet. Hell, many more are hidden in rooms behind closed doors. The goal of this 99 series is to unveil those. Advice you’ve likely never thought about, and most likely have never heard of.
While you don’t need to read all the below at once, it’s helpful to keep the below at your fingertips for when you do need them. As always, unless the advice is not cited, all advice has been backlinked to its source, in case you want the longer, sometimes more nuanced version.
To make it easier for you, I’ve also pooled the advice in categories, depending on your needs:
P.S. Have I started the next one in the 99 series for founders? Yes, I have. Stay tuned!
Fundraising
1/ “Once you take venture capital, the venture capitalist’s business model is your business model. You’ve got to get liquid at a number that makes sense for them. High valuations are good because you take less dilution. Et Cetera. But the reality is that when you have a high valuation, that starts to eliminate your options. ” — Chris Douvos
2/ The employee option pool is easier to negotiate than asking an investor to take less ownership. The pool at the time of term sheet comes out of founder/team’s equity. If the pool becomes completely allocated post-investment, you need to go back to the board and ask for a larger pool, and everyone (you and VCs) gets diluted then.
3/ Beware of the “senior pari-passu,” which means that that investor gets paid paid back before everyone else on the preference stack AND they get equal footing with all the other investors. The thing to watch out for isn’t necessarily for the mechanics of the term itself, but the fact that if you let one investor have that in this round, every subsequent round, investors then will ask for that as well.
4/ Repeat founders often ask for co-sale right immunity (usually 15%) when putting together term sheets. Co-sale rights are usually provisions investors add in to prevent you, the founder, from liquidating before a liquidity event. The rights dictate the when you want to sell your equity, the investor has first dibs to buy your equity AND if not, they can also sell their equity alongside you. Because there are additional provisions, most buyers may not want to put in all the work to diligence just to have an existing investor buy your equity. And also, if your existing investors are also selling, it sends a negative signal to potential buyers.
5/ If any corporates own more than 19.5% of a company, they have to write you off as a subsidiary of the corporate and report your losses as their losses. So they’re less valuation sensitive and care less for ownership.
6/ You’re likely not the only one in market with your solution. If a competitor raises a massive round, that’s market validation. And not a reason to change your pitch. You should only change your pitch if your customers are opting for your competitor, but not if VCs are talking about your competitor. If VCs ask about your well-funded competitor, say “My customers don’t bring this up with me. But rather they bring up incumbents and this is why we’re tackling this space in full force.”
7/ “Once you have $500k+ raised, spend 2/3 of your time on funds, 1/3 on small checks.” — Ash Rust
8/ Beware of SAFE overhangs. You probably don’t want to raise more than 25% on SAFEs in comparison to the next priced round. — Martin Tobias
9/ Don’t say “The market is so large, there are room for many winners.” To a VC, that’s code for “This founder is getting their ass handed to them by competition.” — Harry Stebbings
10/ If a large number of your employee base do not have the experience of being in a startup, “make a choice about how/when/if to be transparent about the things that are happening (good and bad) and the level of startup experience within the group will be a critical factor in whether the decision to be transparent turns out to be a good one.” — Javier Soltero
11/ To fundraise, even if your last X number of months sucked, you need to show just three months of great growth prior to the fundraise. — Jason Lemkin
12/ Rough benchmarks for enterprise revenue growth for things to be interesting to VCs (— Jason Lemkin):
Before $1M ARR, growing 10%-15% a month
Around $1M ARR, growing 8%-10% a month or so
Around $10M ARR, ideally doubling
13/ “An investor is an employee you can’t fire.” — Vinod Khosla
14/ “Things that break the rules have a bigger threshold to overcome to grab the reader’s attention, but once they do, they tend to have a stronger, and more dedicated following. Blandness tends to get fewer dedicated followers.” — Brandon Sanderson on creative writing, but applies just as well to pitches
15/ “Great worldbuilding with bad characters and a bad plot is an encyclopedia. Great characters and a great plot with bad worldbuilding is still often an excellent book. […] The fact that time turners break the entire universe of Harry Potter wide open does not prevent that from being the strongest book in the entire series.” — Brandon Sanderson on story plots, but also applies to markets and founding teams. Replace worldbuilding with market. Replace characters with team, and plot with product-market fit or founder-market fit.
16/ In all great stories, the protagonist (in the case of a pitch, you) is proactive, capable, and relatable. Your pitch needs to show all three, but at the minimum two out of the three. — Brandon Sanderson
17/ “Data rooms are where fund-raising processes go to die.” Prioritize in-person and live conversations. When your investor asks you for documents, ask for 15 minutes on their calendar so you can “best prepare” the information they want. If they aren’t willing to give you that 15 minutes, you’ve lost the deal already. — Mark Suster
18/ “Second conversation with a serious investor is usually around what are you trying to prove and who are you trying to prove that to.” — Fund III GP
19/ “Set your own agenda or someone else will.” — Melinda Gates
20/ “The ‘raise very little’ strategy only works if you’re in a market that most people believe (incorrectly) is tiny or unimportant. If other people are paying attention, you have to beat the next guy.” — Parker Conrad
21/ Beware of stacking SAFEs. And be sure to model out that you as the founder(s), won’t dip below 50% ownership before the Series A. This is a more common problem than most founders think. Inspired by Itamar Novick.
22/ “Before you send a single email or take your first call, you should have a fully-researched pipeline CRM with a minimum number of qualified target investors.” — Chris Neumann
Pre-Seed: 100 – 150 qualified target investors (a mix of angel investors and VCs)
Series A: 60 – 80 qualified target investors (all VCs)
Series B: 40 – 60 qualified target investors (all VCs)
Governance
23/ Find your independent board member before shit hits the fan (usually when your investor representation and you the founders disagree). Because by the time you find an independent board member when things go south, your investor will recommend someone who’ll most likely take their side. Board members recommended by VCs usually have long standing relationships with investors and are likely to sit or have sat on other boards with that investor previously. And because they have a longer standing relationship with that VC, they will likely side with the VC when there’s a disagreement.
24/ “Board members can’t make companies but they can destroy companies.” — Brian Chesky
25/ Ask your prospective investors how long they plan to be at their firm. The worst thing that can happen is you bring on a board member and they switch firms after a year, then you’re left with a someone you didn’t pick. It’s probably also a good idea to let the investor have their board seat, contingent on them working at that firm. — Joseph Floyd
26/ Consider incorporating the company in Nevada or Texas, as Delaware courts are becoming more judiciously activist. Especially consider this if you are either politically exposed or you want more leeway and protection as a founder. — Elad Gil
27/ “When you build with other people’s money, you don’t just owe them outcomes—you owe them truth. And selling your cash to a zombie isn’t a strategy. It’s a story you tell yourself to avoid facing the music.” — Lloyed Lobo
Hiring/Team/Culture
28/ “If you raise a lot of money, do a hiring freeze and don’t hire anybody for 90 days. Money’s not going to solve your problems. You are going to solve them.” — Ryan Petersen
29/ “If you had to hire everyone based only on you knowing how good they are at a certain video game, what video game would you pick?” — Patrick O’Shaughnessy. People’s choices can be quite revealing. You can likely ask the same question for any activity/sport/topic of choice.
30/ “I hate surprises. Can you tell me something that might go wrong now so that I’m not surprised when it happens?” — Simon Sinek. A great question on how to ask weaknesses without candidates giving you a non-answer.
31/ Beware of candidates who can’t stick to a job for at least 18 months. — Jason Lemkin.
32/ Beware of candidates who love what’s on their resume. You want to be sure you’d hire them even if they didn’t have those logos/titles. — Jason Lemkin.
33/ Beware of candidates who don’t have good reasons to leave their last job. Or any job for that matter. Also watch out for candidates that leave because of salary. — Jason Lemkin.
34/ As soon as you raise capital, you should move out of a coworking space. Because as long as you are there, you cannot shape your company’s culture when the culture of the rest of the coworking space is more prevalent. — A VC who was the first institutional check into 5+ unicorns
35/ “First time founders brag about how many employees they have. Second time founders brag about how few employees they have.” — Dan Siroker.
36/ 20 years of experience is more impressive than 20 one-year experiences for deeply technical problems.
37/ 20 one-year experiences is more impressive than 20 years of experience for cultural (consumer) problems.
38/ Great founders don’t delegate understanding. Senior execs aren’t hired until founders themselves prove out the playbook.
39/ Inspired by Marc Randolph. Set boundaries around your work. Ask yourself, do you want to be starting your 7th startup and their 7th wife/husband? If not, be uncompromising with boundaries around work and life. Usually, I see most founders not have that versus most tech employees, who set boundaries almost in the opposite direction.
40/ “My two rules of thumb for CEOs (and all leaders) are:
‘if you feel like a broken record, you’re probably doing something right’ and
‘always craft your comms for the person who just started this week.'” — Molly Graham
41/ At Starbucks, no matter what seniority you are, every employee has lowercase titles. And it isn’t a typo.
42/ If you don’t know how to hire a 10/10 CTO looks like, find a world-class CTO then have them help you interview CTO candidates. It’s important to nail this right in the beginning no matter how long that takes. — Jason Lemkin
43/ “People duck as a natural reflex when something is hurled at them. Similarly, the excellence reflex is a natural reaction to fix something that isn’t right, or to improve something that could be better. The excellence reflex is rooted in instinct and upbringing, and then constantly honed through awareness, caring, and practice. The overarching concern to do the right thing well is something we can’t train for. Either it’s there or it isn’t. So we need to train how to hire for it.” — Danny Meyer
44/ Prioritize references over interviewing when hiring. “Executives have more experience bullshitting you than you have experience detecting their bullshit. So it’s like an asymmetric game where you’re a white belt fighting a black belt and they’re just going to punch you in the face repeatedly.” — Brian Chesky
45/ At the end of a candidate interview process, try to convince them out of joining the company. If you only paint them the rosy picture of joining, even if they join, they’ll joined disillusioned and with expectations that this job will be a country club, which it shouldn’t be.
46/ One of the best job ads out there by Ernest Shackleton, a 19th/20th century Antarctic explorer: “Men wanted for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honor and recognition in case of success.”
47/ “The health of an organization is the relationship between engineering and marketing. Or in enterprise, the relationship between engineering and sales.” — Brian Chesky
48/ “Great leadership is presence, not absence.” — Brian Chesky
49/ “I want the guy who understands his limitations instead of the guy who doesn’t. On the other hand, I’ve learned something terribly important in life. I learned that from Howard Owens. And you know what he used to say? Never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.” — Charlie Munger
50/ “If you pay great people internally, you can push back on the external fees. If you don’t pay great people internally, then you’re a price taker.” — Ashby Monk
51/ “Expect 60% of your VPs to work out — and that’s if you do it right.” — Dev Ittycheria
52/ Be generous with startup equity for your first 10 employees, “as much as leaving 30% of the pool to non-founders.” Be willing to give your early engineers 3-5% of equity, as opposed to only 50-100 basis points. — Vinod Khosla
53/ “A company becomes the people it hires. […] Experience has shown me that successful startups seldom follow their original plans. The early team not only determines how the usual risks are handled but also evolves the plans to better utilize their opportunities and to address and redefine their risks continuously.” — Vinod Khosla
54/ “I often tell pensions you should pay people at the 49th percentile. So, just a bit less than average. So that the people going and working there also share the mission. They love the mission ‘cause that actually is, in my experience, the magic of the culture in these organizations that you don’t want to lose.” — Ashby Monk
55/ “Innovation everywhere, but especially in the land of pensions, endowments, and foundations, is a function of courage and crisis.” — Ashby Monk
56/ “You stay obstinate about your vision; you stay really flexible about your tactics. […] Nobody ever got to Mount Everest by charting a straight path to the peak.” — Vinod Khosla
What criteria would you use to hire someone to do this job if you were in my seat?
How would your spouse or sibling describe you with ten adjectives?
I think we’re aligned in wanting this to be a good fit, you don’t want us to counsel you out in six months and neither do we. Let’s take the perspective of ourselves in six months and it didn’t work. What’s your best guess of what was going on that made it not work?
What are the names of your last five managers, and how would they each rate your overall performance on a 1-100?
What are you most torn about right now in your professional life?
How did you prepare for this interview?
How do you feel this interview is going?
58/ Empower your entire team to be owners in the success of your company. “Take ownership and don’t give your project a chance to fail. Dumping your bottleneck on someone and then just walking away until it’s done is lazy and it gives room for error and I want you to have a mindset that God himself couldn’t stop you from making this video on time. Check. In. Daily. Leave. No. Room. For. Error.” — Jimmy Donaldson “Mr. Beast”
59/ “CEOs are pinch hitters. We should be working on the things that nobody else can or nobody else is.” — Jensen Huang
60/ It’s only after you’ve seen excellence first hand do you no longer need to outsource the recognition of excellence to others (brands, titles, other references).
61/ “When you’re speaking with backchannel references, you know that some of these are also mentors to the candidate, and accordingly will have influence. They’ll likely call the candidate right after your call anyway to tell them how you’re thinking about them. So ask the pointed questions you need to, but then take 10 mins at the end to also tell this person what you’re building, why it could be a special company, the momentum you have in the market and why you’re particularly excited about the candidate for this role. Get the reference excited about this opportunity for the candidate.” — Nakul Mandan
62/ “Every meeting with a great candidate is a buy-and-sell meeting, and you want to build their excitement about you to its peak right before you make the offer. Making the offer too early—before they’re fully sold—can be just as bad as losing momentum by moving too slow on someone you know you want.” — Samantha Price
63/ On co-founders being in the same boat with no Plan B… “We actually wrote this in the shareholder’s agreement and it lived there all the way until the IPO. If one of us took another job or a side hustle or took any income from any other source, we should have to give up our shares. We wanted to be fully committed. If we’re going to fail, we’re not going to fail for lack of effort.” — Olivier Bernhard
64/ “You have made a mis-hire if your Customer Success leader doesn’t understand the pains, needs, and desires of your customers as well as you do within 90 days.” — John Gleeson
65/ Ask a candidate to explain a technical challenge and to talk through how they’d approach it. Then ask them to think through how they’d do it again – but in half the time.” — Keller Rinaudo Cliffton / Sarah Guo
66/ “Your org chart either accelerates or impedes your velocity. Conway’s Law inevitably shapes output—teams structured for pace will produce systems designed for pace.” — Sarah Guo
67/ “Just look at ARR per Employee. It’s the canary in the unicorn coal mine.” — Lloyed Lobo
68/ While your co-founders should excel in areas you lack and love growing further on that wavelength, they must also at some point in their career want to grow in the area you excel in. Otherwise, they’ll never truly appreciate the work you do. And unspoken expectations lead to quiet resentments.
69/ “I find most meetings are best scheduled for 15-20 minutes, or 2 hours. The default of 1 hour is usually wrong, and leads to a lot of wasted time.” — Sam Altman
70/ “Strategy is choosing what not to do.” — Peter Rahal
71/ When hiring talent, ask yourself: Are this candidate’s best days ahead of her or behind her?
Product/Customers
72/ The best way to slow a project down is to add more people to it.
73/ “Never delegate understanding.” — Charles and Ray Eames
74/ There’s this great line in a book I was recently gifted by a founder. “There is only one boss — the customer. And he can fire everybody in the company, from the chairman on down, simply by spending his money somewhere else.”
75/ A community or 1000 true fans built without big brands and logos is far more impressive than a community built by leveraging someone else’s brands.
76/ If your value prop is unique, you should be a price setter not a price taker, meaning your gross margins should be really good. A compelling value prop is a comment on high operating margins. You shouldn’t need to spend a lot on sales and marketing. So the metrics to highlight would be good new ARR/S&M, LTV:CAC ratios, payback periods, or percent of organic to paid growth. — Pat Grady
77/ “If we don’t create the thing that kills Facebook, someone else will.” — Mark Zuckerberg, via a red book titled Facebook Was Not Originally Created to Be a Company, given to every employee pre-IPO
78/ The best sales people are often those who communicate the most with the engineers and product team. They tend to understand the product the best. Rule of thumb should be 80% inside, 20% outside. — Former founder with a 9-figure exit
79/ “Concentration of force is the first principal strategy. Spreading yourself too thin means not concentrating resources on the sales you could win because you are spreading time on lower quality prospects. Doing 90% of what it takes to win doesn’t result in 90% of the revenue, it results in zero. You must pick the battles you can win and win the battles you pick.” — Rick Page
80/ “One of our clients said this about a large defense contractor with multiple subsidiaries: ‘having business at one business unit not only doesn’t help me at the next one, it actually hurt me. They hate each other so much that if one business unit is for me, the other ones are against me. But they are all united in one value: they hate corporate. So the potential for working my way to the corporate offices and coming down as their worldwide standard is impossible in an account like this.” — Rick Page
81/ “Pain doesn’t come from the business problem, it comes from the political embarrassment of the business problem. If the pain or lost opportunity is not visible, then it’s not embarrassing and it will not drive business buying activity to a close.” — Rick Page
82/ “Mr. Prospect, we’ve announced a 6% price increase. We’d hate to see you buy the same proposal later at a higher price, so we really need to get this business in by the end of the quarter to secure this price. — Not only is this technique predictable, but after months of building value for your solution, you have now commoditized yourself. You have turned it from value to price on order to close business at the end of the quarter. Once you have offered a discount, you have announced what kind of vendor you are and the only question now is the price. Let the games begin.” — Rick Page
83/ “You must refocus off the imagined political benefit of a lower price, and on the longer term benefits of the overall project. ‘Mr. Prospect, how are you measured and what you will be remembered for three years from now won’t be the price, it will be the success of the project. If this goes well, the cost will be a detail. If the project goes poorly, no one will say ‘well at least we got a bargain.”” — Rick Page
84/ “Try not to take no from a person who can’t say yes.” — Rick Page
85/ Stacking the bricks, a Steve Jobs’ concept. If you have a pile of bricks and lay them on the ground, then no one will notice the ground. If you stack them up vertically, you create a tower; and everyone will notice the tower. Consider this when you have product features, launches and fixes.
86/ As of Q4 2024, it takes about 70 days to close a $100K contract for enterprise customers. Use that as your benchmark. If you’re faster, brag about it. If you’re slower than that, figure out how to close faster. — Gong State of Revenue Growth 2025 report
87/ Beware of “annual curiosity revenue.” “AI companies with quick early ARR growth can lead to false positives as many are seeing massive churn rates.” — Samir Kaji
88/ Your job is to get to innovation retention before your incumbents get to innovation.
89/ If you didn’t help create the proposal with your customer, you’ve already lost.
90/ People don’t change when they’ve made a mistake. People change when there’s a public embarrassment of them making a mistake.
91/ Know your customers intimately. Go visit your customers as often as you can. In fact, get as many passes / office keys to their offices as possible, and spend time with them.
92/ “Every other week, we have a customer join for the first 30 minutes of our management team meeting: they share their candid feedback, and ~40 leaders from across Stripe listen. Even though we already have a lot of customer feedback mechanisms, it somehow always spurs new thoughts and investigations.” — Patrick Collison
93/ “I see a lot of b2b startups moving to multiyear pricing from monthly or annual. I think this is usually a bad idea. It hides customer delight issues. It lengthens sales cycles. Overall, it just reduces the signal startups need.” — Brian Halligan
94/ Customers will still highly rate your customer service even if they didn’t get what they wanted if you show you care. That you care for their plight, and you really try to help them get what they want. — Simon Sinek
Competition
95/ “When you get outreach from multiple VC associates out of nowhere, your competitor is out raising and they’re just doing their homework.” — Siqi Chen
Legal
96/ “If you’re selling the business, tell as few people as possible and do everything you can to make sure past employees or former business associates do not find out.” Beware of moths who can start lawsuits. — Sammy Abdullah
97/ When you’re working with boutique investment banks, to protect yourself in case the banker sues when you choose to go with a different buyer… “Make sure the banker contract says they only get paid on intros they make directly and have a 6 month tail. Terminate any banker agreement as soon as they’re no longer working and the process is over; do not let these agreements linger.” — Sammy Abdullah
Expenses
98/ “Never buy a SaaS product owned by private equity unless you have to. Main exception: if founder is still CEO. Why: Impossible to cancel, Price increases out of the blue, Lose any real customer success, Innovation slows down or even ends, Support usually terrible” — Jason Lemkin
Secondaries
99/ If you’re planning to sell founder secondaries, beware of signaling risk. Sometimes, you do have a major life event that needs capital (i.e. buying a home, having a baby, hospital bills, etc.). If you are to sell, don’t sell until the Series B. “And even then I’d suggest titrating up… 2% at A, 5% at B, 10% at >=C.” — Hari Raghavan
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
“Some of the best investments, as we look back in history, were never obvious at the moment the investments were made. You may not have to be contrarian, but you have to have a variant perception than the rest of the market. Maybe you saw the team differently. You saw the space growing differently. That, to us, inherently, is a single decision maker-type thought process at the earliest stage, when it’s less about metrics. It’s more about how you evaluate the talent and the team.” – Sean Warrington
Sean Warrington leads private market investing at Gresham Partners, a $10 billion multi-family office based in Chicago. Known for being a transparent and user-friendly LP, he and the Gresham team aim to simplify the fundraising process — offering single-check investments, a streamlined diligence process, and prompt, candid feedback to GPs.
[00:00] Intro [03:29] Who is Jeff French? [05:26] The metrics for success for a junior LP [07:20] The 3 chapters of Sean’s evolution as an LP [11:05] Sean’s first investment [14:44] When GPs put LPs on strict timelines [16:53] One archetype of GP that Sean is excited about [19:37] What it looks like to be thoughtful when growing AUM [23:16] What most LPs don’t understand about solo GPs [25:58] What happens when a GP leaves a partnership [27:33] The definition of LP/GP alignment [30:47] Reference archetypes and how to find them [35:32] How to manage bandwidths in a small team [38:58] Frameworks for taking calls [42:26] How much does Sean travel? [43:25] Why coffee chats don’t work [45:30] What Sean’s changed his mind on about investing [47:12] What did Jason Kelce’s retirement mean to Sean? [49:36] Post-credit scene
“If you’re 60-70% of the time picking good managers, I think you’re pretty good at this industry.” – Sean Warrington
“Frameworks are not foolproof. What they’re designed to do is help us focus on places where we can get to an eventual yes.” – Sean Warrington
“We don’t want a slow no. A slow no is bad for everybody.” – Sean Warrington
“Some of the best investments, as we look back in history, were never obvious at the moment the investments were made. You may not have to be contrarian, but you have to have a variant perception than the rest of the market. Maybe you saw the team differently. You saw the space growing differently. That, to us, inherently, is a single decision maker-type thought process at the earliest stage, when it’s less about metrics. It’s more about how you evaluate the talent and the team.” – Sean Warrington
“One thing LPs are bad at remembering is we are exceptionally diversified investors. For us, to have anything even be 1% – even a manager being a single percent of the overall pool of capital – is very difficult to do. Many times we’re talking about basis points.” – Sean Warrington
“The big risk that LPs don’t appreciate… There’s this view that these two- and three-person teams coming together create this better judgment. What they’re not factoring in is that these are somewhat forced marriages. These are people who may or may not have long histories together. They may not have great bedside manner when they’re in the thick of it.” – Sean Warrington
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
“Most references will not give a negative reference about someone, but you will have to understand and listen between the lines. What is a good or a bad reference? They might say, ‘I really like him as a person. He’s really nice.’ But this is a person that’s worked together with you in a team, and you’re not saying he’s great with founders or finding the best deals. Maybe he’s not that good.” – Raviv Sapir
Raviv Sapir is an early-stage investor at Vinthera, a fund of funds and venture firm with a hybrid strategy that combines VC fund investments with direct startup investments. With a background in tech and finance, an MBA from HEC Paris, and years of experience mentoring startups and supporting LPs, Raviv brings a sharp eye for high-conviction opportunities and a practical approach to venture. He previously held product roles at leading Israeli startups and served in a technological unit within the Israeli Defense Forces. His work across geographies, sectors, and investment stages gives him a uniquely holistic and global perspective on the venture ecosystem.
[00:00] Intro [03:31] Swimming since he was 7 [09:49] Breaking down each GP’s track record and dynamics in a partnership [11:25] Telltale signs that a partnership will last [12:50] An example of questionable GP dynamics [21:45] Virtual partnerships [25:43] GPs working out of coworking spaces [28:30] Commonly held LP assumptions [32:16] A big red flag GPs often say [34:27] What does Raviv look for during reference calls? [39:41] How does the diligence change for a Fund I/II vs Fund III/IV? [42:26] Qualitative traits Raviv likes to see in a Fund I GP vs Fund II+ GP [44:04] Ideal cadence of reporting and LP/GP touchpoints [46:03] Role of the LPAC across different funds [48:47] Diligence as a function of check size [54:37] What’s Raviv’s favorite episode of Venture Unlocked? [56:23] The podcasts that Raviv listens to
“Some of the small funds perform better but a lot of them–… they perform much worse because the variance in their performance is so big. You might have good odds of succeeding with a small fund but very high odds of performing way worse than the bigger funds.” – Raviv Sapir
“GPs are great at selling. ‘Every time is the best time to invest.’” – Raviv Sapir
“Most [references] will not give a negative reference about someone, but you will have to understand and listen between the lines. What is a good or a bad reference? They might say, ‘I really like him as a person. He’s really nice.’ But this is a person that’s worked together with you in a team, and you’re not saying he’s great with founders or finding the best deals. Maybe he’s not that good.” – Raviv Sapir
“‘Interesting’, especially in the US, is used in a negative way.” – Raviv Sapir
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
The ideal situation for a GP is that you have a single close. All LPs who are interested all confirm their participation by the same deadline. And all wires for the first capital call come in at the same time. It’s the utopia. Unfortunately, reality isn’t as picturesque. The truth is the vast majority of LPs wait till the final close, and as long as you have multiple closes, there is no urgency to commit by a certain date.
In fact, it’s almost always better to commit as late as you can if there are multiple closes. Investing in funds is investing in a blind pool of human potential. The blindness scares and humbles many allocators. It is in our interest to invest in the least blind pool of potential possible. And usually, when there are multiple closes, the GP(s) start deploying before the fund closes. So if you come in at the end, you at least get to see 10-20% of the portfolio. Sometimes more, as most LPA clauses stipulate that the final close must happen within 12-18 months from initial close. Of course, you can always move that date via LP votes or just not having that clause in the LPA in the first place.
Single Close
Multiple Closes
LP Network
Robust
Weak
LP Check Size
Large
Small
# of Checks
Few (most of the time)
Many (first close is usually existing LPs/friends and/or anchor)
Deployment
Deploys after the close
Can deploy after the first close (while still fundraising for the rest of the fund)
With single closes, while it helps to get it all one and done, you can’t deploy until you’ve closed. If your network with LPs and your trust with those respective LPs isn’t great, it’s more risky to go for a single close. Many LPs also have different timelines. So, instituting a single close means you need to be firm and align LPs on your timeline. It helps if you have a few large chunks that cover more than 50% of the fund before you set a close date.
With multiple closes, the good news is that you leave the door open for LPs who run processes on their own timelines. And that you can deploy as you’re still fundraising, as long as you get past the first close. The downside is that there’s no urgency for anyone to come in before the final close. It’s better if you don’t have a network of strong LPs, which pertains to the vast majority of first-time fund managers.
So, what to do?
Let’s get the single close strategy out of the way first. First of all, to do this, you need to come from a place of privilege. You must have a large amount of market pull. LPs who are dying to give you money. And for better or worse, not that you have to take them, people who would give you a blank check. Although, as a footnote, beware of the blank checks. More often than not, they’re easily disappointed.
You must have a strict process. And LPs need to self-select themselves in or out of the process very early in the process. Most important part of this, which is often a really hard thing to do for a lot of first-time GPs, you need to be intellectually honest with yourself if an LP is a fit for you or not. Your job is to figure that out before the LPs figure it out. And as soon as you do, you need to “fire” that prospective LP before they tell you no.
For that, even though you may lose the potential of a transaction, in my experience, you often win their respect.
Assuming what the LP invests in is what you are offering, manage your drip campaign well. Do your best to throttle opportunistic asks that deviate from your process. But do so with grace. And I can’t underscore grace enough.
Some things I’ve seen in the past for funds who can close a fund in a single close (none of the below are the Bible, but hopefully tools for the toolkit):
The deck is never sent out before the first meeting.
If the deck is sent out before the first meeting, it is either only a teaser deck (less than five slides) or the GP/IR team says something along the lines of: “If we don’t hear back from you within three days, we will assume our fund is out of scope, and will prioritize our time with other investors.”
The data room opens up on a very specific date. None get access to it before (except for existing LPAC members, and sometimes existing LPs who’ve indicated early interest).
The data room closes on a very specific date. No one will get access to it after. The sub docs need to all be signed within a week or two after.
No additional calls with LPs unless they can commit a meaningful check to the fund. Usually double digit percentage of the fund size.
LPs get little to no additional asks. No side letters.
Communication from the GP/IR team throughout every step of the way is paramount.
Again, a single close is a privilege. And a power. And with great power comes great responsibility, as a wise old uncle once told a budding superhero.
Ok, multiple closes. I often treat Fund I’s different from the other funds. One of the few major differences is that you don’t have existing LPs. Instead, you have friends and family and people who’ve believed in you before. Nevertheless, early momentum is always a good thing to have before you officially open up the fundraise.
The first close is ideally the minimum viable fund size for you to deploy your strategy and/or the fund size you need to prove out the minimum viable assumption before you raise your next fund. It’s helpful to assume you won’t be able to raise anymore after the first close. While usually not true, but nevertheless, a useful mentality. Most GPs close too small of a first close that still constrains them from truly deploying their strategy. For instance, for Costanoa Ventures Fund I in 2012, the first close was at $40-50M on June 7th, 2012, but ended up at $100M at the final close.
For each of the closes, I generally wouldn’t recommend different economic terms, like reduced fees for earlier LPs. I get the incentives. But two reasons:
LPs talk. It’s usually not a good look among LPs if they know that other people at your AGM got better terms than they did.
You’re discounting your value. If you’re investing in an asset class that’s truly transformative and you truly have better access than others, don’t short sell yourself.
That said, I do believe you should reward early believers. Either for those that come in via Fund I or first or second closes. Or both.
Many LPs especially high net-worth individuals (HNWIs), family offices and corporates love co-investment opportunities. Realistically, these will be 90-100% of your Fund I LPs. Leverage that. For instance, first-close LPs get unfiltered access to SPVs/co-investment opportunities. Maybe, opportunistic intros to portfolio companies as well. Second-close LPs get access to all SPVs, but are capped on allocation, assuming the opportunity is oversubscribed. Final-close LPs get last pick.
If you’re raising a Fund II+, first-close LPs can be given SPV access to deals coming out of earlier funds as well. Although, use this strategically so that your Fund I LPs won’t feel slighted.
As you might surmise already, there is no one right answer. Oftentimes, it’s a function of who you know, how quickly they commit, and how obvious you are to them. “Obviousness” is a product of track record, your brand, the quality of your reference checks, and obviously, how complex your story is.
4/13/2025 Edit: Example of Costanoa Ventures’ first close
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Backs turned against the stage. And facing the audience, suspended in anticipation of who’ll walk out on stage.
A lone individual slowly walks out and as she does, the melody starts.
1… 2… 3… in a bellowing, deep yet clear vocal, “OHHHHHHHHHHH~”
Boom. Boom! Boom!! Boom!!!
All four chairs turn. And the crowd goes wild.
As a kid, The Voice was one of those guilty pleasures I had. The centerpiece in a Venn diagram of music, showmanship, and raw talent. Each contestant was judged on nothing more than the raw horsepower their vocals carried. Quite literally, sometimes. For the judges, the call-to-action was quite simple. You had to cast your vote before the song ended. In other words, you must show you wanted to bring a contestant on your team, trusting instinct and years of experience before you saw what they looked like or how they presented themselves. And that… that was awesome!
A decade and a half later, now sitting in the world of private market investments, I find the same parallels in startup and GP pitch decks.
I’m specifically referring to decks you send investors before you have a chance to talk to them. Whether it’s via the cold outreach, a submission on their website, or attached in a warm intro.
A teaser deck is not meant to be finished.
‘Cause if they do, you’ve lost them before you had a chance to talk to them. There is no glory in an investor flipping through every page. There is no glory in finally seeing the call-to-action at the very end of the deck. Usually an email or a how much you’re raising.
While it’s in the title, let me re-underscore. Investors should never read a deck from beginning to end. Each slide should, in theory, give the investor the activation energy to book a call or meeting with you. The sooner in the slide deck you can convince someone to book a meeting, the better. The longer you take to convince an investor, be it VC or LP, the less likely they’ll take that first meeting. The purpose of a viewing deck is to get to the first meeting, not the investment decision. There is nothing a deck can single-handedly do to convince an investor to invest. If the brief can, the fiduciary is not doing their job.
Instead, what a deck should have, in my humble opinion… as early as possible:
Your fund’s greatest highlight — It could be your 10X DPI across 8 years of investing. Could be the fact that you literally built the modern large language model infrastructure. Or that you took your last company public. Or that every. single. CISO. In the Fortune 50 list is an LP. It must deliver the wow factor. The surprise. Something people don’t expect. The primary reason an LP has to talk to you.
Your biggest elephant in the room — In a world where 75% of funds say they’re top quartile, you need to stop being the salesperson, and start being the honest businessperson. There are, undeniably, risks of getting in business with you. To think otherwise is stupid. The question here with a capital Q, is are you self-aware enough to know your biggest flaw? Or can you not recognize your own blind side? Admittedly, this second one is a selfish desire to see more funds with this. Because 99.9% of funds don’t share this. And LPs are tired of overly-promotional decks.
Of course, there are other reasons an LP will take the first meeting.
The person introducing you is a person the LP deeply trusts.
Your outreach is highly personalized. I’d like to stress the word highly.
The LP typically doesn’t receive that much deal flow.
The LP is in learning mode / revamping the portfolio. Likely, but not always, a new CIO.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
One of my favorite equations that I’ve come across over the last few years is:
(track record) X (differentiation) / (complexity) = fund size
I’ve heard from friends in two organizations independently (Cendana Capital and General Catalyst), but I don’t know who the attribution traces back to. Just something about the simplicity of it. That said, ironically, for the purpose of this blogpost, I want to expand on the complexity portion of the equation. Arguably, for many LPs, the hardest part of venture capital as an asset class, much less emerging managers, to underwrite. Much of which is inspired by Brandon Sanderson’s latest series of creative writing lectures.
Separately, if you’re curious about the process I use to underwrite risks, here‘s the closest thing I have to a playbook.
A flaw is something a GP needs to overcome within the next 3-5 years to become more established, or “obvious” to an LP. These are often skillsets and/or traits that are desirable in a fund manager. For instance, they’re not a team player, bad at marketing, struggle to maintain relationships with others, inexperienced on exit strategies, have a limited network, or struggle to win >5% allocation on the cap table at the early stage.
Restrictions, on the other hand, are self-imposed. Something a GP needs to overcome but chooses not to. These are often elements of a fund manager LPs have to get to conviction on to independent of the quality of the GP. For example, the GP plans to forever stay a solo GP even with $300M+ AUM. Or the thesis is too niche. Or they only bet on certain demographics. Hell, they may not work on weekends. Or invest in a heavily diversified portfolio.
Limitations are imposed by others or by the macro environment, often against their own will. GPs don’t have to fix this, but must overcome the stigma. Often via returns. Limitations are not limited to, but include the GPs are too young or too old. They went to the “wrong” schools. There are no fancy logos on their resume. They’re co-GPs with their life partner or sibling or parent. As a founder, they never exited their company for at least 9-figures. Or they were never a founder in the first place.
To break down differentiation:
f(differentiation) = motivation + value + platform
Easy to remember too, f(differentiation) = MVP. In many ways, as you scale your firm and become more established, differentiation, while still important, matters less. More important when you’re the pirate than the navy.
Motivation is what many LPs call, GP-thesis fit. To expand on that…
Why are you starting this fund?
Why continue? Are you in it to win it? Are you in it for the long run?
What about your past makes this thesis painfully obvious for you? What past key decisions influence you today?
What makes your thesis special?
How much of the fund is you? And how much of it is an extension of you or originates with you but expands?
What do you want to have written on your epitaph?
What do you not want me or other people to know about you? How does that inform the decisions you make?
What failure will you never repeat?
In references, does this current chapter obvious to your previous employers?
And simply, does your vision for the world get me really excited? Do I come out of our conversations with more energy than what I went in with?
As you can probably guess, I spend a lot of time here. Sometimes you can find the answers in conversations with the GPs. Other times, via references or market research.
Value is the value-add and the support you bring to your portfolio companies. Why do people seek your help? Is your value proactive or reactive? Why do co-investors, LPs, and founders keep you in their orbit?
Platform is how your value scales over time and across multiple funds, companies, LPs, and people in the network. This piece matters more if you plan to build an institutional firm. Less so if you plan to stay boutique. What does your investment process look like? How do people keep you top of mind?
Of course, track record, to many of you reading this, is probably most obvious. Easiest to assess. While past performance isn’t an indicator of future results, one thing worth noting is something my friend Asheronce told me, “TVPI hides good portfolio construction. When I do portfolio diligence, I don’t just look at the multiples, but I look at how well the portfolio companies are doing. I take the top performer and bottom performer out and look at how performance stacks up in the middle. How have they constructed their portfolio? Do the GPs know how to invest in good businesses?” Is the manager a one-hit wonder, or is there more substance behind the veil?
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
As part of a new project I’m working on with a friend, I’ve spent the last few months doing a lot of research into the history of technology and Silicon Valley, and talking to a lot of primary and secondary sources. One of the rabbit holes I went down last week led me to a really interesting story on deal dynamics back in 1968.
For the historian reading this, you may already know that was the year of the Apollo 8 mission. The assassination of both Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F Kennedy. The Tet Offensive in Vietnam is launched. Also, the year the Beatles’ Magical Mystery Tour album tops music charts and stays there for eight straight weeks. And their White Album goes to number one on December 28th that year too. 2001: A Space Odyssey premieres. Legendary skateboarder Tony Hawk is born.
For the tech historian, that’s the year Intel was founded.
“They came to me with no business plan.” — Arthur Rock
The last two of the Traitorous 8. Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce. Bob Noyce co-invented the integrated circuit. And Gordon Moore coined a term many technologists are familiar with. Moore’s Law. That the number of transistors on a chip double every two years. In 1968, the two last bastions finally left. Instead of promoting Bob to be CEO, the team at Fairchild chose to hire externally. And that was the straw that broke the camel’s back.
The first investor the two went to was Arthur Rock to start a new semiconductor company, with no business plan. Although, eventually, they wrote a single-paged, double-spaced business plan.
Around the same time, Pitch Johnson from Draper and Johnson (Draper comes from Bill Draper’s name) had just sold his portfolio at D&J to Sutter Hill, and Bill himself had joined Sutter Hill right after. Pitch was catching up with Bob, who he had known for a long time having been on the board of Coherent together. Their families had met each other several times. And planes have always been a fascination for both of them. After all, both of them were pilots.
Bob said, “I’m starting a company making integrated circuits, I hope you’ll be interested.”
Pitch responded with an offer of “a couple hundred K”, said that Bill may also be interested, and, “Well, anything you’re doing, Bob, of course I’d be interested.”
As Arthur Rock was putting together that deal, Bob asked Pitch to call Arthur. Pitch reaches out to Arthur, and Arthur tells him to “call [him] back next week.”
Next week comes by. Pitch calls again. And Arthur says, “I’ve done the deal, and you’re not in it.”
Dejected, Pitch picks up the phone to call Bob back, “Art doesn’t want me in the deal.”
Surprised, Bob calls Arthur and Arthur, in the tough, but honest Arthur way, responds, “Am I going to do the deal, or is Pitch going to do the deal?”
Inevitably, Pitch and Bill lost out on investing in Intel. Intel ended up raising $2.5M for 50% of the company.
At the end of last year, I was catching up with a senior partner at a large multi-stage fund. At one point in the conversation, he asked me, “Wanna see how lead investors work with each other?”
Before I could even reply, although I would have said “Yes” regardless, he pulls out his phone and shows me a text thread he has with another Series A lead investor.
The text starts: “Looking at [redacted company]. Any thoughts?”
The other guy responds back: “We are too.”
And the thread ends after one single exchange.
As much as VC has evolved and became a little more mainstream, deal dynamics with lead investors, or at least perceived-to-be lead investors, seem to hold. Of course, as a caveat, not every interaction is like this.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
References and getting beneath the surface have always been fascinating to me. Because of my job, my interests, and my content, I meet a lot of GPs and founders. And when they’re in pitch mode, they will almost always tell you about how amazing they are and how amazing their product is. Truth is, they probably are amazing. But in our world where everyone is, no one is. So what’s more interesting to me is their level of self-awareness. For the purpose of this piece, this is mainly about GPs. And hopefully, in service of GPs and LPs investing in GPs.
When someone is pitching you, especially if it’s the first time you’re meeting with them, they will tell you about all the sunshine and rainbows. That they knew there was going to be a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. With a leprechaun there exclaiming, “I told you so.” I get the psychology behind it. Who wants to buy a new/used car with a dent behind the seat of the shotgun, just hidden from plain sight? Who wants to buy a home where the last owner passed away in it? Or an apartment where the family living above has rowdy kids?
For better or worse, usually for the worse, all of the above salespeople are looking for buyers, not customers. Customers are repeat purchasers; buyers are not. On the flip side, your LPs are more likely to be repeat purchasers. Customers. Specifically, the institutional LPs are looking for 20-year relationships. That’s 3-4 funds. Both Chris Douvos and Raida Daouk have independently shared with me that the average venture fund lasts twice as long as the average American marriage. So you need to know as much as you can get your hands on before you “marry” your LPs. And as such, LPs want to know both what worked and what didn’t. Or at least I do.
Usually, investors usually tell me all the predictions they had that worked out. “We were investing in AI back in 2019 before it became big.” To be fair, so were most other investors. “I knew cryptocurrency was going to be huge back in 2015.” And so on. As an LP, it’s hard to tell what is revisionist’s history and what isn’t. But what is helpful is to know if you had any predictions in the past that didn’t work out.
Why did you hold those beliefs so strongly? What were the factors that led you to that prediction? What did you learn after your prediction proved otherwise?
Venture is still very much a cottage industry. Why? No matter how big funds get. No matter how large deals become. And no matter how many rounds new names for the very first round of funding there are. Series A. Seed. Pre-seed. Angel round. You name it. The definition of venture is betting on the non-obvious before it becomes obvious. You will be wrong more often than you’re right. At the very end of the day, it is an art form. Not because it needs to be, but because very few have actually tried to break down the art form into a science.
Why? Science and strategy require games where the feedback loops are often AND where there are predictable, deterministic outcomes. If you input A in, you get B out. Venture is not that. You can do everything “by the book” and still fail. Although the book itself has yet to really be written.
Yet the most repeatedly successful firms (that have been able to transition leadership successfully to at least one other generation) are sommeliers of succession planning. How they transition this generation’s knowledge to the next. It requires not just being brilliant, but being brilliant enough to be able to break down instinct and intuition as if it were a math formula. If not classical physics, at least quantum.
All that to say, if I ask a GP to break down a prediction — whether it worked or didn’t — and they can’t answer it other than “I just knew,” I’m personally not sure if they’re ready to build a generational firm.
The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
