Raida Daouk started her career in banking before moving to the investment team of BY Venture Partner, a venture fund with offices in Beirut and Abu Dhabi. She quickly climbed the ranks within the company and ultimately became a Venture Partner.
Recognizing a void in the market for personalized venture consulting services, Raida established Amkan Advisory, a boutique consultancy firm specializing in assisting family offices and high-net-worth individuals in identifying venture funds that align with their specific strategies. Given that first-time fund managers often possess the most aligned incentives with their investors, she understood the significant value they bring to the venture capital landscape. However, Raida also understood the reluctance of family offices to commit capital to relatively unproven managers. By curating a portfolio of carefully selected funds, she aims to mitigate the perceived risk associated with investing in first-time managers while still accessing the high-growth potential of emerging ventures.
Amkan Ventures emerged to offer LPs access to emerging managers beyond their direct reach. Focusing on small Funds I and II led by ambitious managers with a conviction-driven approach, the firm prioritizes delivering returns and nurturing opportunities in the venture arena.
Amkan Ventures’ first close occurred in April 2024, with one investment already made in a $30M fund I out of NY and one more about to be announced.
Raida currently serves on the Selection Committees of RAISE Global and The Bridge Platform.
[00:00] Intro [02:45] The impact of biology on Raida’s career [06:24] If Raida were to teach a founder psychology course [08:42] Raida’s definition of “running through walls” [10:16] Similarities and differences between founders and fund managers [11:36] What does GP-thesis fit look like? [14:38] How Raida got to a yes on Nebular Ventures? [20:35] The personas of different kinds of references [26:05] The one question that Raida always asks during reference calls [28:31] Is there such a thing as too many references? [31:57] What if you don’t have a network of references as an LP? [35:26] How does one set up the venture arm of a family office? [40:28] What is the GCC? [43:58] The best way to build relationships in the GCC [47:54] The origin story of Amkan Ventures [52:19] How did Raida build a strong understanding of the foodtech space? [53:58] Where did Amkan’s name come from? [58:26] What fund is in Raida’s anti-portfolio? [1:00:30] What’s Raida’s take on solo GPs? [1:03:10] How does your mindset change as an LP if you had evergreen capital? [1:06:58] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:07:59] If you enjoyed this episode, it would mean a lot if you could share this with one other friend!
“It’s always best to start the relationship when there is no ask.” – Raida Daouk
“The average length of a VC fund is double that of a typical American marriage. So VC splits – divorce – is much more likely than getting hit by a bus.” – Raida Daouk
“The more constraints you have, the more conviction you will have in each manager.” – Raida Daouk
These days I’ve been spending a lot of time thinking about succession and key person risks. Definitely influenced by a number of conversations I’ve had with a partnership I invested in who broke up and LPs who take the long-term perspective on investing in funds.
When I say long-term, I mean when those LPs invest in a firm, it’s not just a single check into one fund. They plan to budget out $XX million dollars over the next three funds or so. Or across 9-10 years primarily to invest in this fund manager. We’ve talked about how underwriting a solo GP is actually much easier than underwriting a partnership, at least on the key person risk side of things.
If a solo GP dies, they die, and the firm naturally cannot go on. And any capital reserved for them automatically goes towards net new investments. If a partnership loses a key partner, then it’s this awkward dance to figure out if the remaining partners are worth re-upping on. And a re-underwriting needs to occur.
Before I go any further, let me first define key person risk for the uninitiated. Key person risk is the risk created when a single person leaves or dies that creates meaningful knowledge, brand, or performance loss at the institution. Simply put, when shit hits the fan in a partnership, how volatile will the transition be?
As such, my recent conversations informs much of what I write below. For the purpose of this blogpost, I’ll focus on partnerships as opposed to solo GPs and founders.
All great relationships are battle tested. Battle-hardened. In fact, when I ask a set of co-founders how they resolve disagreements, and they say, they never disagree, I run in the opposite direction fast. So fast that I could be cast as Barry Allen. Maybe. If my acting were better. If two people never disagree, they’re either the same person (which is hard, ’cause even biological twins disagree) or they’ve never truly worked on something together that they would call their life’s purpose.
To me, the formula for battle-hardened relationships has two key variables.
Depth – High stakes
Breadth – Time for the stakes to manifest
High stakes
Even if artificially high stakes. Even if in the moment, all parties involved must truly believe that this is the be all, end all. That there is no Plan B. There’s no going back. That everyone has to see it through. In Hollywood, I believe it’s called the inciting incident. A clear market in time that after a set of events that there is no way one can go back to their old life. Whether it’s the state championships for a sport among high school students, or fighting for survival in the middle of nowhere. For artificially high stakes, one must distort the reality, so that at the minimum they must convince themselves of the gravity of the situation.
Why do high stakes matter? Because only then does one put their all into something. And when you truly care, you hold nothing back. High stakes reveals the character you are. If people can accept and embrace you at your worst, everything else is a cherry on top.
Time for the stakes to manifest
This varies for different people. Sometimes it takes time to care. Other times, it takes time to fully realize what’s at stake. And others still, may never get to that point of realization. For example, in a ball game with four quarters, sometimes it isn’t until the score is neck and neck in the fourth quarter do you give it your all.
In practice
So in practice, I love spending time with folks to talk about their past. Their origin story. And get into the weeds on key inflection points not only in their own lives, but also in the time they’ve gotten to know each other. When did they first work together? When did they realize they were more than just colleagues? At what point did they introduce their families to each other? What was the point of realization?
Most investors focus primarily on length of a relationship, which is definitely valuable information, but without depth, it’s easy to know someone for decades and care very little for their growth and success.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
But I’m so glad I did. In it, Harry shared a question he likes asking “If we were hiring someone underneath me to support him, what skills would they have?” In many ways, it’s the same as another question Doug Leone shared on his podcast as well. What three adjectives would you use to describe your sibling?
It comes down to simple purpose of trying to ask about someone’s weakness without asking them “what’s your weakness?” Why does it matter? When you’re too forward with your question, say the weakness one, recipients always end up finding ways to explain their “weakness” as a byproduct of their strength, or not really sharing a true weakness. “I’m too honest.” “I work too hard.” And so on.
While the above set of questions may not work for everyone, and probably even less so now that Harry and Doug shared it in a public arena, I can’t help but appreciate the linguistic gymnastics to find the right combination of words that gets one the answer they want. Nevertheless, I’m sure there are many more on this planet who still have yet to be exposed to those questions.
Similarly, I find it to be a damn good question to ask when doing references on potential investments. The truth is every founder or GP one invests in will have weaknesses. And that’s okay. Everyone’s a human. But in reference calls, there are two hurdles that one most overcome in their diligence:
Getting the reference to share an honest assessment of the person they know. This is especially hard when these are on-list references. In other words, references that the person being diligenced is providing themselves. Naturally, this list is full of people who are almost guaranteed to say positive things about said individual. Besides, there is absolutely no incentive to badmouth another person. Neither do most people aim to do so.
How high on the priority list is this person’s weakness? Can I get conviction on this deal even if I were to accept this weakness? Does it matter as much in a Fund I? Fund II? Fund III? If they need to hire someone to fundraise for them, is that a question of ability or network? And how crucial is it not only to the firm’s survival, but also their outperformance? If they need to hire someone to manage their calendar, that may be lower on the priority list of risks for most LPs.
Nevertheless, I find Harry’s question a great one to ask former colleagues, occasionally portfolio or anti-portfolio founders.
The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Just the other day, I was listening to one of 99% Invisible’s episodes, interestingly titled as “As Slow As Possible,” named after the organization ASLSP, which stands for the same. My knee-jerk reaction was that the abbreviation and the first letters of each word just didn’t match up. Luckily, Roman Mars and Gabe Bullard explained. Although it still left something more to be desired.
“The title is also a reference to a line in James Joyce’s novel Finnegans Wake. The line is: ‘Soft morning, city! Lsp!’ Where lisp is just spelled L S P.”
Nevertheless, the episode itself circles around the concept of taking one song and using the entire lifespan of a pipe organ (639 years) to play that song just once. That even a single note would take two years to play. A fascinating concept! And which led me down a rabbit hole of thought experiments.
What if we took our favorite song and extrapolated that to the human lifespan? Say 90 years. What note would we be on today? Have we gotten to the chorus yet?
So for the sake of this thought experiment, for a brief second, let’s walk down the lane of music theory. Take the average pop song. The average pop song plays for about three minutes. And many at 120 beats per minute. Apparently, 120 bpm is also the golden number you want to get to if you’re working a crowd as a DJ. You never start at that speed, but you work your way up throughout the night. And if you can get people’s heart rate matching the beats per minute, you’ve hit resonance. But I digress.
So, taking round numbers, the average pop song has a total of 360 beats. Most songs are in 4/4 time. In other words, four beats per bar. An average pop song takes about 2-4 bars for the intro. 16 bars for a verse. Possibly, another 4 bars as the pre-chorus. And the first chorus doesn’t really start till bar 25. And usually lasts another 4-8 bars.
Now, if we were to extrapolate a song to the average human lifespan. 90 years. 360 beats across 90 years. Assuming it takes 24 bars to get to the chorus, the chorus doesn’t start until we’re 24 years old. And the full chorus doesn’t end until we’re 32 years old. With each note lasting a full three months. And the second chorus starts around age 48.
Then again, I remember reading somewhere that most pop songs are played in multiples of four or eight. And that most of these songs only have 80 bars. If that’s the case, the first chorus doesn’t kick in till we’re just past 28 years old and ends around 36 years old.
In either case, the first chorus happens around the time when most people would define as their prime. Young enough to take risks; old enough to be dangerous. The second chorus seems to fit as the second wind people have in their careers. Hell, HBR found, the median age of a startup founder when they start is 45. And with that reference point, they’ll be 47 or 48 when they become venture-backed.
Obviously, this is just me playing around with numbers. Correlation does not mean causation, of course. But nevertheless, the parallels… curious and uncanny.
P.S. Jaclyn Hester and my episode together on Superclusters got me thinking about a lot how much music applies to our lives and how we live and think.
#unfiltered is a series where I share my raw thoughts and unfiltered commentary about anything and everything. It’s not designed to go down smoothly like the best cup of cappuccino you’ve ever had (although here‘s where I found mine), more like the lonely coffee bean still struggling to find its identity (which also may one day find its way into a more thesis-driven blogpost). Who knows? The possibilities are endless.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Ian Park is a Partner at Primer Sazze, a firm dedicated to investing in ambitious talent across East Asia and North America. Prior to Primer Sazze, he was a venture capital allocator at Korea Investment Corporation (KIC), one of the largest sovereign wealth institutions in the world, where he focused on investments into venture managers and founders. He’s also amassed a fervent following of AI, VC, and LP fans over the years through writing his newsletter and his YouTube channel. Prior to KIC, he’s built his investing repertoire at VMG Partners and Bertram Capital after leaving the world of consulting.
Ian studied mathematics and economics at University of Minnesota and earned his master’s degree in economics at Boston College. He’s also got his master’s in computer and information technology from University of Pennsylvania as well.
[00:00] Intro [02:26] From Boston to SF [10:58] How does Ian diligence a GP’s ability to source? [13:37] The three things Ian looks for in emerging managers [17:04] Best practices on sharing insights [26:37] A typical week at KIC and conversations with GPs [30:42] How to best approach co-investment opportunities as an LP [33:38] How does Ian get to conviction on a direct deal [39:19] What funds should you invest in if you prioritize co-investments? [43:23] What does Ian look for in a Fund II/III that’s not TVPI, DPI, or IRR? [47:26] Relationship management best practices with GPs [53:30] The good, bad, and ugly at a sovereign wealth fund [1:00:00] What is Ian investing in at Primer Sazze? [1:10:20] What has Ian learned over the years as a content creator? [1:16:57] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:17:57] If you liked the episode, would greatly appreciate a like and a share!
“Regression is trying to figure out why this happened, and machine learning is more about what’s going to happen.” – Ian Park
“The three things I’m looking for in emerging managers are first, information; second, network; third, it’s more about co-investments.” – Ian Park
“VCs should publish their thoughts as soon as possible – be it on YouTube or be it on a blog. You have to tell people what you think, and you have to claim that’s your idea too, so you can get some credit.” – Ian Park
“My rule of thumb is five years for 1X [DPI] for PE funds, and seven years for VC funds.” – Ian Park
Inspired by John Felix in our recent episode together, as LPs, we often get pitches where GPs claim they’re an N of 1. That they’re the only team in the venture world who has something. Usually it’s the fact that they have brand-name co-investors. Or they run a community. Or they have an operating background, like John says below. And it isn’t that unlike the world of founders pitching VCs.
The truth is most “unfair advantages” are more commonplace than one might think. Even after one hears 50 GP pitches, one can get a pretty good grasp of the overlap.
For the purpose of this blogpost, the goal is to help the emerging LP who has yet to get to 50-100 pitches. And for the GP who hasn’t seen that many other pitches to know what the rest of the market is like. Obviously, the world of venture shifts all the time. What’s unique today is commonplace tomorrow.
For the sake of this post, and to make sure I’m not using some words too liberally, let’s define a few terms I will use quite often in this blogpost:
Product: A fully differentiated edge that an emerging manager/firm has. In other words, a must-have, if the firm is to succeed.
Feature: A partially differentiated edge, if at all, an edge. In many cases, this may just be table stakes to be an emerging manager today. In other words, a nice-to-have or expected-to-have.
Networks
Product
Feature
Differentiated community (high/consistent frequency of engagement)
Alumni network (school or company)
Downstream investors that prioritize your signals
In-person events
Keeper test
Virtual events
Co-investors
Networks, in many ways, are synonymous with your ability to source. It’s the difference in a lot of ways from co-investing versus investing before anyone else (versus investing after everyone else). The latter of which is least desirable for an LP looking for pure-play venture and risk capital.
The quickest check is simply an examination of numbers. LinkedIn or Twitter followers. Newsletter subscribers. Podcast subscribers. Community members. While it’s helpful context, it’s also simply not enough.
Here’s a simple case study. Someone who has 5,000 followers on LinkedIn with hundreds of people engaging with their content in a meaningful way is usually more interesting than beat someone who has 20,000 followers on LinkedIn, who only has 10s of engagements. Even better if one generates a substantial amount of deal flow with their content alone.
One thing that is hard to evaluate without doing an incredible amount of diligence is your founder network referring other founders to you. From one angle, it’s table stakes. From another, true referral flywheels are powerful. In the former, purely having it on your pitch deck without additional depth makes that section of the deck easily skippable.
One of my favorite culture tests is Netflix’s Keeper test. That if a team member were to get laid off or fired, would you fight to keep them or be relieved? The best folks, you would fight to keep. And as such, one of my favorite questions during diligence to ask the breakout / top founders in each GPs’ portfolios is: If, gun to head, you had to fire all your investors from your cap table and only keep three, which three would you keep and why?
Do note I differentiate breakout and top founders. They’re not mutually exclusive, but sometimes you can be brilliant and do everything right and things still might not work out. But smart people will keep at it and start a new company. And maybe it was a smaller exit the first time, but the second or third time, their business may really take off. Of course, sometimes I don’t have the same amount of time to diligence each GP as an LP with a team, so I generally ask the question: If all of your portfolio founders were to drop what they’re currently doing regardless of outcome, and start a new business, who are the top 2-3 people you would back again without hesitation?
At the end of the day, for networks, it’s all about attention. It’s not about who you know, but about how well you know them AND who you know that TRUSTS what you know. In an era, where there is more and more noise and information everywhere, a wealth of information leads to a poverty of attention. But if you have a strong foothold on founders’ and/or investors’ attention in one way or another, you have something special.
Experience/expertise
Product
Feature
Early hire at a unicorn company + Grew a key metric by many multiples
Hired top operators who’ve gone on to change the world
Experience at a larger firm where you didn’t lead rounds / fight for deals
Independent board member
Experience only matters here where there are clear differentiations that you’ve seen and can recognize excellence. In a broader sense, having an operating background is unfortunately table stakes. As John mentioned, any generalities are.
While strong experiences help you source, its main draw is that it impacts the way you pick and win deals. Only those who have experience recognizing excellence (working with or hiring) know the quality in which A-players operate. Others can only imagine what that may look like. That’s why if you’re going to brag that you’re a Xoogler (or insert any other alumni), LPs are going to care which vintage you were at Google. A 2003 Xoogler is more likely to have that discerning eye than a 2023 Xoogler. The same is true for schools. Being a college dropout from a Harvard and Stanford is different from dropping out of college at a two-year program. Not that there’s anything wrong with the latter, but you must find other ways to stand out if so.
Given a large pool of noise when it comes to titles, it’s for that reason I love questions like: “What did you do in your last role that no one else with that title has done?”
Additionally, when it comes to references, positive AND negative references are always better than neutral references. Even better is that you stay top of mind for your founders regularly. A loose proxy, while not perfect, is roughly 2-3 shoutouts per year in your founders’ monthly updates. It takes a willingness to be helpful and for the founders to recognize that you’ve been helpful.
Process
Product
Feature
Response time/speed
Some generic outline of an investment process
Evidence of a prepared mind
Doing diligence
Asking questions during diligence most others don’t know how to
Yes, response time (or speed in getting back to a founder, or anyone for that matter) is a superpower. It’s remarkably simple, but incredibly hard to execute at scale. By the time, you get to hundreds of emails per week, near impossible, without a robust process. One of my favs to this day happens to be Blake Robbins’ email workflow who’s now at Benchmark.
Now I’m not saying one should rush into a deal, or skip diligence, but making sure people aren’t ghosted in the process matter immensely. As my buddy Ian Park puts it, it’s better for a founder or an LP to know that a GP is working on it than to not feel heard.
You’ve probably heard of the “prepared mind.” The idea that one proactively looks for solutions for a given problem as a function of their lived experiences, research, and analyses over the years.
Its origin probably goes as far back as Louis Pasteur, but I first heard it popularized in venture by the folks at Accel. Anyone can say they have a prepared mind. From an LP’s perspective, we can’t prove that you do or don’t have it outside of you just saying it in a pitch meeting. That’s why a trail of breadcrumbs matter so much. Most people describe it as a function of their track record or past operating experiences. Unfortunately, there may be a large attribution to hindsight bias or revisionist’s history. Being brutally honest with yourself of what was intentional and what was lucky or accidental is a level of intellectual honesty I’ve seen many LPs really appreciate. As an example, I’d really recommend you hearing what Martin Tobias has to say on that topic.
But the best way to illustrate a prepared mind is easier than one thinks. But it also requires starting today. Content. Yes, you can tweet and post on social media or podcast. But I’d probably rank long-form content at the top.
Public long-form writing (or production in general) is arduous. The first draft is rarely perfect. Usually far from it. With the attentive eye and the cautious mind, you go back to the draft again and again until it makes sense. Sometimes, you may even get third parties to comment and revise. Long-form is like beating and refining iron until it’s ready to be made into a blade. And once it’s out, it is encased in amber. A clear record of preparation.
In closing
Pat Grady had a great line on the Invest Like the Best podcast recently. “If your value prop is unique, you should be a price setter not a price taker, meaning your gross margins should be really good. A compelling value prop is a comment on high operating margins. You shouldn’t need to spend a lot on sales and marketing. So the metrics to highlight would be good new ARR/S&M, LTV:CAC ratios, payback periods, or percent of organic to paid growth.”
In a similar way, as a venture firm, if your value prop is truly unique, you’re a price setter. You can win greater ownership and set valuation/cap prices. If your value prop is compelling, the quality of your sourcing engine should be second to none, not just from being present online, but from the super-connectors in the industry, be it other investors, top-tier founders, or subject-matter experts.
Of course, all of the above examples are only ones that recently came to mind. The purpose of this blog is for creative construction and destruction. So if you have any other examples yourself, do let me know, and I can retroactively add to this post.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Dave McClure has been a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and investor for over 25 years. He has invested in hundreds of startups around the world, including 10+ IPOs and 40+ unicorns (Credit Karma, Twilio, SendGrid, Lyft, The RealReal, Talkdesk, Grab, Intercom, Canva, Udemy, Lucid, GitLab, Reddit, Stripe, Bukalapak).
Prior to launching PVC in 2019, he was the founding partner of 500 Startups, a global VC firm with $1B AUM that has invested in over 2,500 companies and 5,000 founders across 75 countries. Dave created 20 VC funds under the 500 brand and invested in 20 other VC funds around the world.
Dave began his investing career at Founders Fund where he made seed-stage investments in 40 companies, resulting in 4 unicorns and 3 IPOs. He led the Credit Karma seed round in 2009 (acq INTU, over 400X return). His $3M portfolio returned more than $200M (~65X) in under 10 years.
Before he became an investor, Dave was Director of Marketing at PayPal from 2001-2004. He was also the founder/CEO of Aslan Computing, acquired by Servinet in 1998. Dave graduated from the Johns Hopkins University (BS, Engineering / Applied Mathematics).
[00:00] Intro [03:37] How did Narnia inspire the start of Dave’s entrepreneurship? [08:32] On the brink of bankruptcy [11:42] The lesson Dave took away from his first acquisition [13:19] What did Dave do that no one else did as a marketing director? [16:06] What do most people fail to appreciate about secondaries? [22:31] The 3 bucket method for secondaries [28:46] How much do fund returners matter for secondaries? [33:01] When do LPs typically think about selling fund secondaries? [42:04] What are two questions that Dave asks to see if a portfolio is good for a secondary? [46:10] Why is it complicated if a GP wants to buy an LP’s stake? [55:03] When do most funds return 1X? 2-3X? [57:13] Underwriting VC vs PE secondaries [1:01:49] How do institutional LPs react to VC secondaries? [1:07:01] The founding story of Practical VC [1:15:36] Closing Josh Kopelman in Fund I [1:18:47] How often does the PayPal Mafia get together? [1:23:49] What’s the most expensive lessons Dave learned over the years? [1:27:38] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:28:29] If you enjoyed the episode, would deeply appreciate you sharing with one other friend!
John Felix is the Head of Emerging Managers at Allocate where he leads manager diligence and product innovation within the emerging manager ecosystem. Prior to joining Allocate, John worked at Bowdoin College’s Office of Investments, helping to invest the $2.8 billion endowment across all asset classes, focusing on venture capital. Prior to Bowdoin, John worked at Edgehill Endowment Partners, a $2 billion boutique OCIO. At Edgehill, John was responsible for building out the firm’s venture capital portfolio, sourcing and leading all venture fund commitments. John started his career at Washington University’s Investment Management Company as a member of the small investment team responsible for managing the university’s now $15 billion endowment. John graduated from Washington University in St. Louis with a BSBA in Finance and Entrepreneurship.
[00:00] Intro [02:35] The band that started it all [08:43] How did a band of 3 become a band of 5? [10:39] What bands served as inspiration for John? [13:37] Lessons on building teams and trust [19:48] The mischance that led John into the endowment world [22:34] What John learned under 3 different CIOs [26:20] What does concentration mean for Washington University’s endowment? [33:53] Portfolio construction perspectives at an endowment [36:26] The flaws of GP commits [41:25] How has John’s approach to emerging managers changed over the years? [44:17] What is key person risk? [47:06] One of the biggest challenges emerging managers face [50:45] Balancing over- and under-diligencing an emerging manager [56:28] What are traits that GPs think are unique but actually aren’t? [1:03:36] What makes a great cold email? [1:08:40] As a sports fan, do the highs or lows hit harder? [1:11:53] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [1:12:54] Let me know if you enjoyed this episode with a like, comment or share!
“Being too dogmatic about things or having too black or white views will prohibit a lot of LPs from making really, really good investments.” – John Felix
“The biggest leverage on time you can get is identifying which questions are the need-to-haves versus nice-to-haves and knowing when enough work is enough.” – John Felix
In a late night conversation with my high school friend last week, I picked up a fascinating Japanese phrase from her. Koi no yokan.
The best translation of it that I found was ‘the premonition of love.’ It serves as the antithesis to the notion of love at first sight. It’s love that takes time to grow on you. Slow, but steady. A seemingly acquired, yet inevitable sense of fate. It’s a feeling that begins when you meet someone you’ll eventually fall in love with.
It’s a remarkable concept with no direct English parallel. It sits in rarified air between words like hiraeth, hyggelig, and yūgen. All of which have inextricable meaning behind a seemingly simplistic string of letters. While I’ll leave the afore-mentioned three to your own rabbit holes, as you might imagine, I’ve been having quite a field trip across the linguistic landscape.
Koi no yokan.
It’s a concept that’s often applied to the enamor between humans. This may just be me being a sacrilegious foreigner, but I find the same linguistic beauty with passions.
In many ways, my love for the emerging GP and LP world was the same. If you told me back in college, that I’d want to spend a few decades of my life obsessed over demystifying the space, I’d have called your bluff. Might have even called you bonkers.
And while I’d been hovering like a satellite around the space for a while, it wasn’t till I started writing The Non-Obvious Emerging LP Playbook that I realized there was an inkling of a yearning there. Answers only led to more questions. Each insight I learned was always paired with another punctuated with a question mark. And it honestly was a really fun exercise. I didn’t write that blogpost for anyone else. Just myself. Like a public diary that encapsulated my intellectual expedition in the LP world. Even before I published it, even before any other feedback I got for it, it felt special. All catalyzed by an opportunity to back a first-time fund manager I’d been honored to see grow as the last check in.
At that point, I still had neither committed to the idea of really being a capital allocator nor to the promise of more of such content.
And when that blogpost finally saw daylight, and a number of readers responded in kind, a tenured investor asked if I was going to write a book. It seemed only fitting that a non-fiction 200-page book be the successor to the 12,500 word blogpost. So pen met paper.
I revisited old and forged new relationships off the momentum of the blogpost. And around 80 pages into the manuscript, I ran out of things to write. I didn’t know how to continue. It felt both lacking and comprehensive at the same time. I could add in more examples. Case studies. Or just superfluous language. The equivalent of turning “my dad” into “my wife’s father-in-law.” The latter of which I swore to myself I wouldn’t do.
So I stopped.
Put it aside. And went on with the rest of my life.
But time and time again, I’d find myself staring at the ceiling at night, journaling, or writing on my whiteboard in the shower about the afore-mentioned topics. It became borderline annoying that my mind kept circling back to it and I was doing nothing about it.
So frick that. As I once learned from Max Nussenbaum, who I got to work with sooner after, the fastest way to test out if there’s a market for your ideas AND if one’s interests are sustained across longer periods of time is to just write about it. And I did. Here, here, here, andmore.
At one point, my buddy Erik asked if I was going to start a podcast. At first, I dismissed the idea. Didn’t think I had the skillset or the personality for one. But man, I lost even more sleep in the ensuing weeks after he seeded the idea in my head. And so I started a podcast. (Which holy hell, I can’t wait to show you Season 3 on July 1st)
I realized much later, probably a year after I stopped writing the book, that the reason I couldn’t write anymore, despite asking so many really smart LPs for help, wasn’t that there was nothing more to share, there was still a lot… Hell, even each family office had a strategy so unlike the next. And as the saying goes, if you know one family office, you really only know one family office. So no, it wasn’t because there was nothing else to write. In one world, I could have just written an encyclopedia of strategies. It was that there was so much that had yet to be written, ever, about allocating into emerging managers.
Venture as an asset class was not the Wild West, still an alternative and still risky, but there have been predecessors who’ve productized the practice. But allocating to Fund I’s and II’s without proof of a track record was a horizon most had yet to cross.
Hell, I wrote a LinkedIn post just yesterday on how I think about evaluating Fund I track records without relying on TVPI, DPI, and IRR. And why I think more funds of funds should exist.
Simply put and in summary, there’s a complexity premium on not just venture capital, but specifically on evaluating Fund Is and IIs. And I don’t mean the big firm spinouts who have a portable track record. I mean the real folks who are truly starting to build a firm (not just a fund) for the first time.
I don’t have all the answers. Sure, as hell, I hope to have more in the near future. But I’m ridiculously excited to find answers (and more nuanced questions) — putting science to art — as an emerging LP.
If you couldn’t tell yet… I think I’m in love.
And if you’re interested, I’d love to have you join me on this ride.
#unfiltered is a series where I share my raw thoughts and unfiltered commentary about anything and everything. It’s not designed to go down smoothly like the best cup of cappuccino you’ve ever had (although here‘s where I found mine), more like the lonely coffee bean still struggling to find its identity (which also may one day find its way into a more thesis-driven blogpost). Who knows? The possibilities are endless.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Recently I’ve been hearing a lot of power law this, power law that. And you guessed right, that’s VC and LP talk. Definitely not founder vocabulary. Simply, that 20% of inputs lead to 80% of outputs. For instance, 20% of investments yield 80% of the returns.
Along a similar vein… what about questions? What 20% of questions lead to 80% of answers you need to make a decision? Or help you get 80% of the way to conviction in a deal?
‘Cause really, every question after those delivers only marginal and diminishing returns. And too much so, then you end up just wasting the founder’s or GP’s time. As the late Don Valentineonce said, “[VC] is all about figuring out which questions are the right questions to ask, and since we don’t have a clue what the right answer is, we’re very interested in the process by which the entrepreneur get to the conclusion that he offers.”
While I can’t speak for everyone, here are the questions that help me get to 80% conviction. For emerging GPs.
I’m going to exclude “What is your fund strategy?” Because you should have either asked this at the beginning or found out before the meeting. This question informs if you should even take the meeting in the first place. Is it a fit for what you’re looking for or not? There, as one would expect, you’d be looking into fund size, vertical, portfolio size, and stage largely. Simple, but necessary. At least to not waste anyone’s time from the get go.
Where are you at as a GP by Fund III? What does Fund I and II look like by Fund III?
Discipline. In the first 4 years of a fund, you’re evaluated on nothing else except for the discipline and the prepared mind that you have going in. All the small and early DPI and TVPI mean close to nothing. And it’s far too early for a GP to fall into their respective quartile. In other words, Fund I is selling that promise. The prepared mind. Fund II is selling Fund I’s strategy and discipline. Fund III, you’re selling the returns on Fund I.
Vision. Is this GP thinking about institutionalizing a firm versus just a fund? How are they thinking about creating processes and repeatability into their model? How do they think about succession and talent? And sometimes I go a few steps further. What does Fund V look like? And what does the steady state of your fund strategy look like?
What value do you bring to your portfolio companies?
This is going to help with reference calls and for you to fact check if an investor actually brings that kind of value to their portfolio companies. So, in effect, the question to portfolio companies would be: How has X investor helped you in your journey?
On the flip side, even during those reference calls, I like asking: Would you take their check if they doubled their ownership? And for me to figure out how high can they take their ownership in a company before the check is no longer worth it. There are some investors who are phenomenal $250K pre-seed/seed checks for 2.5-5% ownership (other times less), but not worth their value for $2-3M checks for the same stages. To me, that’s indicative of where the market thinks GP-market fit is at.
I also love the line of questioning that Eric Bahn once taught me. “How would you rate this GP on a scale of 1 to 10?” Oftentimes, founders will give them a rating of 6, 7, 8, or if you’re lucky 9. And the follow up question then becomes, “What would get this investor to a 10?” And that’s where meaty parts are.
Of course, it’s important to do this exercise a few times, especially with the top performers in their portfolio to truly have a decent benchmark. And the ones that didn’t do so well. After all, our brand is made by our winners. And our reputation is made by those that didn’t.
In the trifecta of sourcing, picking, and winning, this is how GPs win deals.
How do you resolve conflict or disagreement in the partnership?
This is really prescient in a partnership. Same as a co-foundership. If someone says, we never disagree, I’m running fast in the other direction. Everyone disagrees and has conflicts. Even twins and best friends do. If you don’t, you either have been sweeping things under the rug or one (or both or all) of you doesn’t care enough to give a shit. Because if you give a damn, you’re gonna have opinions. And not all humans have the same opinions. If everyone does, realistically, we only need one of you.
Hell, Jaclyn Freeman Hester even goes a step further and asks, How would you fire your partner?
Jaclyn on firing partners and team risk
Personally I think that last question yields interesting results and thought exercises, but lower on my totem pole (or higher if you want to be culturally accurate) of questions I need answers to in the initial meetings.
How are you finding companies? How are you building your pipeline?
This is always a question I get to, but especially valuable, when I ask it to spinouts. Building a repeatable and scalable sourcing pipeline is one of the cruxes of being a great fund manager. But in the age when a lot of LPs are shifting their focus to spinouts from top-tier funds, it’s an important reminder that (a) not all spinouts are created equal, and (b) most often, I find spinouts who rely largely on their existing “brand” and “network” without being able to quantify the pillars of it and how it’s repeatable.
For (a), a GP spinning out is evaluated differently than a partner or a junior investment member. A GP is one who manages the LP relationships, and knows intimately the value of what goes in an LPA, on top of her/his investing prowess. And the further you go down the food chain, the less visibility one gets of the end to end process. In many ways, the associates and analysts spinning out need the most help, but are also most willing to hustle.
Which brings me to (b). Most spinouts rely on the infrastructure and brand of their previous firm, and once they’ve left, they lose that brand within a year’s time. Meaning if they don’t find a way or have an existing way to continue to build deal flow, oftentimes, they’ll be left with the leftovers on the venture table. This question, for me, gives me a sense of whether an investor is a lean-in investor or a lean-back investor. The devil’s in the details.
What are the top 3 reasons I shouldn’t invest?
This is a test to see how much self-awareness a founder/GP has. The most dangerous answer is saying “There are no reasons not to invest.” There are always reasons not to. The question is, are you aware of them? And can you prioritize which risks to de-risk first?
In many ways, I think pitching a Fund I as illustrating the minimum viable assumption you need to get to the minimum viable product. And Fund II is getting to the minimum lovable strategy (by founders and other investors in the ecosystem). And with anything that is minimally viable, there are a bunch of holes in it.
Another way to say the above is also, “If halfway through the fund we realize the fund isn’t working, what is the most likely reason why?”
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
