I’ve always admired the way Mike Maples has thought about backcasting. In summary, he proposes that true innovators are visitors from the future. Or as he puts it: “Breakthrough builders are visitors from the future, telling us what’s coming.” Such that they “pull the present from the current reality to the future of their design.” In other words, start from the future, then work your way backwards to figure out what you need to do today to get there.
And I find it equally as empowering to do the same exercise as an emerging manager. Hell, for any aspiring institutional investor. Be it from an angel to a GP. Or an individual LP to a fund of funds.
Start from your ideal fund model. Your ideal LP base. Your ideal pitch deck. Then work backwards to figure out what you need to do today. For the purpose of this blogpost, I’ll focus on reference checks.
For everyone in the investing world, especially in the early-stage private markets, we all know that reference checks is a key component of making investment decisions. Yet too often, founders and emerging managers alike think about them retroactively. Post-mortem. Testimonials that are often not indicative of one’s strengths. And especially not indicative of how a GP won that investment, as well as how they can win such investments in the future.
An exercise I often recommend investors do is write your ideal reference you would like to get from a founder. Be as specific as you can. What would your portfolio founders say about you? How have you helped them in a way that no one else can? What do founders who you didn’t fund say about you?
Another way to think about it is if you were to own a word — something that would live rent free in people’s minds — what would you own? Hustle Fund owns “hilariously early.” Spacecadet Ventures owns “the marketing VC” and they live up to it. Cowboy’s Aileen Lee created the idea of “unicorns.” “Software is eating the world” is attributed to Marc Andreessen.
On the flip side of the token, what are testimonials that should never be written about you?
Hell, at this point, if you’re an aspiring institutional investor, and have yet to spell things out, create the whole deck. Fill in the numbers and the facts later, but for now, make up your ideal deck. When leading indicators become lagging, then update it and fill it in.
Then be that kind of investor for every founder you help. As Warren Buffett once said, “You should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it.”
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.
The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.
But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!
As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!
While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.
The year was 1997.
Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.
Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”
Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.
If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.
And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.
But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.
So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”
Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”
You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:
“You have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.
What is value?
To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.
Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:
The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence
On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.
We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.
Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
But I digress.
Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.
In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.
For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:
E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.
Graduation rates
What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.
On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.
Valuation step ups
How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.
It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:
Have a real chance at the championship title.
Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.
… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.
The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.
Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?
Dilution
If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?
Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?
Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.
How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.
How does one use the appreciation value equation?
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.
And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.
If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.
But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.
The model
The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.
It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.
Take for instance…
Energy
Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.
Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.
Biotech
Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.
In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.
In closing
All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:
Is your entry point a good entry point?
Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?
For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.
For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.
If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
The other day, I had a super insightful conversation with one of my awesome teammates here at Alchemist Accelerator about access and exposure. The difference between accelerators and emerging early-stage managers.
I’ll preface that for investors, particularly emerging managers, the three things you need to win are sourcing, picking, winning. And to be a GP, you need at least two of the above three. But for the purpose of this blogpost, I’m only focusing on sourcing.
I’ll also preface with the fact that I may be biased. I started in venture at SkyDeck, an accelerator. Additionally, I advise at a bunch of studios, incubators and accelerators. Moreover, I worked at On Deck when we launched our accelerator. And now, I’m here at Alchemist Accelerator.
I truly love early-stage programs. The earlier the better.
Instacart’s recent IPO is a clear example of venture returns compared to the public market equivalent as a function of stage. The earlier you invest, the more alpha you generate to your most liquid comparable.
It’s the difference between a market maker and a market taker. A price maker and a price taker.
Though admittedly, one day, this too may become saturated, just like how venture capital went from 50-60 funds in ’07 and ’08 to now over 4000 in 2023. Do fact check me on exact numbers, but I believe I’m directionally accurate.
Let me give a more concrete example. Harvard is a phenomenal institution. And there’s a Wikipedia page full of breakout Harvard alums. But as an LP, if 50% of your managers, despite having different theses, all have half their portfolio as Harvard alums, then you as the LP are overexposed to the same underlying asset. The same is true for Stanford. Or seed or Series A funds investing in YC founders. All great institutions, but you’re not getting your buck’s worth of diversification.
The only caveat here is if you’re not looking for diversification. After all, the best performing fund would be the fund that invested a 100% of their fund in Google at the seed round. AND holding it till today. Realistically, they will have had to distribute on IPO.
The question is are you a fisher? Or are you a digger? One requires a fishing rod; the other a shovel. The latter requires more work, but you’re more likely to be the first to gold. Like Eniac was for mobile. Or Lux to deep tech.
So how do you know you’re fishing in someone else’s pond?
Easy. Your deal flow includes someone’s else’s brand. Whether that’s Sequoia or YC or SBIR. It’s not your own. You don’t own that pipeline. A lot of people have access to it. It’s no longer about proprietary deal flow, but about proprietary access to deals to borrow a framing from the amazing Beezer.
If your deal flow pipeline looks something like the graph below, you probably don’t have a sourcing advantage.
Now that’s not to say there aren’t a lot of nonobvious companies coming out of YC or these startup accelerators. Airbnb, Sendbird, Twitch (the last of which Ravi who I work with here at Alchemist happened to be one of the first institutional investor for, so have heard some of these stories), and more were all non-obvious coming out of YC. And have also seen the same for companies coming out of Techstars, 500, and Alchemist, where I call home now. But that’s a picking advantage, not a sourcing one.
The flip side is, how do you know you’re excavating your own pond?
I’ll preface by saying having your own Slack or Discord “community” is not enough. Or having your own podcast.
I put community in quotes simply because having XXX members in a large group chat isn’t indicative that their presence is really there. Is their seat warm or cold?
I love using a stadium analogy. Imagine you sold a couple thousand season tickets to a team. You can name whatever sport it is. Football (yes, the rough American kind). Soccer. Basketball. Baseball. You name it. But despite all the tickets you sell, a solid percentage of your seats each game is empty. Can you really say that your team has fans? All you did was sell a couple of cold seats.
You can make the same analogy with likes or comments on Instagram. Which seems to be a problem these days, when an influencer with a couple thousand likes per post starts hosting their fan meetups, only to realize they rented out an empty hall. In case, you’re wondering for the IG example, it’s due to bots.
All that said, I like to think about excavation in the lens of competition for attention. Everyone only has 24 hours in a day. 7 days in a week. 365 days in a year. And as someone who is expecting any level of engagement from others, you are fighting for attention with every other product, person, and habit out there.
Perks of being a consumer investor, I think about this a lot. But in the same way, having an unfair sourcing advantage is the same.
Is the greatest source of your deals tuning into you at least four of the seven calendar days in a week? Or if you have a professional audience (i.e. only product people, or only execs), are they engaging at least 3 workdays per week or 8 workdays per month? Are they spending more time reading/listening/engaging with you than with their best friend?
If you have a community, do you have solid product-market fit? Is your daily active to monthly active over 50%? You don’t need a massive audience, but for the people who are primary sources of your deal flow, are you top of mind? As Andrew Chensays, at that point, “it’s part of a daily habit.”
Is it easy for them to share your content, what you’re doing, who you are with others? Does sharing you or your content generate dopamine and social capital for them? Do you embody something aspirational? Is your viral coefficient greater than 0.5? Even better if it’s 1, then you’re ready to go viral.
And do people stick around? Do the seats stay warm? Is your community self-propagating? Is your content evergreen? Or do you produce content at a voracious pace that it doesn’t have to be? Do you live rent free in people’s brain?
And once you do invest, are you the weapon in the arsenal of choice? For instance, 65% of Signalfire’s portfolio use their platform weekly to learn and get advice. But more on the winning side in a future essay.
In closing
To truly have a sourcing advantage, you need to be building your own platform that is impressionable and regularly take mind space from the founder audience. But if you don’t, that’s okay. You just need to be really good at picking and winning.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
The most provocative part was when she posed the question: If you need an app to make friends, is that a negative signal?
The solution, in her words, “the long term winner here is likely to be… interest-graph social networks.” Furthermore, “platforms that give people an ‘excuse’ to gather, either IRL or digitally” are immensely powerful. Where friendship is a byproduct of usage but not the main or sole purpose of being on these platforms.
I agree that dual-purposed social networks and platforms are a wonderful solution, but, and I may be biased, I don’t think it’s the only solution.
As a former power user of networking or friend apps like Shapr and Lunchclub (yes, I used an app to make friends), I’ve made some great friends via both of those platforms. But at the same time, I was an early user for both. Both had yet to be widely adopted at the time.
For Lunchclub, I was using it at a time when everything was in-person, and you only had the option to meet people on Fridays at 2PM or 5PM at either Sightglass Coffee on 7th Street or Caffe Centro in South Park in SF. The latter unfortunately closed recently. And that was it. There were no other options. I had often joked with friends that as you were meeting your friend match that week at Sightglass, you would be sitting next to the person you would match with next week AND the person sitting five feet over would be who you matched with last week. It was a tight community, even if it was an unintentionally designed community. A group of hackers, early adopters, investors, and people just doing cool things.
Then, as Lunchclub pursued scale, quality declined. And as Olivia shares in her thread above, bad actors ruined the experience altogether. The same was true for Shapr. For Clubhouse. Just to name a few.
But dating apps nailed it. They’ve reached widespread adoption. Olivia postulates it’s because they offer data points and filters that you can’t find anywhere else. For instance, who’s single. She’s right. But there’s another reason. These apps promote interest in others. Or amplifying inherent motivation to be on said apps.
Let me elaborate.
Be interesting and interested
I’ve written about the above line before. Here. And here. And likely a few other places that’s escaping my memory at the time of writing this piece.
The thing is most platforms promote being interesting. The heavy profile customizations. The ability to share your own thoughts. Platforms that incentivize you to go from a consumer to a creator. A lot of it is about me. Look at me. Look at how cool I am. How cool my life is. The strive for perfection.
How can I ever be like the person I’m following? My life is nowhere near as awesome as her/his is. Most social platforms prop users up as a point of comparison.
All that to say, there are a lot of apps that help you be interesting, but not enough that help you be interested. The latter takes work. There’s a line that Mark Susterrecently shared on a podcast, and I love it! Citing the late Zig Ziglar (which by the way, is an awesome name), Mark shared, “People don’t care how much you know until they know how much you care.”
I want to underscore that line one more time.
“People don’t care how much you know until they know how much you care.”
It’s why I love my buddy Rishi’s recent piece on how to build and maintain meaningful relationships.
In Rishi’s essay, he shares that there are three levels to doing your homework — each deeper than the last — and show that you care:
Level 1 – The Basics: LinkedIn, Common Connections, Google, and Company Website
Level 2 – Digging in: Social Media
Level 3 – Going Deep: Podcasts, Writing, YouTube et. al
The purpose isn’t to be all-encompassing, but to show that you care for the human sitting across from you. It’s the intention that matters.
The late David Rockefellerbuilt prolific Rolodexes to show that he cared. In fact, it’s cited that his handwritten notes on others stood five feet tall and accounted for 100,000 people. Alan Fleischmannonce wrote in reference to David Rockefeller that, “If you were so fortunate to be a fly on the wall for any of his countless meetings and interactions, you would hear him inquire about the smallest details of his guest’s life, from a child’s ballet recital to a parent’s recent health concern. Rockefeller’s interactions were said to be ‘transformational, never transactional.'”
And it’s also the small things that matter.
In closing
The reason why I think Lunchclub was so popular in the beginning is in two parts:
The platform reduced the friction — the back-and-forths — of scheduling. They gave you two times, and you either made it or you didn’t.
The platform’s early users were innately curious individuals. When I was invited on the platform, my friend pitched it as, “I’ve learned so much from the people I met.” And my friend was and is already one of the foremost subject-matter experts in her field. The same was true when I began using the platform. People spent more time asking questions than talking about themselves. In fact, in many conversations, it’d be a battle of who can delay talking about themselves more than the other.
People were simply interested. There was no agenda. And no agenda was the best agenda. No one was trying to peddle anything to you. No one was trying to ask you for money or intros. People were the ends in and of themselves, and not a means to an end.
All in all, while there are incredible platforms that help you build friendships through interest and hobby alignment, I do believe there is room for a friend app for the curious. Or at least to help you be a really good friend.
So if you’re building something there, ring me up. That said, no matter how great technology is, with AI and all, every great relationship still needs that human touch. AI and platforms and apps might be able to get you 90% of the way there. But if you don’t complete that last 10% trek, 90% is still incomplete. For those of you reading who are American football fans, running the ball 90 yards from one endzone is still an incomplete. It’s still not a touchdown. You need to run the full 100.
If there’s anything to take away from this blogpost, it’s to be both interesting AND interested. Emphasis on the latter.
And in case you’re curious as to how I approach caring, these might be helpful starting points:
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
If you’ve been following me on Twitter recently, you might have noticed I’m working on a new blogpost for the emerging LP. One that I’m poorly equipped personally to talk about, but one that I know many LPs are not. Hence, I’ve had the opportunity to sit down with a number of LPs (limited partners – people who invest in venture funds) and talk about what is the big question GPs need to answer to get LP money, specifically institutional LP money.
And it boils down to this question:
Why does the world need another venture fund?
Most LPs think it doesn’t. And it is up to the GP to convince those LPs why they should exist. For most institutional LPs, even those who mean to back emerging managers, to invest in a new manager, they have to say no to an existing manager. While data has historically shown that new managers and small funds often outperform larger, more established funds on TVPI, DPI, and IRR, when institutional LPs invest in a Fund I, it’s not just about the Fund I, but also the Fund II and Fund III.
For those who reading who are unfamiliar with those terms, TVPI is the total value to paid-in capital. In other words, paper returns and the actual distributions you give back to LPs. DPI, distributions to paid-in capital, is just the latter – the actual returns LPs get in hand. IRR, internal rate of return, is the time value of money – how much an LP’s capital appreciates every year.
It’s a long-term relationship. Assuming that you fully deploy a fund every three years, that’s a 19-year relationship for three funds. Three years times three funds, with each fund lasting ten years long. If you ask for extensions, that could mean an even longer relationship.
But the thing is… it’s not just about returns. After all, when you’re fundraising for a Fund I, you don’t have much of a track record as a fund manager to go on. Even if you were an active angel and/or syndicate lead, most have about 5-6 years of deals they’ve invested in. Most of which have yet to realize.
So, instead, it’s about the story. A narrative backed by numbers of what you see that others don’t see. Many institutional LPs who invest in emerging managers also invest directly into startups. I’ve seen anywhere from 50-50 to 80-20 (startups to funds). And as such, they want to learn and grow and stay ahead of the market. They know that the top firms a decade ago were not the top firms that are around today. In fact, a16z was an emerging fund once upon a time back in 2009.
Of course, anecdotally, from about 15-ish conversations with institutional LPs, they still want a 4-5x TVPI in your angel investing track record as table stakes, before they even consider your story.
The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.
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Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
These past two years, we’ve seen many investors and founders alike lose their pricing discipline. A number of whom believed anything north of a 10-15x multiple was the new normal. Expectedly, it wasn’t here to last. And I fear there may be an overcorrection to revert back to the mean.
Signal was heavily weighted on the names of other investors, whereas it’s now weighted on strictly traction and revenue. As Samir Kajipublished not too long ago, “The market reset provides a return to a rational environment where underwriting of deals has shifted away from a “growth at all costs” mentality, and inclined toward fundamental metrics such as margins, capital efficiency, and the current public market comps.”
The pandemic years
I’ve written before why it’s better to get 70% conviction, than 50 or 90%. 50% is a gamble. And for the past two years, investors made many more and much larger gambles than would have been kosher. When capital became a commodity and we saw a convergence of value adds in the early-stage investing world, one of the only differentiators between firms became more capital, better terms, or more introductions. Quantity became the selling point rather than quality. Subsequently, that also bolstered many a founder to take bigger risks.
Companies were overcapitalized. Companies then hired more talent than they needed, which meant, on average, each employee needed to do less work than previously required. It wasn’t rare that we saw the best talent out there working more than one job. In fact, in a study by Nielsen, over 50% of talent worked for two companies without either knowing. As such, we’ve the trimming of fat over the past few months with massive company layoffs.
Very few investors were going to spend an extra week or two to dig deeper – do a little more homework to get the extra 20% conviction. Why? Because if they did, they’d miss the funding window. They’d miss the opportunity to invest in the next big thing.
I also saw many founders working on 10% improvements and features, rather than building robust, 10x, non-cyclical products. Founders rushed to product-market fit, followed by massive injections to put fuel on the fire, as opposed to taking time to A/B test for channel-market fit and minimum lovable products. Founders also became less scrappy with the surplus of capital. Growth at all costs was revitalized as the memo of the future. We were left with a world that too quickly forgot the importance of cash in the bank in the few months from March of 2020 till the summer.
Where is money after the market correction?
Today, investors are going for 90%, much of that on fundamentals, rather than a technical analysis on markets. People have become more focused on the beta portfolios than the alpha in portfolios – not saying the latter isn’t important. It still is.
The good news is that there are still many more dollars to deploy. The nine- and ten-figure funds aren’t going anywhere. The bad news is while there’s technically already money allocated to invest in early-stage companies, they’re getting deployed more slowly. But we’ve seen a slowdown in the deployment of capital. And while capital calls are usually leading indicators of capital deployment schedules, they became lagging indicators in March’s slowdown.
What are capital calls? No LP keeps a massive amount of money parked in a checking account with 0% interest, aka a VC fund. So, capital calls are a VC’s legal right to call forth a portion of the money promised to them by LPs. Usually capital calls are made semi-annually.
From 2015 to 2018, this metric hovered in the 20% range, however a step change came into effect in 2019 and we’ve been sitting in the 30% range ever since. pic.twitter.com/fF3kOWMGe9
Last year we saw capital call schedules rise from 20% to 32%. As such, timelines were compressed. Funds were deployed in 1.5-2 years. I even saw one-year deployment periods. Today, I’m anecdotally seeing funds revert to a 3-4 year timeline.
What does that mean for founders?
You should prepare for the worst. Things may turn out differently, and that’ll be great, but don’t expect it will. Over the next two years, there will only be a third to half as much capital to deploy into private companies. That also means your competition has increased two- to three-fold.
Focus on your gross margins, your customer acquisition costs (CAC), and your burn multiples. For software companies, aim for greater than 50% gross margins. Your CAC payback periods should be at most a year. And get your burn multiple to one. In other words, you bring back a $1 for every $1 you’re spending. If you’re south of that, great! Instead of raising venture money, see if you can use non-dilutive capital, aka revenue, to help you grow. For those, that are still growing north of three times per year on ARR after you hit $1M ARR, then venture capital is a very viable option.
If you’re raising a new round, show that you’ve hit your milestones and that you have a road to your next set of milestones to raise your next round in 12-18 months. If you’re raising a bridge (or preemptive) round, you’re on a tighter schedule. You need to show you can hit milestones deserving of a new round within six months or less.
Sometimes even when you have all the above, investors still won’t bat an eye. So, at the end of the day, I always go back to the sage advice my friend shared with me. Teach your investor something new. Mike Maples Jr calls it the earned secret. a16z calls it spending time in the idea maze. I don’t care what you call it. Investors pay their tuition to work alongside the best. If you want investors fighting over you, you need to show them value from Day 1.
One reason investors are more willing to express unconventional opinions than people running other businesses is that they don't mind alienating fools. A cookie company boycotted by fools would lose a lot of money. Whereas a VC boycotted by fools would be better off.
In the past two years, when people became bullish, I became bearish. I didn’t trust myself to find signal in hot markets. For example, while I believe in the amazing potential of blockchain and the future of web3, I intentionally chose to look at consumer solutions that were not tied to the chain, unable to justify for most ideas, why the chain was necessary to solve the problem. I found many founders stumbling on a solution, then finding a problem to fit in the solution. Rather than the other way around.
Today, I’m more bullish than ever (when others are bearish). An investor will generate much more outsized alpha being in the nonobvious and non-consensus than being in the consensus. And we’re swimming in an ocean of non-consensus today. As Keith Raboistalked about earlier this year, don’t focus on just optimizing for the beta where you’ll only be optimizing for incremental returns. Focus on the alpha.
Innovation is secular to the macro-economic trends. It’s exactly in this time that I’m excited to uncover the next world-defining teams. That said, I’m looking for world-defining insights I’ve never heard of or seen before.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Given the impending, potentially larger market correction, I’ve been thinking a lot about liquidation preferences recently. And it seems I’m nottheonlyone.
Many reasons, two amongst them, concisely:
1) Liq pref results in lower FMV to option-holders, which ostensibly is net +ve for employee equity comp
2) Liq pref makes it so the startup needs to create value. Can't just raise money, immediately return capital, and profit from it
— Matt Levine .eth lol (@Matt_Levine_1) May 26, 2022
I’ve seen three major trends over the past two months:
Founders are raising on smaller multiples compared to the last round. Investors argue it’s come back to the fundamentals. Founders say it’s the market conditions. Regardless, we won’t see the same 2020 and 2021 multiples in the near future.
If a startup is still growing and is cash efficient, valuations won’t have changed as drastically. David Sacksput it best when he said that founders are still going to get well-funded, if they’re:
Cash is king. We’ve seen it in the news all of last month. Founders are extending their runways, by reducing burn. As Marc Andreessensaid 1.5 months ago, “The good big companies are overstaffed by 2x. The bad big companies are overstaffed by 4x or more.” Companies are buckling in for 18-24 month runways, if not longer.
So what?
That goes to say, if a startup isn’t growing as expected, has a high burn, AND still wants to raise an up-round a year out of their last raise, investors are adding in more downside protection provisions. Anti-dilution provisions, minimum hurdle rate expectations, blocks on IPO or M&A opportunities, and liquidation preferences. What Bill Gurley and some VCs call the “dirty term sheet.”
Now I know there’s nuance and reason behind why liquidation preferences were created. To align incentives between the founder and investor. It stops a founder from immediately “selling the business” as soon as the money is in the bank, as Matt Levine mentioned in the above tweet. It also leads to a lower fair market value in a 409a valuation as both Matt and Keith mentioned as well. A net positive for employees, who are looking for lower strike prices to exercise their options in the future.
But as an aggregate, it seems liquidation preferences are really a strategy not to lose rather than a strategy to win. Not just the 1x liquidation preference, but the 2-3x liquidation preferences I’ve been seeing in the side letters offered by VCs.
To put it into context, that means investors get 2-3x their money back before the founders and everyone else gets theirs. By the same token, investors believe that same startup is worth at least 2-3x the money they gave the founders. Again, downside protection.
How does venture differ from other asset classes?
Unlike real estate or public market stocks or bonds, venture capital is a hit-driven business. Success is not measured by percentages, but rather by multiples. High risk, high return.
In a successful venture portfolio of 50 companies, 49 could theoretically be a tax write-off, if one makes you 200 times your capital, you’ve quadrupled your fund. A respectable return for a seed stage fund. As such, liquidation preferences have little impact on fund returns. If you’ve done venture right, your biggest winners account 90% of the fund’s returns. And they are the best pieces of evidence you can use to raise a subsequent fund. Your fund returners are the greatest determinants of your ability to raise the next fund, not how much money you saved after making a bad bet. No one cares if you got your dollar back for dollars you’ve invested towards the bottom of your portfolio, or even 50 cents back on every dollar.
And when a startup wildly succeeds, liquidation preferences don’t matter since everyone is getting a massive check in the mail, far exceeding any downside protection provisions.
In closing
Of course, as always, I might be missing something here, but preferred shares feel like a vestigial part of venture capital – thanks to our history with other financial services businesses.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
“Two of our biggest clients pulled the rug on us. They just cut their budgets, and can’t pay us anymore.”
“My co-founder had to leave. His wife just lost her job, and he needs to find a stable job to support the family.”
“I don’t think we’ll make it, David. How do we break it to our team?”
It was June 2020. The above were three of a dozen or so calls I had with founders so far who couldn’t make it through the pandemic. But most of the founders who called me weren’t looking for any solutions. In fact, half of them had already decided on their ultimatum before calling me. I could hear the pain in their voices over the phone. Yes, we called on the phone. Neither them nor I had the luxury of beautifying or blurring our backgrounds on Zoom or to try to look presentable. The only thing we had between us was the raw reality of the world.
Those conversations inspired me to compile a list of hard-won insights and advice from some of the best at their craft. A Rolodex of tactical and contrarian insights that a founder can pull from any time, so that you are well-equipped for times in the startup journey in which you’ll need them. I don’t know when you will, or even if you will, but I know someone will. Even if that someone is just myself.
Below are bits and pieces of insights that I’ve selectively collected over several months that might prove useful for founders. As time went on, I found myself to be more and more selective with the advice I add on to this list, as a function of my own growth as well as the industry’s growth.
I also often find myself wasting many a calorie in starting from a simple idea and extrapolating into something more nuanced. And while many ideas deserve the nuance I give them, if not more, some of the most important lessons in life are simple in nature. The 99 soundbites below cover everything, in no particular order other than categorical resonance, including:
Some might be more contrarian than others. You might not use every single piece of advice now or for your current business or ever. After all, they’re 100% unsolicited. At the end of the day, all advice is autobiographical. Nevertheless, I imagine they’ll be useful tools in your toolkit to help you grow over the course of your career, as they have with mine.
Oh, why 99 tips, and not 100? Things that end in 9 feel like a bargain, whereas things that end in 0 feel like a luxury. We can thank left-digit bias for that. Dammit, if you count this tip, that’s 100!
To preface, none of this is legal investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.
On fundraising…
1/ Some useful benchmarks and goals for stages of funding:
<$1M: pre-seed
Find what PMF looks like and how to measure it
$1-5M: seed
$2-4M – you found PMF already and you’re gearing up to scale
$5M – you’re ready for the A
$5-20: Series A *timestamped mid-2021, your mileage may vary in different fundraising climates
2/ If you’re a hotly growing startup, time to term sheet is on the magnitude of a couple of weeks. If not, you’re looking at months*. Prepare your fundraising schedule accordingly. *timestamped mid-2021, your mileage may vary in different fundraising climates
3/ On startup accelerators… If you’re a first-time founder, go for the knowledge and peer and tactical mentorship. If you’re a second- or third-time founder, go for the network and distribution.
4/ Legal fees are often borne by founders in the first priced round. And are usually $2-5K at the seed stage. $10-20K at the A. Investor council fee is $25-50K. So by the A, may come out to a $75-100K cost for founders.
5/ If you’re raising from VCs with large funds (i.e. $100M+), don’t have an exit slide. It may seem counterintuitive, but by having one, you’ve capped your exit value. Most early stage investors want to see 50-100x returns, to return the fund. And if their expected upside isn’t big enough, it won’t warrant the amount of risk they’re going to take to make back the fund. With angels or VCs with sub-$20M funds, it doesn’t matter as much.
6/ “Stop taking fundraising advice from VCs*. Would you take dating advice from a super model? In both cases, they’re working with an embarrassment of riches and are poor predictors of their own future behaviors. Advice from VCs is based on what they think they want versus what they want.” – Taylor Margot, founder of Keys *Footnote: Unless they’ve been through the fundraising process – either for their fund or previous startup.
7/ These days, it’s incredibly popular for founders to set up data rooms for their investors. What are data rooms? A central hub of a startup’s critical materials for investors when they do due diligence. Keep it on a Google Drive, Dropbox, Docsend, or Notion. Usually for startups that have some traction and early numbers, but what goes in a pre-seed one, pre-revenue, or even pre-product?
Pitch deck + appendix slides
Current round investment docs
Use of funds
Current and proforma cap table
Pilot usage data, if any
References + links to everyone’s LinkedIn:
Key members of management
1-2 customers, if any
1-2 investors, if any
Financials: annual + YTD P&L + projections
Slightly controversial on projections. Some investors want to see how founders think about the long term, plus runway after capital injection. Some investors don’t care since it’s all guesswork. Rule of thumb at pre-seed is don’t go any further than 2-3 years.
List of all FAQ investor questions throughout the fundraising process
Press, if any
Legal stuff: Patents, trademarks, IP assignments, articles of incorporation
8/ If you’re a pre-seed, pre-revenue, or even pre-product, you don’t need all of the above points in tip #7. Just stick to pitch deck/appendix, investment docs, use of funds, and current/proforma cap table.
9/ Investors invest in lines not dots. Start “fundraising”, aka building relationships, early with investors even before you need to fundraise. Meet 1-2 investors every week. Touch base with who would be the “best dollars on your cap table” every quarter. With their permission, get them on your monthly investor update. So that you can raise capital without having to send that pitch deck.
10/ Don’t take more money than you actually need when fundraising. While it’s sexy to take the $6M round on $30M valuation pre-product and will guarantee you a fresh spot on TechCrunch and Forbes, your future self will thank you for not taking those terms to maintain control and governance and preserve your mental sanity. Too many cooks in the kitchen too early on can be distracting. And taking on higher valuations comes with increased expectations.
11/ If you’re getting inbound financing, aka investor is reaching out to you, decide between two paths: (a) ignore, or (b) engage. If you choose the first path (a), when you ignore one, get comfortable ignoring them all – with very few exceptions i.e. your dream investors, which should be a very short list. Capital is a commodity. Your biggest strength is your focus on actually building your business. For undifferentiated VCs, understand speed is their competitive advantage. Fundraising at that point, for you the founder, is a distraction. If you choose (b) engage, set up the process. As you get inbound, go outbound. Build a market of options to choose from. Inspired by Phin Barnes.
12/ If you haven’t chatted with an investor in a while (>3 months), remind them why they (should) love you. Here’s a framework I like: “Hi, it’s been a minute. The last time we chatted about Y. And you suggested Z. Here’s what I’ve done about Z since the last time we chatted.“
13/ If you have a business everyone agrees on, you don’t have a venture-backable business. Alphas are low in perfect competition and businesses that are common sense. You’re going to generate a low 2-5x return on their capital, depending on how obvious your idea is.
Strive for disagreement. Be contrarian. Don’t be afraid to disagree in your pitch. Trying to be a people pleaser won’t get you far. If your investor disagrees with your insight, either you didn’t explain it well or you just don’t need them on your cap table. If the former, go through the 7 year old test. Are you able to explain your idea to a 7-year old? If that 3rd grader does understand, and you have sound logic to get to the insight, and your investor still disagrees, you need to find someone who agrees with strategic direction forward.
It’s not worth your time trying to convince a now-and-future naysayer on a future they don’t believe in. Myself included. There will be some ideas that just don’t make sense to me. While part of it might be ’cause of poor explanation/communication, the other part is I’m just not your guy. And that’s okay.
14/ If a VC asks your earlier investors to give up their pro-rata, and forces you to pick between your earlier investors and that VC, it’s a telltale sign of an unhealthy relationship. If they’re willing to screw your earlier investors over, they’ll have no problem screwing you over if things go south. To analogize, it’s the same as if the person you’re dating asks you to pick between your parents who raised you and them. If they have to force a choice out of you, you’re heading into a toxic relationship where they think they should be the center of the universe.
15/ You can really turn some heads if your pitch deck doesn’t have the same copy/paste answers as every other founder out there. Seems obvious, but this notion becomes especially tested on two particular slides: the go-to-market (GTM) and the competitorslides.
16/ If you want to be memorable, teach your investor something they didn’t know before. To be memorable means you’re likely to get that second meeting.
17/ Focus on answering just one question in your pitch meeting with an investor. That question is dependent on the plausibility of your idea. If your idea is plausible, meaning most people would agree that this should exist in the market, answer “why this.” If your idea is possible, meaning your idea makes sense but there’s not a clear reason for why the market would want it, answer “why now.” If your idea is preposterous, answer “why you.” Why you is not about your X years of experience. It’s about what unique, contrarian insight you developed that is backed by sound logic. That even if the insight is crazy at first glance, it makes sense if you dive deeper. Inspired by Mike Maples Jr.
18/ Beware of investor veto rights in term sheets. Especially around future financing. The verbage won’t say “veto rights,” but rather “no creation of a new series of stock without our approval” or “no amendments to the certificate of incorporation without our approval.”
19/ 99% of syndicate LPs like to be passive capital, since they’re investing 50 other syndicates at the same time. Don’t expect much help or value add from them. But if they’re also a downstream capital allocator, you can leverage that relationship when you go to them for bigger checks in future rounds.
20/ Don’t count on soft commitments. “We will invest in you if X happens.” Soft commitments are easy to make, and don’t require much conviction. X usually hinges on a lead investor or $Y already invested in the startup. Investors who give soft commits are not looking for signal in your business but signal via action from other investors. Effectively, meaning they don’t believe in you, but they will believe in smart people who believe in you.
21/ Just because they’re an A-lister doesn’t mean they’ll bring their A-game. Really get to know your investor beforehand.
22/ If you’re an outsider of the VC world, first step is to accept you are one and that you will have to work much harder to be recognized. “You will be work for investors. The data doesn’t support investing in you. The game is not fair at all. It will be a struggle.” Inspired by Mat Sherman.
23/ Mixing your advisors and investors in the same slide is a red flag for potential investors, unless your advisors also invested. Why? It gives off the impression that you’re hiding things. If the basis of an investment is a 10-year marriage, doubt is the number one killer of potential investor interest.
24/ Too many advisors is also a red flag. “Official” and “unofficial“. Too many distractions. Advisors almost always invest. If they don’t, that’s signaling to say you need their help, but they don’t believe in you enough to invest.
25/ There are also some investors don’t care about your advisors at all, at least on the pitch deck. The pitch deck should be your opportunity to showcase the team who is bleeding and sweating for you. Most advisors just don’t go that far for you. The addendum would be that technical advisors are worth having on there, if you have a deeply technical product.
26/ “Find an investor’s Calendly URL by trying their Twitter handle, and just book a meeting. With so many investor meetings, it’s easy to forget you never scheduled it. Just happened to me and it was both frightening and hilarious.” – Lenny Rachitsky
27/ If you want money, ask for advice. If you want advice, ask for money.
28/ Don’t waste your energy trying to convince investors who strongly disagree to jump onboard. Your time is better spent finding investors who can already see the viability of your vision.
29/ Higher valuations mean greater expectations. You might want to raise for a longer runway, and I’ve seen pitches as great as 36 months of runway, but most investors are still evaluating you on a 12-month runway upon financing round. Can you reach your next milestones (i.e. 10x your KPIs) in a year from now? Higher valuations mean your investor thinks you are more likely and can more quickly capture your TAM at scale than your peers.
30/ As founder, you only need to be good at 3 things: raise money, make money, and hire people to make money. Every investor, when going back to the fundamentals, will evaluate you on these 3 things.
31/ A good distribution of your company’s early angel investors include:
32/ “All investor questions are bad. They are a tell tale sign of objections politely withheld until you are done talking.” Defuse critical questions by incorporating their respective answers into the pitch. For instance, if the question that’ll come up is “How do you think about your competition?”, include a slide that says “We know this is a competitive space, and here’s why we’re doing what we’re doing.” Inspired by Siqi Chen.
33/ “‘Strategics’ (aka non-VCs) may care less about ROI, and more about staying close for competitive intel and downstream optionality.” – Brian Rumao
On managing team/culture…
34/ Align your vacation with when the core team takes their vacation. (i.e. if you’re a product-led team, take your vacations when your engineers and product teams go on vacation)
35/ Please pay yourself as a founder. Some useful founder salary benchmarks:
Seed stage – lowest paid employee
Series A or when you find product-market fit (PMF) – lowest paid engineer
When you hit scale – mid-level engineer
When you’ve reached market dominance – market rate pay for CEOs
If growth slows or stops or hard times hit – cut back to previous compensation, until you grow again
36/ Measure twice, cut once. If you’re going to lay people off, do it once. Lay more people than you think you need to, so you don’t have to do it again. Keep expectations real and don’t leave unnecessary anxiety on the table for those that still work for you.
One of my favorite examples is that, at the start of the pandemic, Alinea, one of the most recognizable names in the culinary business, furloughed every full-time employee, giving them $1000 and paid for 49% of their benefits and health care, eliminated the salaries of owners completely, and reduced the business team and management’s salary by 35%. Not only that, they emailed all their furloughed employees to level expectations and to understand the why. In normal situations, the law states that furloughed employees shouldn’t have access to their work emails, but Nick said “I will break the law on that because this is the pandemic.” For more context, highly recommend checking out Nick’s Medium post and his Eaterinterview, time-stamped at the start of the pandemic.
37/ Take mental health breaks. I’ve met more venture-backed founders who regretted not taking mental health breaks than those who regretted taking them.
38/ Build honesty into your culture, not transparency. And do not conflate the two. Take, for example, you are going through M&A talks with one of the FAAMGs. If you optimize for transparency, this gets a lot of hype among your team members. But let’s say the deal falls through. Your team will be devastated and potentially lose confidence in the business, which can have second-order consequences, like them finding new opportunities or trying to sell their shares on the secondary market. I’ve quoted mmhmm‘s Phil Libinbefore, when he said, “I think the most important job of a CEO is to isolate the rest of the company from fluctuations of the hype cycle because the hype cycle will destroy a company.” Very similarly, full transparency sounds great in theory but will often distract your team from focusing on their priorities.
39/ When in doubt, default to Bezos’ two-pizza rule. Every project/team should be fed by at most two pizzas. In the words of David Sacks, even “the absolute biggest strategic priority could [only] get 10 engineers for 10 weeks.” Don’t overcomplicate and over-bureaucratize things.
40/ Perfect is the enemy of good. Have a “ship-it” mentality. Give yourself an 10-20% margin of error. Equally so, give your team members that same margin so that they’re not scared of making mistakes. It’s less important that mistakes happen, and they will, but more important how you deal with it.
41/ James Currier has a great list of ways to compensate your team and/or community.
Value of using the product (e.g. utility, status, cheaper prices, fun, etc)
Cash (e.g. USD, EUR)
Equity shares (traditional)
Discounted fees
Premier placement and traffic/attention
Status symbols
Early access
Some voting and/or decision making, ability to edit/change
Premier software features
Membership to a valuable clique of other nodes
Real world perks like dinner/tickets to the ball game
Belief in the mission (right-brain, intrinsic)
Commitment to a set of human relationships (right-brain, intrinsic)
Tokens (fungible)
Non-Fungible Tokens
42/ Have Happy Hour Mondays, not on Thursdays and Fridays. Give your team members something to look forward to on Mondays.
43/ “Outliers create bad mental models for founders.” – Founder Collective
44/ Once you break past product-market fit and hit scale, you have to start thinking about your second act. It’s about resource allocation. The most common playbook for resource allocation is to spend 70% of your resources on your core business, 20% on business expansion, and 10% on venture bets.
45/ The top three loads that a founder needs to double down or back on when hitting scale. “You have to stop being an individual contributor (IC). Stop being a VP. And you gotta hire great [VPs]. The sign of a great VP… is that you look forward to your 1:1 each week. And that plus some informal conversations are enough. Otherwise you’re micromanaging.” – Jason Lemkin.
46/ If you could write a function to mathematically approximate the probability of success of any given person on your team, what would be the coefficients? What are the parameters of that function? Inspired by Dharmesh Shah.
47/ The team you build is the company you build. And not, the plan you build is the company you build. – Vinod Khosla.
48/ “The output of an organization is equal to the vector sum of its individuals. A vector sum has both a magnitude and a direction. You can hire individuals with great magnitude, but unless they were all pointed in the same direction, you’re not going to get the best output of the organization.” – Pat Grady summarizing a lesson he learned from Elon Musk.
49/ “The founder’s job is to make the receptionist rich.” – Doug Leone
50/ “The amount of progress that we make is directly proportional to the number of hard conversations that we’re willing to have.” – Mark Zuckerberg quoting Sheryl Sandberg.
52/ Hire for expertise, not experience. The best candidates talk about what they can do, rather than what they did.
53/ A great early-stage VP Sales focuses on how fast they can close qualified leads, not pipeline. Also, great at hiring SDRs. It’s a headcount business.
54/ A great early-stage VP Marketing focuses on demand gen and not product or corporate marketing.
55/ Kevin Scott, now CTO of Microsoft, would ask in candidate interviews: “What do you want your next job to be after this company?” Most of your team members realistically won’t stick with the same company forever. This is even more true as you scale to 20, then 50, then 100 team members and so on. But the best way to empower them to do good work is to be champions of their career. Help them level up. Help them achieve their dreams, and in turn, they will help you achieve yours.
56/ When you’re looking to hire people who scale, most founders understand that a candidate’s experience is only a proxy for success in the role. Instead, ask: “How many times have you had to change yourself in order to be successful?” Someone who is used to growing and changing according to their aspirations and the JD are more likely to be successful at a startup than their counterparts. Inspired by Pedro Franceschi, founder of Brex.
57/ The best leading indicator of a top performing manager is their ability to attract talent – both externally and internally. “The ability to attract talent, not just externally, but also internally where you’ve created a reputation where product leaders are excited to work not just with you, but under you.” Inspired by Hareem Mannan.
58/ When you’re hiring your first salespeople, hire in pairs. “If you hire just one salesperson and they can’t sell your product, you’re in trouble. Why? You don’t know if the problem is the person or the product. Hire two, and you have a point of comparison.” Inspired by Ryan Breslow.
59/ The longer you have no team members from underestimated and underrepresented backgrounds and demographics, the harder it is to recruit your first.
On governance…
60/ You don’t really need a board until you raise the A. On average, 3 members – 2 common shareholders, 1 preferred. The latter is someone who can represent the investors’ interests. When you get to 5 board seats (around the B or C), on average, 3 common, 1 preferred, and 1 independent.
61/ As you set up your corporate board of directors, set up your personal board of directors as well. People who care about you, just you and your personal growth and mental state. Folks that will be on your speed dial. You’ll thank yourself later.
62/ You can’t fire your investor, but investors can fire you, the founders. That’s why it’s just as important, if not more important, for founders to diligence their investors as investors do to founders. Why for founders? To see if there’s founder-investor fit. The best way is to talk to the VC’s or angel’s portfolio founders – both current and past. Most importantly, to talk to the founders in their past portfolio whose businesses didn’t work out. Many investors will be on your side, until they’re not. Find out early who has a track record for being in for the long haul.
63/ Echoing the previous point, all your enemies should be outside your four walls, and ideally very few resources, if at all, should be spent fighting battles inside your walls.
64/ Standard advisor equity is 0.25-1%. They typically have a 3-month cliff on vesting. Founder Institute has an amazing founder/advisor template that would be useful for bringing on early advisors. You can also calculate advisor equity as a function of:
(their hourly rate*) x (expected hours/wk of commitment) / (40 hours) x (length of advisorship**) / (last company valuation) *based on what you believe their salary would be **typically 1-2 years
65/ Have your asks for your monthly investor updates at the top of each email. Make it easy for them to help you. Investors get hundreds every month – from inside and outside their portfolio. I get ~40-50 every month, and I’m not even a big wig. Make it easy for investors to help you.
66/ Monthly/quarterly investor updates should include, and probably in the below order:
Your ask
Brief summary of what you do
Key metrics, cash flow, revenue
Key hires
New product features/offerings (if applicable)
67/ In his book The Messy Middle, Scott Belsky quotes Hunter Walk of Homebrew saying, “Never follow your investor’s advice and you might fail. Always follow your investor’s advice and you’ll definitely fail.”
68/ While you’re probably not going to bring on an independent board member until at or after your A-round, since they’re typically hard to find, once you do, offer them equity equivalent to a director or VP level, vested over two to three years (rather than four). Independent board members are a great source for diversity, and having shorter schedules, possibly with accelerated vesting schedules on “single trigger”, will keep the board fresh. Inspired by Seth Levine.
69/ “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation. In other words to take a concrete example, Google is a great company. Google is not a great company because Sequoia invested in them. Sequoia is a great venture firm because they invested in Google.” – Ashmeet Sidana. This seems like obvious advice, but you have no idea how many founders I’ve met started off incredible, then relied on their VC’s brand to carry them the rest of the way. Don’t rely solely on your investors for your own success.
70/ “Invest in relationships. Hollywood idolizes board meetings as the place where crucial decisions are made. The truth is the best ideas, collaboration, and feedback happen outside the boardroom in informal 1:1 meetings.” – Reid Hoffman
71/ When your company gets to the pre-IPO stage or late growth stages, if you, as the founding CEO, are fully vested and have less than 10% ownership in your own company, it’s completely fine to re-up and ask your board for another 5% over 5 years. No cliffs, vesting starts from the first month. Inspired by Jason Calacanis.
72/ A great independent board member usually takes about 6-9 months of recruiting and coffee chats. You should start recruiting for one as early as right after A-round closes. In terms of compensation, a great board member should get the same amount of equity as a director of engineering at your current stage of the company, with immediate monthly vesting and no cliff. Inspired by Delian Asparouhov.
73/ If your cap table doesn’t have shareholders with equity that is differentiated (i.e. everyone owns the same size of a slice of the pie), then their value to the company won’t be differentiated. No one will feel responsible for doing more for the business. And everyone does as much as the lowest common denominator. It becomes a “I only have to do as much as [lowest performer] is doing. Or else it won’t be fair.”
74/ “If you ‘protect’ your investor updates with logins or pins, you will also protect them from actually being read.” – Paul Graham
On building communities…
75/ Every great community has value and values. Value, what are members getting out of being a part of the community. Values, a strict code of conduct – explicit and/or implicit, that every member follows to uphold the quality of the community.
76/ Build for good actors, rather than hedge against the bad actors. I love Wikipedia’s Jimmy Wales‘ steak knives analogy. Imagine you’re designing a restaurant that serves steak. Subsequently, you’re going to be giving everyone steak knives. There’s always the possibility that people with knives will stab each other, but you won’t lock everyone in cages to hedge against that possibility at your restaurant. It’s actually rather rare for something like that to happen, and we have various institutions to deal with that problem. It’s not perfect, but most people would agree that they wouldn’t want to live in a cage. As Jimmy shares, “I just think, too often, if you design for the worst people, then you’re failing design for good people.”
77/ If you’re a consumer product, Twitter memes may be the new key to a great GTM (go-to-market) strategy. (e.g. Party Round, gm). As a bonus, a great way to get the attention of VCs. There’s a pretty strong correlation between Twitter memes and getting venture funding. Community, check. Brand, check. Retention and engagement, check.
On pricing…
78/ For B2B SaaS, do annual auto-price increases. Aim for 10% every year. Why?
Customers will try to negotiate for earlier renewal, longer contract periods.
When you waive the price increases, customers feel like they’re winning.
You can upsell them more easily to more features.
79/ If you’re a SaaS product, you shouldn’t charge per seat. Focus on charging based on your outcome-based value metric (# customers, # views per video), rather than your process-based value metric (e.g. per user, per time spent). If you charge per seat, aka a process-based value metric, everything works out if your customer is growing. But incentives are misaligned when your customer isn’t. After all, more users using your product makes you more sticky, so give unlimited seats and upsell based on product upgrades.
80/ Charge consumers and SMBs monthly. And enterprises annually. The former will hesitate on larger bills and on their own long-term commitment. The latter doesn’t want to go back to procurement every month to get an invoice approved. Equally so, the latter likes to negotiate for longer contracts in exchange for discounts. Inspired by Jason Lemkin.
On product/strategy…
81/ Having a launch event, like Twitchcon, Dreamforce, Twilio’s Signal, or even Descript’s seasonal launch events, aligns both your customers and team on the same calendar. Inspired by David Sacks’ Cadence. For customers, this generates hype and expectation for the product. For your team, this also sets:
Product discipline, through priorities, where company leaders have to think months in advance for, and
Expectations and motivates team members to help showcase a new product.
82/ Startups often die by indigestion, not starvation. Exercise extreme focus in your early days, rather than offering different product lines and features.
83/ “Epic startups have magic.” Users intuitively understand what your product does and are begging you to give it to them. If you don’t have magic yet, focus on defining – quantitatively and qualitatively – what your product’s magic is. Ideally, 80% of people who experience the magic take the next step (i.e. signup, free trial, download, etc.). Inspired by John Danner.
84/ To find product-market fit (PMF), ask your customers: “How would you feel if you could no longer use our product?” Users would have three choices: “Very disappointed”, “Somewhat disappointed”, and “Not disappointed”. If 40% or more of the users say “very disappointed”, then you’ve got your PMF. Inspired by Rahul Vohra.
85/ For any venture-backed startup founder, complacency is cancer. As Ben Horowitz would put it, you’re fighting in wartime. You don’t have the luxury to act as if you’re in peacetime. As Reid Hoffman once said, “an entrepreneur is someone who will jump off a cliff and assemble an airplane on the way down.”
86/ Good founders are great product builders. Great founders are great company builders.
87/ To reach true scale as an enterprise, very few companies do so with only one product. Start thinking about your second product early, but will most likely not be executed on until $10-20M ARR. Inspired by Harry Stebbings.
88/ Build an MVT, not MVP. “An MVP is a basic early version of a product that looks and feels like a simplified version of the eventual vision. An MVT, on the other hand, does not attempt to look like the eventual product. It’s rather a specific test of an assumption that must be true for the business to succeed.” – Gagan Biyani
89/ Focus on habit formation. “Habit formation requires recurring organic exposure on other networks. Said another way: after people install your app, they need to see your content elsewhere to remind them that your app exists.” And “If you can’t use your app from the toilet or while distracted—like driving—your users will have few opportunities to form a habit.” Inspired by Nikita Bier.
90/ “Great products take off by targeting a specific life inflection point, when the urgency to solve a problem is most acute.” – Nikita Bier. Inflection points include going to college, getting one’s first job, buying their first car or home, getting married, and so on.
91/ You’re going to pivot. So instead of being married to the solution or product, marry yourself to the problem. As Mike Maples Jr. once said about Floodgates portfolio, “90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.”
92/ Retention falls when expectation don’t meet reality. So, either fix the marketing/positioning of the product or change the product. The former is easier to change than the latter.
93/ To better visualize growth of the business, build a state machine – a graph that captures every living person on Earth and how they interact with your product. The entire world’s population should fall into one of five states: people who never used your product, first time users, inactive users, low value users, and high value users. And every process in your business is governed by the flow from one state to another.
For example, when first time users become inactive users, those are bounce rates, and your goal is to reduce churn before you focus on sales and marketing (when people who never used your product become first time users). When low value users become high value users, those are upgrades, which improve your net retention. Phil Libin took an hour to break down the state machine, which is probably one of the best videos for founders building for product-market fit and how to plan for growth that I’ve ever seen. It’s silly of me to think I can boil it down to a few words.
94/ When a customer cancels their subscription, it’s either your fault or no one’s fault. If they cancel, it is either because of the economy now or you oversold and underdelivered. So, make the cancellation (or downgrading) process easy and as positive as the onboarding. If so, maybe they’ll come back. Maybe they’ll refer a friend. Inspired by Jason Lemkin.
On market insight and competitive analysis…
95/ To find your market, ask potential customers: “How would you feel if you could no longer use [major player]’s product?” Again, with the same three choices: “Very disappointed”, “Somewhat disappointed”, and “Not disappointed”. If 40% or more of your potential customers say “not disappointed”, you might have a space worth doubling down on.
96/ Have a contrarian point of view. Traits of a top-tier contrarian view:
People can disagree with it, like the thesis of a persuasive essay. It’s debatable.
Something you truly believe and can advocate for. Before future investors, customers, and team members do, you have to have personal conviction in it. And you have to believe people will be better off because of it.
It’s unique to you. Something you’ve earned through going through the idea maze. A culmination of your experiences, skills, personality, instincts, intuition, and scar tissue.
Not controversial for the sake of it. Don’t just try to stir the pot for the sake of doing so.
It teaches your audience something – a new perspective. Akin to an “A-ha!” moment for them.
Backed by evidence. Not necessarily a universal truth, but your POV should be defensible.
It’s iterative. Be willing to change your mind when the facts change.
97/ Falling in love with the problem is more powerful than falling in love with the solution.
98/ If you’re in enterprise or SaaS, you can check in on a competitor’s growth plan by searching LinkedIn to see how many sales reps they have + are hiring, multiply by $500K, and that’s how much in bookings they plan to add this year. Multiply by $250K if the target market is SMB. Inspired by Jason Lemkin.
99/ Failures by your perceived competitors may adversely impact your company. Inspired by Opendoor’s 10-K (page 15).
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal or investment advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
When winds and waves a mutual contest wage, These foaming anger, those impelling rage; Thy blissful light can cheer the dismal gloom, And foster hopes beyond a wat’ry doom.
– John William Smith, “The Lighthouse,” 1814
Marc Andreessenanswered a few weeks back to a question that has been ringing in many founders’ minds. What product do founders want to buy from investors? For the past few years, the natural answer rose as operational expertise. A notion that still holds true for the earliest stages of starting a business when you bring on strategic angels as small checks to help you find product-market fit. As you continue down the path and start raising institutional capital, the answer becomes more and more amorphous.
I've always thought the biggest thing a founder buys from a VC is a bridge loan of credibility in advance of tangible evidence.
Why do investors look for signal in the first place? A means to de-risk a very early, and very risky bet. A product of asymmetric information. Investors invest in lines not dots, but the truth is, most investors don’t have the time – luxury or ability – to see all lines. So what they must do instead is look for specific dots – be it traction, co-investors, or founding team “legitimacy” – that would help them trace out of a line of best fit. As Precursor’s Charles Hudson wrote earlier this week,
After 8ish years of pre-seed investing in 300+ companies, the biggest gap I see between VCs and founders is the relative weight placed on current traction by founders and the importance the next VC puts on market opportunity. Only gets bigger with each extra round raised.
1. Founders focus on traction – it's quantitative, many want fundraising to be deterministic (it isn't) 2. VCs have better market intel on what "great" traction looks like 3. For a co w top 10% traction, that can be the story. Applies to very few.
By definition, signal should be a leading indicator of long-term business value. Yet, for most investors in the world, what they look for are lagging indicators of conviction.
The signal paradox
In the investing world, there’s a paradoxical notion of signal. Through many conversations with syndicate leads, data teams of investing platforms, and LPs, I realized a common thread. For the majority of investors in the world, at the early stages, signal comes not from the founder, but from other funders.
In a syndicate, there are three things that make a deal move fast:
Great co-investors
Great traction
And, great team
Arguably in that order. Synonymously, as an emerging fund manager, the best way to raise from family offices* (I’ll explain below why FO’s are my reference point here) who are notoriously closed off to cold emails, you need:
Tier 1 VCs as your co-investors
Tier 1 GPs as your fund’s LPs
Or, deals that family offices wanted to get into anyway (which isn’t mutually exclusive from the above as well)
Quite noticeably, for many investors out there, signal comes in the form of people with a proven track record already. Or to break it down even more. Signal comes in the form of familiarity. Familiarity in the form of warm intros or college classmates or pattern recognition. The easiest pattern to follow for any investor without needing to do too much diligence or requiring too much personal conviction (I know, it’s funny), but to be able to write fast checks, is other top-tier investors. If you’re a founder who’ve fundraised before, you’re probably very familiar with this notion. Consciously or subconsciously. I’m gonna bet money that you’ve been asked, “Which other investors are you talking to? And how far along the process are you with them?” Or simply, “Do you have a lead investor?”
While there are some nuances to the last question, like the inability for smaller investors to pay for legal counsel fees, to have the resources to completely diligence a startup, or just that the check size required to lead/fill the round is just too large for them, generally speaking, my argument still stands. Put nicely, for many investors, they’re looking for external validation of the product. Put harshly, that question is a band-aid approach to their inability to get to conviction.
As a founder, you have to realize that capital has become a commodity. Investors are in the business of selling money. And subsequently, making $1 become $2. Or for a great early-stage investor, $1 becomes $5. There are many ways to underwrite risk. The one that requires the least amount of new thinking, or thought leadership, is following firms who have proven their investing acumen already and consistently.
*Additional context on family offices
I specifically mention family offices above since most LPs in Fund I’s are individuals and angels. Mostly small checks. And can quickly fill up the limit the SEC has set for how many accredited investors you can have investing in your fund. And their reason to invest is based on the founding GPs – very similar to why investors would back startups at the pre-seed stage.
While some GPs do pitch to institutional LPs (i.e. endowments, pension funds, fund of funds, etc.), very, very little institutional capital goes to Fund I’s and II’s – very similar to the fact that Tiger or Coatue very rarely invest before the A. You have yet to have a track record where they can fit into their financial model. They’re underwriting a very different type of risk. And so, if you’re a Fund I GP looking for larger checks, you’re looking to generational wealth in the form of family offices, who are surprisingly closed off to cold emails. But I digress.
The surplus of “signal” in 2021
In the last year, we’ve seen some record-breaking numbers. We’ve been in an exciting boom market. There have never been more venture dollars poured into the ecosystem. In fact, there were 1,148 concurrent unicorns in 2021. Half of which were new. In comparison, 2020 minted just 167 unicorns. Just looking at the two charts from Crunchbase below, we see just how crazy 2021 was.
And quite reflectively, there have never been as many “experts” in the market. To be fair, when everyone’s portfolio and/or startup is raising consecutive rounds of funding and mark ups are a dime a dozen, psychologically, I would also feel good about myself too. Everyone’s an “expert” in a boom market, especially if a16z or Tiger is leading the round. And a16z’s done double the number of deals they did in 2020. And Tiger’s invested 4 out of every 5 business days. In full disclosure, I did feel quite proud of myself as well. Nevertheless, I do my best to stay humble in this business.
Interestingly enough, while there were more seed, pre-seed and angel dollars going into startups, progressively, less startups were getting funded. Effectively, while the overall number of dollars invested look great, less founders come to bat. A smaller top of funnel means a more concentrated funnel in consecutive rounds.
The truth is fundraising will get harder over the next year and valuations won’t be as high. You can expect the current market correction in the public markets to soon be reflected in the private ones. So you may need to spend 12 months longer growing into your next round’s target valuation.
So where should investors look for signal?
In fairness, I am ill-equipped to answer this question for the masses. And most likely will never be fully equipped to make generalist statements. That said, I have and will continue to share what signal looks like for me. And if you’re a founder, here’s my template to conviction.
Two weeks ago, I broke down my sense of intuition around startup investing. I won’t go too deep in this essay, but I do share a more detailed internal calculus there. To put it simply, I look for different signals across the spectrum of idea plausibility and stages.
Signal by idea plausibility
Idea Plausibility
Key Question
Context
Plausible
Why this?
Most people can see why this idea should exist. Because of the consensus, you’re competing in a saturated market of similar, if not the same ideas. Therefore, to stand out, you must show traction.
Possible
Why now?
It makes sense that this idea should exist, but it’s unclear whether there’s a market for this. To stand out, you have to convince investors on the market, and subsequently the market timing.
Preposterous
Why you?
Hands down, this is just crazy. You’re clearly in the non-consensus. Now the only way you can redeem yourself is if you have incredible insight and foresight. What’s the future you see and why does that make sense given the information we have today? If an investor doesn’t walk out of that meeting having been mind-blown on your lesson from the future, you’ve got no chance.
Signals by stage
Stage of investment
Key Question
Context
Pre-seed
Why you?
The earlier you go, the less quantitative data you have to support your bet. And therefore, your bet is largely on the founder. For me, it matters less their XX years of experience, but more so their expertise. In other words, insight. Can I learn something new in my first meeting (and consecutive ones too) with them?
At the pre-seed, there is also one more key signal I look for in founders – their level of focus. Rather than wanting to do everything, can they streamline their resources to tackle one thing? What is their minimum viable assumption they have to prove before they can build their MVP (or MLP – minimum lovable product)? Startups often die of indigestion, not starvation.
Seed
Why now?
By the seed stage these days, you’ve either found your product-market fit or really close to finding it. The larger your round, the more you’re feeling the pull of the market. Whereas pull can come be measured (i.e. daily organic sign ups, demand converting to supply in a marketplace, etc.), sometimes when you’re at the cusp of it, there’s a level of foresight that is required. Some leading indicator for the business often comes as a lagging indicator from industry trends. What is the inflection point(s) (political, socio-economic, technological, cultural) we are at today that is going to have compounding effects on the business?
Series A
Why this?
By the time you get to the A, you’re ready to scale. In other words, what you mainly need is to add fuel to the fire. I place a larger emphasis on traction here. Admittedly for me, compared to the two earlier stages, this is more of a numbers conversation. The best founders here have a very clear picture of what worked and didn’t work for the business. They’re already familiar with their main GTM channel, but are exploring new opportunities for channel-market fit where they need capital to test.
Not incredibly pertinent yet, but founders will have started thinking about their Act II. What’s the next product they’re going to offer to secure their immortality in the market?
In closing
A simple litmus test I often share with founders on signal is:
Your ability to raise capital is directly correlated with your ability to inspire confidence in your investor that you will get straight A’s with little to no help.
This isn’t just true for myself, but also most investors out there. While the best investors out there will always be there for you in your time of need, before they decide to jump aboard the same ship with you, you need to convince them that you’re a top 10% founder. Or a top 1% in-the-making.
While I dislike using the dating analogy, it’s an apt comparison in this case. You’re not going to share your deepest, least desirable secrets on your first date. You’re also not going around saying you’re the perfect – and I underscore perfect – partner without any flaws. ‘Cause that’s as much baloney as an unknown African prince in your inbox telling you to help him secure $5 million in gold bars by helping him set up a Swiss bank account with a deposit of $10K. It’s too good to be true. In reality, you’re most likely going to share that you have a number of great qualities, but you’re still growing in many ways.
Admit what you don’t know or don’t have. As long as it’s not mission critical or the biggest risk in your business (and if it is, figure that out before you raise VC funding), the investors who truly believe in you will understand. Always err on the side of honesty, but not bravado.
‘Cause you yourself are a signal. If you’ve got your bases covered and still have to go out of your way to convince an investor or try to flip their “no”, they’re probably not worth your time.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal or investment advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
A founder recently asked me how investors would perceive her going through two different accelerator programs. Specifically, what would investors think if she took dilutive capital from two investors who care about ownership targets, yet have similar, if not the same, value adds to her business?
How each type of investor thinks about dilution
It’s a great question. Unsurprisingly, a nuanced one as well.
Honestly, a “messy” cap table or early dilution is an excuse investors give when they’re not sold on you or the business. Investors regress to the “why this”, or otherwise known as, traction, when you haven’t convinced them on “why you.”
Investors want to be excited about you. They want to brag about you to their partnership, colleagues and friends. But if you don’t give them a strong reason to, they’re going to regress to what they know will return them capital. Predictability. And that comes in the form of traction. But I digress.
If Max Levchin or Phil Libin or Elon Musk or Justin Kan – pick your favorite serial entrepreneur with unicorn exits under their belt – wanted to raise for a new startup, no matter what it is or how early, people are gonna jump on the opportunity to regardless of how saturated the cap table is.
Let’s stand in the shoes of an investor for a second. Of which there are three main kinds of early investors.
Angels
Non-lead VCs and syndicate leads
VCs who lead rounds
For individual angels, ownership targets don’t matter. They just want a piece of the action. In fact, multiple sources of signal and validation give them more confidence to invest. Especially if you’ve taken previous or current checks from your small handful of top tier VCs. These angels’ check sizes are negligible on the cap table, so they won’t end up crowding anyone else out.
On the other hand, notice how I bucketed non-lead VCs and syndicate leads into the same category. Why? These investors are writing bigger checks. They won’t price the round. And they move a lot faster if someone with a great track record is leading the round. Once again, ownership also doesn’t matter, but great co-investors do. As long as ownership targets don’t matter, the excuse of dilution is merely lip service. The story here is “I just need to get in the best deals, so I can raise my next fund from LPs.” Or “I need build my track record as an investor, so I can raise a fund one day.” I’m going to generalize here really quickly. While it doesn’t apply to every non-lead investor, it does apply to the vast majority. I dare say, 90% of them. These investors move on the combination of three levers:
Great traction
Great team,
And great co-investors – the last of which is often the most important.
The more of the above levers you have as a founder, the faster you’ll get a check from the above individuals and institutions. Why do great co-investors matter so much? Outside of branding and social rapport, their investors – their LPs – also want to invest in these top deals led by these funds, but often can’t invest into these top-tier funds since everyone wants to get into a16z or Sequoia. In fact, for many of these top-tier funds, there’s a massive waitlist of LPs.
Finally, lead VCs. Ownership does matter. Really, this is the only audience you need to worry about when it comes to the topic of early dilution. While you as a founder should be dilution-preserving, sometimes, taking the capital (and subsequently, the dilution) is the best option. Maybe you really need something from an accelerator or an early investor that would be hard to get for you yourself. At that point, their capital becomes optimization capital. Early checks can get you from A to B faster, with less burn potentially, and with less detours.
So, the question you have to figure out if you take subsequent capital injections is that each time you dilute the cap table, did you reach an important milestone? What’s worrying is if you keep diluting your cap table without making meaningful progress each time. Think in the framework of milestone-based financing. Raise what you need, while giving you and your team an appropriate margin of error.
In closing
As a footnote, it’s also important to consider how much equity you as the founder will have left upon exit. If you’re going through large amounts of early dilution, you’re going to have very little upside unless you go through a massive exit. Unlike investors who invest in many businesses and have diversified their risk appetite, you, the founder, have put all your eggs in one basket. So if you care about the upside, you want to reduce dilution unless there is an absolute necessity to raise capital.
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