S1E3: Eric Woo

Eric Woo is co-founder and CEO of Revere, where he leads product development and investment analysis & due diligence efforts.

Prior to starting Revere, he was Head of Institutional Capital at AngelList, the world’s largest online venture capital investment platform that supports over $10B in assets and has participated in the financing of over 190 “unicorn” companies. At AngelList, Eric worked closely with investors to curate early-stage fund and deal opportunities. He also developed systematic and data-driven strategies for institutional investors.

Over the last 12 years, Eric has helped allocate over $160 million in venture funds and direct co-investments. Notably, he played a key role in establishing the emerging manager investment programs at Top Tier Capital and Northgate Capital, organizations that collectively have more than $15B in AUM. Eric is an acknowledged thought leader in the VC emerging managers ecosystem.

Before his venture career, Eric worked in pricing and risk management for a large insurance company and financial guarantor. He also has experience in online marketing and private market research. A Bay Area native, Eric graduated with a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from UC Berkeley and has been a CFA charter holder since 2004.

You can find Eric on his socials here:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/ericjwoo
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ericwoo/

And huge thanks to this episode’s sponsor, Alchemist Accelerator: https://alchemistaccelerator.com/superclusters

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

Brought to you by Alchemist Accelerator.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[03:30] How did Eric pivot from being an engineer to an asset manager?
[09:52] Building emerging manager programs at Top Tier and Northgate
[15:25] How does Eric define conviction?
[17:23] What was the thesis that Eric raised his fund of funds on?
[20:00] How much does an established fund’s portfolio is allocated to emerging managers?
[23:48] How did Eric pitch institutional LPs to join AngelList?
[32:48] How does Eric measure the ROI on hosting events?
[36:24] How does Eric pitch Revere to my relatives?
[39:29] How does Revere rate emerging managers?
[47:49] What are telltale signs of a fund’s outperformance?
[51:36] The value of community
[58:10] What are subconscious decisions LPs make that deserve a double take?
[1:02:09] Why strategy drift is not a bad thing
[1:04:57] What VC firm turned identity into culture?
[1:07:39] What is Eric’s nighttime routine?
[1:09:50] Angel investing is to tipping as LP investing is to ____
[1:13:45] What is one thing Eric recommends GPs do but no one ever listens?
[1:15:18] What is an investment opportunity Eric missed because of what he didn’t do rather than what he did?
[1:18:21] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring!
[1:20:58] Legal disclaimer

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

The Science of Re-Upping

baseball, follow on

Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.

The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.

But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!

As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!

While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.


The year was 1997.

Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.

Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”

Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.

If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.

And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.

But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.

So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”

Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”

You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:

“You have to either:

  1. Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
  2. Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
  3. Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”

For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.

To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.

Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:

The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence

On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.

We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.

Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”

But I digress.

Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.

In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.

For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:

E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.

What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.

On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.

How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.

It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:

  • Have a real chance at the championship title.
  • Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
  • And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.

… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.

The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.

Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?

If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?

Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?

Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.

How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.

And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.

If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.

But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.

The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.

It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.

Take for instance…

Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.  

Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.

Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.

In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.

All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:

  1. Is your entry point a good entry point?
  2. Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?

For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.

For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.

If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉

Photo by Gene Gallin on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

S1E2: Beezer Clarkson

Beezer Clarkson leads Sapphire Partners‘ investments in venture funds domestically and internationally. Beezer began her career in financial services over 20 years ago at Morgan Stanley in its global infrastructure group. Since, she has held various direct and indirect venture investment roles, as well as operational roles in software business development at Hewlett Packard. Prior to joining Sapphire in 2012, Beezer managed the day-to-day operations of the Draper Fisher Jurvetson Global Network, which then had $7 billion under management across 16 venture funds worldwide.

In 2016, Beezer led the launch of OpenLP, an effort to help foster greater understanding in the entrepreneur-to-LP tech ecosystem. Beezer earned a bachelor’s in government from Wesleyan University, where she served on the board of trustees and currently serves as an advisor to the Wesleyan Endowment Investment Committee. She is currently serving on the board of the NVCA and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School.

You can find Beezer on her socials here:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/beezer232
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/elizabethclarkson/

And huge thanks to this episode’s sponsor, Alchemist Accelerator: https://alchemistaccelerator.com/superclusters

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

Brought to you by Alchemist Accelerator.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[02:57] Who was Beezer’s first mentor?
[06:57] How did Beezer get to work with the founder of eBay?
[10:45] The strength of diverse backgrounds
[14:11] How Hustle Fund convinced Foundry Group to invest in their fund
[15:27] Why should another venture fund exist in this world?
[19:41] What does proprietary “access” to deal flow mean?
[23:53] Superpowers on the Sapphire Partners team
[25:35] How does Sapphire resolve disagreements?
[27:11] Why does entire Sapphire team meet with GPs?
[28:18] A sneak peek into Sapphire investment process
[33:34] What does Sapphire look for in a pitch deck?
[34:58] The art and science behind Sapphire’s own portfolio construction
[43:37] How does Sapphire look at fund managers’ portfolio construction?
[47:50] Meaningful fund metrics in the first 5-7 years of a VC fund
[52:44] How to think about recycling
[56:15] What keeps Beezer humble?
[58:22] What is an investment opportunity Beezer missed because what she didn’t do?
[1:04:03] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring!
[1:06:39] Legal Disclaimer

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

“It’s the access and why do the great people pick you that is much harder. And that speaks to what it is that you, the investor, are bringing to the table. There’s an LP-GP corollary to this too. The strongest GPs can pick their LPs, what gives the access from the LP side. So it’s a really different way of saying why are you so special. But it’s repeatable.”

“The good and the bad of being an LP is that you’re the peanut gallery to the show. So yes, a VC doesn’t exist unless LPs back them. The LPs are limited partners. We’re limited, which is there for a reason. You’re not driving the bus. There’s humility in that. I liken it to being a parent. There’s all sorts of things you take pride in in your kids. But at the end of the day, it’s your fund; it’s not me. You’re the one making the choices. The same way, it’s the entrepreneurs that make the companies.”


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

S1E1: Chris Douvos

Chris Douvos founded Ahoy Capital in 2018 to build an intentionally right-sized firm that could pursue investment excellence while prizing a spirit of partnership with all of its constituencies. A pioneering investor in the micro-VC movement, Chris has been a fixture in venture capital for nearly two decades. In addition to successfully identifying and catalyzing nascent funds, he bridges a gap between the providers of capital and the consumers of capital by creating platforms for transparent dialogue. Chris authors the blog SuperLP in which he chronicles his adventures investing in venture capital and private equity; and his brick oven pizza parties, small gatherings of LPs, GPs, and entrepreneurs, are well-known in the Valley. He is sought after not only for investment capital, but also for his advice, and serves on numerous managers’ advisory boards.

Prior to Ahoy Capital, Chris spearheaded investment efforts at Venture Investment Associates, and The Investment Fund for Foundations. He learned the craft of illiquid investing at Princeton University’s endowment. He started his business career as a strategy consultant at Monitor Company. Chris regularly speaks at industry conferences and business schools and is a frequent resource for tech and business media. He earned his B.A. with Distinction in history from Yale College in 1994 and an M.B.A. from Yale School of Management in 2001. He was awarded the CFA Charter in 2004.

You can find Chris on his socials here:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cdouvos
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/chrisdouvos/

And huge thanks to this episode’s sponsor, Alchemist Accelerator: https://alchemistaccelerator.com/superclusters

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

Brought to you by Alchemist Accelerator.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[03:01] What Chris learned from the founder of Greylock and the Chief Investment Officer at Yale’s Endowment.
[06:25] How a timber pitch and losing the nose game earned a Chris a front-row seat to venture capital.
[10:35] How 2001 is similar to 2023.
[12:44] What legislation makes California special?
[13:11] Do firms need to have geographical presence?
[16:44] How did Chris first start to build his deal flow?
[23:17] What needs to go in a good cold email
[24:53] Breaking down how Chris constructed his first opinion on great venture capital firms
[30:04] How did Josh Kopelman build ‘ecosystem as a service’ in 2004
[33:28] How did Chris end up backing Data Collective
[37:52] What are the 4 leading indicators of fund manager outperformance?
[48:46] Which firm of Chris’ recent portfolio is willing to be wrong and alone?
[51:32] Chris’ Peter Dolan impression
[56:09] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring
[58:45] Legal disclaimer

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

“Entrepreneurship is like a gas. It’s hottest when it’s compressed.”

“Have an opinion. Have a viewpoint. There are so many investors who are just caught up in these tides. They’re heat-seeking missiles, looking for the new, new thing. The reality is that by the time, the new, new thing is new to them, it’s already a little bit longer in the tooth in the ecosystem — all the great deals have been done.”

“I’m looking for well-rounded holes that are made up of jagged pieces that fit together nicely.”

“OPM is like opium. It’s a hell of a drug.”


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on Instagram: https://instagram.com/super.clusters

Launching Superclusters

Hello friends,

I did a thing.

I started a podcast.

So why the name Superclusters?

I’ve always been a fan of easter eggs. Cup of Zhou also happens to be one of them. Superclusters is another. But this time, rather than leaving it for surprise, I’d love to spell out why and with that, the purpose of this podcast.

In the startup world, we always say startups are the stars of our universe. They shine the brightest and they light up the night sky. We also have tons of aphorisms in the startup world. For instance, “Aim for the stars, land on the moon”. Startups are often called moonshots. They need to achieve escape velocity. And so on.

So if startups are the stars of the universe, galaxies would be VC firms that have a portfolio of stars.

And if galaxies were VC firms, superclusters would be LPs. Superclusters are collections of multiple galaxies. For example, the supercluster that the Milky Way is in is called Laniakea (Hawaiian for “immense heavens,” for the curious).

So why a podcast on the LP world?

  1. The LP industry in ten years will be much bigger than it is today. We are not even close to the TAM of it.
  2. The LP industry will be a lot more transparent than it is today. FYI, as many of you know already, the industry is very opaque. Many want and still like to keep their knowledge proprietary. But what’s proprietary today will be common place tomorrow. I’m not here to share anyone’s deepest, darkest secrets, or anyone’s social security number. That’s none of my business. But the tactics that make the greatest LPs great are already being shared over intimate happy hours and dinners between a select few. And it’s only a matter of time before the rest of the world catches up. We saw the same happen with the VC industry, and now people are moving even more upstream.
  3. I think of content on a cartesian X-Y graph. On the X-axis, there’s intellectual stimulation. In other words, interesting. On the Y-axis, there’s emotional stimulation, or otherwise known as fun. Most financial services (for instance, hedge fund, private equity, venture capital, options trading) content tends to highly index on intellectual stimulation and not emotional. And for the purpose of this pod, I want to focus on making investing in VC funds fun AND interesting.

You can find my podcast on YouTube, Spotify, and Apple Podcasts for now. In full transparency, waiting on RSS feed approval for the other platforms, but soon to be shared on other platforms near you.

You can expect episodes to come out weekly with ten episodes per season, and a month break in between each to ensure that I can bring you the best quality content. 🙂

You can find my first episode with the amazing Chris Douvos here:

Or if you’re an Apple Podcast person, here’s the Apple Podcast link.

Thank you’s

I am no doubt flawed, clearly evidenced by my verbal “ummmm’s” and “likes” in the podcast. But nevertheless pumped to begin this journey as a podcast host. I expect to grow in this journey tackling the emerging LP space and running a podcast, and I hope you can grow with me. So, any and all feedback is deeply appreciated. Recommendations of who to get on. What questions would you like answered. Formats that you find interesting. I’m all ears.

That said, I’m grateful to everyone who made this possible. My mighty editors, Tyler and JP. Without the two of you, I’d still be struggling telling head from tail on how to do J-cuts and L-cuts. The sole sponsor for the pod, Ravi and Alchemist. And while the pod itself is separate from Alchemist altogether, Ravi pushed me to make it happen. And for that and more, I am where I am now. Every single LP who took a bet on me for Season 1 when all I had for them was an idea and a goal. Chris. Beezer. Eric. Jamie. Courtney. Ben. Howard. Amit. Samir. Jeff and Martin.

And to everyone, who’s offered feedback, advice, introductions and pure energy to fuel all of this. Thank you!

And to you, my readers, I appreciate you taking time out of your busy day when there are so many things that fight for your attention, that you spend time with me every week! If I could just be a bit more self-serving, if you have the chance to tune in, I’d be extremely grateful if you could share it with one LP or one GP who could take something away from it.

Cheers,

David

P.S. Don’t worry. I’ll still continue to write on this blog weekly about everything else in between. That’s a habit I’m not willing to give up any time soon.

P.P.S. I’m already working on and recording for Season 2 of the pod, and I can tell you now that things will only get spicier.

P.P.P.S. Due to a million bugs and a half, I’m still working on launching a dedicated website for the podcast (superclusters.co), but until then, I’ll be sharing the show notes of each episode here.


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Non-obvious Hiring Questions I’ve Fallen in Love with

read, book, child, question

Recently, I’ve been chatting with a number of GPs and LPs looking to make their first hires. Many of whom hadn’t built a team prior. Now I’m no expert, nor would I ever claim to be one. But I’ve been very lucky to hire and work with some stellar talent.

They asked me how I think about interviewing, selecting, as well as onboarding. I’ll save the last of which for a future blogpost, but for the purpose of this one, if you frequent this blog, you’ll know I love good questions. And well, I get really really nerdy about them. So, as I shared my four favorite, nonobvious interview questions as of late with them (some I’ve used more than others), I will also share them with you.

I won’t cover the table stakes. Why are you excited to be here? What skills are you a B+/A- at? And what are you A+++ in? Why you? Etc.

If you had to hire everyone based only on you knowing how good they are at a certain video game, what video game would you pick?

I recently heard Patrick O’Shaughnessy ask that question to a guest on his podcast, and I found it inextricably profound. While the question was directed at Palmer Luckey, who has a past in video games, the words “video game” can easily be replaced by any other activity or topic of choice and be equally as revealing. Be it sports. Or an art form. Or how they grasp a certain topic. Even, putting them in front of a Nobel Prize winner and see how quickly they realize they’re in front of one.

The last example may be stretching it a bit, but has its origin in one of my favorite fun facts about the CRT — the cognitive reflection test. Effectively, a test designed to ask the minimum number of questions in order to determine someone’s intelligence. But in a parodical interpretation of the test, two of the smartest minds in the world, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, decided to make an even shorter version of the test to measure one’s intelligence. The test would be to see that if one were to put you in front of Amos Tversky, one of the most humble human beings out there despite his intelligence, how long it would take you to realize that the person sitting across from you was smarter than you. The shorter it took you, the smarter you were. But I digress (although there’s your fun fact for the day).

The reality is that any activity that requires a great amount of detail, nuance, resilience, frustration and failure probably qualify to be mad-libbed into that question. Nevertheless, it’s quite interesting to see what someone would suggest, and a great way of:

  1. Assessing how deep a candidate can go deep on a particular subject,
  2. How well they can relay that depth of knowledge to a layperson, and
  3. How they build a framework around that.

I hate surprises. Can you tell me something that might go wrong now so that I’m not surprised when it happens?

Simon Sinek has always been one for great soundbites. And the above question is no exception. It’s a great way of asking what is one of your weaknesses. Without asking what is your weakness? Most, if not all hiring managers are probably accustomed to getting a rose-tinted “weakness” that turns out is a strength when asking the weakness question to candidates. It is, after all, in the candidate’s best interest to appear the most suitable for the job description as possible. And the JD doesn’t include anything about having weaknesses. Only strengths… and responsibilities.

At the same time, while the weakness question makes sense, when there is an honest answer, I’ve seen as many hiring managers use the associated answer to discount a candidate’s ability to succeed in the role, before given the chance. While this is still throwing caution to the wind, for one to be open-minded when asking this question, at the very least, you’re more likely to get an honest one. At least until this question becomes extremely popular.

Another version, thought a lot more subtle, is: What three adjectives would you use to describe your sibling?

I won’t get into the nuances here, but if you’re curious for a deeper dive, would recommend reading this blogpost. The TL;DR is that when we describe others (especially those we know well), we often use adjectives that juxtapose how we see ourselves in relation to them.

What did you do in your last role that no one else in that role has ever done?

This is one of my favorite professors, Janet Brady’s, favorite questions, and ever since I learned of it, it’s been mine as well. Your mileage may vary. Of particular note, I look for talent with entrepreneurial natures to them. Most of what I work on are usually pre-product-market fit in nature. In other times, and not mutually exclusive to the former, requires us to re-examine the status quo. What got us here — as a team, as a company, as an industry, or as a citizen of the world — may not get us there.

And there is bias here in that I enjoy working with people who push the boundaries rather than let the boundaries push them. And I love people who have asked the question “What if?” in the past and has successfully executed against that, even if it meant they had to try, try again.

What haven’t you achieved that you want to achieve?

Steven Rosenblatt has always been world-class at hiring. By far, one of the best minds when it comes to scaling teams. For a deeper dive, and some of his other go-to questions, I highly recommend checking out this blogpost.

When you’re building a world-class team, you need people to self-select themselves in and out of the culture in which you want to build. Whether it’s Pulley’s culture of move fast and ruthlessly prioritize to build a high-performance “sports team or orchestra” or On Deck’s non-values, it’s about making it clear that you’re in not because you’re peeking through rose-tinted glasses, but that you know full well, that you will be confronted by reality, yet you still remain optimistic. To do that, you need:

  1. A tight knit team who hold the same values
  2. And folks with a chip on their shoulder

The latter is the essence of what Steven gets at with the above question. And does one’s selfish motivation align with where the company wants to go and what the role will entail.

Photo by Aaron Burden on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

DGQ 18: If you lived your life 1000 times, what would be true in 999 of them?

luck, clover, serendipity

I first heard this question from Morgan Housel quoting a Navalism (for the uninitiated, that means has its source tracing back to the one and only Naval Ravikant). And it makes you think, that in the multiverse, where each version of you lives a different life and makes different choices, what would stay constant?

These are things that are not attributed to luck. And as Morgan mentioned, “those are the things you want to focus on in life.” When predicting the future, many try to predict what will change, but the best bets with long time horizons are on those that don’t change. Things that aren’t attributed to luck. Or chance. In this world we live in, you’d be quite surprised the number of small, accidental decisions we make that lead to life-changing events.

Like you being 10 minutes late to a party meant that you somehow just showed up at the same time as your future spouse. And it was because of that, that led you to have a two-hour long conversation with him/her. Otherwise, you’d have spent the entire party hanging with your college friends.

Or because you forgot to bring your umbrella on a day it rained, it made you run into a hotel for shelter, where you stumbled upon the investor who led your Series A round. Because he/she too forgot to bring an umbrella.

Of course, I could play hypotheticals forever. Although I find it’d be a fun exercise to really examine how much of your most life-changing moments were due to serendipity.

As someone who makes their living on attempting to predict the future, that means we have to go back to first principles. For instance, human nature. Reid Hoffman’s framework that all great consumer products tap into one of the seven deadly sins. Something that despite innovation is timeless. Anecdotally, I do find some of the greatest investors — LPs and GPs alike — to be avid students of history, philosophy or psychology.

In the same interview I alluded to above, Tim Ferriss mentions another line once written by Don Knuth when he was quitting the use of email:

“Email is a wonderful thing for people whose role in life is to be on top of things. But not for me; my role is to be on the bottom of things.”

In life, while catchy and interesting and the talk of the town for that brief moment, sometimes it’s better to get to the bottom of things than to stay on top of things. After all, you only have so many letters on your tombstone.

Photo by Yan Ming on Unsplash


The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Emerging Market Funds Seem to Have Longer Deployment Periods

market

This past week, one particular graphic stood out. Endeavor shared some research they’ve been working on for a bit on the common themes in unicorn founders. And the below graphic is what came out of that.

Source: Endeavor

For any VC out there, the above may be interesting to compare to your own deal flow and portfolio. For any founders out there reading the piece, and while this is a loaded term that comes with a lot of baggage, the above is where you might see a lot of investors regress to pattern recognition. So if you don’t look like a founder that’s illustrated above, be sure to address the implicit elephant in the room early on in your pitch. The best way to do so is through metrics. The second best way is to share leading indicators of grit and market / problem obsession.

While the study itself is fascinating, and I highly recommend you taking a deeper dive into it, one particular portion is worth underscoring. “Another difference between the emerging market and US founders is how fast they grow their companies. Founders in emerging markets achieved unicorn status for their companies in an average of five and a half years, while US founders took more than six years.”

Why is that noteworthy?

So I will preface that this is completely anecdotal. I’ve seen about two dozen or so emerging market funds myself, and have chatted with about the same number of LPs who have invested in emerging market funds. And the statisticians out there may say that isn’t statistically significant. So take what I’m about to say next with a grain of salt.

In the decks I’ve seen and the conversations I’ve had, I’ve noticed something else. That funds investing in the US and Western European markets tend to have an expected deployment period of 3-4 years. I’ll caveat that this period in practice may differ from the pitch. But nevertheless the model holds. LPs in US-oriented funds often expect 6-8 years before any exits or liquidation events happen. Which is why so many LPs say it takes a fund an average of 6-8 years to settle into its quartile. (And, here’s another example.)

And it is because of that, GPs are incentivized to deploy their last net new check before year 4, and for others year 3. ‘Cause compounding takes time.

But on the flip side, I’ve seen emerging market funds err on the side of longer deployment periods. Usually 4-5 years. At least in the pitch. In my very, very basic diligence, aka asking lawyer friends who help funds set up in emerging markets, that seems to corroborate with their experience.

Reading the tea leaves

So I don’t know how much of this deployment period pitch is intentional by design, or accidental. The latter in the sense, that at least in Asian and SEA markets, professionals tend to be more conservative than in the US. So longer deployment periods help investors proceed with caution. In fairness, some investors are more intentional than others. But the logic seems to hold. If it takes less time for exits to materialize in emerging markets, for the same 10-year fund, one can afford to deploy their last net new check later.

All this to say, Endeavor’s piece was quite thought-provoking for an LP, just as much it’s been for a VC or founder.

Photo by Mark Pecar on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Timing is Only Obvious in the Rearview Mirror

watch, time, clock

There’s this line I love in Jerry Colonna’s Reboot, and I’m loosely paraphrasing just because I’m travelling and I don’t have the book in front of me, “The saying is buy low, sell high; not buy lowest, sell highest.”

The reason I bring up that line is that I’ve been hearing a lot of investors talk about timing the market. At least that was the case before this wonderful trip I’ve been taking across the Pacific, as I sip my hojicha atop my hotel in the backdrop of the Kyoto evening metropolis. When’s a good time to sell? What price makes sense on the secondary market? Should I be investing now? When’s a good time to re-up? Is it a good idea to re-up? Should I be generating DPI for my investors now? Or should I hold? When should I start my fund? When should I begin fundraising?

Now, I don’t pose the above questions as if I have all the answers. In fact, I don’t. I try to. But I don’t. Although I’ve heard 50-60% is the discount secondary buyers have been able to get for great companies that became overvalued in the pandemic days. On the flip side, while Dave and I did published a blogpost not too long ago on early DPI, the truth is there are different ways to make money. Ed Zimmerman shared some of his investments’ data recently to illustrate that exact point.

Another obvious truth is that as investors for an alternative asset class — hell for any asset class, our job is to make our LPs money. Ideally, more money than we were given. For other asset classes, it’s measured in percentages. For venture, it’s multiples. And because of that raison d’être, it’s our job to think not only about the upside, but also the downside protection. Hence, why early DPI matters in some of your best outliers. It always matters.

But from what I’m seeing and hearing, it matters more in a bear market, like today. Than the bull we were in yesterday. Why?

  1. Liquidity is a differentiator.
  2. Because of the point 1, giving LPs some liquidity back makes it easier to get to conviction as you raise your next fund.
  3. Point 2 holds the most weight if you’re an emerging manager on Funds I through III, or have sub $100M AUM. Although Funds I and II, you have little to go off of. As such, sticking to your strategy may be more important to some LPs. In other words, consistency.
  4. Also seems to matter more if your LPs are investing off balance sheet. For instance, corporates.

While I was in Tokyo earlier this trip, I caught up with a colleague. We spent the evening chatting about fund managers and current deployment schedules. (In case you’re wondering, no, we didn’t spend the whole time talking the biz.) And we see a lot of folks slowing down their pace of deployment. Could be the case of deal flow contraction, as Chris Neumann recently wrote about. Could be the case of loss of conviction behind initial fund strategy. We’ve also seen examples of VCs stretching their deployment schedule as their fundraises have been extended to 2024. All in all, that means VCs’ bar for “quality” has gone up.

But let me explain in a bit why I put “quality” in quotation marks.

So, timing comes down to two things:

  1. Entry point
  2. Exit point

I’ve seen a plurality of investors consider exit options as a means to *crossing fingers* convince existing LPs to re-up to the next fund. Debatable on how effective it is. As many LPs I’ve chatted with are “graduating” a lot more of their GPs than years prior. In other words, fancy shmancy word for they’re not re-upping on certain existing managers. Some LPs say it’s an AUM problem (but I’ve also seen them make exceptions). Others say it’s strategy drift. But more so say that certain GPs haven’t been a good fiduciary of capital, which ends being a combination of:

  • High entry points
  • Faster than promised deployment schedules (i.e. 1-1.5 years instead of 2-4 years)
  • Investing in a company where the preference stack is greater than the valuation of the company (similar to the first bullet point)
  • Reactive communication of strategy drift, instead of preemptive and proactive
  • Logo shopping which led to strategy drift

All that to say, there are a good amount of LPs who, though appreciate the extra liquidity from partial exits, are not re-investing in existing managers. In addition, they’re holding off until on new ones till earliest Q1 next year to build the relationship earlier. Especially those $5M+ checks.

So, quality, for both GPs and LPs, is this new sugar coating of a term to account for time it takes to figure out where they want to put the next dollar. Investors on both sides are waiting to pull the trigger at 90% conviction, instead of the usual 70%. And realistically, for pre-product market fit companies and firms (i.e. pre-seed, seed startups and Funds I-III), 90% usually never comes until it’s too late. Meaning one misses their entry point.

I have no doubt (as well as many if not all my peers) that the greatest companies of the next generation are being built today. But only a small handful will make it out the gauntlet of fire. Even good companies won’t make it, unfortunately.

So, for the one building, the importance of communicating focus and discipline will be more powerful than ever. My buddy Martin also recently tweeted by an unrelenting focus on a niche audience may serve more useful than targeting a seemingly large TAM.

For the one investing, there is no good time. Our job is to buy low, sell high. Not buy lowest, sell highest. Waiting for the right moment will only have you miss the moment. In the surfing analogy, where the market is the wave, the product is the board, the team is the surfer, and you need all three to be a great surfer, you don’t want to be on the shore when the wave hits. It is better to be paddling in the water before the wave hits than on the shore when the wave does hit. Timing is only obvious in hindsight, never in foresight.

There’s also a great Chinese proverb that the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago, the next best time is today.

So in this flight to quality, consider what quality actually means. Is it a function of you doubting your original thesis? Then re-examine what caused the doubt. Was your thesis founded on first principles? For consumer, which is where I know a little bit more about, is it founded on the basis and habits of the human condition? Is it secular from technological and hype trends?

Is quality waiting on numbers or external validation? That’s fine if you’re a growth or late stage investor. You’re never going to get it if you’re a true pre-seed and seed. If you’re waiting on a large amount of traction, you’re not an early-stage investor. Round-semantics aside.

You built a fund around a 10-15 year vision. Deploy against that. Or… although we don’t see this much these days, return any remaining capital back to your LPs.

Photo by Alex Perez on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

To Define or To Be Defined By

dictionary, definition, defined

One of my recent favorite soundbites is Rich Paul‘s. For the uninitiated, he’s the agent behind LeBron James and Draymond Green. And in his recent Tim Ferriss episode, he said: “Some people define the business card and some people are defined by their business card, and so I don’t carry a business card.”

Some of the most exciting conversations I’ve been having as of late have been in the world of family offices. There’s this shift in generational wealth transfer, but often times without sufficient knowledge transfer. At the same time, there are many next gens leaning more into risk and philanthropy. Many want to increase their exposure to venture and private equity as an asset class, but are still learning how to underwrite such risk.

My conversations echo a lot of what Citi’s been seeing as well. Two in five family offices wanted to increase their exposure to illiquid asset classes, namely the PE and VC asset classes. And while many bucket VC and PE in the same asset class, the truth is the assets operate very differently. Even within venture, underwriting the risk and performance of a sub-$40M fund versus a $40-100M fund versus a $100-500M fund versus a $500M+ VC fund are completely different. Some LPs may disagree on the exact benchmarks (for instance, sub-$100M funds and everything else), but the reality of assessing an emerging manager and an established manager are different. But I digress.

The rest are either rebalancing or figuring out their re-up strategy. Yet, as I’m sure GPs are seeing today, that shift in strategy, requires time, research, and confidence before family offices can pull the trigger. Many are waiting to Q1 next year, but engaging in conversation today.

I’ve also written before about one of my favorite lines from Engineering Capital’s Ashmeet Sidana, “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation. In other words to take a concrete example, Google is a great company. Google is not a great company because Sequoia invested in them. Sequoia is a great venture firm because they invested in Google.”

And I’m seeing a similar vein with family offices. The next gen don’t want to be defined by their predecessor’s goals and records. They want to define their own legacy.

There’s also the saying: If you know one family office, you only know one family office. So any broad-stroke generalizations are loosely correlated at best. That said, anecdotally, having talked with about a hundred or so family offices, here’s what I’ve come to notice.

My crudely drawn 1D scale of whether venture capital is an asset class or an access class

Smaller and/or emerging LPs see VC as an access class. Larger and more sophisticated and established LPs see VC as an asset class.

The Mendoza line — the line that separates the emerging LPs from the established ones —seems to be around 20-30 managers or over 6-7 years of venture data. For the latter, that means, you’ve seen Fund I’s and II’s graduate to Fund III’s and IV’s.

So the question for many of the next generation leading family offices has flipped from: Are you defined by your surname? To: Do you define your surname?

For those that pursue the latter, they’re a lot more proactive than previous generations. They participate in communities. Go to events. Seek education on the matter. Network with their existing managers to discover new ones. Some have also built covenants to co-invest in their manager’s breakout winners. Quite a few are building emerging manager programs or would like to. They’re hungry. Hungry to learn.

The problem I’m seeing with many managers is that they’re seeking transactional relationships. The urgency to get to their first or final close leads them to optimize for LPs who can close fast. And I get it, that’s been the game historically. But it’s leaving a massive opportunity in the market for those who have the time and are willing to educate their and prospective LPs. Who are willing to spend time building a relationship through giving first.

Photo by Edurne Tx on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.