In the process of catching up with a number of fund managers this week, I was reminded of two things:
That I still have an outstanding blogpost on intuition and discipline sitting on my desk, having gone through more revisions than I would like
That Fund I’s mostly start by drawing trendlines in your previous portfolio’s winners.
Now it’s not my job to call anyone out, but many of those I caught up with this week, told me in confidence (no longer in confidence now that I’m writing about it) that their best investments were simply due to being in the right place at the right time. That they were lucky. Others invested often off-thesis to accommodate for a brilliant founder that looked and sounded like nothing they had seen before. Then retroactively, went back to LPs in a subsequent fundraise armed with the knowledge to account for their previous outlier.
Chris Paik once wrote, ““Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence
Josh Wolfe said last year, “We believe before others understand.” And sometimes the investor themselves may not fully grasp what makes someone special other than that person is special.
Other times the company in which you initially bet on may not look like the company that earns you the most capital. As Mike Maples Jr. once said, “90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.
Of course, many LPs don’t want to hear that. They want to hear that you know exactly what you’re doing. That you can predict the future. But you can’t. In many ways, VCs invest in what stays the same. Not what changes. Human nature. Great hires. Network effects. Talent pools. Intellectual curiosity. Rigor. It’s a long list.
An amazing VC once told me. The job of a VC is to:
Have a wide enough aperture so enough light can come in
But have a fast enough trigger finger to catch the light, the reflections, the shadows just at the right time so that you get a good enough shot.
The rest is all done in the editing room, where you massage the photo with your expertise and experience to help it stand out.
I love that line. But simply put, the job of a VC is to:
Cast a wide enough net so that you can see as many great companies as you can,
Have the ability and awareness to know a great company when you see it.
After all, as an investor, you don’t have to invest in every great company, but every company you invest in must be great. Big anti-portfolios don’t mean much in this world if you can still get great returns.
All that to say, the job of an angel is to increase the surface area for luck to stick. And once enough do, a thesis blossoms.
A thesis, at the end of the day, is retroactive. And the best thing a fund manager can do is that the thesis the fund ends on is as close as possible to the initial. As LPs, it is our job to bet on the future of the thesis and the discipline of the fund manager. Both are equally as important. If things do change, a fund manager must preemptively communicate strategy drift and do so in the best interest of their investors.
It’s not ideal in many cases. For individual LPs and smaller family offices, strategy drift matters less. For large institutional LPs, it matters more. Because the latter don’t want you to be investing in the same underlying asset as other funds they’re invested into are.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I wrote a blogpost last year, where I went a level deeper into my NTY thesis. In short, in what situations and in front of what kind of ideas do I ask founders: Why now? Why this? And why you?
But let’s go a step deeper. As I’m writing another blogpost slated to come out next year, I’ve had the chance to sit down with some amazing multi-cycle investors. And a common thread across all those conversations has been that they chose to be the first check in companies that would be big, if true.
Which got me thinking…
If ‘big if true’ is for the preposterous ideas out there, then possible ideas would be ‘big when true.’ And plausible ideas would be ‘big AND true.’
Let’s break it down.
Big AND true
Not too long ago, the amazing Chris Douvosshared with me that the prerequisite to being “right and alone”, where fortune and glory lie, is to be “wrong and alone.”
Imagine a two-by-two matrix. On one axis, right and wrong. On the other axis, alone and in the crowd. You obviously don’t want to be wrong and in the crowd. But you do want to be in the right and alone quadrant. Because that’s where fortune and glory are at. Most people think that to get there, you must first start in the right and in the crowd quadrant. But it’s important to note, that once you’re in the crowd, and you get the dopamine hits of validation, it’s really hard to stray away from the crowd. So really, the only way to get to fortune and glory is to be wrong and alone. To be willing to go against the grain.
Unfortunately, for big AND true, you’re in the crowd. And while you can usually make money on the margins, it’s hard to be world-defining. ‘Cause you’re too late.
The thing to be wary of here if it is any investor’s strategy to deploy capital here is to not be the last money in. Hype and compounding are dangerous. And for many companies that exist here, they have a short half life. If you’re the last one holding the bag, that’s it.
Big WHEN true
You know that saying, “It’s a matter of when, not if…” it’s just as true in the innovation space. There are some things in life that are bound to happen. Recessions. Hype cycles. Rain. First snowfall. Summer heat. Progress. Maturity. When one’s baby teeth fall out. Wrinkles. Gray hair. Some with more predictability than others.
These ideas are defined as those with early commercial traction, likely with a niche audience or only your 1000 true fans. And that’s okay. Usually happens to be some of the toughest pre-seed and seed rounds to raise. There’s clearly traction, but no clear sense of rocket ship growth.
Timing matters. Is the larger market ready to adopt the beliefs and culture and habits of the few?
For some investors, it’s why they target quality of life improvements to the wealthy made ready for the masses. Living a wealthy lifestyle is, after all, aspirational for many. On the flip side, if you have a niche audience and are looking to expand, are there underlying beliefs and traits that the broader market has but has instead applied those beliefs and habits in other parts of their life?
Big IF true
Sam Altman put out a blogpost just yesterday, titled “What I Wish Someone Had Told Me.” And out of the 17 lessons he shares, one in particular resonated the most with me:
“It is easier for a team to do a hard thing that really matters than to do an easy thing that doesn’t really matter; audacious ideas motivate people.”
While the stories of Airbnb or Coinbase or Canva seem to suggest that these are nigh impossible ideas to raise on, anecdotally, I seem to find that the most transcendent companies with CEOs who are able to acquire world-class talent to their companies have less trouble fundraising than the ‘big when true’ ideas. But more difficulty raising than the ‘big and true’ ideas.
That said, instead of many smaller checks, you just need to find one big believer. In other words, the Garry Tan for your Coinbase or the Fred Wilson for your Twitter. One way to look at it, though not the only way, is what Paul Grahamputs as the “reasonable domain expert proposing something that sounds wrong.” Crazy, but reasonable. Simply, why you?
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Courtney Russell McCrea enjoys over 30 years of venture capital and private equity investment experience including 13 years of fund investing and 18 years of direct principal investing.
Courtney is Co-Founder and Managing Partner of Recast Capital, a 100% women-owned platform investing in and supporting emerging managers in venture, with a focus on diverse partnerships.
Prior to co-founding Recast, Courtney was a Managing Director of Weathergage Capital, a boutique fund of funds that provided its clients with access to premier venture capital, growth equity and micro-VC partnerships. Venture fund commitments included both brand name funds and emerging managers. In addition to fund investment responsibilities, Courtney led the direct co investing program at Weathergage. During her 10 year tenure at Weathergage, Courtney made commitments to 100 funds and seven direct co-investments.
Prior to Weathergage, Courtney was a General Partner with Weston Presidio, a leading diversified private equity firm based in San Francisco. After 7 years at Weston Presidio, she left in 2004 and founded Silver Partners, a private equity advisory firm where she evaluated secondary and co-investment opportunities and advised consumer growth businesses. Courtney was also a Director at Sterling Stamos, where she managed investments in buyout funds, venture capital funds and hedge funds.
Earlier in her career, Courtney made equity co-investments as an Assistant Vice President at PPM America. She also spent 5 years at GE Capital where she worked on private equity, senior and subordinated debt investing.
Courtney has an M.B.A., with honors, from the Kellogg Graduate School of Management and a B.A. in Economics from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. She is a member of the Kauffman Fellows Class 3.
Courtney is a member of the NVCA Forward Board of Directors and the Alzheimer’s Association Northern California and Nevada Board of Directors.
[00:00] Intro [02:37] What of Courtney’s past helped her co-found Recast Capital [04:02] Three reasons to invest in emerging managers [05:17] What does “institutional quality of emerging managers” mean? [06:52] How to diligence emerging managers [10:30] How to do reference checks on GPs [14:40] How has being a Kauffman fellow helped Courtney build Recast’s Enablement and Accelerate programs [19:51] How do alumni GP stay active in Recast Capital’s community [20:59] Zoom vs. in-person education for GPs [23:00] What kind of managers do Recast Capital invest in versus who ends up joining the Enablement Program versus who joins the Accelerate program [28:33] Why are the Enablement Program and Accelerate program free [30:25] Spinouts from larger funds [32:12] What are emerging manager red flags? [34:03] Should emerging managers have answers to questions on succession planning? [36:00] Challenging the 1% GP commit: How much should different archetypes of GPs commit to their own fund? [40:52] Lessons from arguments between GPs [46:30] Getting Courtney to say yes [47:46] Courtney may make some enemies with this statement! [48:54] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [51:30] Legal disclaimer
Earlier this week, I was listening to a fascinatingly thoughtful conversation between Tim Ferriss and Kindred’s Steve Jang, where Tim said one line that stood out in particular: “I’ve been paying a lot of attention, but I’ll be honest, I don’t know how to pay proper attention.”
And well, it got me thinking. About the difference between knowing what to look at and knowing how to look at it.
One of my favorite TED talks is by Will Guidara (quite honestly I think it deserves more views on YouTube than it has). Will is probably best known for co-founding one of New York’s hottest fine dining restaurants, Eleven Madison Park, and for writing the book, Unreasonable Hospitality. And in it, he talks about how just listening to the conversations that are happening at the tables and delivering these small, unexpected pockets of joy can create experiences that transcend money and time.
In the afore-mentioned talk, he talks about how there are four diners at Eleven Madison Park. That they went to all the top restaurants in NYC. Le Bernardin. Per se. And so on. And Eleven Madison Park was the last on their to-do list. But the only regret they had was that they never got to try a New York hot dog. Of course, upon hearing that, Will storms out the door to buy a $2 dog, brings it back to the kitchen and convinces the chef to serve it over the aged duck that took years to perfect. And when he finally delivered the next course on the menu as the hot dog he just bought, the four guests went bonkers. That despite on the multiple courses and the brilliant food, that their favorite dish was the NYC hot dog.
That it was because Will paid proper attention to his guests that he was able to deliver a truly unforgettable experience.
The truth is how to pay proper attention to anything that deserves our attention is the million-dollar question.
Paying proper attention
There’s the famous selective attention test, where viewers are asked to count the number of times the ball is being passed between the players, only to fail to realize that there is gorilla that walks across the screen. We’re told to pay attention to the ball passes, but only by paying proper attention to the purpose of why the test is being administered, do we catch what is hiding in plain sight.
Similarly, Raymond Joseph Teller (or better known for being half of the dynamic magic duo Penn & Teller) did a fascinating talk a decade and a half ago about the illusion of expectation. That magic in all of its novel facets feeds off of the expectations of its onlookers. When one tries to pay attention to the coins that are “magically” jumping from one hand to the next, you might fail to catch the sleight of hand in between. But only after he reveals his secrets is the simple magic act all the more impressive. In other words, in the second half, he teaches you how to pay proper attention.
If you have eight minutes in your day, would highly recommend watching the below video.
I can’t speak for every topic, industry, relationship, and so on out there, but at least for the cottage industry of venture capital, why I choose to write an angel or an LP check is similar. I don’t really look for what will change. ‘Cause damn, it’s so hard to predict what will change and how things will change. If I knew, and if one day, I know, please invest in my public markets fund, which will be the best performing fund of all time. But I don’t. We, as pundits sitting around the table, might draw predictions. But even the smartest of us (not sure why I say us, ’cause not sure if I can put myself in that category yet) would be lying if we knew what would happen in foresight.
Instead, I look at what doesn’t change.
What doesn’t change?
The great Charlie Munger passed away last week at the age of 99. And without question, a great loss to the world we live in today. Just half a year prior, he and Warren Buffett were hosting their 2023 annual meeting. And just two weeks prior, he was still doing CNBC interviews. And one of my favorite lines from that May annual meeting was:
“Well, it’s so simple to spend less than you earn, and invest shrewdly, and avoid toxic people and toxic activities, and try and keep learning all your life, et cetera, et cetera, and do a lot of deferred gratification because you prefer life that way. And if you do all those things, you are almost certain to succeed. If you don’t, you’re going to need a lot of luck. And you don’t want to need a lot of luck. You want to go into a game where you’re very likely to win without having any unusual luck.”
In reducing the requirement to need luck, one of the most effective ways to find what is constant in life. That despite changing times and technologies, these stay true. Or as Morgan Housel and Naval Ravikantput it, If you lived your life 1000 times, what would be true in 999 of them? In investing jargon, pattern recognition. Across my investments and more, where have I seen outperformance? What characteristics do they all share? What about human nature won’t change?
In fairness, pattern recognition gets a bad rap. And for a lot of investors, that’s because they choose to only invest in their comfort zone, and what they know best. Their former colleagues. Their Stanford GSB classmates. People who look like them, think like them, act like them. But recognizing thematic threads stretch across all facets of our life. We learn that not brushing our teeth well can lead to cavities. We learn that after stubbing our toe on the kitchen counter numerous times, we take a wider turn before turning into the kitchen. And we learn that eating piping hot foods kills your tastebuds for the next few days.
The venture corollary
In venture, we’re always taught to look at the team, product, and market. And that all are important. But if you tell a new grad or an ex-founder or an emerging angel to do just that. To them, that means nothing. They wouldn’t know how to judge. They have no benchmarks, nor do they know what’s right versus wrong. Now I don’t want to sound like a broken record, but I do believe previous blogposts like this and this are quite comprehensive for how I pay proper attention as an investor.
Emerging LPs are not immune to the lack of perspective as well. My hope and my goal is for how to be just as important if not more than the what. And for the why to be just as or more important than the how. It’s because of that, I write essays like this and this. And of course, it’s why I started Superclusters because I, too, am looking for how to pay proper attention to the next generation of venture investors. (Stay tuned for the coming Monday for episode four where we unpack the bull and bear case of early distributions in a fund!)
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.
The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.
But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!
As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!
While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.
The year was 1997.
Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.
Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”
Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.
If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.
And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.
But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.
So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”
Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”
You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:
“You have to either:
Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”
For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.
What is value?
To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.
Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:
The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence
On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.
We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.
Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”
But I digress.
Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.
In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.
For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:
E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.
Graduation rates
What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.
On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.
Valuation step ups
How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.
It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:
Have a real chance at the championship title.
Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.
… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.
The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.
Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?
Dilution
If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?
Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?
Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.
How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.
How does one use the appreciation value equation?
E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)
If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.
And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.
If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.
But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.
The model
The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.
It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.
Take for instance…
Energy
Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.
Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.
Biotech
Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations
The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.
In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.
In closing
All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:
Is your entry point a good entry point?
Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?
For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.
For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.
If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
This past week, one particular graphic stood out. Endeavor shared some research they’ve been working on for a bit on the common themes in unicorn founders. And the below graphic is what came out of that.
For any VC out there, the above may be interesting to compare to your own deal flow and portfolio. For any founders out there reading the piece, and while this is a loaded term that comes with a lot of baggage, the above is where you might see a lot of investors regress to pattern recognition. So if you don’t look like a founder that’s illustrated above, be sure to address the implicit elephant in the room early on in your pitch. The best way to do so is through metrics. The second best way is to share leading indicators of grit and market / problem obsession.
While the study itself is fascinating, and I highly recommend you taking a deeper dive into it, one particular portion is worth underscoring. “Another difference between the emerging market and US founders is how fast they grow their companies. Founders in emerging markets achieved unicorn status for their companies in an average of five and a half years, while US founders took more than six years.”
Why is that noteworthy?
So I will preface that this is completely anecdotal. I’ve seen about two dozen or so emerging market funds myself, and have chatted with about the same number of LPs who have invested in emerging market funds. And the statisticians out there may say that isn’t statistically significant. So take what I’m about to say next with a grain of salt.
In the decks I’ve seen and the conversations I’ve had, I’ve noticed something else. That funds investing in the US and Western European markets tend to have an expected deployment period of 3-4 years. I’ll caveat that this period in practice may differ from the pitch. But nevertheless the model holds. LPs in US-oriented funds often expect 6-8 years before any exits or liquidation events happen. Which is why so many LPs say it takes a fund an average of 6-8 years to settle into its quartile. (And, here’s another example.)
And it is because of that, GPs are incentivized to deploy their last net new check before year 4, and for others year 3. ‘Cause compounding takes time.
But on the flip side, I’ve seen emerging market funds err on the side of longer deployment periods. Usually 4-5 years. At least in the pitch. In my very, very basic diligence, aka asking lawyer friends who help funds set up in emerging markets, that seems to corroborate with their experience.
Reading the tea leaves
So I don’t know how much of this deployment period pitch is intentional by design, or accidental. The latter in the sense, that at least in Asian and SEA markets, professionals tend to be more conservative than in the US. So longer deployment periods help investors proceed with caution. In fairness, some investors are more intentional than others. But the logic seems to hold. If it takes less time for exits to materialize in emerging markets, for the same 10-year fund, one can afford to deploy their last net new check later.
All this to say, Endeavor’s piece was quite thought-provoking for an LP, just as much it’s been for a VC or founder.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
There’s this line I love in Jerry Colonna’s Reboot, and I’m loosely paraphrasing just because I’m travelling and I don’t have the book in front of me, “The saying is buy low, sell high; not buy lowest, sell highest.”
The reason I bring up that line is that I’ve been hearing a lot of investors talk about timing the market. At least that was the case before this wonderful trip I’ve been taking across the Pacific, as I sip my hojicha atop my hotel in the backdrop of the Kyoto evening metropolis. When’s a good time to sell? What price makes sense on the secondary market? Should I be investing now? When’s a good time to re-up? Is it a good idea to re-up? Should I be generating DPI for my investors now? Or should I hold? When should I start my fund? When should I begin fundraising?
Now, I don’t pose the above questions as if I have all the answers. In fact, I don’t. I try to. But I don’t. Although I’ve heard 50-60% is the discount secondary buyers have been able to get for great companies that became overvalued in the pandemic days. On the flip side, while Dave and I did published a blogpost not too long ago on early DPI, the truth is there are different ways to make money. Ed Zimmerman shared some of his investments’ data recently to illustrate that exact point.
Another obvious truth is that as investors for an alternative asset class — hell for any asset class, our job is to make our LPs money. Ideally, more money than we were given. For other asset classes, it’s measured in percentages. For venture, it’s multiples. And because of that raison d’être, it’s our job to think not only about the upside, but also the downside protection. Hence, why early DPI matters in some of your best outliers. It always matters.
But from what I’m seeing and hearing, it matters more in a bear market, like today. Than the bull we were in yesterday. Why?
Liquidity is a differentiator.
Because of the point 1, giving LPs some liquidity back makes it easier to get to conviction as you raise your next fund.
Point 2 holds the most weight if you’re an emerging manager on Funds I through III, or have sub $100M AUM. Although Funds I and II, you have little to go off of. As such, sticking to your strategy may be more important to some LPs. In other words, consistency.
Also seems to matter more if your LPs are investing off balance sheet. For instance, corporates.
While I was in Tokyo earlier this trip, I caught up with a colleague. We spent the evening chatting about fund managers and current deployment schedules. (In case you’re wondering, no, we didn’t spend the whole time talking the biz.) And we see a lot of folks slowing down their pace of deployment. Could be the case of deal flow contraction, as Chris Neumann recently wrote about. Could be the case of loss of conviction behind initial fund strategy. We’ve also seen examples of VCs stretching their deployment schedule as their fundraises have been extended to 2024. All in all, that means VCs’ bar for “quality” has gone up.
But let me explain in a bit why I put “quality” in quotation marks.
So, timing comes down to two things:
Entry point
Exit point
I’ve seen a plurality of investors consider exit options as a means to *crossing fingers* convince existing LPs to re-up to the next fund. Debatable on how effective it is. As many LPs I’ve chatted with are “graduating” a lot more of their GPs than years prior. In other words, fancy shmancy word for they’re not re-upping on certain existing managers. Some LPs say it’s an AUM problem (but I’ve also seen them make exceptions). Others say it’s strategy drift. But more so say that certain GPs haven’t been a good fiduciary of capital, which ends being a combination of:
High entry points
Faster than promised deployment schedules (i.e. 1-1.5 years instead of 2-4 years)
Investing in a company where the preference stack is greater than the valuation of the company (similar to the first bullet point)
Reactive communication of strategy drift, instead of preemptive and proactive
Logo shopping which led to strategy drift
All that to say, there are a good amount of LPs who, though appreciate the extra liquidity from partial exits, are not re-investing in existing managers. In addition, they’re holding off until on new ones till earliest Q1 next year to build the relationship earlier. Especially those $5M+ checks.
So, quality, for both GPs and LPs, is this new sugar coating of a term to account for time it takes to figure out where they want to put the next dollar. Investors on both sides are waiting to pull the trigger at 90% conviction, instead of the usual 70%. And realistically, for pre-product market fit companies and firms (i.e. pre-seed, seed startups and Funds I-III), 90% usually never comes until it’s too late. Meaning one misses their entry point.
I have no doubt (as well as many if not all my peers) that the greatest companies of the next generation are being built today. But only a small handful will make it out the gauntlet of fire. Even good companies won’t make it, unfortunately.
So, for the one building, the importance of communicating focus and discipline will be more powerful than ever. My buddy Martin also recently tweeted by an unrelenting focus on a niche audience may serve more useful than targeting a seemingly large TAM.
For the one investing, there is no good time. Our job is to buy low, sell high. Not buy lowest, sell highest. Waiting for the right moment will only have you miss the moment. In the surfing analogy, where the market is the wave, the product is the board, the team is the surfer, and you need all three to be a great surfer, you don’t want to be on the shore when the wave hits. It is better to be paddling in the water before the wave hits than on the shore when the wave does hit. Timing is only obvious in hindsight, never in foresight.
There’s also a great Chinese proverb that the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago, the next best time is today.
So in this flight to quality, consider what quality actually means. Is it a function of you doubting your original thesis? Then re-examine what caused the doubt. Was your thesis founded on first principles? For consumer, which is where I know a little bit more about, is it founded on the basis and habits of the human condition? Is it secular from technological and hype trends?
Is quality waiting on numbers or external validation? That’s fine if you’re a growth or late stage investor. You’re never going to get it if you’re a true pre-seed and seed. If you’re waiting on a large amount of traction, you’re not an early-stage investor. Round-semantics aside.
You built a fund around a 10-15 year vision. Deploy against that. Or… although we don’t see this much these days, return any remaining capital back to your LPs.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
One of my recent favorite soundbites is Rich Paul‘s. For the uninitiated, he’s the agent behind LeBron James and Draymond Green. And in his recent Tim Ferriss episode, he said: “Some people define the business card and some people are defined by their business card, and so I don’t carry a business card.”
Some of the most exciting conversations I’ve been having as of late have been in the world of family offices. There’s this shift in generational wealth transfer, but often times without sufficient knowledge transfer. At the same time, there are many next gens leaning more into risk and philanthropy. Many want to increase their exposure to venture and private equity as an asset class, but are still learning how to underwrite such risk.
My conversations echo a lot of what Citi’s been seeing as well. Two in five family offices wanted to increase their exposure to illiquid asset classes, namely the PE and VC asset classes. And while many bucket VC and PE in the same asset class, the truth is the assets operate very differently. Even within venture, underwriting the risk and performance of a sub-$40M fund versus a $40-100M fund versus a $100-500M fund versus a $500M+ VC fund are completely different. Some LPs may disagree on the exact benchmarks (for instance, sub-$100M funds and everything else), but the reality of assessing an emerging manager and an established manager are different. But I digress.
The rest are either rebalancing or figuring out their re-up strategy. Yet, as I’m sure GPs are seeing today, that shift in strategy, requires time, research, and confidence before family offices can pull the trigger. Many are waiting to Q1 next year, but engaging in conversation today.
I’ve also written before about one of my favorite lines from Engineering Capital’s Ashmeet Sidana, “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation. In other words to take a concrete example, Google is a great company. Google is not a great company because Sequoia invested in them. Sequoia is a great venture firm because they invested in Google.”
And I’m seeing a similar vein with family offices. The next gen don’t want to be defined by their predecessor’s goals and records. They want to define their own legacy.
There’s also the saying: If you know one family office, you only know one family office. So any broad-stroke generalizations are loosely correlated at best. That said, anecdotally, having talked with about a hundred or so family offices, here’s what I’ve come to notice.
My crudely drawn 1D scale of whether venture capital is an asset class or an access class
Smaller and/or emerging LPs see VC as an access class. Larger and more sophisticated and established LPs see VC as an asset class.
The Mendoza line — the line that separates the emerging LPs from the established ones —seems to be around 20-30 managers or over 6-7 years of venture data. For the latter, that means, you’ve seen Fund I’s and II’s graduate to Fund III’s and IV’s.
So the question for many of the next generation leading family offices has flipped from: Are you defined by your surname? To: Do you define your surname?
For those that pursue the latter, they’re a lot more proactive than previous generations. They participate in communities. Go to events. Seek education on the matter. Network with their existing managers to discover new ones. Some have also built covenants to co-invest in their manager’s breakout winners. Quite a few are building emerging manager programs or would like to. They’re hungry. Hungry to learn.
The problem I’m seeing with many managers is that they’re seeking transactional relationships. The urgency to get to their first or final close leads them to optimize for LPs who can close fast. And I get it, that’s been the game historically. But it’s leaving a massive opportunity in the market for those who have the time and are willing to educate their and prospective LPs. Who are willing to spend time building a relationship through giving first.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
The other day, I had a super insightful conversation with one of my awesome teammates here at Alchemist Accelerator about access and exposure. The difference between accelerators and emerging early-stage managers.
I’ll preface that for investors, particularly emerging managers, the three things you need to win are sourcing, picking, winning. And to be a GP, you need at least two of the above three. But for the purpose of this blogpost, I’m only focusing on sourcing.
I’ll also preface with the fact that I may be biased. I started in venture at SkyDeck, an accelerator. Additionally, I advise at a bunch of studios, incubators and accelerators. Moreover, I worked at On Deck when we launched our accelerator. And now, I’m here at Alchemist Accelerator.
I truly love early-stage programs. The earlier the better.
Instacart’s recent IPO is a clear example of venture returns compared to the public market equivalent as a function of stage. The earlier you invest, the more alpha you generate to your most liquid comparable.
It’s the difference between a market maker and a market taker. A price maker and a price taker.
Though admittedly, one day, this too may become saturated, just like how venture capital went from 50-60 funds in ’07 and ’08 to now over 4000 in 2023. Do fact check me on exact numbers, but I believe I’m directionally accurate.
Let me give a more concrete example. Harvard is a phenomenal institution. And there’s a Wikipedia page full of breakout Harvard alums. But as an LP, if 50% of your managers, despite having different theses, all have half their portfolio as Harvard alums, then you as the LP are overexposed to the same underlying asset. The same is true for Stanford. Or seed or Series A funds investing in YC founders. All great institutions, but you’re not getting your buck’s worth of diversification.
The only caveat here is if you’re not looking for diversification. After all, the best performing fund would be the fund that invested a 100% of their fund in Google at the seed round. AND holding it till today. Realistically, they will have had to distribute on IPO.
The question is are you a fisher? Or are you a digger? One requires a fishing rod; the other a shovel. The latter requires more work, but you’re more likely to be the first to gold. Like Eniac was for mobile. Or Lux to deep tech.
So how do you know you’re fishing in someone else’s pond?
Easy. Your deal flow includes someone’s else’s brand. Whether that’s Sequoia or YC or SBIR. It’s not your own. You don’t own that pipeline. A lot of people have access to it. It’s no longer about proprietary deal flow, but about proprietary access to deals to borrow a framing from the amazing Beezer.
If your deal flow pipeline looks something like the graph below, you probably don’t have a sourcing advantage.
Now that’s not to say there aren’t a lot of nonobvious companies coming out of YC or these startup accelerators. Airbnb, Sendbird, Twitch (the last of which Ravi who I work with here at Alchemist happened to be one of the first institutional investor for, so have heard some of these stories), and more were all non-obvious coming out of YC. And have also seen the same for companies coming out of Techstars, 500, and Alchemist, where I call home now. But that’s a picking advantage, not a sourcing one.
The flip side is, how do you know you’re excavating your own pond?
I’ll preface by saying having your own Slack or Discord “community” is not enough. Or having your own podcast.
I put community in quotes simply because having XXX members in a large group chat isn’t indicative that their presence is really there. Is their seat warm or cold?
I love using a stadium analogy. Imagine you sold a couple thousand season tickets to a team. You can name whatever sport it is. Football (yes, the rough American kind). Soccer. Basketball. Baseball. You name it. But despite all the tickets you sell, a solid percentage of your seats each game is empty. Can you really say that your team has fans? All you did was sell a couple of cold seats.
You can make the same analogy with likes or comments on Instagram. Which seems to be a problem these days, when an influencer with a couple thousand likes per post starts hosting their fan meetups, only to realize they rented out an empty hall. In case, you’re wondering for the IG example, it’s due to bots.
All that said, I like to think about excavation in the lens of competition for attention. Everyone only has 24 hours in a day. 7 days in a week. 365 days in a year. And as someone who is expecting any level of engagement from others, you are fighting for attention with every other product, person, and habit out there.
Perks of being a consumer investor, I think about this a lot. But in the same way, having an unfair sourcing advantage is the same.
Is the greatest source of your deals tuning into you at least four of the seven calendar days in a week? Or if you have a professional audience (i.e. only product people, or only execs), are they engaging at least 3 workdays per week or 8 workdays per month? Are they spending more time reading/listening/engaging with you than with their best friend?
If you have a community, do you have solid product-market fit? Is your daily active to monthly active over 50%? You don’t need a massive audience, but for the people who are primary sources of your deal flow, are you top of mind? As Andrew Chensays, at that point, “it’s part of a daily habit.”
Is it easy for them to share your content, what you’re doing, who you are with others? Does sharing you or your content generate dopamine and social capital for them? Do you embody something aspirational? Is your viral coefficient greater than 0.5? Even better if it’s 1, then you’re ready to go viral.
And do people stick around? Do the seats stay warm? Is your community self-propagating? Is your content evergreen? Or do you produce content at a voracious pace that it doesn’t have to be? Do you live rent free in people’s brain?
And once you do invest, are you the weapon in the arsenal of choice? For instance, 65% of Signalfire’s portfolio use their platform weekly to learn and get advice. But more on the winning side in a future essay.
In closing
To truly have a sourcing advantage, you need to be building your own platform that is impressionable and regularly take mind space from the founder audience. But if you don’t, that’s okay. You just need to be really good at picking and winning.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
It’s fundraising season again. For founders. And for investors.
It may have been a product of the content I’ve been writing and the events I’ve been hosting. It could also be a product of my job title. But in the last few months, I’ve met a great deal of fund managers — from Fund I to Fund XIII. With a strong skew to the right. In other words, vastly Fund I through III.
And given the current market, there is the same pressing question from all: How should I pitch my fund?
And subsequent to that, who should I talk to? Or can you intro me to any LPs?
And in all these conversations, I’m reminded of a great piece Jason Lemkin once wrote on hiring the right VP of Marketing. I won’t go too much into depth since I’ve written about it here. But if you have a spare five minutes, I highly recommend the read. As such, the framework I share with fund managers is:
Fund I and II, it’s all about lead generation.
Fund III and IV, it’s about product marketing. The product is the fund. The product is the partners’ decision making.
Fund V and onwards, it’s all about brand marketing.
I’ll elaborate.
Now I’ll preface with most emerging funds won’t have the capacity to bring on an investor relations person, so the onus lies with the founding partners themselves.
Lead generation
Barely anyone knows you exist. You need to be out there. You’re pre-product-market fit. And you need to sell why you are the best sub-$50 million fund to return three times your LPs’ money back. Five times if you’re pre-seed or seed. LPs are looking for GP-thesis fit. But more importantly for you, this looks very much like a sales game, not a marketing game.
Generating demand where there is none is key. How do you best tell a story no one’s heard of?
You have to break an arm and a leg to close LPs outside of your initial friends and family. You have to show you care. Or as Mark Suster recently said (quoting Zig Ziglar), “People don’t care how much you know until they know how much you care.”
You’re going to events. Trade-show equivalents. You’re hosting your own. Your asking co-investors to be your LPs. You’re asking for LP intros to largely high net-worth individuals, who’ll be your beachhead “customers” before you prove the promise you’re selling capital allocators. And just as much as they’re looking for the right people to marry for the next 10 years or 20 years (latter if you’re working together for at least three funds), you need to qualify them as well. And while yes, it’s important to keep your funnel wide, you need to have a strong idea of who’s a good fit and who isn’t from the very beginning. If it helps, here are some of my favorite pre-qualifying questions.
You’ve now gotten to a stage where your strategy is known. Founders and LPs self-select themselves into investing in you or not. For instance, if you know you can win on a diversified strategy betting with portfolio sizes north of 50, all the LPs that look for concentrated portfolios or strong reserve strategies will turn the cheek.
You’ve built a strategy off of the scare tissue from Fund I. Now you’re selling that strategy. Are you fishing in ponds that other GPs are not? In other words, is it differentiated? And how?
It’s an interesting exercise but it’s usually not the first thing you think of, but the third. When you really dig into your fund’s soul. Why do founders come for you? Why will they choose you over all the other 4000 VC fund options out there? Equally as helpful to do a “Why did you choose me” survey with your founders.
The big question for LPs now is: Is this repeatable?
Why? Your initial LPs for Fund I, maybe II, are smaller checkwriters, given the size of most Fund I’s and II’s. A lot of them know, even innately, that as you scale in assets under management, you will eventually graduate from their check size. But starting from Fund III, and maybe even Fund II, you’re targeting sophisticated and larger LPs, who are looking to build that 20+ year relationship. And for them repeatability and consistency is important.
Brand marketing
When you’ve finally settled into your quartile, which usually takes at least 6-7 years of track record, you’re now focused on largely selling the returns on your previous fund. Your product works. For some funds, they diversify into other product offerings, or bring on new partners to manage new verticals and initiatives.
Just like a Super Bowl ad needs to be played at least seven times or in the marketing world the 7-11-4 strategy (you need at least seven hours of interaction, 11 touchpoints, and in four separate locations) before one remembers and hopefully buys your product, you’re trying to help LPs keep you top of mind. Again not hard and fast rules, but a useful reference point of just how much work it takes to stay top of mind.
That could mean a focus on content — a newsletter, podcast, great/frequent LP updates, social media and so on. Or great AGMs (annual general meetings). And hosting events. Or being that awesome co-investor that pops up other emerging managers’ pitch decks. Strong communication is key — either directly or indirectly — so that when you raise your next fund, your LPs are ready and have pre-allocated to re-up in your fund.
In closing
Now the purpose of all this segmentation isn’t to just be snotty about it, but that the focus for pitching and closing LPs varies per the number of your fund. Don’t try to do everything at the same time. It’s not worth it, and neither do you have the resources, time or bandwidth. Stick to one strategy and get really good at it.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
