Are you going to start an advisory?

information, advice, help desk

October last year, I was having dinner with an aspiring GP who, for whatever reason, thought I should do more advisory work. A comment made after I shared that I do very little advisory work. So she asked why.

And I said something to the effect of: My goal in life is to spend time with the most curious, the most ambitious, and the highest performing individuals. In the early days, when advisory is opportunistic and assuming you don’t need the capital, you can choose to work with some incredible people. Over time, as you build a sustainable business, and as this becomes your primary source of income, to pay the bills, you may end up working with folks that you may not have chosen to work if you had the choice. You end of building a fantasy portfolio of, in my case, GPs, that you’ve allocated your time to. The one resource you can never get back. And because I’m someone who likes optimizing different parts of my life, I may very well fall victim to my own optimization of being an advisor. I would rather not see myself inevitably choosing those circumstances. What scares me is not the work but the person I will end up becoming.

Just earlier this week, I had another conversation around the same topic with a GP I deeply respect and have chosen to work with. So I thought it seems to be time I share this publicly.

Many of my contemporaries have built robust businesses for themselves being advisors to GPs and LPs. And I think it’s a beautiful thing. The world needs more great advisors. We always seemed to be starved of them. The world needs more people who are willing to pay it forward. To share their lived experiences with those who have yet to live. But I don’t think I could ever do what they do.

To me, this blog and my podcast are what I need as outlets to help the world. Two things that will always stay free. Although for my podcast, many a time I have resisted the temptation to create a paid product to keep the podcast’s lights on. I hope good and useful knowledge continues to stay that way. Free. Through that, the frameworks and lessons I’ve come across and/or use.

But the reason I don’t think I could ever do what some of my advisor friends do is because I think a lot about optimization. And in the theme of optimization, I will take more opportunities than I would like. But I’m also really bad at breaking up. And so to not put myself in that situation, it is better to not begin.

Have I advised folks? Yes. Will I continue to? Probably. Opportunistically. Will I still say no to most advisory opportunities even if there is money to be made? Yes.

Does that mean I build an advisory practice? No.

If you’ve been a long-time reader of this blog, you’ll know I’m a deeply flawed individual. I don’t claim to be perfect. And I’m definitely not a profit maximalist. Although I do wonder what kind of person my alter ego would be. But there are a specific set of choices that I believe I can make so that I live my most fulfilling life. And one of those choices is choosing the people I get to spend time with. So if I were to do any advisory, it’d only be with people I deeply respect AND can learn something from them as much as they from me.

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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

On 2026 Liquidity

liquidity, surf

“This is going to be exciting year for IPOs.”

I’ve heard this statement more than a few times since the beginning of this year and even late last year from GPs. I’m no public market or IPO expert so I’ll refrain from commenting on it as if I am. But as a layman, speaking to other LPs who are less lay in this regard, we have about $3 trillion of pre-IPO tech companies that will really make a splash. Plus or minus half a trillion. Figma’s IPO was held in bated breath. 6 months out, post-lock-up, they were down from their IPO price of $33. A great outcome for early stage investors. TBD for people who came in right before the IPO. Whether that’s going to move and open markets or not, that’ll be for people smarter than me to opine on. But the truth is we’re going to see some realization this year.

And the conclusion drawn from public markets creating liquidity is that there will be more capital moving to emerging managers, which naturally, emerging managers are excited about. Yes and no.

Yes, in the sense that early employees will have more liquidity to invest in friends. High net worth individuals who come in at a Fund I, maybe Fund II. So yes, if you’re an emerging manager with friends at these soon-to-be public companies, great. If not, you’ll have to hustle just like everyone else.

Yes, also in the sense that any institutions that are holding equity directly or indirectly in these companies will have a payday. But when they reallocate that capital, it’ll go back into their existing portfolio construction. Most of which isn’t for venture. Many more institutions are not at the growth phases of their portfolio construction, so allocating to high growth, high risk assets are not at the forefront of their mind. Last year, I heard more conversations on who to re-up on in their existing portfolio, as well as chatter on LBOs/PE funds and credit funds than I have on venture. So maybe, in the optimistic case, they do 1-3 more net new checks to managers this year, maybe next. But the uncertainty with the “AI bubble” has many allocators hedging their AI bets in large AI companies with other asset classes.

And so, in that sense, no.

Assuming we have a number of large companies go public this year, we still won’t have the exuberance of 2020 and 2021 in emerging managers. The dollars that are made liquid will just go into the funds that had those outliers in their portfolio, not new managers. And even if they do find the budget to allocate to net new, I don’t think it means they hire a new team member specifically to focus on emerging managers where they write smaller but more checks. The diligence process is still largely the same regardless of check size. And unfortunately, that also means more taxes, K1s and reporting to do if they have more in the portfolio. Speaking anecdotally from institutional allocators I’ve been lucky enough to pick their brain on in the last few years, emerging manager complexity is just not worth it for many allocators. Even through a fund-of-funds vehicle. If you’re reading this blog post, you’re probably well aware of the fundraising environment for fund-of-funds, both standalone ones as well as those part of larger venture or secondary organizations.

That said, I’m personally still bullish on emerging managers, which is where I choose to spend my time and energy. This blogpost is in parts a sanity check, but also a reminder to myself to not believe the bubble in which I live in is what the world thinks.

As the great Richard Feynman once said, “The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.”

Photo by Austin Neill on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Will AI Take Over LP Investing?

I recently watched Brandon Sanderson’s keynote on whether AI is art or not.

It’s a great talk. And I highly recommend you check it out even if you don’t work in the creative industries.

We’ve seen writer strikes in Hollywood as well as a proliferation of AI use cases in creative industries. James Cameron joined the board of Stability AI. The Russo brothers behind Marvel’s superhero sequel prowess have created their own AI studio. Pouya Shahbazian as well, using AI over the next four years to create 30 AI-generated films. The list goes on. As such, the question of “Is AI art?” is an interesting one to answer. And admittedly, harkens to a series of conversations I’ve had with allocators on leveraging AI in investing practices.

From the VC/GP side, there are folks like Yohei, Sarah, and Ben and Matt, just to name a few who’ve all been building and incorporating AI recently into their workflows and deal flow pipelines. Yes, I know I’m missing a lot more names. But you get the point. From the LP side, progress is still slower, but many younger LPs are quickly adopting AI as well. The conversations I’ve had come from senior allocators on whether it makes sense to use AI. And if so, how much?

Which begs the question: If AI can do your job, do you still have a job?

I was at a dinner last year where the CIO of a large endowment shared that the reason she knows what to look for in managers today, how to underwrite funds, and how to build a venture portfolio was due to the fact she made a plethora of mistakes on her way up the allocator ladder. Small mistakes, like mixing up a decimal on the spreadsheet which led to a venture fund needing a $10B outcome instead of a $1B outcome. Or like Jamie Rhode once said on Superclusters, that she failed to check before she made a commitment to a fund if the fund actually had the commitments that the GP advertised, leading to her check being a larger proportion of the final fund size than she anticipated.

A lot of senior leaders in the LP space seem to be quite skeptical of what AI can do for investment decisions in its current state, yet junior team members seem to widely adopt it to write memos, to inform investment decisions, to create portfolio construction models, and so on. And so far, there’s been a general consensus that AI, at least with respect to investment decision-making, has yet to reach its desired state. In one comment at the same dinner, a senior allocator remarked that one of her direct reports submitted a fund construction model that was built via AI and suggested that in order to return the fund, they needed almost a quarter of the companies to become unicorns. And when questioned, the junior allocator saw nothing wrong with the model. Only to further defend their choice. Or as Brandon Sanderson says in the talk, the problem with AI “is because they steal the opportunity for growth from us.”

“The process of creating art makes art of you. My friends, let me repeat that. The book, the painting, the film script is not the only art. It’s important, but in a way, it’s a receipt. It’s a diploma. The book you write, the painting you create, the music you compose is important and artistic, but it’s also a mark of proof you’ve done the work to learn because in the end of it all, you are the art. The most important change made by an artistic endeavor is the change it makes in you. The most important emotions are the ones you feel when writing that story and holding the completed work.

“I don’t care if the AI can create something that is better than what we can create because it cannot be changed by that creation. Writing a prompt for an LLM, even refining what it spits out, will not make an artist of you because if you haven’t done the hard partโ€”if you haven’t watched a book spiral completely out of control, if you haven’t written something you thought was wonderful and then had readers get completely lost because your narrative chops aren’t strong enough, if you haven’t beat your head against the wall of dead ends on a story day after day until you break it down and find the unexpected pathโ€”you’re not going to have the skill to refine that prompt. The machine will have done the hard part for you and it doesn’t care.”

Growth comes from making mistakes. It comes from the struggle. The “distance travelled,” to borrow a term Aram Verdiyan used before. This is why investors often prefer partnerships and co-founderships. It’s why many firms have “red teams.”

There is probably a day when AI can do our job. But for now, the art of investing is in the friction it takes to make a decision. The character-building moments. The moments where you question your own priors. So if AI enables you to have more nuanced dialogues with yourself, if it challenges the way you think in ways you hadn’t considered before so that you look for evidence that either proves or disproves the null hypothesis, then there will still be room for the use of AI in investing. Otherwise, if you’re regurgitating scripts based on singular uninspired prompts, then you likely won’t have a job for long.


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

The Currency of Trust

Recently, I had three conversations about trust. So forgive me, but that’s the soup du jour today, as their comments are still swimming in my mind.

I spent some time with the Head of Investor Relations at a high nine-figure AUM firm. And he said something that echoed much of the reality of fundraising these days. “Fundraising is all about trust. It’s not about the performance metrics. It’s about who believes in you.”

Then, immediately after, I caught up with an LP friend, who said, “Investor relations is a wasted job title in VC. They’re glorified note takers and relationship managers. I won’t invest in any fund where I haven’t met the GP.” Only to later share how much we both admired a certain Head of IR at a large multi-stage fund.

At first glance, the irony is blinding. The funny thing is that both are equally as true. GPs have a bank account where they can deposit trust. They withdraw trust every time they make an ask. Whether it’s for capital or special terms on the term sheet or for a certain ownerships target or for a guest speaker for an event they’re hosting. Before a GP starts a firm, they need to bank a lot of trust. They should give more than they take. And to run a firm, there are three types of primary customers you need to bank trust with:

  1. Founders,
  2. Co-investors,
  3. And LPs.

You also can’t take a loan on trust (in other words, outsource trust) before you’ve deposited enough trust in your own bank account. Or else, you’ll be in debt. If you’re in too much debt (i.e. have a negative balance), your reputation takes a hit. But when you’ve banked enough trust, you can have a separately managed trust account managed by others. An IR professional who manages the trust account with LPs. A community/platform person with co-investors and talent. And so on.

Having others manage these accounts too early in the firm lifecycle means taking debt and impacting reputation. So when my buddy who’s the LPs says he doesn’t like most IR folks, it’s because before the IR person was hired, the GP didn’t bank enough trust.

And the truth is trust is built not in grand gestures and one-off deals. It’s in the small interactions. How fast do you respond? Even when you’re busy, do you make time for people important to you? Do you remember what you talked about last time? Do you close the loop on advice you get from LPsโ€”whether you use it or not? Do you remember their answer to ‘What did you do last weekend’ 15 weekends ago? Do you follow through with what you promiseโ€”even if it’s a restaurant recommendation you mentioned in the call?

In a conversation with a Fund I GP yesterday who successfully raised his 8-figure fund in 8 weeks (and yes, part of that duration was over the holidays), he said something I really liked: “Every LP is looking for returns. That’s a given. But every LP is also looking for returns plus X. Your job during the fundraising process is to find out what X is, and it may be less obvious than you think it is.” For some, X is undoing boredom. For others, it’s the front row seat to learn. Others still, it’s the prospect of social capital that will come with making an investment. And you can’t find any of these out, if you don’t spend the time to build trust with the other party.

Photo by Marek Piwnicki on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Diligence on a GP’s Social Media Presence

social media

A lot of what I will say applies similarly to assessing founders and with senior talent, but for the sake of this blogpost, I’m going to focus primarily on doing diligence on GPs.

Sequoia’s Pat Grady co-wrote a piece on AGI that’s been making its rounds the last few days. FYI, this post has nothing to do with AGI, so don’t get your hopes up. But in it, he shares:

Source: Pat Grady’s X post on AGI

Note the highlights above are all around how to better understand an individual’s internet presence. While not all-encompassing, understanding someone’s brand via their social media is more than just how many followers, likes, comments, and shares. As my good YouTuber friend once told me, “Not all subscribers are created equal. English-speaking personal finance content get paid the most per impression.” Analogously, the same is true for LinkedIn or Twitter/X content.

Just because you have 25K followers, how often are you just resharing your employer’s content? Or your portfolio company’s content? How often do you share your thought leadership? Do people follow you because of your perceived status or do people follow you because of the weight of your ideas? There’s a great Simon Sinek talk about the former Under Secretary of Defense on this, which I won’t bore you with the details, but if you want the full story, it’s here. In summary, if you no longer held the job title you do today, would people engage with you differently?

That’s what I’m trying to figure out.

The first filter is: What is your insight per post ratio? This includes reshares and comments they make on other people’s posts. At a high level, do you recognize what good content looks like?

The second filter is: What is your original insight per post ratio? How much of your activity is original ideas? Is that what people engage with? Or do they engage more with your reshared content? When they do engage, how?

  • Level 1 is a like. The least number of clicks to engage with you.
  • Level 2 is a reaction other than a like. It takes a second longer to do so, but is more intentional. To be fair, a spam-like content (i.e. “LFG”, “Proud of you”, “Excited”, etc.), I also put in this tier.
  • Level 3 is a thoughtful comment that you can’t use on any other post. They’ve read and thoughtfully engaged back. Also on this tier is a quick reshare.
  • Level 4 is a thoughtful reshare. Or on Twitter (still not easy to call it X), a “quote retweet.” You’re staking not only your personal brand and reputation with your own followers, but you’re also letting others know how you’ve thought about the content being shared.

It’s not a perfect scorecard, but I do keep a rough mental tally (which goes into my own memo) of what a GP’s social brand is. And at what point was there an inflection in their thinking and/or following. Usually quite correlated with each other.

Other things I find interesting to observe, but cannot be understood in isolation:

  • Most frequent commenters and reshare your content
  • Reactions-to-follower count ratio
  • Connections-to-follower ratio
  • How similar/different their content on LinkedIn vs Twitter/X vs Instagram/TikTok vs podcast platform is
  • AI-search optimization (AEO): What keywords and/or questions do certain GPs own in search traffic? How does it compare across ChatGPT vs Claude vs Gemini? And in incognito AI search.
  • Frequency of getting tagged by others on social media outside of viral periods
  • Endurance of content even when little to no engagement, usually for podcasts, blogs and newsletters. And why do they continue doing so even when it’s not producing the results they desire (more of a qualitative understanding on the personality traits of a GP)
  • Frequency of guest appearances on others’ content channels and how do those appearances’ views compare to said influencer’s average view-to-subscriber ratio

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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

What is Adverse Selection?

directions, adverse selection, sunset

One of the most interesting self-reflective questions I think GPs should ask is: If someone else had the exact same strategy and offered the exact same terms, why would someone not pick you over another VC? That’s adverse selection.

One of the three pillars (or five pillars, depending on who you ask) of underwriting a venture fund is winning. The others being seeing and picking (and supporting and selling). But sometimes what’s more interesting than underwriting why a GP wins is understanding all the reasons they won’t win.

It’s an interesting thought exercise I like working through with a GP. “Why won’t a founder let you invest?” or “Assuming you wanted to invest, why would you lose out on a deal?”

The most common answers are always:

  • “I missed the timing.”
  • “There was no more space left.”
  • “They weren’t raising at the time.”

In my opinion, while possibly true, all cop-out answers. Then I follow up: “Assuming you wanted to invest, and there’s space left, and they’re currently raising, why would a founder say no to you?” Or “Why wouldn’t you be able to invest?” More often than not, I get an answer along the lines of: “I win (almost) every deal I want.” Or “I have yet to raise my fund.”

Even if true historically, it doesn’t answer the question. It’s like asking a job candidate: “Tell me about your weakness.” And they respond with, “I’m too honest.” Or worse, “I have no weaknesses.”

What I’m trying to get at in these questions is not the “right” answer. There is none. But rather what are the reasons you’ll fail to win a deal. Which of those reasons are areas where you would like to improve upon? Which of those reasons are areas where you will continue to be unrelenting on? What will you not change? Only then can I get a better understanding of the GP you will become 2-3 funds from now. And if so, does it make sense to do business with each other today?

There’s a Fund I GP I ended up investing in. When I first asked him the question above, he reached the conclusion that his pitch and value-add resonated more with second-time founders than first-time founders at the pre-seed stage. And given that he wanted to grow into a lead investor eventually, what he had to figure out was how to build a strong enough brand with first-time founders, requiring both education and intentional positioning. For me as an LP, it became easy for me to see how he would grow into a Fund II GP. Between then and his next fundraise, I’d just track how many first-time founders he invested in, try to spend time with them at events, and ask why did you take this GP’s check and what did you really want from him.

There is no right answer as to what founders wouldn’t want to work with you. It’s just an exercise of self-awareness, so you can figure out what’s worth working on and what’s not. Adverse selection reasons I’ve heard in the past, in no particular order, include:

  • Political alignment
  • Naming a firm after their own name instead of an ideal (yes, that is a real answer I’ve gotten before)
  • Speed to make a decision
  • High ownership targets
  • Response time, including taking the holidays/weekends off when their peers might still be dealmaking
  • Lack of brand awareness
  • No founding experience
  • No experience at a large established firm
  • No relationships with key potential customers
  • Values shared publicly / controversial opinions
  • Personality (i.e. too nice, people pleaser, argumentative, arrogant, name-dropping/logo-shopping, too humble, etc.)
  • Lack of talent networks
  • Having invested in a competitor
  • A homogenous partnership
  • A rumor that is widespread but may not have real credence
  • A single remark from an influencer in the ecosystem (or a close friend), then what’s more interesting is why someone would say something like that
  • The way a GP dresses (especially important in certain geographies outside of the US)
  • The initial outreach was done by a junior team member or a broker/dealer
  • Subsequent conversations done by a junior team member
  • A reference call with their network done in poor taste
  • Someone with no board experience asking for a board seat
  • Having someone else on the team take the board seat even though you did the deal and the founder wanted you
  • Aggressive term sheet terms (1X+ liquidation preferences – participating and preferred)
  • Having no respect for prior round investors (especially, in relation to their most helpful investors so far, often related to their pro rata)
  • Badmouthing their existing investors and/or teammates

Photo by Javier Allegue Barros on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

How Trees Fall

lumberjack, felling a tree, axe, emerging lp

I caught up with a single family office over the holidays. Let’s call him Mark. Mark told me that he had caught up with a Fund I GP that I had passed on. Let’s call her Susan. In that conversation with that GP, he told Susan that I introed him to another GP “Charlie” whom she knew and whom I invested in, which he eventually passed on. And Susan asked Mark why I invested. That it made no sense. That Susan herself would have never invested in Charlie. As such, she didn’t know why I would invest in Charlie and not her. After sharing that last line, with no explicit question that plead for an answer, Mark looked at me, waiting to see how I’d respond.

I stared back at him. And he to I. And I to him.

As he felt seemingly unsatisfied with my reaction, I asked him, “If I put both of these GPs on a report card, how would you score each?”

He followed up, “Susan is more experienced. She’s done X and Y. And she came from Z.”

“You’re right. Susan is all of that. In fact, on a report card, it’s fair to say that her GPA is a solid B+, maybe an A-.”

He concurred.

I went on. “And Charlie would probably score a B, maybe B-, if we were really critical. But to you, did anything about Susan jump out at you?”

“Not exactly.”

“What about Charlie?”

“Well, there’s that…”

“I agree. For me, and you don’t have to agree with my assessment, Charlie is on paper a lower GPA than Susan, but Charlie spikes in very particular areas. Areas I personally believe puts him in a position to do really well. That he will have a good chance to outperform. Susan is factually better in almost every area than Charlie is, but she doesn’t spike in any area. At least it’s not obvious to me. I like her thesis. I think she has a great GP-thesis fit. And I do believe that her thesis has a really good chance of being right, but I’m not sure she’s the only person in the world who can do that, much less the best person in the world to do it. In fact, I can think of two other GPs who spike in that thesis area where she doesn’t.”

It’s harsh criticism. And it’s not my place to give non-constructive criticism. So what I said when I passed was that we had other deals in the pipeline that were a lot more interesting to us. Which is true. But it’s not my place to say “I don’t think you’re good enough.” And she probably felt my pass was unsatisfying. Because in her shoes, I’d probably feel the same.

I don’t invest in all-rounders. There’s a time and place and industry for those. But I don’t believe it’s venture. Even less early stage emerging managers. There’s a line I’ve long liked in the F1 world. “In Formula 1 itโ€™s nearly impossible to go from 13th to 1st on a sunny day, but itโ€™s possible on a rainy day.” In the uncharted territory of true early, early stage investing, it’s always a rainy day. And to go from 13th to 1st, you need to make bold decisions. Measured, well-timed, but risky decisions. You need to make certain sacrifices to do so.

To me, that meant comparatively lower grade-point averages, but much, much higher select individual subject grades. In fact, only an A++ would suffice. A spike must be at least three standard deviations from the mean. As an emerging manager LP, who plans to be an active participant in the journey, naturally with the GP’s permission, it falls on me and my peers to help our GPs raise their overall GPAs, but we can’t help them spike. But in that, we must know and recognize their flaws.

One of the most interesting spectacles I’ve always marveled at is how lumberjacks fell trees. The first cut is the notch cut that indicates the direction the tree will fall. The second is the felling cut that catalyzes the tree to fall, acting as the hinge.

In many ways, the GP spikes (and flaws) makes the first cut. Whether you count it as nature or nurture. The GP’s job is to figure out which direction they’d like to fall. Or to borrow a line from Mark Manson’s most important question of your life: “What pain do you want in your life? What are you willing to struggle for? How do you choose to suffer?” To further borrow, “What determines your success isnโ€™t ‘What do you want to enjoy?’ The question is, ‘What pain do you want to sustain?’ The quality of your life is not determined by the quality of your positive experiences, but the quality of your negative experiences. And to get good at dealing with negative experiences is to get good at dealing with life.” All in all, it’s a GP’s job to make that choice. An LP cannot make that choice for the GP. And it is a function of the flaws they’re willing to overcome, and how they want to double down on their spikes.

The second cut is for investors, board and advisory members to nudge our investees towards the direction they so chose. As the great Tom Landry once said, “A coach is someone who tells you what you don’t want to hear, who has you see what you don’t want to see, so you can be who you have always known you could be.” But the prerequisite for the second cut is the first. The first requires intentional and special people.

Along a similar vein, my buddy Henry wrote a post recently I really liked.

“Is this founder special?” That’s probably the only question that has to be asked in every non-obvious investment decision. Maybe every investment decision. But especially true under imperfect information conditions. And special isn’t just about getting a high GPA.

Photo by Radek Skrzypczak on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Peter Walker as You’ve Never Seen Him Before | Peter Walker | Superclusters | S6PSE3

peter walker

โ€œYouโ€™re making decisions in an incomplete vacuum. What I think many people should do more of, in terms of those mental models, is frame it in the reverse. Which of these decisions am I going to make that is the most regret-minimizing? That I have the least likelihood of regretting later on in life, assuming that in most cases, I will be wrong.โ€ โ€” Peter Walker

The holiday season has always been a great time to celebrate the movers and shakers in our world. This season we’re celebrating my personal favorites in the VC and startup world. This episode, it’s with my man, Peter Walker, who creates some of the industry’s most talked charts and graphics around the ebbs and flows of tech innovation.

Peter Walker runs the Insights team at Carta, where he works to make startups a little less opaque for founders, investors, and employees. Prior to Carta, he was a marketing executive for the media analytics startup PublicRelay and led a data visualization team at The Atlantic magazine. He lives in San Francisco, but you can find him on LinkedIn (see links below).

You can find Peter on his socials here:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/peterjameswalker/
X / Twitter: https://x.com/PeterJ_Walker

Listen to the episode onย Apple Podcastsย andย Spotify. You can alsoย watch the episode on YouTube here.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[02:52] Peter’s first brush with entrepreneurship
[11:49] 996 work culture
[17:11] Peter’s disclaimer on his data
[21:27] Regret-minimization when investing
[24:24] One example of regret-minimization
[26:07] How does Peter choose which conferences to go to?
[29:33] Conference panels are often bad
[36:22] The incongruencies of what GPs say publicly and privately
[41:43] Peter’s first data visualization
[44:18] Why is soccer underrated in the US?
[46:10] What great lengths has Peter gone for his friends?
[48:21] One worrisome trend we’re going to see in 2026
[52:18] One optimistic trend to look forward to in 2026

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

โ€œNo one has to force you to work long hours if you really want to. The founders and early employees who push hardest arenโ€™t usually doing it because someone set the office lights to stay on until midnight. Theyโ€™re doing it because they care. Itโ€™s not obedienceโ€”itโ€™s compulsion.โ€ โ€” Cristina Cordova

โ€œThereโ€™s a growing recognition that that sense of compulsion, it very rarely lasts for 10 years. […] Itโ€™s very rare to find that one thingโ€”that one set of problemsโ€”that can get you so excited for your entire life.โ€ โ€” Peter Walker

โ€œCuriosity is the art of asking questions where youโ€™re not married to the answer.โ€ โ€” Matt Huang

โ€œYou should probably, if youโ€™re a founder, for instance, selectively ignore at least half of what Iโ€™m saying because it doesnโ€™t apply to you. And your job as a founder, your job as an investor, your job as a thoughtful person is to figure out which half.โ€ โ€” Peter Walker

โ€œIf you torture the data long enough, it will confess to anything.โ€  โ€” Ronald Coase

โ€œYouโ€™re making decisions in an incomplete vacuum. What I think many people should do more of, in terms of those mental models, is frame it in the reverse. Which of these decisions am I going to make that is the most regret-minimizing? That I have the least likelihood of regretting later on in life, assuming that in most cases, I will be wrong.โ€ โ€” Peter Walker

โ€œThe worrisome part is that sometimes [selling founder secondaries] is at pretty early-stage companiesโ€”seed, A. Sometimes, itโ€™s for $10,000 and I donโ€™t know what happened there. Sometimes, itโ€™s for a really sizable amount of moneyโ€”seven figures. To me, that is a bubble sign. That is as close as you can get to capital is chasing consensus too much, and therefore, smart founders are just taking advantage and taking stuff off the table.โ€ โ€” Peter Walker


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
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Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

On Investing in Generalist GPs

pull up bar, high bar

A quick thought on investing in generalist funds, inspired by a GP following up with me after I told him I prefer investing in “specialist” funds. Which he followed up with “I am a stage specialist.” Technically, he’s not wrong. But under that definition, almost all emerging managers are stage specialists. Their specialization just depends on which stage we’re talking about. But when most, including myself, use the word specialists, we really mean sector specialists.

A couple things to caveat before I go further:

  • I’m an emerging LP. I don’t have that many years or funds I’ve invested in at this point, so I need to spread my coverage wider than after I figure things out. But not too wide that I trend towards the median, also known as “indexing venture.” Median, even top quartile in today’s venture, is uninspiring. And there are far better liquid options that can deliver the same return profile as top quartile in venture.
  • I have a stage preference because I think it’s where you can build meaningful relationships while still figuring things out alongside the founder. As they say, a friend in need is a friend indeed.
  • I have a geographical preference because of my existing network, which makes certain opportunities easier to diligence.
  • I prefer sector specialists because I’m designing a portfolio where I can hopefully predict where 50% of my underlying portfolio will come from, and 50% where I can’t. Since most things in venture are opportunistic, and I give each of my managers that longer leash to make bets to be opportunistic (20%-ish; not a hard number, but can’t be 70%). Specialists are easier to underwrite how valuable they can be to a portfolio. Generalists, it’s harder to, unless I’m somehow convinced that a GP has a unique skillset I’ve never seen before in my career so far, which the bar just gets higher the longer I’m in business, AND that skillset is uniquely valuable to a founder across sectors.

I want to have exposure to 50-60 new companies/opportunities per year, with very little overlap. Stats suggest 30 of a sample size becomes statistically significant so anything less than that, I’m not giving my null hypothesis an honest chance. If I believe that 20 companies per year matter (not sure of the exact number, but this number feels directionally accurate), I want to know my managers collectively together has at least a 1 in 3 chance of hitting at least one. That means being in the right networks. Proportionally, some should spend their time hunting (i.e. actively spend time in interesting ways to find and chase after the best opportunities). Some should spend time fishing (i.e. building a brand so fish swim to or at least through their fishing hole). Some should spend time farming (i.e. cultivating relationships).

That said, my portfolio has yet to deploy into 50 new opportunities per year, so I am actively adding to it, in specific areas. Areas I don’t have good coverage over for now. So to invest in a new sector generalist manager, I likely need to “fire” one or more managers from my existing portfolio, which means I won’t re-up in them. And there are only a small handful o reasons I’ll won’t re-up into an existing manager.

  • Their investments have really deviated off of the thesis I underwrote them to have.
  • There’s a major team change that puts into question their ability to outperform.
  • Their fund size has drastically increased to a point I question the return profile that would get me excited.
  • They’ve made a series of bad bets where I question their ability to make decisions (i.e. I meet with their founders and they just don’t feel like high performers.).
  • They lose motivation to be a VC and hang up the cleats. In this case, I won’t have to say the “no.” They will for me. But on occasion, they’ll try to raise another firm, or hear whispers on how tough the market is, and they’ll choose not to raise another vintage.
  • I meet with a new GP covering an area an existing manager covers but materially better on almost all fronts. 10-20% better, even 50% better, is negligible, and also really hard to measure in foresight. And assuming the manager I’ve invested in learns quickly, that 50% gap will be closed shortly.

Luckily none of the above has happened yet. But I imagine, because I’m not perfect, at some point, one or some of the above will.

So if you’re a generalist covering 2-4 areas that my existing portfolio is covering AND has reasonable access to, in order to invest in you, I must believe that you’d be better than the firms I’ve already invested in, then subsequently fire them from my portfolio the next vintage.

That is a high bar. And only gets higher the more my portfolio grows.

Photo by Vitaly Gariev on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

The Most Disappointing Podcast You’ll Ever Listen To (ft. Allie Garfinkle) | Superclusters | S6PSE2

allie garfinkle, david zhou, superclusters

Warning: This is a brief-ish, but hopefully entertaining intermission from the usual Superclusters programming. When we passed the 50th episode mark more than a few episodes ago, Tyler (my editor) and I thought it’d be interesting to record an episode where I change seats. Instead of me asking the questions, someone else would ask me questions. And I couldn’t imagine any better person to do so than my good friend, Allie, who in my humble opinion, is one of the best interviewers alive today.

Allie Garfinkle is a senior finance reporter for Fortune, covering venture capital and startups. She authors Fortuneโ€™s weekday dealmaking newsletter Term Sheet, hosts the Term Sheet Podcast, and co-chairs Fortune Brainstorm, a community and event series featuring an annual retreat in Deer Valley, Utah. A regular contributor to BBCโ€™s Business Matters podcast, Allie is also a frequent moderator at major conferences such as SXSW. Before joining Fortune, she covered Amazon and Meta at Yahoo Finance and helped produce Emmy-nominated PBS Frontline business documentaries, including Elon Muskโ€™s Twitter Takeover and The Power of the Fed. A graduate of The University of Chicago and New York University, Allie currently resides in Los Angeles.

You can find Allie on her socials here:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexandra-garfinkle1/
X / Twitter: https://x.com/agarfinks

Listen to the episode onย Apple Podcastsย andย Spotify. You can alsoย watch the episode on YouTube here.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[02:01] Art
[09:39] Competition
[17:49] Paleontology
[18:14] Allie’s Tiki mugs
[22:49] How has VC evolved?
[29:41] Evaluating risk
[43:04] Why is it important for VCs to stay in touch?
[47:10] Are there reliably good investors?
[53:09] Young GPs in market
[54:58] How useful is education that come via public talks?
[57:50] Does your niche fund size make sense for the market?
[1:01:16] Is there too much venture capital?
[01:05:24] How much of VC is art vs science?
[1:07:18] What’s going on in Allie’s world?
[1:09:45] Post-credit scene: Receipts

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

Iโ€™m intentionally keeping this section void of the things that I said since I hate the idea of quoting myself.

โ€œPart of the point of this [investing job] is that you want to be anonymously, asymmetrically correct. And you canโ€™t necessarily be that by saying or doing the same thing as everyone else. That being said, the worst nightmare for a VC is that no one wants to back a company theyโ€™ve backed.โ€ โ€” Allie Garfinkle

โ€œIf it eventually doesnโ€™t become consensus, you were wrong.โ€ โ€” Allie Garfinkle


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
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Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.