If 198 Pieces of Unsolicited, (Possibly) Ungoogleable Advice for Founders Were Not Enough

windmill

This is my third iteration of the 99 series for founders. You can find the first two here and here. The premise for this series was simple. The best, most insightful, unsuspecting lessons are hidden in the deepest, darkest corners of the internet. Hell, many more are hidden in rooms behind closed doors. The goal of this 99 series is to unveil those. Advice you’ve likely never thought about, and most likely have never heard of.

While you don’t need to read all the below at once, it’s helpful to keep the below at your fingertips for when you do need them. As always, unless the advice is not cited, all advice has been backlinked to its source, in case you want the longer, sometimes more nuanced version.

To make it easier for you, I’ve also pooled the advice in categories, depending on your needs:

  1. Fundraising (22)
  2. Governance (5)
  3. Hiring/Team/Culture (44)
  4. Product/Customers (23)
  5. Competition (1)
  6. Legal (2)
  7. Expenses (1)
  8. Secondaries (1)

P.S. Have I started the next one in the 99 series for founders? Yes, I have. Stay tuned!

Fundraising

1/ “Once you take venture capital, the venture capitalist’s business model is your business model. You’ve got to get liquid at a number that makes sense for them. High valuations are good because you take less dilution. Et Cetera. But the reality is that when you have a high valuation, that starts to eliminate your options. ” — Chris Douvos

2/ The employee option pool is easier to negotiate than asking an investor to take less ownership. The pool at the time of term sheet comes out of founder/team’s equity. If the pool becomes completely allocated post-investment, you need to go back to the board and ask for a larger pool, and everyone (you and VCs) gets diluted then.

3/ Beware of the “senior pari-passu,” which means that that investor gets paid paid back before everyone else on the preference stack AND they get equal footing with all the other investors. The thing to watch out for isn’t necessarily for the mechanics of the term itself, but the fact that if you let one investor have that in this round, every subsequent round, investors then will ask for that as well.

4/ Repeat founders often ask for co-sale right immunity (usually 15%) when putting together term sheets. Co-sale rights are usually provisions investors add in to prevent you, the founder, from liquidating before a liquidity event. The rights dictate the when you want to sell your equity, the investor has first dibs to buy your equity AND if not, they can also sell their equity alongside you. Because there are additional provisions, most buyers may not want to put in all the work to diligence just to have an existing investor buy your equity. And also, if your existing investors are also selling, it sends a negative signal to potential buyers.

5/ If any corporates own more than 19.5% of a company, they have to write you off as a subsidiary of the corporate and report your losses as their losses. So they’re less valuation sensitive and care less for ownership.

6/ You’re likely not the only one in market with your solution. If a competitor raises a massive round, that’s market validation. And not a reason to change your pitch. You should only change your pitch if your customers are opting for your competitor, but not if VCs are talking about your competitor. If VCs ask about your well-funded competitor, say “My customers don’t bring this up with me. But rather they bring up incumbents and this is why we’re tackling this space in full force.”

7/ “Once you have $500k+ raised, spend 2/3 of your time on funds, 1/3 on small checks.” — Ash Rust

8/ Beware of SAFE overhangs. You probably don’t want to raise more than 25% on SAFEs in comparison to the next priced round. — Martin Tobias

9/ Don’t say “The market is so large, there are room for many winners.” To a VC, that’s code for “This founder is getting their ass handed to them by competition.” — Harry Stebbings

10/ If a large number of your employee base do not have the experience of being in a startup, “make a choice about how/when/if to be transparent about the things that are happening (good and bad) and the level of startup experience within the group will be a critical factor in whether the decision to be transparent turns out to be a good one.” — Javier Soltero

11/ To fundraise, even if your last X number of months sucked, you need to show just three months of great growth prior to the fundraise. — Jason Lemkin

12/ Rough benchmarks for enterprise revenue growth for things to be interesting to VCs (— Jason Lemkin):

  • Before $1M ARR, growing 10%-15% a month
  • Around $1M ARR, growing 8%-10% a month or so
  • Around $10M ARR, ideally doubling

13/ “An investor is an employee you can’t fire.” — Vinod Khosla

14/ “Things that break the rules have a bigger threshold to overcome to grab the reader’s attention, but once they do, they tend to have a stronger, and more dedicated following. Blandness tends to get fewer dedicated followers.” — Brandon Sanderson on creative writing, but applies just as well to pitches

15/ “Great worldbuilding with bad characters and a bad plot is an encyclopedia. Great characters and a great plot with bad worldbuilding is still often an excellent book. […] The fact that time turners break the entire universe of Harry Potter wide open does not prevent that from being the strongest book in the entire series.” — Brandon Sanderson on story plots, but also applies to markets and founding teams. Replace worldbuilding with market. Replace characters with team, and plot with product-market fit or founder-market fit.

16/ In all great stories, the protagonist (in the case of a pitch, you) is proactive, capable, and relatable. Your pitch needs to show all three, but at the minimum two out of the three. — Brandon Sanderson

17/ “Data rooms are where fund-raising processes go to die.” Prioritize in-person and live conversations. When your investor asks you for documents, ask for 15 minutes on their calendar so you can “best prepare” the information they want. If they aren’t willing to give you that 15 minutes, you’ve lost the deal already. — Mark Suster

18/ “Second conversation with a serious investor is usually around what are you trying to prove and who are you trying to prove that to.” — Fund III GP

19/ “Set your own agenda or someone else will.” — Melinda Gates

20/ “The ‘raise very little’ strategy only works if you’re in a market that most people believe (incorrectly) is tiny or unimportant. If other people are paying attention, you have to beat the next guy.” — Parker Conrad

21/ Beware of stacking SAFEs. And be sure to model out that you as the founder(s), won’t dip below 50% ownership before the Series A. This is a more common problem than most founders think. Inspired by Itamar Novick.

22/ “Before you send a single email or take your first call, you should have a fully-researched pipeline CRM with a minimum number of qualified target investors.” — Chris Neumann

  • Pre-Seed: 100 – 150 qualified target investors (a mix of angel investors and VCs)
  • Seed: 80 – 100 qualified target investors (mostly VCs)
  • Series A: 60 – 80 qualified target investors (all VCs)
  • Series B: 40 – 60 qualified target investors (all VCs)

Governance

23/ Find your independent board member before shit hits the fan (usually when your investor representation and you the founders disagree). Because by the time you find an independent board member when things go south, your investor will recommend someone who’ll most likely take their side. Board members recommended by VCs usually have long standing relationships with investors and are likely to sit or have sat on other boards with that investor previously. And because they have a longer standing relationship with that VC, they will likely side with the VC when there’s a disagreement.

24/ “Board members can’t make companies but they can destroy companies.” — Brian Chesky

25/ Ask your prospective investors how long they plan to be at their firm. The worst thing that can happen is you bring on a board member and they switch firms after a year, then you’re left with a someone you didn’t pick. It’s probably also a good idea to let the investor have their board seat, contingent on them working at that firm. — Joseph Floyd

26/ Consider incorporating the company in Nevada or Texas, as Delaware courts are becoming more judiciously activist. Especially consider this if you are either politically exposed or you want more leeway and protection as a founder. — Elad Gil

27/ “When you build with other people’s money, you don’t just owe them outcomes—you owe them truth. And selling your cash to a zombie isn’t a strategy. It’s a story you tell yourself to avoid facing the music.” — Lloyed Lobo

Hiring/Team/Culture

28/ “If you raise a lot of money, do a hiring freeze and don’t hire anybody for 90 days. Money’s not going to solve your problems. You are going to solve them.” — Ryan Petersen

29/ “If you had to hire everyone based only on you knowing how good they are at a certain video game, what video game would you pick?” — Patrick O’Shaughnessy. People’s choices can be quite revealing. You can likely ask the same question for any activity/sport/topic of choice.

30/ “I hate surprises. Can you tell me something that might go wrong now so that I’m not surprised when it happens?” — Simon Sinek. A great question on how to ask weaknesses without candidates giving you a non-answer.

31/ Beware of candidates who can’t stick to a job for at least 18 months. — Jason Lemkin.

32/ Beware of candidates who love what’s on their resume. You want to be sure you’d hire them even if they didn’t have those logos/titles. — Jason Lemkin.

33/ Beware of candidates who don’t have good reasons to leave their last job. Or any job for that matter. Also watch out for candidates that leave because of salary. — Jason Lemkin.

34/ As soon as you raise capital, you should move out of a coworking space. Because as long as you are there, you cannot shape your company’s culture when the culture of the rest of the coworking space is more prevalent. — A VC who was the first institutional check into 5+ unicorns

35/ “First time founders brag about how many employees they have. Second time founders brag about how few employees they have.” — Dan Siroker.

36/ 20 years of experience is more impressive than 20 one-year experiences for deeply technical problems.

37/ 20 one-year experiences is more impressive than 20 years of experience for cultural (consumer) problems.

38/ Great founders don’t delegate understanding. Senior execs aren’t hired until founders themselves prove out the playbook.

39/ Inspired by Marc Randolph. Set boundaries around your work. Ask yourself, do you want to be starting your 7th startup and their 7th wife/husband? If not, be uncompromising with boundaries around work and life. Usually, I see most founders not have that versus most tech employees, who set boundaries almost in the opposite direction.

40/ “My two rules of thumb for CEOs (and all leaders) are:

  • ‘if you feel like a broken record, you’re probably doing something right’ and 
  • ‘always craft your comms for the person who just started this week.'” — Molly Graham

41/ At Starbucks, no matter what seniority you are, every employee has lowercase titles. And it isn’t a typo.

42/ If you don’t know how to hire a 10/10 CTO looks like, find a world-class CTO then have them help you interview CTO candidates. It’s important to nail this right in the beginning no matter how long that takes. — Jason Lemkin

43/ “People duck as a natural reflex when something is hurled at them. Similarly, the excellence reflex is a natural reaction to fix something that isn’t right, or to improve something that could be better. The excellence reflex is rooted in instinct and upbringing, and then constantly honed through awareness, caring, and practice. The overarching concern to do the right thing well is something we can’t train for. Either it’s there or it isn’t. So we need to train how to hire for it.” — Danny Meyer

44/ Prioritize references over interviewing when hiring. “Executives have more experience bullshitting you than you have experience detecting their bullshit. So it’s like an asymmetric game where you’re a white belt fighting a black belt and they’re just going to punch you in the face repeatedly.” — Brian Chesky

45/ At the end of a candidate interview process, try to convince them out of joining the company. If you only paint them the rosy picture of joining, even if they join, they’ll joined disillusioned and with expectations that this job will be a country club, which it shouldn’t be.

46/ One of the best job ads out there by Ernest Shackleton, a 19th/20th century Antarctic explorer: “Men wanted for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honor and recognition in case of success.”

47/ “The health of an organization is the relationship between engineering and marketing. Or in enterprise, the relationship between engineering and sales.” — Brian Chesky

48/ “Great leadership is presence, not absence.” — Brian Chesky

49/ “I want the guy who understands his limitations instead of the guy who doesn’t. On the other hand, I’ve learned something terribly important in life. I learned that from Howard Owens. And you know what he used to say? Never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.” — Charlie Munger

50/ “If you pay great people internally, you can push back on the external fees. If you don’t pay great people internally, then you’re a price taker.” — Ashby Monk

51/ “Expect 60% of your VPs to work out — and that’s if you do it right.” — Dev Ittycheria

52/ Be generous with startup equity for your first 10 employees, “as much as leaving 30% of the pool to non-founders.” Be willing to give your early engineers 3-5% of equity, as opposed to only 50-100 basis points. — Vinod Khosla

53/ “A company becomes the people it hires. […] Experience has shown me that successful startups seldom follow their original plans. The early team not only determines how the usual risks are handled but also evolves the plans to better utilize their opportunities and to address and redefine their risks continuously.” — Vinod Khosla

54/ “I often tell pensions you should pay people at the 49th percentile. So, just a bit less than average. So that the people going and working there also share the mission. They love the mission ‘cause that actually is, in my experience, the magic of the culture in these organizations that you don’t want to lose.” — Ashby Monk

55/ “Innovation everywhere, but especially in the land of pensions, endowments, and foundations, is a function of courage and crisis.” — Ashby Monk

56/ “You stay obstinate about your vision; you stay really flexible about your tactics. […] Nobody ever got to Mount Everest by charting a straight path to the peak.” — Vinod Khosla

57/ Questions to ask a candidate by Graham Duncan:

  • What criteria would you use to hire someone to do this job if you were in my seat?
  • How would your spouse or sibling describe you with ten adjectives?
  • I think we’re aligned in wanting this to be a good fit, you don’t want us to counsel you out in six months and neither do we. Let’s take the perspective of ourselves in six months and it didn’t work.  What’s your best guess of what was going on that made it not work?
  • What are the names of your last five managers, and how would they each rate your overall performance on a 1-100?
  • What are you most torn about right now in your professional life?
  • How did you prepare for this interview?
  • How do you feel this interview is going?

58/ Empower your entire team to be owners in the success of your company. “Take ownership and don’t give your project a chance to fail. Dumping your bottleneck on someone and then just walking away until it’s done is lazy and it gives room for error and I want you to have a mindset that God himself couldn’t stop you from making this video on time. Check. In. Daily. Leave. No. Room. For. Error.” — Jimmy Donaldson “Mr. Beast”

59/ “CEOs are pinch hitters. We should be working on the things that nobody else can or nobody else is.” — Jensen Huang

60/ It’s only after you’ve seen excellence first hand do you no longer need to outsource the recognition of excellence to others (brands, titles, other references).

61/ “When you’re speaking with backchannel references, you know that some of these are also mentors to the candidate, and accordingly will have influence. They’ll likely call the candidate right after your call anyway to tell them how you’re thinking about them. So ask the pointed questions you need to, but then take 10 mins at the end to also tell this person what you’re building, why it could be a special company, the momentum you have in the market and why you’re particularly excited about the candidate for this role. Get the reference excited about this opportunity for the candidate.” — Nakul Mandan

62/ “Every meeting with a great candidate is a buy-and-sell meeting, and you want to build their excitement about you to its peak right before you make the offer. Making the offer too early—before they’re fully sold—can be just as bad as losing momentum by moving too slow on someone you know you want.” — Samantha Price

63/ On co-founders being in the same boat with no Plan B… “We actually wrote this in the shareholder’s agreement and it lived there all the way until the IPO. If one of us took another job or a side hustle or took any income from any other source, we should have to give up our shares. We wanted to be fully committed. If we’re going to fail, we’re not going to fail for lack of effort.” — Olivier Bernhard

64/ “You have made a mis-hire if your Customer Success leader doesn’t understand the pains, needs, and desires of your customers as well as you do within 90 days.” — John Gleeson

65/ Ask a candidate to explain a technical challenge and to talk through how they’d approach it. Then ask them to think through how they’d do it again – but in half the time.” — Keller Rinaudo Cliffton / Sarah Guo

66/ “Your org chart either accelerates or impedes your velocity. Conway’s Law inevitably shapes output—teams structured for pace will produce systems designed for pace.” — Sarah Guo

67/ “Just look at ARR per Employee. It’s the canary in the unicorn coal mine.” — Lloyed Lobo

68/ While your co-founders should excel in areas you lack and love growing further on that wavelength, they must also at some point in their career want to grow in the area you excel in. Otherwise, they’ll never truly appreciate the work you do. And unspoken expectations lead to quiet resentments.

69/ “I find most meetings are best scheduled for 15-20 minutes, or 2 hours.  The default of 1 hour is usually wrong, and leads to a lot of wasted time.” — Sam Altman

70/ “Strategy is choosing what not to do.” — Peter Rahal

71/ When hiring talent, ask yourself: Are this candidate’s best days ahead of her or behind her?

72/ The best way to slow a project down is to add more people to it.

73/ “Never delegate understanding.” — Charles and Ray Eames

74/ There’s this great line in a book I was recently gifted by a founder. “There is only one boss — the customer. And he can fire everybody in the company, from the chairman on down, simply by spending his money somewhere else.”

75/ A community or 1000 true fans built without big brands and logos is far more impressive than a community built by leveraging someone else’s brands.

76/ If your value prop is unique, you should be a price setter not a price taker, meaning your gross margins should be really good.
A compelling value prop is a comment on high operating margins. You shouldn’t need to spend a lot on sales and marketing. So the metrics to highlight would be good new ARR/S&M, LTV:CAC ratios, payback periods, or percent of organic to paid growth. — Pat Grady

77/ “If we don’t create the thing that kills Facebook, someone else will.” — Mark Zuckerberg, via a red book titled Facebook Was Not Originally Created to Be a Company, given to every employee pre-IPO

78/ The best sales people are often those who communicate the most with the engineers and product team. They tend to understand the product the best. Rule of thumb should be 80% inside, 20% outside. — Former founder with a 9-figure exit

79/ “Concentration of force is the first principal strategy. Spreading yourself too thin means not concentrating resources on the sales you could win because you are spreading time on lower quality prospects. Doing 90% of what it takes to win doesn’t result in 90% of the revenue, it results in zero. You must pick the battles you can win and win the battles you pick.” — Rick Page

80/ “One of our clients said this about a large defense contractor with multiple subsidiaries: ‘having business at one business unit not only doesn’t help me at the next one, it actually hurt me. They hate each other so much that if one business unit is for me, the other ones are against me. But they are all united in one value: they hate corporate. So the potential for working my way to the corporate offices and coming down as their worldwide standard is impossible in an account like this.” — Rick Page

81/ “Pain doesn’t come from the business problem, it comes from the political embarrassment of the business problem. If the pain or lost opportunity is not visible, then it’s not embarrassing and it will not drive business buying activity to a close.” — Rick Page

82/ “Mr. Prospect, we’ve announced a 6% price increase. We’d hate to see you buy the same proposal later at a higher price, so we really need to get this business in by the end of the quarter to secure this price. — Not only is this technique predictable, but after months of building value for your solution, you have now commoditized yourself. You have turned it from value to price on order to close business at the end of the quarter. Once you have offered a discount, you have announced what kind of vendor you are and the only question now is the price. Let the games begin.” — Rick Page

83/ “You must refocus off the imagined political benefit of a lower price, and on the longer term benefits of the overall project. ‘Mr. Prospect, how are you measured and what you will be remembered for three years from now won’t be the price, it will be the success of the project. If this goes well, the cost will be a detail. If the project goes poorly, no one will say ‘well at least we got a bargain.”” — Rick Page

84/ “Try not to take no from a person who can’t say yes.” — Rick Page

85/ Stacking the bricks, a Steve Jobs’ concept. If you have a pile of bricks and lay them on the ground, then no one will notice the ground. If you stack them up vertically, you create a tower; and everyone will notice the tower. Consider this when you have product features, launches and fixes.

86/ As of Q4 2024, it takes about 70 days to close a $100K contract for enterprise customers. Use that as your benchmark. If you’re faster, brag about it. If you’re slower than that, figure out how to close faster. — Gong State of Revenue Growth 2025 report

87/ Beware of “annual curiosity revenue.” “AI companies with quick early ARR growth can lead to false positives as many are seeing massive churn rates.” — Samir Kaji

88/ Your job is to get to innovation retention before your incumbents get to innovation.

89/ If you didn’t help create the proposal with your customer, you’ve already lost.

90/ People don’t change when they’ve made a mistake. People change when there’s a public embarrassment of them making a mistake.

91/ Know your customers intimately. Go visit your customers as often as you can. In fact, get as many passes / office keys to their offices as possible, and spend time with them.

92/ “Every other week, we have a customer join for the first 30 minutes of our management team meeting: they share their candid feedback, and ~40 leaders from across Stripe listen. Even though we already have a lot of customer feedback mechanisms, it somehow always spurs new thoughts and investigations.” — Patrick Collison

93/ “I see a lot of b2b startups moving to multiyear pricing from monthly or annual. I think this is usually a bad idea. It hides customer delight issues. It lengthens sales cycles. Overall, it just reduces the signal startups need.” — Brian Halligan

94/ Customers will still highly rate your customer service even if they didn’t get what they wanted if you show you care. That you care for their plight, and you really try to help them get what they want. — Simon Sinek

Competition

95/ “When you get outreach from multiple VC associates out of nowhere, your competitor is out raising and they’re just doing their homework.” — Siqi Chen

96/ “If you’re selling the business, tell as few people as possible and do everything you can to make sure past employees or former business associates do not find out.” Beware of moths who can start lawsuits. — Sammy Abdullah

97/ When you’re working with boutique investment banks, to protect yourself in case the banker sues when you choose to go with a different buyer… “Make sure the banker contract says they only get paid on intros they make directly and have a 6 month tail. Terminate any banker agreement as soon as they’re no longer working and the process is over; do not let these agreements linger.” — Sammy Abdullah

98/ “Never buy a SaaS product owned by private equity unless you have to. Main exception: if founder is still CEO. Why: Impossible to cancel, Price increases out of the blue, Lose any real customer success, Innovation slows down or even ends, Support usually terrible” — Jason Lemkin

99/ If you’re planning to sell founder secondaries, beware of signaling risk. Sometimes, you do have a major life event that needs capital (i.e. buying a home, having a baby, hospital bills, etc.). If you are to sell, don’t sell until the Series B. “And even then I’d suggest titrating up… 2% at A, 5% at B, 10% at >=C.” — Hari Raghavan

Photo by Jonny Gios on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Single Close vs Multiple Closes

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The ideal situation for a GP is that you have a single close. All LPs who are interested all confirm their participation by the same deadline. And all wires for the first capital call come in at the same time. It’s the utopia. Unfortunately, reality isn’t as picturesque. The truth is the vast majority of LPs wait till the final close, and as long as you have multiple closes, there is no urgency to commit by a certain date.

In fact, it’s almost always better to commit as late as you can if there are multiple closes. Investing in funds is investing in a blind pool of human potential. The blindness scares and humbles many allocators. It is in our interest to invest in the least blind pool of potential possible. And usually, when there are multiple closes, the GP(s) start deploying before the fund closes. So if you come in at the end, you at least get to see 10-20% of the portfolio. Sometimes more, as most LPA clauses stipulate that the final close must happen within 12-18 months from initial close. Of course, you can always move that date via LP votes or just not having that clause in the LPA in the first place.

Single CloseMultiple Closes
LP NetworkRobustWeak
LP Check SizeLargeSmall
# of ChecksFew
(most of the time)
Many
(first close is usually
existing LPs/friends and/or anchor)
DeploymentDeploys after the closeCan deploy after the first close
(while still fundraising
for the rest of the fund)


With single closes, while it helps to get it all one and done, you can’t deploy until you’ve closed. If your network with LPs and your trust with those respective LPs isn’t great, it’s more risky to go for a single close. Many LPs also have different timelines. So, instituting a single close means you need to be firm and align LPs on your timeline. It helps if you have a few large chunks that cover more than 50% of the fund before you set a close date.

With multiple closes, the good news is that you leave the door open for LPs who run processes on their own timelines. And that you can deploy as you’re still fundraising, as long as you get past the first close. The downside is that there’s no urgency for anyone to come in before the final close. It’s better if you don’t have a network of strong LPs, which pertains to the vast majority of first-time fund managers.

So, what to do?

Let’s get the single close strategy out of the way first. First of all, to do this, you need to come from a place of privilege. You must have a large amount of market pull. LPs who are dying to give you money. And for better or worse, not that you have to take them, people who would give you a blank check. Although, as a footnote, beware of the blank checks. More often than not, they’re easily disappointed.

You must have a strict process. And LPs need to self-select themselves in or out of the process very early in the process. Most important part of this, which is often a really hard thing to do for a lot of first-time GPs, you need to be intellectually honest with yourself if an LP is a fit for you or not. Your job is to figure that out before the LPs figure it out. And as soon as you do, you need to “fire” that prospective LP before they tell you no.

For that, even though you may lose the potential of a transaction, in my experience, you often win their respect.

Assuming what the LP invests in is what you are offering, manage your drip campaign well. Do your best to throttle opportunistic asks that deviate from your process. But do so with grace. And I can’t underscore grace enough.

Some things I’ve seen in the past for funds who can close a fund in a single close (none of the below are the Bible, but hopefully tools for the toolkit):

  • The deck is never sent out before the first meeting.
  • If the deck is sent out before the first meeting, it is either only a teaser deck (less than five slides) or the GP/IR team says something along the lines of: “If we don’t hear back from you within three days, we will assume our fund is out of scope, and will prioritize our time with other investors.”
  • The data room opens up on a very specific date. None get access to it before (except for existing LPAC members, and sometimes existing LPs who’ve indicated early interest).
  • The data room closes on a very specific date. No one will get access to it after. The sub docs need to all be signed within a week or two after.
  • No additional calls with LPs unless they can commit a meaningful check to the fund. Usually double digit percentage of the fund size.
  • LPs get little to no additional asks. No side letters.
  • Communication from the GP/IR team throughout every step of the way is paramount.

Again, a single close is a privilege. And a power. And with great power comes great responsibility, as a wise old uncle once told a budding superhero.

Ok, multiple closes. I often treat Fund I’s different from the other funds. One of the few major differences is that you don’t have existing LPs. Instead, you have friends and family and people who’ve believed in you before. Nevertheless, early momentum is always a good thing to have before you officially open up the fundraise.

The first close is ideally the minimum viable fund size for you to deploy your strategy and/or the fund size you need to prove out the minimum viable assumption before you raise your next fund. It’s helpful to assume you won’t be able to raise anymore after the first close. While usually not true, but nevertheless, a useful mentality. Most GPs close too small of a first close that still constrains them from truly deploying their strategy. For instance, for Costanoa Ventures Fund I in 2012, the first close was at $40-50M on June 7th, 2012, but ended up at $100M at the final close.

For each of the closes, I generally wouldn’t recommend different economic terms, like reduced fees for earlier LPs. I get the incentives. But two reasons:

  1. LPs talk. It’s usually not a good look among LPs if they know that other people at your AGM got better terms than they did.
  2. You’re discounting your value. If you’re investing in an asset class that’s truly transformative and you truly have better access than others, don’t short sell yourself.

That said, I do believe you should reward early believers. Either for those that come in via Fund I or first or second closes. Or both.

Many LPs especially high net-worth individuals (HNWIs), family offices and corporates love co-investment opportunities. Realistically, these will be 90-100% of your Fund I LPs. Leverage that. For instance, first-close LPs get unfiltered access to SPVs/co-investment opportunities. Maybe, opportunistic intros to portfolio companies as well. Second-close LPs get access to all SPVs, but are capped on allocation, assuming the opportunity is oversubscribed. Final-close LPs get last pick.

If you’re raising a Fund II+, first-close LPs can be given SPV access to deals coming out of earlier funds as well. Although, use this strategically so that your Fund I LPs won’t feel slighted.

As you might surmise already, there is no one right answer. Oftentimes, it’s a function of who you know, how quickly they commit, and how obvious you are to them. “Obviousness” is a product of track record, your brand, the quality of your reference checks, and obviously, how complex your story is.

And there will always be exceptions. 🙂

Photo by Etienne Girardet on Unsplash


4/13/2025 Edit: Example of Costanoa Ventures’ first close


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Investors Should Never Read a Deck From Beginning to End

sing, voice, singer, song

Four judges. Four chairs.

Backs turned against the stage. And facing the audience, suspended in anticipation of who’ll walk out on stage.

A lone individual slowly walks out and as she does, the melody starts.

1… 2… 3… in a bellowing, deep yet clear vocal, “OHHHHHHHHHHH~”

Boom. Boom! Boom!! Boom!!!

All four chairs turn. And the crowd goes wild.

As a kid, The Voice was one of those guilty pleasures I had. The centerpiece in a Venn diagram of music, showmanship, and raw talent. Each contestant was judged on nothing more than the raw horsepower their vocals carried. Quite literally, sometimes. For the judges, the call-to-action was quite simple. You had to cast your vote before the song ended. In other words, you must show you wanted to bring a contestant on your team, trusting instinct and years of experience before you saw what they looked like or how they presented themselves. And that… that was awesome!

A decade and a half later, now sitting in the world of private market investments, I find the same parallels in startup and GP pitch decks.

I’m specifically referring to decks you send investors before you have a chance to talk to them. Whether it’s via the cold outreach, a submission on their website, or attached in a warm intro.

A teaser deck is not meant to be finished.

‘Cause if they do, you’ve lost them before you had a chance to talk to them. There is no glory in an investor flipping through every page. There is no glory in finally seeing the call-to-action at the very end of the deck. Usually an email or a how much you’re raising.

While it’s in the title, let me re-underscore. Investors should never read a deck from beginning to end. Each slide should, in theory, give the investor the activation energy to book a call or meeting with you. The sooner in the slide deck you can convince someone to book a meeting, the better. The longer you take to convince an investor, be it VC or LP, the less likely they’ll take that first meeting. The purpose of a viewing deck is to get to the first meeting, not the investment decision. There is nothing a deck can single-handedly do to convince an investor to invest. If the brief can, the fiduciary is not doing their job.

Instead, what a deck should have, in my humble opinion… as early as possible:

  1. Your fund’s greatest highlight — It could be your 10X DPI across 8 years of investing. Could be the fact that you literally built the modern large language model infrastructure. Or that you took your last company public. Or that every. single. CISO. In the Fortune 50 list is an LP. It must deliver the wow factor. The surprise. Something people don’t expect. The primary reason an LP has to talk to you.
  2. Your biggest elephant in the room — In a world where 75% of funds say they’re top quartile, you need to stop being the salesperson, and start being the honest businessperson. There are, undeniably, risks of getting in business with you. To think otherwise is stupid. The question here with a capital Q, is are you self-aware enough to know your biggest flaw? Or can you not recognize your own blind side? Admittedly, this second one is a selfish desire to see more funds with this. Because 99.9% of funds don’t share this. And LPs are tired of overly-promotional decks.

Of course, there are other reasons an LP will take the first meeting.

  1. The person introducing you is a person the LP deeply trusts.
  2. Your outreach is highly personalized. I’d like to stress the word highly.
  3. The LP typically doesn’t receive that much deal flow.
  4. The LP is in learning mode / revamping the portfolio. Likely, but not always, a new CIO.
  5. You’re Taylor Swift.
  6. You’re lucky.

Obviously, never count on the last.

Photo by Forja2 Mx on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Flaws, Restrictions and Limitations

One of my favorite equations that I’ve come across over the last few years is:

(track record) X (differentiation) / (complexity) = fund size

I’ve heard from friends in two organizations independently (Cendana Capital and General Catalyst), but I don’t know who the attribution traces back to. Just something about the simplicity of it. That said, ironically, for the purpose of this blogpost, I want to expand on the complexity portion of the equation. Arguably, for many LPs, the hardest part of venture capital as an asset class, much less emerging managers, to underwrite. Much of which is inspired by Brandon Sanderson’s latest series of creative writing lectures.

Separately, if you’re curious about the process I use to underwrite risks, here‘s the closest thing I have to a playbook.

To break down complexity:

f(complexity) = flaws + restrictions + limitations

A flaw is something a GP needs to overcome within the next 3-5 years to become more established, or “obvious” to an LP. These are often skillsets and/or traits that are desirable in a fund manager. For instance, they’re not a team player, bad at marketing, struggle to maintain relationships with others, inexperienced on exit strategies, have a limited network, or struggle to win >5% allocation on the cap table at the early stage.

Restrictions, on the other hand, are self-imposed. Something a GP needs to overcome but chooses not to. These are often elements of a fund manager LPs have to get to conviction on to independent of the quality of the GP. For example, the GP plans to forever stay a solo GP even with $300M+ AUM. Or the thesis is too niche. Or they only bet on certain demographics. Hell, they may not work on weekends. Or invest in a heavily diversified portfolio.

Limitations are imposed by others or by the macro environment, often against their own will. GPs don’t have to fix this, but must overcome the stigma. Often via returns. Limitations are not limited to, but include the GPs are too young or too old. They went to the “wrong” schools. There are no fancy logos on their resume. They’re co-GPs with their life partner or sibling or parent. As a founder, they never exited their company for at least 9-figures. Or they were never a founder in the first place.

To break down differentiation:

f(differentiation) = motivation + value + platform

Easy to remember too, f(differentiation) = MVP. In many ways, as you scale your firm and become more established, differentiation, while still important, matters less. More important when you’re the pirate than the navy.

Motivation is what many LPs call, GP-thesis fit. To expand on that…

  • Why are you starting this fund?
  • Why continue? Are you in it to win it? Are you in it for the long run?
  • What about your past makes this thesis painfully obvious for you? What past key decisions influence you today?
  • What makes your thesis special?
  • How much of the fund is you? And how much of it is an extension of you or originates with you but expands?
  • What do you want to have written on your epitaph?
  • What do you not want me or other people to know about you? How does that inform the decisions you make?
  • What failure will you never repeat?
  • In references, does this current chapter obvious to your previous employers?
  • And simply, does your vision for the world get me really excited? Do I come out of our conversations with more energy than what I went in with?

As you can probably guess, I spend a lot of time here. Sometimes you can find the answers in conversations with the GPs. Other times, via references or market research.

Value is the value-add and the support you bring to your portfolio companies. Why do people seek your help? Is your value proactive or reactive? Why do co-investors, LPs, and founders keep you in their orbit?

Platform is how your value scales over time and across multiple funds, companies, LPs, and people in the network. This piece matters more if you plan to build an institutional firm. Less so if you plan to stay boutique. What does your investment process look like? How do people keep you top of mind?

Of course, track record, to many of you reading this, is probably most obvious. Easiest to assess. While past performance isn’t an indicator of future results, one thing worth noting is something my friend Asher once told me, “TVPI hides good portfolio construction. When I do portfolio diligence, I don’t just look at the multiples, but I look at how well the portfolio companies are doing. I take the top performer and bottom performer out and look at how performance stacks up in the middle. How have they constructed their portfolio? Do the GPs know how to invest in good businesses?” Is the manager a one-hit wonder, or is there more substance behind the veil?


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Winning Deals in 1968

boxing

As part of a new project I’m working on with a friend, I’ve spent the last few months doing a lot of research into the history of technology and Silicon Valley, and talking to a lot of primary and secondary sources. One of the rabbit holes I went down last week led me to a really interesting story on deal dynamics back in 1968.

For the historian reading this, you may already know that was the year of the Apollo 8 mission. The assassination of both Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F Kennedy. The Tet Offensive in Vietnam is launched. Also, the year the Beatles’ Magical Mystery Tour album tops music charts and stays there for eight straight weeks. And their White Album goes to number one on December 28th that year too. 2001: A Space Odyssey premieres. Legendary skateboarder Tony Hawk is born.

For the tech historian, that’s the year Intel was founded.

“They came to me with no business plan.” — Arthur Rock

The last two of the Traitorous 8. Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce. Bob Noyce co-invented the integrated circuit. And Gordon Moore coined a term many technologists are familiar with. Moore’s Law. That the number of transistors on a chip double every two years. In 1968, the two last bastions finally left. Instead of promoting Bob to be CEO, the team at Fairchild chose to hire externally. And that was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

The first investor the two went to was Arthur Rock to start a new semiconductor company, with no business plan. Although, eventually, they wrote a single-paged, double-spaced business plan.

Around the same time, Pitch Johnson from Draper and Johnson (Draper comes from Bill Draper’s name) had just sold his portfolio at D&J to Sutter Hill, and Bill himself had joined Sutter Hill right after. Pitch was catching up with Bob, who he had known for a long time having been on the board of Coherent together. Their families had met each other several times. And planes have always been a fascination for both of them. After all, both of them were pilots.

Bob said, “I’m starting a company making integrated circuits, I hope you’ll be interested.”

Pitch responded with an offer of “a couple hundred K”, said that Bill may also be interested, and, “Well, anything you’re doing, Bob, of course I’d be interested.”

As Arthur Rock was putting together that deal, Bob asked Pitch to call Arthur. Pitch reaches out to Arthur, and Arthur tells him to “call [him] back next week.”

Next week comes by. Pitch calls again. And Arthur says, “I’ve done the deal, and you’re not in it.”

Dejected, Pitch picks up the phone to call Bob back, “Art doesn’t want me in the deal.”

Surprised, Bob calls Arthur and Arthur, in the tough, but honest Arthur way, responds, “Am I going to do the deal, or is Pitch going to do the deal?”

Inevitably, Pitch and Bill lost out on investing in Intel. Intel ended up raising $2.5M for 50% of the company.

At the end of last year, I was catching up with a senior partner at a large multi-stage fund. At one point in the conversation, he asked me, “Wanna see how lead investors work with each other?”

Before I could even reply, although I would have said “Yes” regardless, he pulls out his phone and shows me a text thread he has with another Series A lead investor.

The text starts: “Looking at [redacted company]. Any thoughts?”

The other guy responds back: “We are too.”

And the thread ends after one single exchange.

As much as VC has evolved and became a little more mainstream, deal dynamics with lead investors, or at least perceived-to-be lead investors, seem to hold. Of course, as a caveat, not every interaction is like this.

Photo by Johann Walter Bantz on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Feeding the LP Beast

feed, bird

My family and friends have always enjoyed local restaurants and never found that higher end culinary flair ever satisfied the beast within. Also, having been a swimmer in a prior lifetime, I also ate like a vacuum cleaner. Food was inhaled rather than chewed.

In 2015, my mentor brought me to my first fine dining experience. One with a Michelin star at that. It was a multi-course meal, filled with words I knew the definitions of, but the permutation of which left me perplexed. Palate cleanser. Salad forks and dinner forks. Kitchen tours. And more.

I remember one distinct course where they had served us clams with the shells attached in a bowl. And another ornate bowl after we de-shell. The messiest part of the dinner, to be fair. After we were all done, they cleaned the table and brought us a glass bowl of water. With slices of lemon and grapefruit, adorned with flower petals.

Thinking it was a complementary drink, I took a swig. It was akin to spa water. Cool, and rather refreshing. Contrary to the calming effect of the drink, I saw, out of the corner of my eye, our waiter run across the room faster than any Olympian. After zigs and zags between tables, he stopped abruptly at our table. Now the whole restaurant stared curiously at what would happen next. Between lengthy exhales, he said, “Sir, this bowl is for washing your hands.” Embarrassed, I apologized profusely. To which, he consoled me profusely back. He took the bowl to get us a new one.

As I looked over at my dining mate, he said, “Man, I’m glad you took that bullet for us. I would have done the same.”

Nowadays, especially if I’m in a fine dining establishment, I almost always ask, “How would you recommend us to eat this?”

Most fund managers start the meeting off, almost immediately with the pitch. Most founders do the same too. I was at a virtual conference last week, where I was matched with 8 GPs on a 15-minute speed date, 6 out of 8 jumped straight into, “Let me tell you about my fund.” I get the urgency, but the first meeting should always be an opportunity to get to know the person you are talking to. As Simon Sinek says, start with the why. Then the how. Then the what. Most flip the order when they’re in pitch mode. Hell, some may not ever get into the ‘why.’

Most LPs do not invest in venture full-time. In fact, it’s the asset class they know least well. And within their smallest bucket of allocation, aka venture, emerging managers are the smallest of the smallest bucket in their larger portfolio. So if amount of capital equated to depth of understanding, most LPs know bar none about venture. At least, compared to you, the GP, who is pitching. Some may think they know a lot. They may even want to invest directly in early-stage companies themselves. And while they may not admit it to you, a number of LPs think your job, as a venture capital GP, is easy.

You, I, and every investor who has spent meaningful time in venture and is not deluding themselves, know that this is the exact opposite of any easy job that anyone can do well. Do note, raising capital easily and deploying capital easily and supporting entrepreneurs easily are all different things.

Nevertheless, depending on the LP’s proficiency level, you need to remind them:

  1. On venture and its risks (why the asset class) — Compare the asset class to others. Buyout. Real estate. Credit. And so on. Set expectations explicitly. If you yourself are not capable of comparing and contrasting between the asset classes, you should learn about the others yourself.
  2. Why emerging managers (Big multi stage fund vs you the Fund I) — You are not Andreessen, GC, Redpoint, Emergence, IVP, Industry, you name it. Neither should you at a Fund I or II. The risks of betting on emerging managers is present. If an LP indexes the emerging manager venture asset class, they’ll be disappointed. The mean is great, but the median is horrible. At least, compared to other asset classes they could be investing in. Do not pitch them, “emerging managers are more likely to outperform.” Inform them of the real risks at play.
  3. Why vertical/industry — Many emerging funds are specialists. For good reason. Based on your past experience, you’re likely to have more scar tissue but also real learnings than in other industries you did not have exposure to. Just like the first two, set the stage. How does your industry compare to others?
  4. Why you — Why the strategy? Why do you have GP-thesis fit? Why have all your previous experiences culminated to this one point in time to start this fund? And is your interest in running a firm enduring? If not, it’s also okay, but be explicit about it.
  5. Why they loved you — This is for the venture-literate LP AND if they’ve previously invested in you. Now they’re deciding if they should re-up. Were you true to your word? Have you stayed focused enough that your bets are still largely uncorrelated to the other bets in the LP’s portfolio? Why are you as awesome, but ideally more awesome compared to the last time you’ve chatted?

In that order. Starting from (1) to (5). Do not skip (1), (2), and (3).

If you jump straight to (4), that LP will consume that information within their own biases. Something you may not be able to control. And that will either make a fool out of them. Or a fool out of you. Just like I was at my first fine dining meal.

No one wants to be a fool. Don’t give anyone a chance to be one.

Photo by Santiago Lacarta on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

When is a Market too Small for VCs

small tea set, miniature

I was reading Chris Neumann’s latest post earlier this week, “Fundraising Sucks. Get Over It.” True to its name, it does. In all the ways possible. Especially if you’re an outsider. In it, there is a truism, among many others:

“If investors are repeatedly telling you that the market is too small or the opportunity isn’t big enough, what they might be saying is, ‘the market is too small for VCs,’ not that it’s a bad idea.”

Which reminded me of a post I wrote late last year. To which, I thought I’d elaborate on. As a founder, how do you know if a market is too small for a VC?

Or when a VC tells you, your market is too small, what do they mean?

Spoiler alert: What’s small for one may not be small for another. Let me elaborate.

If a fund has reserves — in other words, they write follow-on checks —, assume 50-60% dilution between entry to exit ownership. If they don’t, expect 75-80% dilution on their ownership. Of course, these may be on the higher end. Sometimes, there’s less dilution. You, the founder, need fewer rounds to get to profitability, or better yet, an exit.

Tactically, what that means is if a first-check only seed investor wants to invest in your company for 10%, by exit, they’ll have around 2%. Say they’re a $50M fund. Investors are always looking for fund returners, knowing that most of their investments will strike out and they’re really better on each company’s potential to be that one great, truly transformative company. And so… to return the fund or break even on the fund, you need to be at least a $2.5B company. In other words, 2% of $2.5B is $50M.

Of course, seed stage funds are usually underwritten to a 4-5X net. Roughly 5-6X gross return. Usually 50-70% of the returns come from one investment. So, to have a 5X gross on a $50M seed fund, they need to have a portfolio whose enterprise value is $12.5B. A single investment should exit between $6 and $9B, roughly.

So… if a VC cannot seeing you exiting for that amount, they’ll tell you your market is too small. Maybe it’s due to historical exits in your industry. Maybe it’s due to a lack of strategic acquirers who’d buy you at that price. Or maybe it’s that you’re too cash intensive that you need to raise more rounds to get to an exit that is meaningful. And in the process of which, take on a hefty preference stack. Fancy schmancy term for all those investors who collectively include a larger than 1X liquidation preference in their term sheet. Aka downside protection.

That said, let’s take another example. $50M seed fund, concentrated portfolio fund. They like to come in for 20% and will invest in at least 1-2 rounds after. By exit, they might dilute down to 10%. To return the fund, they only need a $500M exit. To 5X gross the fund, they’ll need only $2.5B of enterprise value. Half of which will come from a single company. Meaning instead of needing to be almost a decacorn at exit to impress the VC, you only need to be a unicorn. Still impressive, but let’s be real. Unicorn exits are easier to achieve than decacorn exits.

Next time, you’re about to have a VC pitch meeting, do your homework. And try not to spend too much time with investors who may give you the feedback of “your market is too small.”

Photo by Gabriella Clare Marino on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

VC as an Asset vs Access Class

key, access

There are LPs who see VC as an asset class. And there are those who see it as an access class. Most GPs spend time with the former. Most emerging GPs try to spend time with the latter, just ’cause the former are out of their reach for multiple reasons. Chief of which is probably that the “asset-class” LPs typically write large checks, have small teams, and have little to no appetite for the risk in this asset class. Also given how much the industry is a black box, it’s hard to underwrite anything that puts their career at risk.

But most emerging GPs I talk to actually fail the latter, the “access-class” LPs, more often than not. Much of which is in understanding how to approach them.

In the world of business, there are customers and there are buyers. Someone who makes a one-time purchase, and rarely again is a buyer. It could be due lack of demand. Lack of availability. Or simply, they were bamboozled. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Most emerging LPs, whether individuals or family offices or even corporate venture arms, buy a product once. And unfortunately, what they were sold and what they bought ended up being two different things.

Relationships, in any industry, take time to nurture. It takes time to win trust. Those who trust easily can take trust away easily. Yet, most GPs talk to LPs for the first time when they start fundraising. With a fire under them. And a sense of urgency as the clock is ticking. And by function of that, attempt to force these LPs who see VC as an access class to make a transactional decision.

To help visualize the difference, this is how I typically like to frame it:

LPs who see VC as an…Asset classAccess class
When pitching them, it’s similar to which business functionMarketing
(Brand and outliers matter)
Sales
Turnover rate in portfolioLowHigh
Involvement“Lean back”
(Big picture)
“Lean in”
(In the trenches)
StrategyStrategy not to lose
(Play to stay rich)
Strategy to win
(Play to get rich)
Depth vs BreadthBreadth > DepthDepth > Breadth
Capital flows in the near futureSteady state
(VC exists and will keep our allocation at a steady state / set percentage annually. Any additional significant DPI generated here is re-allocated to other assets.)
Capital increase
(VC is interesting and likely to increase allocation to it in the impending future.)

For access-driven LPs, they typically transition to asset-driven after about 4 years. Subsequently churning from their “access” category, as they now have enough relationships and “experience” building a strategy around venture capital. Access-driven LPs typically churn through their portfolio quite frequently, with generational shifts and new regimes and interests.

Moreover, with access-driven LPs, the pitching process is often collaborative and there’s room for terms negotiation. More often than not, they have curiosities they’d like to satiate. Asset-driven LPs have you pitch them. When challenged, they are more defensive than they are curious.

Photo by Silas Köhler on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

The 4 P’s to Evaluate GPs | Charlotte Zhang | Superclusters | S4E6

charlotte zhang

“Executional excellence can get you to being great at something – let’s call that top quartile – but it really is passion that distinguishes the best from great – top decile.” – Charlotte Zhang

As the director of investments, Charlotte Zhang oversees the selection of external investment managers at Inatai Foundation, conducts portfolio research, and helps to institutionalize processes, tools, and resources. Experienced in impact investing, she previously served as a senior associate at ICONIQ Capital and, before that, Medley Partners. Investing on behalf of foundations affiliated with family offices, her investments supported a variety of nonprofit work, from early childhood education to autism research. Charlotte was a founding partner of Seed Consulting Group, a California-based nonprofit that provides pro bono strategy consulting to environmental and public health organizations, and currently serves on the Women’s Association of Venture and Equity’s west coast steering committee and as a Project Pinklight panelist for Private Equity Women Investor Network. She is also on the advisory boards of MoDa Partners, a family office whose mission is to advance the economic and educational equity of women and girls, and 8090 Partners, a multifamily office consisting of families and entrepreneurs across diverse industries that is currently deploying an impact investment fund.

Charlotte earned a BS with honors in business administration from the University of California, Berkley. When not working, you can find her globetrotting (18 countries and counting), writing a Yelp review about the best bite in town, or cuddling up with a book and her two adorable cats.

You can find Charlotte on her LinkedIn here:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/charlotterzhang/

And huge thanks to this episode’s sponsor, Alchemist Accelerator: https://alchemistaccelerator.com/superclusters

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

Brought to you by Alchemist Accelerator.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[02:56] Charlotte’s humble beginnings
[07:02] Lessons as a pianist
[10:23] Lessons from swimming that piano didn’t teach
[14:52] How Charlotte became an LP
[17:44] Where are emerging managers looking for deal flow these days?
[21:23] Reasons as to why Inatai may pass on a fund
[24:35] The 4 P’s to Evaluate GPs
[29:26] How small is too small of a track record?
[34:42] How do you build a multi-billion dollar portfolio from scratch
[39:43] The minimum viable back office for an LP
[42:03] Underrated Bay Area restaurants
[47:01] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring!
[48:02] If you learned something from this episode, it would mean a lot if you could share it with ONE friend!

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

“Executional excellence can get you to being great at something – let’s call that top quartile – but it really is passion that distinguishes the best from great – top decile.” – Charlotte Zhang

“If you have enough capital chasing after an opportunity, alpha is just going to be degraded.” – Charlotte Zhang


Follow David Zhou for more Superclusters content:
For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
Follow David Zhou’s blog: https://cupofzhou.com
Follow Superclusters on Twitter: https://twitter.com/SuperclustersLP
Follow Superclusters on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@super.clusters
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

The Most Common Rejection Email for Transformative Startups

The most common VC rejection by founders who end up building the world’s most transformative companies seems to be:

The market is too small.

Other variations:

  • Unfortunately, the size of the market didn’t make sense for our investment model.
  • The price of the round felt too expensive for our strategy. (An indirect assumption that the exit-to-entry multiple would be south of a 100X. In other words, there’s a cap on market size. Aka small market.)

There are plenty of public examples of founders (i.e. Airbnb, Instacart, Uber, Facebook/Meta, Shopify, eBay, Ford, NVIDIA, etc.) sharing their rejection emails from the first couple hundred VCs they’ve met. But also, I’ve been lucky enough to read a lot of the memos that GPs and partners have written in the decades past on their anti-portfolio.

Yep, that’s the blog post for today.


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