Backs turned against the stage. And facing the audience, suspended in anticipation of who’ll walk out on stage.
A lone individual slowly walks out and as she does, the melody starts.
1… 2… 3… in a bellowing, deep yet clear vocal, “OHHHHHHHHHHH~”
Boom. Boom! Boom!! Boom!!!
All four chairs turn. And the crowd goes wild.
As a kid, The Voice was one of those guilty pleasures I had. The centerpiece in a Venn diagram of music, showmanship, and raw talent. Each contestant was judged on nothing more than the raw horsepower their vocals carried. Quite literally, sometimes. For the judges, the call-to-action was quite simple. You had to cast your vote before the song ended. In other words, you must show you wanted to bring a contestant on your team, trusting instinct and years of experience before you saw what they looked like or how they presented themselves. And that… that was awesome!
A decade and a half later, now sitting in the world of private market investments, I find the same parallels in startup and GP pitch decks.
I’m specifically referring to decks you send investors before you have a chance to talk to them. Whether it’s via the cold outreach, a submission on their website, or attached in a warm intro.
A teaser deck is not meant to be finished.
‘Cause if they do, you’ve lost them before you had a chance to talk to them. There is no glory in an investor flipping through every page. There is no glory in finally seeing the call-to-action at the very end of the deck. Usually an email or a how much you’re raising.
While it’s in the title, let me re-underscore. Investors should never read a deck from beginning to end. Each slide should, in theory, give the investor the activation energy to book a call or meeting with you. The sooner in the slide deck you can convince someone to book a meeting, the better. The longer you take to convince an investor, be it VC or LP, the less likely they’ll take that first meeting. The purpose of a viewing deck is to get to the first meeting, not the investment decision. There is nothing a deck can single-handedly do to convince an investor to invest. If the brief can, the fiduciary is not doing their job.
Instead, what a deck should have, in my humble opinion… as early as possible:
Your fund’s greatest highlight — It could be your 10X DPI across 8 years of investing. Could be the fact that you literally built the modern large language model infrastructure. Or that you took your last company public. Or that every. single. CISO. In the Fortune 50 list is an LP. It must deliver the wow factor. The surprise. Something people don’t expect. The primary reason an LP has to talk to you.
Your biggest elephant in the room — In a world where 75% of funds say they’re top quartile, you need to stop being the salesperson, and start being the honest businessperson. There are, undeniably, risks of getting in business with you. To think otherwise is stupid. The question here with a capital Q, is are you self-aware enough to know your biggest flaw? Or can you not recognize your own blind side? Admittedly, this second one is a selfish desire to see more funds with this. Because 99.9% of funds don’t share this. And LPs are tired of overly-promotional decks.
Of course, there are other reasons an LP will take the first meeting.
The person introducing you is a person the LP deeply trusts.
Your outreach is highly personalized. I’d like to stress the word highly.
The LP typically doesn’t receive that much deal flow.
The LP is in learning mode / revamping the portfolio. Likely, but not always, a new CIO.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
One of my favorite equations that I’ve come across over the last few years is:
(track record) X (differentiation) / (complexity) = fund size
I’ve heard from friends in two organizations independently (Cendana Capital and General Catalyst), but I don’t know who the attribution traces back to. Just something about the simplicity of it. That said, ironically, for the purpose of this blogpost, I want to expand on the complexity portion of the equation. Arguably, for many LPs, the hardest part of venture capital as an asset class, much less emerging managers, to underwrite. Much of which is inspired by Brandon Sanderson’s latest series of creative writing lectures.
Separately, if you’re curious about the process I use to underwrite risks, here‘s the closest thing I have to a playbook.
A flaw is something a GP needs to overcome within the next 3-5 years to become more established, or “obvious” to an LP. These are often skillsets and/or traits that are desirable in a fund manager. For instance, they’re not a team player, bad at marketing, struggle to maintain relationships with others, inexperienced on exit strategies, have a limited network, or struggle to win >5% allocation on the cap table at the early stage.
Restrictions, on the other hand, are self-imposed. Something a GP needs to overcome but chooses not to. These are often elements of a fund manager LPs have to get to conviction on to independent of the quality of the GP. For example, the GP plans to forever stay a solo GP even with $300M+ AUM. Or the thesis is too niche. Or they only bet on certain demographics. Hell, they may not work on weekends. Or invest in a heavily diversified portfolio.
Limitations are imposed by others or by the macro environment, often against their own will. GPs don’t have to fix this, but must overcome the stigma. Often via returns. Limitations are not limited to, but include the GPs are too young or too old. They went to the “wrong” schools. There are no fancy logos on their resume. They’re co-GPs with their life partner or sibling or parent. As a founder, they never exited their company for at least 9-figures. Or they were never a founder in the first place.
To break down differentiation:
f(differentiation) = motivation + value + platform
Easy to remember too, f(differentiation) = MVP. In many ways, as you scale your firm and become more established, differentiation, while still important, matters less. More important when you’re the pirate than the navy.
Motivation is what many LPs call, GP-thesis fit. To expand on that…
Why are you starting this fund?
Why continue? Are you in it to win it? Are you in it for the long run?
What about your past makes this thesis painfully obvious for you? What past key decisions influence you today?
What makes your thesis special?
How much of the fund is you? And how much of it is an extension of you or originates with you but expands?
What do you want to have written on your epitaph?
What do you not want me or other people to know about you? How does that inform the decisions you make?
What failure will you never repeat?
In references, does this current chapter obvious to your previous employers?
And simply, does your vision for the world get me really excited? Do I come out of our conversations with more energy than what I went in with?
As you can probably guess, I spend a lot of time here. Sometimes you can find the answers in conversations with the GPs. Other times, via references or market research.
Value is the value-add and the support you bring to your portfolio companies. Why do people seek your help? Is your value proactive or reactive? Why do co-investors, LPs, and founders keep you in their orbit?
Platform is how your value scales over time and across multiple funds, companies, LPs, and people in the network. This piece matters more if you plan to build an institutional firm. Less so if you plan to stay boutique. What does your investment process look like? How do people keep you top of mind?
Of course, track record, to many of you reading this, is probably most obvious. Easiest to assess. While past performance isn’t an indicator of future results, one thing worth noting is something my friend Asheronce told me, “TVPI hides good portfolio construction. When I do portfolio diligence, I don’t just look at the multiples, but I look at how well the portfolio companies are doing. I take the top performer and bottom performer out and look at how performance stacks up in the middle. How have they constructed their portfolio? Do the GPs know how to invest in good businesses?” Is the manager a one-hit wonder, or is there more substance behind the veil?
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
As part of a new project I’m working on with a friend, I’ve spent the last few months doing a lot of research into the history of technology and Silicon Valley, and talking to a lot of primary and secondary sources. One of the rabbit holes I went down last week led me to a really interesting story on deal dynamics back in 1968.
For the historian reading this, you may already know that was the year of the Apollo 8 mission. The assassination of both Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F Kennedy. The Tet Offensive in Vietnam is launched. Also, the year the Beatles’ Magical Mystery Tour album tops music charts and stays there for eight straight weeks. And their White Album goes to number one on December 28th that year too. 2001: A Space Odyssey premieres. Legendary skateboarder Tony Hawk is born.
For the tech historian, that’s the year Intel was founded.
“They came to me with no business plan.” — Arthur Rock
The last two of the Traitorous 8. Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce. Bob Noyce co-invented the integrated circuit. And Gordon Moore coined a term many technologists are familiar with. Moore’s Law. That the number of transistors on a chip double every two years. In 1968, the two last bastions finally left. Instead of promoting Bob to be CEO, the team at Fairchild chose to hire externally. And that was the straw that broke the camel’s back.
The first investor the two went to was Arthur Rock to start a new semiconductor company, with no business plan. Although, eventually, they wrote a single-paged, double-spaced business plan.
Around the same time, Pitch Johnson from Draper and Johnson (Draper comes from Bill Draper’s name) had just sold his portfolio at D&J to Sutter Hill, and Bill himself had joined Sutter Hill right after. Pitch was catching up with Bob, who he had known for a long time having been on the board of Coherent together. Their families had met each other several times. And planes have always been a fascination for both of them. After all, both of them were pilots.
Bob said, “I’m starting a company making integrated circuits, I hope you’ll be interested.”
Pitch responded with an offer of “a couple hundred K”, said that Bill may also be interested, and, “Well, anything you’re doing, Bob, of course I’d be interested.”
As Arthur Rock was putting together that deal, Bob asked Pitch to call Arthur. Pitch reaches out to Arthur, and Arthur tells him to “call [him] back next week.”
Next week comes by. Pitch calls again. And Arthur says, “I’ve done the deal, and you’re not in it.”
Dejected, Pitch picks up the phone to call Bob back, “Art doesn’t want me in the deal.”
Surprised, Bob calls Arthur and Arthur, in the tough, but honest Arthur way, responds, “Am I going to do the deal, or is Pitch going to do the deal?”
Inevitably, Pitch and Bill lost out on investing in Intel. Intel ended up raising $2.5M for 50% of the company.
At the end of last year, I was catching up with a senior partner at a large multi-stage fund. At one point in the conversation, he asked me, “Wanna see how lead investors work with each other?”
Before I could even reply, although I would have said “Yes” regardless, he pulls out his phone and shows me a text thread he has with another Series A lead investor.
The text starts: “Looking at [redacted company]. Any thoughts?”
The other guy responds back: “We are too.”
And the thread ends after one single exchange.
As much as VC has evolved and became a little more mainstream, deal dynamics with lead investors, or at least perceived-to-be lead investors, seem to hold. Of course, as a caveat, not every interaction is like this.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
My family and friends have always enjoyed local restaurants and never found that higher end culinary flair ever satisfied the beast within. Also, having been a swimmer in a prior lifetime, I also ate like a vacuum cleaner. Food was inhaled rather than chewed.
In 2015, my mentor brought me to my first fine dining experience. One with a Michelin star at that. It was a multi-course meal, filled with words I knew the definitions of, but the permutation of which left me perplexed. Palate cleanser. Salad forks and dinner forks. Kitchen tours. And more.
I remember one distinct course where they had served us clams with the shells attached in a bowl. And another ornate bowl after we de-shell. The messiest part of the dinner, to be fair. After we were all done, they cleaned the table and brought us a glass bowl of water. With slices of lemon and grapefruit, adorned with flower petals.
Thinking it was a complementary drink, I took a swig. It was akin to spa water. Cool, and rather refreshing. Contrary to the calming effect of the drink, I saw, out of the corner of my eye, our waiter run across the room faster than any Olympian. After zigs and zags between tables, he stopped abruptly at our table. Now the whole restaurant stared curiously at what would happen next. Between lengthy exhales, he said, “Sir, this bowl is for washing your hands.” Embarrassed, I apologized profusely. To which, he consoled me profusely back. He took the bowl to get us a new one.
As I looked over at my dining mate, he said, “Man, I’m glad you took that bullet for us. I would have done the same.”
Nowadays, especially if I’m in a fine dining establishment, I almost always ask, “How would you recommend us to eat this?”
Most fund managers start the meeting off, almost immediately with the pitch. Most founders do the same too. I was at a virtual conference last week, where I was matched with 8 GPs on a 15-minute speed date, 6 out of 8 jumped straight into, “Let me tell you about my fund.” I get the urgency, but the first meeting should always be an opportunity to get to know the person you are talking to. As Simon Sinek says, start with the why. Then the how. Then the what. Most flip the order when they’re in pitch mode. Hell, some may not ever get into the ‘why.’
Most LPs do not invest in venture full-time. In fact, it’s the asset class they know least well. And within their smallest bucket of allocation, aka venture, emerging managers are the smallest of the smallest bucket in their larger portfolio. So if amount of capital equated to depth of understanding, most LPs know bar none about venture. At least, compared to you, the GP, who is pitching. Some may think they know a lot. They may even want to invest directly in early-stage companies themselves. And while they may not admit it to you, a number of LPs think your job, as a venture capital GP, is easy.
You, I, and every investor who has spent meaningful time in venture and is not deluding themselves, know that this is the exact opposite of any easy job that anyone can do well. Do note, raising capital easily and deploying capital easily and supporting entrepreneurs easily are all different things.
Nevertheless, depending on the LP’s proficiency level, you need to remind them:
On venture and its risks (why the asset class) — Compare the asset class to others. Buyout. Real estate. Credit. And so on. Set expectations explicitly. If you yourself are not capable of comparing and contrasting between the asset classes, you should learn about the others yourself.
Why emerging managers (Big multi stage fund vs you the Fund I) — You are not Andreessen, GC, Redpoint, Emergence, IVP, Industry, you name it. Neither should you at a Fund I or II. The risks of betting on emerging managers is present. If an LP indexes the emerging manager venture asset class, they’ll be disappointed. The mean is great, but the median is horrible. At least, compared to other asset classes they could be investing in. Do not pitch them, “emerging managers are more likely to outperform.” Inform them of the real risks at play.
Why vertical/industry — Many emerging funds are specialists. For good reason. Based on your past experience, you’re likely to have more scar tissue but also real learnings than in other industries you did not have exposure to. Just like the first two, set the stage. How does your industry compare to others?
Why you — Why the strategy? Why do you have GP-thesis fit? Why have all your previous experiences culminated to this one point in time to start this fund? And is your interest in running a firm enduring? If not, it’s also okay, but be explicit about it.
Why they loved you — This is for the venture-literate LP AND if they’ve previously invested in you. Now they’re deciding if they should re-up. Were you true to your word? Have you stayed focused enough that your bets are still largely uncorrelated to the other bets in the LP’s portfolio? Why are you as awesome, but ideally more awesome compared to the last time you’ve chatted?
In that order. Starting from (1) to (5). Do not skip (1), (2), and (3).
If you jump straight to (4), that LP will consume that information within their own biases. Something you may not be able to control. And that will either make a fool out of them. Or a fool out of you. Just like I was at my first fine dining meal.
No one wants to be a fool. Don’t give anyone a chance to be one.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I was reading Chris Neumann’s latest post earlier this week, “Fundraising Sucks. Get Over It.” True to its name, it does. In all the ways possible. Especially if you’re an outsider. In it, there is a truism, among many others:
“If investors are repeatedly telling you that the market is too small or the opportunity isn’t big enough, what they might be saying is, ‘the market is too small for VCs,’ not that it’s a bad idea.”
Which reminded me of a post I wrote late last year. To which, I thought I’d elaborate on. As a founder, how do you know if a market is too small for a VC?
Or when a VC tells you, your market is too small, what do they mean?
Spoiler alert: What’s small for one may not be small for another. Let me elaborate.
If a fund has reserves — in other words, they write follow-on checks —, assume 50-60% dilution between entry to exit ownership. If they don’t, expect 75-80% dilution on their ownership. Of course, these may be on the higher end. Sometimes, there’s less dilution. You, the founder, need fewer rounds to get to profitability, or better yet, an exit.
Tactically, what that means is if a first-check only seed investor wants to invest in your company for 10%, by exit, they’ll have around 2%. Say they’re a $50M fund. Investors are always looking for fund returners, knowing that most of their investments will strike out and they’re really better on each company’s potential to be that one great, truly transformative company. And so… to return the fund or break even on the fund, you need to be at least a $2.5B company. In other words, 2% of $2.5B is $50M.
Of course, seed stage funds are usually underwritten to a 4-5X net. Roughly 5-6X gross return. Usually 50-70% of the returns come from one investment. So, to have a 5X gross on a $50M seed fund, they need to have a portfolio whose enterprise value is $12.5B. A single investment should exit between $6 and $9B, roughly.
So… if a VC cannot seeing you exiting for that amount, they’ll tell you your market is too small. Maybe it’s due to historical exits in your industry. Maybe it’s due to a lack of strategic acquirers who’d buy you at that price. Or maybe it’s that you’re too cash intensive that you need to raise more rounds to get to an exit that is meaningful. And in the process of which, take on a hefty preference stack. Fancy schmancy term for all those investors who collectively include a larger than 1X liquidation preference in their term sheet. Aka downside protection.
That said, let’s take another example. $50M seed fund, concentrated portfolio fund. They like to come in for 20% and will invest in at least 1-2 rounds after. By exit, they might dilute down to 10%. To return the fund, they only need a $500M exit. To 5X gross the fund, they’ll need only $2.5B of enterprise value. Half of which will come from a single company. Meaning instead of needing to be almost a decacorn at exit to impress the VC, you only need to be a unicorn. Still impressive, but let’s be real. Unicorn exits are easier to achieve than decacorn exits.
Next time, you’re about to have a VC pitch meeting, do your homework. And try not to spend too much time with investors who may give you the feedback of “your market is too small.”
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
There are LPs who see VC as an asset class. And there are those who see it as an access class. Most GPs spend time with the former. Most emerging GPs try to spend time with the latter, just ’cause the former are out of their reach for multiple reasons. Chief of which is probably that the “asset-class” LPs typically write large checks, have small teams, and have little to no appetite for the risk in this asset class. Also given how much the industry is a black box, it’s hard to underwrite anything that puts their career at risk.
Moreover not every dollar of DPI generated from emerging VC gets re-invested in the asset class
It will get allocated to others (real estate, public, debt, PE/buyout) that are easier to get buy-in from the investment committee
But most emerging GPs I talk to actually fail the latter, the “access-class” LPs, more often than not. Much of which is in understanding how to approach them.
In the world of business, there are customers and there are buyers. Someone who makes a one-time purchase, and rarely again is a buyer. It could be due lack of demand. Lack of availability. Or simply, they were bamboozled. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Most emerging LPs, whether individuals or family offices or even corporate venture arms, buy a product once. And unfortunately, what they were sold and what they bought ended up being two different things.
Relationships, in any industry, take time to nurture. It takes time to win trust. Those who trust easily can take trust away easily. Yet, most GPs talk to LPs for the first time when they start fundraising. With a fire under them. And a sense of urgency as the clock is ticking. And by function of that, attempt to force these LPs who see VC as an access class to make a transactional decision.
To help visualize the difference, this is how I typically like to frame it:
LPs who see VC as an…
Asset class
Access class
When pitching them, it’s similar to which business function
Marketing (Brand and outliers matter)
Sales
Turnover rate in portfolio
Low
High
Involvement
“Lean back” (Big picture)
“Lean in” (In the trenches)
Strategy
Strategy not to lose (Play to stay rich)
Strategy to win (Play to get rich)
Depth vs Breadth
Breadth > Depth
Depth > Breadth
Capital flows in the near future
Steady state (VC exists and will keep our allocation at a steady state / set percentage annually. Any additional significant DPI generated here is re-allocated to other assets.)
Capital increase (VC is interesting and likely to increase allocation to it in the impending future.)
For access-driven LPs, they typically transition to asset-driven after about 4 years. Subsequently churning from their “access” category, as they now have enough relationships and “experience” building a strategy around venture capital. Access-driven LPs typically churn through their portfolio quite frequently, with generational shifts and new regimes and interests.
Moreover, with access-driven LPs, the pitching process is often collaborative and there’s room for terms negotiation. More often than not, they have curiosities they’d like to satiate. Asset-driven LPs have you pitch them. When challenged, they are more defensive than they are curious.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
“Executional excellence can get you to being great at something – let’s call that top quartile – but it really is passion that distinguishes the best from great – top decile.” – Charlotte Zhang
As the director of investments, Charlotte Zhang oversees the selection of external investment managers at Inatai Foundation, conducts portfolio research, and helps to institutionalize processes, tools, and resources. Experienced in impact investing, she previously served as a senior associate at ICONIQ Capital and, before that, Medley Partners. Investing on behalf of foundations affiliated with family offices, her investments supported a variety of nonprofit work, from early childhood education to autism research. Charlotte was a founding partner of Seed Consulting Group, a California-based nonprofit that provides pro bono strategy consulting to environmental and public health organizations, and currently serves on the Women’s Association of Venture and Equity’s west coast steering committee and as a Project Pinklight panelist for Private Equity Women Investor Network. She is also on the advisory boards of MoDa Partners, a family office whose mission is to advance the economic and educational equity of women and girls, and 8090 Partners, a multifamily office consisting of families and entrepreneurs across diverse industries that is currently deploying an impact investment fund.
Charlotte earned a BS with honors in business administration from the University of California, Berkley. When not working, you can find her globetrotting (18 countries and counting), writing a Yelp review about the best bite in town, or cuddling up with a book and her two adorable cats.
[00:00] Intro [02:56] Charlotte’s humble beginnings [07:02] Lessons as a pianist [10:23] Lessons from swimming that piano didn’t teach [14:52] How Charlotte became an LP [17:44] Where are emerging managers looking for deal flow these days? [21:23] Reasons as to why Inatai may pass on a fund [24:35] The 4 P’s to Evaluate GPs [29:26] How small is too small of a track record? [34:42] How do you build a multi-billion dollar portfolio from scratch [39:43] The minimum viable back office for an LP [42:03] Underrated Bay Area restaurants [47:01] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring! [48:02] If you learned something from this episode, it would mean a lot if you could share it with ONE friend!
“Executional excellence can get you to being great at something – let’s call that top quartile – but it really is passion that distinguishes the best from great – top decile.” – Charlotte Zhang
“If you have enough capital chasing after an opportunity, alpha is just going to be degraded.” – Charlotte Zhang
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
The most common VC rejection by founders who end up building the world’s most transformative companies seems to be:
The market is too small.
Other variations:
Unfortunately, the size of the market didn’t make sense for our investment model.
The price of the round felt too expensive for our strategy. (An indirect assumption that the exit-to-entry multiple would be south of a 100X. In other words, there’s a cap on market size. Aka small market.)
There are plenty of public examples of founders (i.e. Airbnb, Instacart, Uber, Facebook/Meta, Shopify, eBay, Ford, NVIDIA, etc.) sharing their rejection emails from the first couple hundred VCs they’ve met. But also, I’ve been lucky enough to read a lot of the memos that GPs and partners have written in the decades past on their anti-portfolio.
Yep, that’s the blog post for today.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Back when I was still swimming competitively, one of the drills our swim coach always had us do was a set of hypoxic drills. The two that left the most indelible marks were:
10 sets of 100 yards, broken down by 25 yards. Lap 1, breathe every 5 strokes. Lap 2, every 3 strokes. Lap 3, every 7 strokes. And Lap 4, every 9 strokes.
20 sets of 55 yards. You start with a flip turn into the wall. First 25 yards (Lap 1), no breaths allowed. Second 25 (Lap 2), you’re allowed to only take one breath.
Naturally, those drills usually left me the most exhausted. Not only did I find myself catching my breath, we also had to swim those on specific intervals, which left less than five seconds of rest at best, while swimming at 80% our max speed.
All that to say, it was a set of exercises that trained us to hold our breath. We had less oxygenated blood. Naturally, it was harder to exert our max strength and endurance. But it tested our ability to weather exhaustion.
Just like today.
Our venture ecosystem needs oxygen. The whole industry is holding their breath. For IPOs. like Stripe’s. Which may be unlikely to happen in the near future given Sequoia’s recent share acquisition. Software acquisitions have also hit an all-time low, leaving LPs starved for liquidity from the major private market exit paths.
And of the few “acquisitions” that are happening, they’re done to circumnavigate anti-trust laws. As Tomasz points out, “they hire the core team [in other words the founding team], license the technology, but the majority company continues to operate as a separate entity.” In addition, a number of companies also need to get re-priced in the market, having raised in 2020 and 2021 on over three-year runways. Which to their credit, was the common advice given by VCs during that era.
Election season does not make this Mexican standoff any less strenuous. How will it impact the global economy? And who’s the last to hold the bag with all these hot AI deals? We all know AI has low margins and requires and immense amount of compute to deliver the results that we expect, but how much longer will this need to go on?
Who knows?
At least until we get to breathe again. The consensus seems to be Q1 2025. But until we have oxygen again, this is the hypoxic training that our world will have to endure for the foreseeable future.
In the words of my coach, “focus on distance per stroke.” In other words, executional discipline. Do more with less.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
I went shoe shopping with my partner the past two weekends, and I’ll be the first to plead ignorance to the difference between the B and D suffix for shoe sizes. And even after two weekends, I’m still learning.
I’ve never looked much into shoes. Having spent much of my early life bathed in chlorine (so much that at one point, my hair was brown with blond tips. FYI, for those I’ve never met in person before, I sport naturally black hair.), I’ve spent more time choosing the right $300-400 swimsuit than what I’d wear on my two lower appendages the other eight hours of the day. All that to say, I’m ill-equipped to speak the language of sneakerheads and running shoe geeks.
But just as I’m still learning how shoe geeks around the world understand the finer nuances of heel to toe drop impacting ankle versus knee strain, most founders who haven’t spent the time understanding the nuances of VCs think all money is green. In fact, just last month, I spoke with a founder I randomly met at an event who said, “Money is money.”
And he’s not completely wrong. There is some truth to it. At the end of the day, as investors, we sell money. Moreover, most investors who promise to be helpful are not. As well-intentioned as they are at the time of investment, most fall short of being truly helpful. There are multiple studies that show that founders believe a huge majority of their investors are not helpful.
That said, one of my investor buddies said something quite interesting to me earlier this week. Many founders see investors as saviors not partners. A source of capital to save them when they’re near the gates of hell, but not while they’re building their stairway to heaven. All that to say, as someone who’s been an operator, now a “VC”, but also someone who invests in other VCs, here are some of the nuances I’ve really come to appreciate over the years that I overlooked when I first stepped into the world of entrepreneurship.
Consensus and conviction-driven decision making
Some firms are consensus-driven. Others are conviction-driven. The former requires majority or unanimous buy-in. The latter doesn’t. Neither is universally better than the other, but knowing how decisions are made is extremely helpful. Not only to know who else you need to convince on the team, but also to know how the firm will help you post-investment.
The former is usually a firm where carry is split equally among all partners, so all partners are theoretically incented to see every portfolio company succeed. So as a founder, if you want to rely on the expertise and network of the collective partnership, these are the firms you should pursue. The latter, the conviction-driven ones, are most helpful if you really want one specific partner’s experience. They’ll be the person who takes the board seat. Opportunistically, they may ask for 1-2 junior team members to also have board observer seats. The downside is when and if this partner leaves the firm, there may be a gaping hole in governance as well as interest in the continued success of your company. But otherwise, this will be the partner you will have on speed dial.
I shared a presentation I made recently on LinkedIn. Of which, I share that three kinds of friends in the world. When shit hits the fan at 3AM in the morning…
There’s the friend you call. They see the call. And they go back to sleep.
There’s the friend you call. They see the call. And begrudgingly pick up.
And there’s the friend you call. And as they’re picking up the phone, they’ve got their pants on already and are running out the door with their keys.
Conviction-driven firms, where the partner that pounds the table for you will likely be on you board, or even if not, they’re going to be the third friend. At consensus-driven firms, and I’m clearly being reductive here, you’re more likely — not always — to have the reluctant one or sleepers.
Then it comes down to how the team is compensated. Not something most founders can find out or ask out, but how carry is distributed for each fund matters.
Disagreeableness
I’ve realized a lot of the best investors are quite disagreeable. They have their opinions and are quite vocal about them.
A lot of them quite often score incredibly low on investor review sites. Of course, some just score low on NPS purely because their assholes. But I want to caveat. Assholes are often disagreeable, but not all disagreeable people are assholes.
But it takes a lot of courage to have a contrarian viewpoint that one can back up. You don’t have to agree with it. But it matters. More often than not, these folks will also have negative references. For an LP evaluating VCs, that’s ok. Negative is always better than neutral references. The latter means you’re easily forgettable.
Regardless of whether you agree with these investors or not (equally, if not more true, in great founders), they make you stop and think. And that pause to think makes you a more well-rounded professional, and makes your own opinions more robust when you choose to adopt or not adopt said piece of advice.
There’s a great Steve Jobs line, which I think is quite applicable here. “Here’s to the crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels. The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things differently. They’re not fond of rules. And they have no respect for the status quo. You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify or vilify them. About the only thing you can’t do is ignore them. Because they change things. They push the human race forward. And while some may see them as the crazy ones, we see genius. Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do.”
Great investors are troublemakers. In a good way.
P.S. To the three verified troublemakers I know who are reading this blogpost, can’t wait for your debut.
Small talk
Small talk was definitely one of those things I was rather dismissive of earlier in my career. Who da hell cares about the weather? Or what you did over the weekend?
But over the years, I realize some of the best investors are remarkably good at this. Not in the sense that they know how to ask great weather questions, but they learn how to build rapport early and quickly. And even better, they get a founder comfortable, honest, and candid about where they are at.
No one’s perfect. Every investor gets that. Most founders often pretend that they are. But a great investor is great at helping a founder realize they don’t have to be, and also get to understand a founder from a personal level. Not jumping straight into the pitch. Or give me your metrics. Or how much are you raising at how high of a valuation?
Radical candor
Borrowing this phrase from the amazing Kim Scott, the best investors are upfront with expectations. They don’t waste your time. Some even go as far as to share what their incentives are. And the harsh reality that they may be wrong many times before they’re right. They don’t beat around the bush. They don’t delay the inevitable. They’re great at ripping bandages off quickly, so they can prioritize their focus on other matters that require more attention. They have tough conversations early and synchronously. The last thing one can ever say about them is that they aren’t thoughtful. It seems remarkably simple, but most cannot do just that.
To be fair, it’s sometimes easier said than done. Even for myself, and I would not even dare to put myself in the category of great, I’ve been berated, gaslit, and shamed (haha!) for giving and attempting to give honest feedback to founders and investors. In fact, I was introed to a fund manager recently for the purpose of giving feedback. When I realized a couple red flags about her fund (namely her raising a $100M fund with no track record), I asked if she wanted feedback. To which, she replied with something to the effect that she only takes feedback from people who invest and that I didn’t deserve to give her feedback.
So I can see why some managers are averse to giving any.
Raising junior talent
I was reminded of this in my recent episode with Rick Zullo. And I noticed Rick is really good at giving credit and lifting up his team. In a soon-to-be-released episode, Eric Bahn from Hustle Fund does the same. I’ve asked him to speak at events before and he’s often referred one of his junior team members to the event. Not as a “I don’t want to do this, so someone else should”, but as a “I believe XX person will be a great future leader of this firm, and I believe others need to hear her insights.” And he’s been right every time.
Building an institutional firm takes more than one person. It takes a village. To build a legacy also requires more than one generation. I often see great investors taking less credit and giving a lot more to their team. Those often hidden from the limelight.
Discipline
Every great investor I know does something consistently every day. They set ground rules and while it’s less so for others, they hold themselves accountable to do so. Whether it’s a cup of coffee brewed from home every morning, or going to the gym on a daily basis or quality time with family or calling their significant other at a set time every day, I have yet to meet an investor who can’t keep to a promise they made to themselves consistently.
Venture capital is a long game, and it’s very possible for these multi-decade games, to be lucky at least once. Good investors, at some point, hit a unicorn. Great investors can discover many before others do. But any more than twice requires extreme discipline and the ability to say no to things that are good to make room for the great. And it’s so much harder than one might think.
And the simplest proxy to an investor’s ability to do so is their ability to fulfill promises to themselves when no one else is looking.
In closing
At the end of the day, not all shoes are the same. Just like not all VCs are. But if all you need is to get from Point A to Point B, and you don’t care for what kind of support you get along the way, VCs, like shoes, may all be the same.
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
