Tag: y combinator

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Mentors and Investors

There is an incredible wealth of people in this world who self-proclaim to have insights or secrets to unlocking insights. From parents to teachers to the wise soul who lives down the street. From coaches to gurus to your friendly YouTube ad. To mentors. To investors. While there are a handful who do have incredibly insightful anecdotes, their stories should serve as reference points rather than edicts of the future. Another tool in the toolkit. No advice is unconditionally right nor unconditionally wrong. All are circumstantial.

After all, a friend once told me: All advice is autobiographical.

The same is true for anything I’ve ever written. Including this blogpost in itself.

Over the past two weeks, as a first-time mentor, I’ve had the incredible fortune of working alongside and talking to some amazing founders at Techstars LA. At the same time, I was able to observe some incredible mentors at work. And in this short span of time so far, I’ve gotten to understand something very acutely. The dichotomy between mentors and investors. For the purpose of this blogpost, I’m going to focus on startup mentors, rather than other kinds of mentors (i.e. personal mentors). Although I imagine the two cohorts of mentors are quite synonymous.

While the two categories aren’t mutually exclusive, there are differences. A great mentor can be a great investor, and vice versa. But they start from two fundamentally different mindsets.

Investors/mentors

An investor tries to fit a startup in the mold they’ve prescribed. A mentor fits themselves into the mold a startup prescribes.

An investor thinks “Will this succeed?” A mentor thinks “Assuming this will succeed, how do we get there?”

An investor starts with “Why you?” A mentor starts with “Why not you?”

An investor evaluates how your past will help you get to your future. A mentor helps you in the present to get to your future.

An investor has a fiduciary responsibility to their investors (i.e. LPs). A mentor doesn’t. Or a mentor, at least, has a temporal responsibility to their significant other. Then again, everyone does to the people close to them.

An investor will be on your tail to hold you accountable because they’ve got skin in the game. A mentor might not.

You can’t fire your investor. You can theoretically “fire” your mentor. More likely, you’re going to switch between multiple mentors over the course of your founding journey.

An investor has a variable check size-to-helpfulness ratio. Who knows if this investor will be multiplicatively more helpful with intros, advice, operational know-how than the size of their check? A mentor has theoretically an infinite CS:H ratio. Check size, zero. Helpfulness, the sky’s the limit.

It’s also much harder to find a mentor than an investor, outside of startup communities, like On Deck and Indie Hackers, and acceleration and incubation programs, like Y Combinator and Techstars. Frankly, being a mentor is effectively doing free consultations over an extended period of time. And if you’re outside of these communities, the best way to bring on mentors is to bring them on as advisors with advisor equity. I would use Founder’s Institute’s FAST as a reference point. And Tim Ferriss‘ litmus test for bringing on advisors: If you could only ask 5-10 very specific questions to this person once every quarter, would they still be worth 0.5% of your company without a vesting schedule?

In closing

As I mentioned above, being a mentor and an investor isn’t mutually exclusive. The best investors are often incredible mentors. And some of the greatest mentors end up being investors into your startup as well. Having been in the venture world for a while, I’ve definitely seen all categories on this Venn diagram. Sometimes you need more of one than the other. Sometimes you need both. It’s a fluid cycle. And for the small minority of venture-scalable startups, it’s worth having both.

Photo by Robert Ruggiero on Unsplash

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14 Reasons For Me Not to Source This Deal

Founders often ask me what makes a VC say yes. Or what they need to do for a VC to say yes. Or what they need to do for me to say yes. TL;DR: it depends. On firm, partner, thesis, active conversations, stealth investments, next fund fundraising schedules, reserve ratios, implicit biases, and more. In sum, a million reasons. And even if I knew all the above, I still can’t guarantee a term sheet.

So I can’t say what’ll guarantee a VC yes. A term sheet. If I could, I’d be the one writing them. Nevertheless I do my best to help brilliant founders get funded. On the flip side, here’s what aren’t educated guesses, but guarantees. Or as close as one can get to a guarantee. A guaranteed no. An anti-playbook, if I might call it that. If it doesn’t help, I hope, at the very minimum, it provides you a few minutes of entertainment.

  1. Not treating me as a human. This is less of a reason for me to get myself worked up. There are discriminatory, dismissive, bigoted people in the world. I get it. This is more of a problem for the founder when they’re looking to scale the team. Being a dick limits your ability to grow and/or empathize with the market. If you’re fine with treating me this way, then you’re definitely going to not bat an eyelid with other future hires, team members, investors, and customers. Equally true for any VCs/angels/investors out there.
  2. Badmouthing others. This is more of a personal turnoff. We’re all intellectuals here. And it’s okay to have differing opinions of the world. But it’s not okay to talk behind others back. If you’re gonna badmouth others, I imagine the exact same for anyone else who gets on your bad side for whatever reason, including myself. Practice good social hygiene.
  3. Complaining about your team/product. Complaining is a bit more nuanced. It’s fine from time to time, we’re human. I don’t expect you to be the perfect human, but a first meeting with me, as with any investor, is a first date. I want to hear about the bigger picture, the vision, the dream. Impress me. If you have time to complain during a 30-minute meeting, you’re probably not spending your time wisely. And if this is an intro meeting, you have yet to build up your social rapport with me to complain. Being frustrated about the market is fine. Being honest, introspective, and vulnerable is also fine. Your mileage may differ for the last part, but I love candid founders.
  4. Lying. That goes without saying, if you’re lying about numbers or if I somehow find out that you are, then no. If you don’t know, you don’t know. If your numbers aren’t pretty, admit it. While I might not be able to help you get funded, I’ll do my best to help. If you don’t know something, admit it as well. And find out after. Going back to the earlier point, I love candid founders who have a bias to action.
  5. Having an exit strategy slide. This is more true for larger $100M+ funds I send deals to. Having an exit makes sense for angels, and smaller funds, but larger funds need to look for fund returners and outsized winners, and an exit of XX/XXX million is not sexy at all.
  6. Crazy, but not crazy and reasonable. This one is a new one, inspired by PG. It’s fairly rare, since I try to avoid putting myself in situations with crazy, especially cantankerous people. But it happens. If by any chance, you know your idea might err on the side of crazy, walk me through the logic of how you got there. Don’t just tell me “It makes sense to me” or “I know the industry better than you do.”
  7. Lack of focus. It’s great if you want to do a million things, but saying you want to focus on everything means you’ll end up focusing on nothing. A lack of focus shows a lack of priorities. Focus and be able to back up why are you focusing on this at this point in time. I love Phil Libin‘s 4-year plan defined by one word for each year forward. You can find that plan here and here.
  8. Asking for an intro without any context. “I saw you were connected with X on LinkedIn. Can you introduce us?” If that line pops up in the first 30 seconds of our first conversation, I’m running away. I need to know who you are, what you’re building, why it matters, and hell, why would this person you want to get introduced to is a good use of yours and their time. Build a relationship first. Don’t lead with the transaction. I am not an ATM machine. Neither are other people – investors or not.
  9. Asking me to sign an NDA. Early on in my career, I admittedly signed a number of NDAs sent to me by founders. I love connecting brilliant people together, but if I have to get your permission each time I pass it to an investor or a potential advisor, it’s too much work for me. Frankly, I have other priorities. I get it; I’m a stranger. But I hope you can at least trust that I won’t run away with your idea or give it to a competitor. You have my word. If that isn’t enough for you, that’s fine. I’m just not your guy.
  10. Asking the VC to do their work. “When we raise X dollars, we will do Y tasks.” I usually follow up on that statement with “What have you done so far to accomplish Y?” My least favorite founders are the ones who say something along the lines of, “We’ll worry about that when we get there.” Or “We were hoping our future investors will find someone for us.” We don’t expect you to know everything and everyone, nor do everything right, but we expect you to do some legwork to show you are learning. Show us that you’ve been scrappy, resourceful, and used what you had available to you.
  11. Lack of self-awareness. “Where are you weak at?” If your answer is “Nothing” or “I’m good at everything”, that sends alarm bells to any investor. Which might also lead to a secondary question of “What do you need me for then?” A close cousin is one of my favorites: “What is your competition doing right?” If your answer is also “Nothing”, then you might need to do some market research and reconnaissance again. There’s a reason other customers are using your competitors’ and incumbents’ products. Find it out. On top of what they’re weak at. There’s a romanticized concept in Silicon Valley that every founder needs to be like Jobs with his reality distortion field. While it’s true you need to be able to help others see the future you’re seeing, you also have to deeply understand the realities of today of what’s stopping you from getting there.
  12. Nothing’s changed since the last time we spoke. Investors invest on potential. A bet we make in a company is a bet that it has a chance to be as big as X tech giant in your space. Your ability to meet the demand in the market scales with the number of investment dollars in your company. That said, we expect movement. We expect deltas. And if your product really is inevitable in the market, you should be making progress with or without injections of capital. The latter, just at a slower pace. Venture capital is impatient capital. Also understand, 99% of businesses in the world don’t need VC dollars and operate incredibly well without venture investors.
  13. You’re not obsessed about the product and the market. Building a scalable startup requires obsession. It requires you to lose sleep. You can’t just check out at 5 or 6pm. While I can’t measure that in the first meeting, a close proxy is how well you know the table stakes metrics of your business – net retention, CAC, LTV, growth, revenue, engagement rates – and more. In fact, obsessed founders usually tell me that they’ve already thought of and tried out the first 10 ideas I think of. Moreover they bring me back the results of their discovery. Obsession is contagious.
  14. I have no idea what your product is or does. This is simple. If I walk out of our meeting and I still have no idea how to describe your product to others and why we need it in the world now, there’s no way I can confidently pitch your startup to the partners. Piggybacking off of the #14, if you’re obsessed about the product, you’ve told your story a million times and a million ways already. A few of which should have already resonated with select audiences. And even if it wasn’t to investors, you must’ve already told that same story to your customers. As a CEO/founder, you are the first and most important salesperson. In many ways, it means you have to push the sale. You have to get your customers to take action. I, admittedly, am a potential customer. A recipient of your sales strategy. And if I don’t get your pitch, it’s likely others might not as well. That said, for certain industries, like deep tech or biotech, I’m really, really dumb. So take my thoughts with a grain of salt.

This post was inspired by Jason Lemkin‘s blogpost, which I highly recommend checking out.

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

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Expert + Reasonable + Crazy Idea = Crazy Good

The amazing Paul “PG” Graham came out with an essay this month on crazy new ideas. And the thing I’ve learned over the years, being in Silicon Valley, is if PG writes, you read. In it, one section in particular stood out:

“Most implausible-sounding ideas are in fact bad and could be safely dismissed. But not when they’re proposed by reasonable domain experts. If the person proposing the idea is reasonable, then they know how implausible it sounds. And yet they’re proposing it anyway. That suggests they know something you don’t. And if they have deep domain expertise, that’s probably the source of it.

“Such ideas are not merely unsafe to dismiss, but disproportionately likely to be interesting.”

I’ve written a number of essays about crazy ideas. Here. Also here. The last of which you’ll need to Ctrl F “crazy”, if you don’t want to read through all of it. And also, most recently, here. But that’s besides the point. The common theme between all of these is that crazy ideas are not hard to come by. Crazy good ideas are. Good implies that you’re right when everyone else thinks you’re crazy. When you’re in the minority. And the smaller of the minority you are in, the greater the margin on the upside. Potential upside, to be fair.

As investors, we hear crazy pitches every so often. David Cowan at Bessemer even wrote a satire on it all. For the crazy pitches, go to episode five. The question is: How do we differentiate the crazy ideas from the crazy good ideas? But as PG says, if it’s coming from someone we know is a subject-matter expert (SME) and they’re usually grounded on logic and reasoning, then we spend time listening. Asking questions. And listening. ‘Cause they most likely know something we don’t.

That was true for Brian Armstrong, who recently brought his company, Coinbase, public. He worked on fraud detection for Airbnb in its early days prior. And he knew he was getting into the deep end with crypto back in 2012. But he realized how unscalable crypto transactions were and how frustrated he was. Garry Tan, then at YC and part-time at Initialized, saw exactly that in him. A reasonable SME with a crazy idea. Garry just released an amazing interview between him and Brian too, if you want to tune into the full story.

What if some of the variables in the equation are missing?

But most of the time the founders you’re talking to aren’t subject-matter experts with deep domain expertise. Or at least, they haven’t left an online breadcrumb trail of whether they’re a thought leader or if they’re reasonable human beings. So subsequently, in the little time I have with founders in a first or second meeting, I look for proxies.

For proxies on domain expertise, I go back to first principles. What are the underlying assumptions you are making? Why are they true? How did you arrive at them? What are the growing trends (i.e. market, economic, social, tech, etc.) that have primed your startup to succeed in the market? Does timing work out?

To see if they’re “reasonable” under PG’s definition, I seek creative conflict. How do you disagree with people? If I brought in a contrarian opinion you don’t agree with, how do you enlighten me? How do you disagree with your co-founders?

In closing

To be fair, we’re not always right. In fact, we’re rarely right. On average, in a hypothetical portfolio of 10 startups, five to six go to zero. One to two break even. Another one to two make a 2-3x on investment. That is to say, they return to the investor $2-3 for every $1 invested. And hopefully, one, just one, kills it, and becomes that fund returner. Fund returner – what we call an investment that returns the whole fund and maybe more. Of course, every time a VC invests, they’re aiming for the fences every time. As a VC once told me, “it’s not about the batting average but the magnitude of the home runs you hit.” And even in those 10 investments, it’s a stretch to say that all of them are “crazy” ideas.

But the hope is that even if we’re wrong on the idea, we’re right on the people.

Photo by Àlex Rodriguez on Unsplash

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A Strategy to Win Versus A Strategy Not to Lose w/ Alex Sok

For a number of friends and founders I’ve chatted this with, I’ve been a big fan of the concept of “winning versus not losing”. Ever since I heard back in 2018. In an interview with Tim Ferriss, Ann Miura-Ko of Floodgate said, “This is probably the hardest piece – knowing the difference between a winning strategy versus a strategy not to lose. […] Not losing often involves a lot of hedging. And when you feel that urge to hedge, you need to focus. You need to be offensive.”

There are a few great examples of what differentiates winning and not losing from both Tim and Ann in that interview. For instance, a lack of focus by going after two different market segments is a strategy not to lose. “The reason why that’s really hedging is you have two completely different ways of selling to those organizations and you’re afraid to pick one because maybe you have some revenue in both.”

My college friend recently connected me with entrepreneur, designer, angel investor, Alex Sok. Both of us found unlikely common ground in using sports analogies to relate to building a company. Me, swimming (e.g. here and here). Alex, football. Specifically, American football. Having been a quarterback for his school’s football team back in the day, he said something quite fascinating, “You can’t win in the first quarter, but you can lose in the first quarter.” And you know me, I had to double click on that.

I was previously under the assumption that you only needed a strategy to win, but not to lose. But as all generalizations that start with the word “only”, I was wrong. And Alex contextualized it for me – that sometimes you do need to think about how not to “lose”.

Winning versus not losing

“You can’t win in the first quarter, but you can lose in the first quarter.”

Throwing the ball deep for your running back to make the touchdown is a strategy to win. On the flip side, if you don’t convert on the third down, you’re going to lose. You may not win, but if you don’t, you could very much lose. Not all mistakes carry the same gravitas. Some mistakes can be detrimental; most mistakes aren’t. Just because you’re making sure that you convert on the third down does not mean you can’t still swing for the fences.

For founders, losing in the first quarter is akin to:

  • Burning through your seed funding in six months;
  • Hiring four professional executives before you get to product-market fit;
  • Not talking to your customers;
  • There is no one in the room who can tackle the biggest risk of the business (i.e. no engineer when you’re building an AI solution, or no one who can do sales when you’re an enterprise tech company)

You’re still aiming high, but that doesn’t mean you should burden yourself with an astronomical burn rate.

“Game plans will have to vary depending on your market or product. Key fundamental traits that increase the probability of failure will always be present. It’s important to identify which ones matter most in relation to the game plan,” says Alex. “A tough defense or go-to-market means being more focused on identifying which channels to pursue and then doubling down if it works out.”

On the flip side, “an aggressive defense or burgeoning industry might mean taking more chances but setting up plays wisely to take advantage of their aggressive, risk-taking nature. This will force the defense to settle down and play you more honestly. In startup terms, that might mean steady progress and growth with a few deep shots to achieve escape velocity from your competitors.”

Not to get forget about winning

You’ve probably heard of the saying, “If you want your company to truly scale, you have to do things that don’t scale.” Especially in the zero to one phase. From idea to product-market fit. Many of us in venture break down the early life cycle of a company by zero-to-one and one-to-infinity. The first “half” is doing things that don’t scale. Figuring out what frustrations your customers are going through. Getting that pedometer up on the street yourself. Daniel Kahneman wrote in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, “Acquisition of skills requires a regular environment, an adequate opportunity to practice, and rapid and unequivocal feedback about the correctness of thoughts and actions.”

Here are a few examples:

In the early days of Airbnb, Brian, Joe, and Nathan used to visit early Airbnb hosts with a rented DSLR to photograph their houses.

For Stripe, the founders manually onboarded every merchant to deliver “instant” merchant accounts. Of course, the Collison brothers took it a step further to mint the term “Collison installation”. Usually when founders ask early leads “Will you try our beta?”, if people say yes, then they say, “Great, we’ll send you a link.” Rather, Patrick and John said, “Right then, give me your laptop” and set it up for them right then and there.

At Doordash, they found restaurant menu PDFs online, created landing pages, put their personal number out there for people to call, and personally executed deliveries within the day.

To get his first 2000 users, Ryan at Product Hunt wrote handcrafted emails to early users and reporters to grow what started off as an email list.

Similarly, in football, teams often spend the first half of the game feeling out their opponents. Their strengths, their weaknesses. And the back half, doubling down on where your opponents fall short on. While not your opponents, founders should be spending the first half feeling out their market. Be scrappy. Nothing that’ll make you lose in the first quarter, but make mistakes. Give your team and yourself a 10-20% error rate. One of your greatest superpowers as a small team is your ability to move fast. Use it to your advantage.

Paul Graham once wrote, “Tim Cook doesn’t send you a hand-written note after you buy a laptop. He can’t. But you can. That’s one advantage of being small: you can provide a level of service no big company can.”

In closing

Alex said, “In order to be a dominant offense, you have to force the defense to cover every inch of the field.” If you only throw long, then your opponents will only need to cover long. If you only throw to the left, they only have to cover left. But if you have a diversified strategy, your opponents will have to cover every inch of the field. And to win, all you need is for your opponents to hesitate for half a second. And with a laser-focused strategy, that’s all you need to break through against your incumbents. Your incumbents often have bigger teams, can attract more talent, have deeper pockets, and the list goes on.

As a small team, you’re on offense. You can’t cover every inch of the field, and neither do you need to. You just need to be a single running back who makes it past a wall of linebackers. To do that, you need focus. As Tim Ferriss recently said on the Starting Greatness podcast, “the biggest risk to your startup is your distraction.” And it’s not just you and your team, but also the investors you bring on. Sammy Abdullah of Blossom Street Ventures wrote that the question you need to be asking yourself about your investors is: “Are you going to distract me from running the business and will you be candid with me when I have a problem?”

Focus. If you’re focusing on everything, you’re focusing on nothing. You have no room to hesitate, but it’s exactly what you want your competitors to do. That half a second on the field is about two years in the venture world. Or until you can find your product-market fit. Until you reach scale. Until you reach the “one” in zero-to-one. ‘Cause once you’re there, you just need to put your head down and run. And it’s the beginning of something defensible. Of something you can win with.

If you’re curious about taking a deeper dive on product-market fit, I recommend checking out some of my other essays:

Photo by Joe Calomeni from Pexels

Thank you Alex for helping me with early drafts of this essay!

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How to Find Product-Market Fit From Your Pricing Strategy

bread, value-based pricing, saas, revenue model, startup pricing strategy

As part of my work, I talk to many seed-stage SaaS founders. At the seed, most of these founders are thinking about how to get to product-market fit. The one in zero to one. They’re launching their product with a select few companies to really nail their pain points. And often times, pricing and the business model take a backseat when they offer their customers the product for free or at an extreme discount. While investors don’t expect founders to nail pricing at the seed, it’s useful to start thinking about your revenue model early on. After all, pricing is both an art and a science. And with the right pricing structure, it can also be your proxy for assessing product-market fit. Here’s how.

As a quick roadmap:

  1. How to use the pricing thermometer to understand value-based pricing
  2. The difference between buyers and customers
  3. What is your value metric? And why does it matter?
  4. How pricing influences positioning
  5. How to approach building a tiered plan, with a mini case study on Pulley
  6. Net dollar retention, what product-market fit looks like in dollars
  7. The SaaS version of engagement metrics

The pricing thermometer

Every product manager out there knows that customers don’t always know what they want, so asking them for a solution rarely nets valuable feedback. Rather, start with the problem. What are their frustrations? What sucks? What’s the last product they bought to attempt to alleviate their problem? Subsequently, what’d they like about that product? What didn’t they like?

There are two perspectives you can use to approach pricing: cost-plus and value-based. Cost-plus pricing is pricing based on selling the product at a given markup from its unit cost. The biggest mistake founders often make here is underestimating how much it costs to produce a product.

On the other hand, there’s value-based pricing. An approach where you determine the economic value of the service you are providing and give it to your customers for a bargain. Superhuman, for instance, prices the fastest email experience at $30/month. Or in a different light, a dollar a day. If you are saving more than a dollar of economic value a day by responding to emails faster than ever, then the product is worth it. The biggest pitfall here is that founders often don’t fully understand the value they’re bringing to their customers, which is a result of:

  1. They don’t understand your value,
  2. Or you can’t convince them of the value you think you offer.

To visualize both of these approaches better, let’s use the pricing thermometer, as YC calls it.

value based pricing

The greater the gap between two nodes (i.e. value and price, or price and cost), the greater the incentive. If you’re selling at a price far greater than its unit cost, you are far more motivated to sell your product. On the flip side, if your product is priced far below the value and benefits you provide, a customer is more motivated to purchase your product.

Buyers vs Customers

To take it a step further, if you’re planning to scale your startup, what you’re looking for our customers, not buyers. Buyers are people who purchase your product once, and never again. They learned from their mistake. Your product either didn’t deliver the value you promised or the value they thought you would deliver. Customers are repeat purchasers. Why? Because they love your product. It addresses your customers’ needs (and ideally more) again and again. Your customers’ satisfaction is evergreen, rather than ephemeral.

When you only have buyers, you have to push your product to others. It’s the epitome of a door-to-door salesperson. Think Yellow Pages.

When you have customers, you feel the pull. Customers are drawn to you. They come back willingly on their own two feet. As Calvin French-Owen, co-founder of Segment, once said: “The biggest difference between our ideas pre-PMF vs. when we found it was this feeling of pull. Before we had any sort of fit, it always felt like we had to push our ideas on other people. We had to nag people to use the product.”

value-based pricing

Value-based pricing is playing to win. Cost-plus pricing is playing to not lose. While the latter is convenient strategy when you’re a local business not looking to scale (i.e. coffee shop, local diner, local auto parts store, etc.), it’s incredibly difficult to scale with, especially as customer needs evolve. As you scale, your customers might include anyone from Microsoft who wants you to bring a sales engineer to integrate your product to a 5-person startup team who’s just testing your product out. With cost-plus pricing, you’ll be forced to determine price points on a case-by-case scenario. With value-based pricing, you can systemize dynamic pricing based on evolving customer needs. As their value received goes up, the price does too.

As the name suggests, to generate pull, we have to start from value. In this case, your value metric.

Continue reading “How to Find Product-Market Fit From Your Pricing Strategy”
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The CEO’s Evolving Job Description

Not long ago, I was asked: “Why do founders often fail as CEOs?” A rather provocative question. I wouldn’t go as far as to say founders often fail as CEOs as a blanket statement. Equally so, the question isn’t “why”, but “where”. People can “fail” in their positions for any number of reasons. “Why” is simply that they didn’t perform well under the expectations of the role. The better question comes down to “where” might they need to watch out for. Still so, there are many. But one that often catches founders by surprise is: the (in)ability to scale themselves with the company.

Founders often make great CEOs at the beginning. What I’ve seen and heard more of is the inability of founders to scale at the same pace as their company. As the company grows, the job description of the CEO changes as well. The same is true for all executive/leadership positions in a company. Something I personally love is at Shopify, every year the executives have to requalify for the position they hold, and that includes the CEO.

In the early stages, the CEO is a maker. They’re the most obsessed about the problem space. Their main job is to get the product to market. And test if it resonates. They get shit done. As the company scales (post product/market fit), the CEO is a manager. They’re no longer working on the daily/weekly updates of the product at a granular level, but making sure the entire organization functions as a well-oiled machine. How can the CEO enable their team members to be greater than the sum of their parts? To quote Paul Graham of Y Combinator, it’s the difference between the maker’s schedule and the manager’s schedule.

When you’re a small team of 5 or even 20, you’re the product lead. You decide the direction in which the product will go and you’re involved in the day-to-day nuances of the product itself, from the UI/UX to talking to customers to discover pain points, etc. When the company grows to 50 – give or take, you have already hired or are going to hire your first product manager, which means you won’t be involved in the day-to-day anymore, but rather in the larger strategic directions of the company and the product. As a maker, your decisions are tactical. On the other hand, as a manager, your decisions are strategic.

Similarly, Ben Horowitz, the second name in the investment firm, Andreessen Horowitz, wrote about peacetime and wartime CEOs. In the early days of a company, you’re at war. You’re selling; you’re networking. You’re fighting in a competitive market of attention. Not only from your customers, but also potential hires and investors. As your company scales past $100M ARR (among any of the other heuristics when you stop being a “startup”), you’re now a category leader and possibly a market leader as well. As the market leader in “peacetime”, you decide the rules of the game. You’re working to maintain your market position. You focus on the masses, and not the niches as much. And therefore, the job description of a leader born in an era of war is different from a leader born to maintain peace.

Many founding CEOs understand that their role will evolve over time, but unfortunately, many are still unable to keep up with the pace at which the company evolves. Effectively, CEOs have to always be one step ahead of the company’s growth to prepare the infrastructure for the rest of the team to grow into.

Photo by Patrick Tomasso on Unsplash

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How to Build a Culture that Ruthlessly Prioritizes w/ Yin Wu, Founder of Pulley

Last week, I was lucky enough to jump on a call with the founder of Pulley, Yin Wu. Backed some of the best investors out there including Stripe, General Catalyst, YC, Elad Gil, just to name a few, Pulley is the ultimate tool for cap table management. In addition, Yin is a 4-peat founder, one of which led to an acquisition by Microsoft, and three of which, including Pulley, went through YC.

In our conversation, we covered many things, but one particular theme stood out to me the most: how she built a culture of ruthless prioritization.

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Fantastic Unicorns and Where to Find Them

As a venture scout and as someone who loves helping pre-seed/seed startups before they get to the A, I get asked this one question more often than I expect. “David, do you think this is a good idea?” Most of the time, admittedly, I don’t know. Why? I’m not the core user. I wouldn’t count myself as an early adopter who could become a power user, outside of pure curiosity. I’m not their customer. To quote Michael Seibel of Y Combinator,

… “customers are the gatekeepers of the startups world.” Then comes the question, if customers are the gatekeepers to the venture world, how do you know if you’re on to something if you’re any one of the below:

  • Pre-product,
  • Pre-traction,
  • And/or pre-revenue?

This blog post isn’t designed to be the crystal ball to all your problems. I have to disappoint. I’m a Muggle without the power of Divination. But instead, let me share 3 mental models that might help a budding founder find idea-market fit. Let’s call it a tracker’s kit that may increase your chances at finding a unicorn.

  1. Frustration
  2. The highly fragmented industry with low NPS
  3. Right on non-consensus
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Not the White Knight in Shining Armor

startup fundraising

I hear so many founders in their pitch decks say: As soon as they raise funding, [blank] will happen. [blank] could be: hiring that CTO or lead developer or an operations lead, getting to X0,000 users, or going “all in” on growth (often heard as Facebook and/or Google ads). That line by itself really doesn’t mean much. So I always follow up, with: “How do you plan to achieve [blank] milestone after you extend your runway/receive venture backing?”

Then this is when I start thinking, “Oh no!”, especially as soon as I hear, after I partner with X investor, they will help me do Y, or worse, they will do Y for me.

And I’m not alone. So, what signals does that response give investors?

  1. Alright, Investor A, I’m planning for you to do the legwork for growing my business.
  2. I don’t know what I’m doing, but please invest in my naivety.
  3. I haven’t thought about that problem/milestone at all, and I’ll worry about it when I get there. So, take a big risk in me.

Why I love athletes, chefs and veterans

There is no white knight in shining armor when you’re raising a round.

This is the reason I love athletes. And for that matter, veterans and chefs, too. Each of them chose a career where they are forced to deal with adversity. Personally and collectively. To a level, most of us might call inhuman. While I’m sure I’ve missed many other industries that also sponsor such arduous growth, and yes, I know I’m generalizing here, these 3 industries seem to have a higher batting average of producing individuals who can find the internal grit to overcome almost any obstacle.

In the words of Y Combinator‘s Michael Seibel in a recent talk he gave with Saastr Annual @ Home,

“They’ve trained themselves to be better at doing things that are hard.”

While he wasn’t necessarily talking about professional athletes, chefs, or veterans, the same is true. The people who are better than you at doing something don’t have it any easier than you do. Rather, they’ve developed a system, or mental model, that helps them conquer extremely difficult obstacles. And because it’s become muscle memory for them, it seems easier for them to accomplish these goals. At the same time, we should never discount their blood, sweat, and tears, or what some of my colleagues call scar tissue, just because we cannot see them. It’s why we in venture call startups “10-year overnight successes“.

To founders

Bringing it back full circle, a great founder (as opposed to a good or okay founder) never completely relies on an external source for the growth of their company. By the same token, a great founder also never blames the failure of their startup because of an external source. A great founder – regardless of the business’s success or failure – learns quickly to not only repeat the same mistake again, but also develop insights and skills to push their business forward. While you as the founder isn’t required to be the best in the world of a particular skill, you will need to practice and accel at it until you can find the best in the world. But to hire the best in the world, you also have to be reasonably literate in the field to differentiate the best from the second best.

The solution

Here’s what investors are looking for instead:

  1. We’ve thought about the problem. We’ve A/B tested with these 3 strategies (and why we chose each strategy). Numbers-wise, Strategy B proves to: (a) have the most traction, and (b) is most closely aligned with our core metric – revenue.
  2. Here are the 2-3 core milestones we plan to hit once we get this injection of capital. And we will do what it takes to get there. In order to get there, we’ve thought about hiring an expert in operational efficiency and purchasing these 5 tools to help us hit these milestones. For the former, here’s who we’ve talked to, why we think they’re a perfect fit, and what each of their responses are so far. For the latter, each tool in this short list can help us save X amount of time and Y amount of burn. Do you think we’re approaching these goals in an optimal way?
    • Note: The signal you’re giving here is that you and your team are results-/goals-oriented, while the process of getting to those goals are fluid and stress-tested.

In both cases, you’re showing your potential investors that you’ve done your homework already (versus a Hail Mary). But at the end of the day, you are open and willing to entertain their suggestions, which, ideally, come with years of experience in operating and/or advising other founders who have gone through a similar journey.

So, stay curious out there! Always question the seemingly unquestionable!

Photo by gaspar manuel zaldo on Unsplash

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The Different Types of Risk a VC Evaluates

Photo by trail on Unsplash

Founders take on many different types of risk when creating a business. Subsequently, investors constantly put founders and their businesses under scrutiny using risk as a benchmark. In broad terms, in my experience, they largely fall under two categories: execution risk and market risk.

Finding Product-Market Fit and “Idea-Market Fit”
Where I first introduced the dichotomy of market and execution risk in the frame of idea-market fit.

Some Background

Contrary to popular belief, VCs are some of the most risk-averse people that I know. As an investor, the two goals are to:

  1. Take calculated bets, via an investment thesis and diligence;
  2. And de-risk each investment as much as possible.

From private equity to growth equity to venture capital, more and more investors are writing ‘discovery checks.’ Typically, funds write checks that are 2-4% of their fund size. For example, $100M fund usually write $2-4M initial checks. Yet, more and more investors are writing increasingly smaller check sizes (0.1-0.5% fund size). In the $100M fund example, that’s $100-500K checks. This result is a function of FOMO (fear of missing out), as well as a proving grounds for founders before the fund’s partners put in their core dollar. Admittedly, this upstream effect does lead to:

  • Less diligence before checks are written (closing within 48-72 hours on the extreme end, and inevitably, more buyer’s remorse);
  • Less bandwidth allotted per portfolio startup (even less for startups given discovery checks);
  • And, inflated rounds (and therefore, inflated startup valuations).

The Risks

The risks for a startup investor are fairly obvious, and so are the rewards. Effectively, an early-stage investor is betting millions of dollars on a stranger’s claim. But not all risks are the same.

In the eyes of a VC, an execution risk is categorically less risky than a market risk. Furthermore, even within the category of execution, a product risk is usually less risky than a team risk.

Execution Risk

Why are more and more early-stage investors defaulting to enterprise over consumer startups?

Two reasons.

  1. Enterprise startups often run on a SaaS (software-as-service) subscription business model. There will always be recurring revenue, assuming the product makes sense. For an investor, that’s foreseeable ROI.
  2. It’s an execution risk, not a market risk. Often times, an enterprise tech startup is the culmination of existing frustrations prevalent in the respective industry already. And therefore, have reasonably stable distribution channels and go-to-market strategies.

Eric Feng, formerly at Kleiner Perkins, now at Facebook, used Y Combinator’s data set at the end of last year to illustrate the consumer-to-enterprise shift.

Using discovery checks, and playing pre-core business, VCs can evaluate team risk. Between the discovery check and their usual ‘core checks’, VCs can also test their initial hypotheses on their founders.

As a startup grows, especially after realizing product-market fit, market risk becomes more of a product risk. Best illustrated by market share, product risk is when a product fails to meet the expectations of their (target) customers. It can be evaluated via a permutation of key metrics, like unit economics, NPS, retention and churn rate. There is an element of technological risk early on in the startup lifecycle for deep tech ventures, but admittedly, it’s not a vertical I have my finger on the pulse for and can share insight into.

Given that VCs are either ex-operators or have seen a breadth of startup life-cycles, VCs can best use their experience to mitigate a startup’s execution risk.

Market Risk

Market risk requires a prediction of human/market behavior. And unfortunately, the vast majority of investors can predict about the constant evolution of human behavior as well as a founder can. What does that mean? Founders and VCs are walking hand-in-hand to gain market experience. It, quite excitingly, is an innovator’s Rubrik’s cube to solve.

Market risk is frequently attributed to consumer tech products. In an increasing proliferation of consumer startups, consumers have become more expensive to acquire and harder to retain. Distribution channels change frequently and are determined by political, economic, technological, and social trends.

In Closing

Every VC specializes in tackling a certain kind of risk. But founders must quickly adapt, prioritize, and tackle all the above risks at some point in the founding journey. As Reid Hoffman, co-founder of LinkedIn, famously said:

“An entrepreneur is someone who will jump off a cliff and assemble an airplane on the way down.”

Happy hunting!

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