There’s a comical number of debates around where the team slide goes in a pitch deck. In fact, this blogpost may end being more of a meme than have any substantive value. Nevertheless, here’s to hoping that by the end of this essay, there’s some semblance of a call-to-action for you. The “too-long-don’t read” answer for the order of your team slide is… it depends.
Why “why you” is important
First, let’s start from the “facts”.
The earlier your company is, the more your team matters to an investor. The more mature your company is, the less it matters.
If your investor doesn’t understand your answer to the “why you” question, you’re not winning any gold medals, much less a check.
Investors have, effectively, three questions they want answered in the intro meeting.
Why now?
Why this?
And, why you?
“Why now” tells an investor why they should look into the space. “Why this” tells an investor why they should look at the solution. But if we’re being completely honest, if an investor is a specialist and not a generalist, and even if they were the latter, you’re not the first person who’s brought up the exact same “why now” and “why this”. Even if you answer the first two questions perfectly, there’s still no reason as to why you should be the one to take this product to market. Investors, if they were more blunt, would just thank you for your market research.
On the other hand, if you can answer the “why you” question, you give them a reason to have a second conversation with you. And the whole goal of the intro meeting is to have the second meeting. Not to get the check. Don’t skip steps. As a footnote, your mileage will vary with angel investors and micro funds. For them, speed is their competitive advantage, not their check size nor possibly their network or resources. While they will try to be helpful, they’re not a platform – yet. If you answer the “why you”, in the worst case scenario, your investors won’t regret backing the startup. You just weren’t lucky. But they’d probably be willing to back you again if you started another business.
The reason why so many VCs regress back to metrics and traction is because you’ve failed to answer the “why you” question.
Founders haven't sold them on the "why you" so they regress to finding answers for "why this" and "why now", which typically come in the form of lagging indicators like rev and traction
Based on the above “facts”, the younger your startup is, the earlier you should put the team slide. To give investors context as to who you are. This matters a bit more for partnership meetings, as well as if this is a (relatively) cold pitch. That is, to say, if you AND your co-founders don’t have a prior relationship with the people you are pitching to, move the team slide to the beginning.
Eniac Ventures, an incredible seed-stage firm, recently wrote, “We believe that it should probably be slide 1 or 2. That’s because investors want to become familiar with the people behind the product early on, whether we’re flipping through the deck or you’re pitching us directly. When the team slide is second, it also gives you a great opportunity to walk investors through your background and impress upon them why your unique set of experiences makes you and your team the best one to build and scale the product.”
In closing
But, that might not be the case for you. The investors you pitch might have a different set of priorities. I always go back to the question: When going into the meeting, if the investor could only ask one question, what is the one question they need the answer for to give them enough of a reason to take the second meeting?
Then your pitch deck should be in that order of priority.
If you’re tackling a problem most people care little about or where it’s non-obvious, talk about the problem first.
If it’s not a revolutionary product and it already makes sense, talk about why you and your team are the best equipped to tackle this problem.
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Founders often ask me, what slides on my pitch deck do I have to make sure I get right? The short answer, all of them. Then again, if you’re focusing on all of them, you’re focusing on none of them. So I’ll break it down by fundraising stages:
Pre-seed/seed (might as well include angels here too)
Series A/B
Since I spend almost no time in the later stages, I’ll refrain from extrapolating from any anecdotes there.
If you’re using DocSend, you already have the numbers for your deck viewership in front of you. As DocSend’s CEO Russ Heddleston said in his interview with Jason Calacanis, VCs often spend ~3.5 minutes on your deck. Though I’ve never timed myself, it seems to be in the same ballpark for myself as well. After all, it’s the deck that gets the meeting, not the deck that determines if you get funding or not.
Nevertheless, I hope the below contextualizes the time spent beyond the numbers, and what goes on in an investor’s head when we’re skimming through.
Pre-seed/seed
Team
What is the biggest risk this business is taking on?
Is the person who can address the biggest risk of this business on this slide?
And does this person have decision-making power?
Let’s say your biggest risk is that you’re creating a market where there isn’t one. Do you have that marketing/positioning specialist – either yourself or on your team – to tackle this problem? As much as I love techies, three CS PhDs are going to give me doubts.
Similarly, the biggest risk for a hypothetical enterprise SaaS business is often a sales risk. Then I need proof either via your network/experience or LOIs (letters of intent) that you have corporations who will buy your product.
Or if it’s a tech risk, I’ll be hesitant if I see two MBAs pursuing this. Even if their first hire is an ML engineer, who owns 2% of the business. Because it doesn’t sound like the one person who can solve the biggest risk for the business has been given the trust to make the decisions that will move the needle.
This might be a bit controversial, but having talked with several VCs, I know I’m not alone here. I don’t care about quantity – number of years in the industry or at X company. Maybe a little more if you were a founding team member who helped scale a startup to $100M ARR. I do care for quality – your earned secret, which bleeds into the next slide.
Solution/product
The million-dollar question here is: What do you know that makes money that everyone else is overlooking, underestimating, or just totally missed? If you’re a frequent reader of this blog, you’ll be no stranger to this question. I’ve talked about it here and here, just to name a few.
Or in other words, having spent time in the idea maze, what is your earned secret? Here are two more ways of looking at it is:
Is there an inflection point you found, as Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate calls it, in the socio-economic/technological trends that makes the future you speak of more probable?
Is it a process/mental model that you’ve built over X years in the industry that grafts extremely well to an adjacent or a broader industry?
I believe that’s what’ll greatly increase the chances of your startup winning. Or at least hold your incumbents at bay until you reach product-market fit. If you’re able to find the first insight, then you’ll be able to find the second. And by pattern recognition, you’ll be able to find the third, fourth, and fifth in extreme velocity. It’s what we, on the VC side, call insight development. And your product/solution is the culmination of everything you and your team has learned faster and better than your competitors.
Of course, your product still has to address your customers’ greatest pain points. You don’t have to be the best at everything, but you have to be the best (or the only) one who can solve your customers’ greatest frustration. So VCs, in studying how you plot out the user journey, look for: do you actually solve what you claim this massive problem in the market is?
Series A/B
Traction
What are your unit economics? I’m looking for something along the lines of LTV:CAC ~3-5x.
Who’s paying?
For enterprise, which big logo is your customer? And who are your 5-7 referenceable customers?
For consumer:
If it’s freemium, what percent of premium users do you have? I’m looking for at least a 3-5% here.
If your platform is free, how are people paying with their time? DAU/MAU>25-30%? Is your virality coefficient k>1? 30- and 90-day retention cohorts > 20%, ideally 40%.
What does your conversion funnel look like? What part of the funnel are you really winning? Subsequently, what might you need more work on?
The competition
95 out of every 100 decks, I see two kinds of competitor slides:
2×2 matrix/Cartesian graph, where the respective startup is on the upper right hand corner
The checklist, where the respective startup has all the boxes checked and their competitors have some percentage of the boxes checked
Neither are inherently wrong in nature, but they give rise to two different sets of questions.
The former, the graph, often leads to the trap of including vanity competitors. For the sake of populating the graph, founders include the logos of companies who hypothetically could be their competitors, but when it comes down to reality, they never or rarely compete on a deal with their target user/customer. April Dunford, author of Obviously Awesome, calls these “theoretical competitors.”
A simple heuristic is if you jumped on a call with a customer right now and ask: “What would you use currently if our solution did not exist?”, would the names of the competitors you listed actually pop up during the call? Or with a potential customer, what did they use before you arrived? For enterprise software, Dunford says that startups usually lose 25% of their customers when the answer to the above question is “nothing”. When your greatest incumbent is a habitual cycle deeply engrained in your user’s behavior, you need to either reposition your solution, or find ways to educate the market and greatly reduce the friction it takes to go from 0 to 60.
The latter, the checklist, usually sponsors a second kind of trap – vanity features. Founders often list a whole table’s worth of “awesome features” that their competitors don’t have, but many of which may not resolve a customer’s frustration. And on the one that does, their competitors have already taken significant market share. The key question here: Do all features listed resolve a fundamental problem your customers/users have? Which are necessary, which are nice-to-have’s? Are you winning on the features that solve fundamental problems?
The question I ask, as it pertains to competition, in the first or second meeting is: What are your competitors doing right? If you were to put yourself in your competitor’s shoes, what did they ace and what can you learn from the success of their experiment?
Financial projections
What are you basing the numbers off of?
What are your underlying assumptions?
How fast do you claim you can double the business growth? Is it reasonable? If we’re calculating bottom-up, can you actually sell the number of units/subscriptions you claim to? What partnerships/distribution channels are you already in advanced talks with? Anything further than 2 years out, for the most part, VCs dismiss. The future is highly unpredictable. And the further out it is, the less likely you’re able to predict that.
I also say financial projections for Series A/B decks is because only with traction can you reasonably predict what the 12-month forward revenue is going to look like. Maybe 18 months, depending on your pending contracts as well. In the pre-seed/seed, when you’re still testing out the product with small set of beta users, it’s hard to predict. And pre-seed/seed decks that have projections without much traction are often heavily scrutinized than their counterparts that don’t have that slide.
In closing
Of course, that doesn’t mean you should neglect any slide on your deck. Rather, the above is just a lens for you to see which slides an investor might allocate special attention to. If you can answer the above questions well in your pitch deck, then you’re one step closer to a winning strategy not only in fundraising, but in building a company that will change the world.
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Friday last week, I jumped on a phone call with a founder who reached out to me after checking out my blog. In my deep fascination on how she found and learns from her mentors, she shed some light as to why she feels safe to ask stupid questions. The TL;DR of her answer – implicit trust, blended with mutual respect and admiration. That her mentors know that when she does ask a question, it’s out of curiosity and not willing ignorance – or naivety.
But on a wider scope, our conversation got me thinking and reflecting. How can we build psychological safety around questions that may seem dumb at first glace? And sometimes, even unwittingly, may seem foolish to the person answering. The characteristics of which, include:
A question whose answer is easily Google-able;
A question that the person answering may have heard too many times (and subsequently, may feel fatigue from answering again);
And, a question whose answer may seem like common sense. But common sense, arguably, is subjective. Take, for example, selling losses and holding gains in the stock market may be common sense to practiced public market investors, but may feel counter-intuitive to the average amateur trader.
We’re Human
But, if you’re like me, every so often, I ask a ‘dumb’ question. Or I feel the urge to ask it ’cause either I think the person I’m asking would provide a perspective I can’t find elsewhere or, simply, purely by accident. The latter of which happens, though I try not to, when I’m droning through a conversation. When my mind regresses to “How are you doing?” or the like.
To fix the latter, the simple solution is to be more cognizant and aware during conversations. For the former, I play with contextualization and exaggeration. Now, I should note that this isn’t a foolproof strategy and neither is it guaranteed to not make you look like a fool. You may still seem like one. But hopefully, if you’re still dying to know (and for some reason, you haven’t done your homework), you’re more likely to get an answer.
Founders take on many different types of risk when creating a business. Subsequently, investors constantly put founders and their businesses under scrutiny using risk as a benchmark. In broad terms, in my experience, they largely fall under two categories: execution risk and market risk.
Where I first introduced the dichotomy of market and execution risk in the frame of idea-market fit.
Some Background
Contrary to popular belief, VCs are some of the most risk-averse people that I know. As an investor, the two goals are to:
Take calculated bets, via an investment thesis and diligence;
And de-risk each investment as much as possible.
From private equity to growth equity to venture capital, more and more investors are writing ‘discovery checks.’ Typically, funds write checks that are 2-4% of their fund size. For example, $100M fund usually write $2-4M initial checks. Yet, more and more investors are writing increasingly smaller check sizes (0.1-0.5% fund size). In the $100M fund example, that’s $100-500K checks. This result is a function of FOMO (fear of missing out), as well as a proving grounds for founders before the fund’s partners put in their core dollar. Admittedly, this upstream effect does lead to:
Less diligence before checks are written (closing within 48-72 hours on the extreme end, and inevitably, more buyer’s remorse);
Less bandwidth allotted per portfolio startup (even less for startups given discovery checks);
The risks for a startup investor are fairly obvious, and so are the rewards. Effectively, an early-stage investor is betting millions of dollars on a stranger’s claim. But not all risks are the same.
In the eyes of a VC, an execution risk is categorically less risky than a market risk. Furthermore, even within the category of execution, a product risk is usually less risky than a team risk.
Execution Risk
Why are more and more early-stage investors defaulting to enterprise over consumer startups?
Two reasons.
Enterprise startups often run on a SaaS (software-as-service) subscription business model. There will always be recurring revenue, assuming the product makes sense. For an investor, that’s foreseeable ROI.
It’s an execution risk, not a market risk. Often times, an enterprise tech startup is the culmination of existing frustrations prevalent in the respective industry already. And therefore, have reasonably stable distribution channels and go-to-market strategies.
Using discovery checks, and playing pre-core business, VCs can evaluate team risk. Between the discovery check and their usual ‘core checks’, VCs can also test their initial hypotheses on their founders.
As a startup grows, especially after realizing product-market fit, market risk becomes more of a product risk. Best illustrated by market share, product risk is when a product fails to meet the expectations of their (target) customers. It can be evaluated via a permutation of key metrics, like unit economics, NPS, retention and churn rate. There is an element of technological risk early on in the startup lifecycle for deep tech ventures, but admittedly, it’s not a vertical I have my finger on the pulse for and can share insight into.
Given that VCs are either ex-operators or have seen a breadth of startup life-cycles, VCs can best use their experience to mitigate a startup’s execution risk.
Market Risk
Market risk requires a prediction of human/market behavior. And unfortunately, the vast majority of investors can predict about the constant evolution of human behavior as well as a founder can. What does that mean? Founders and VCs are walking hand-in-hand to gain market experience. It, quite excitingly, is an innovator’s Rubrik’s cube to solve.
Market risk is frequently attributed to consumer tech products. In an increasing proliferation of consumer startups, consumers have become more expensive to acquire and harder to retain. Distribution channels change frequently and are determined by political, economic, technological, and social trends.
In Closing
Every VC specializes in tackling a certain kind of risk. But founders must quickly adapt, prioritize, and tackle all the above risks at some point in the founding journey. As Reid Hoffman, co-founder of LinkedIn, famously said:
“An entrepreneur is someone who will jump off a cliff and assemble an airplane on the way down.”
