How to Develop Intuition as a Rookie Startup Investor

intuition, how to develop intuition

In the month before I started this blog in 2019, I had written 20 odd blogposts as a safety net in case I ran out of ideas in my weekly cadence. Most of which never had the chance to stand in the limelight, including my first one on intuition. Particularly, my one on intuition. Over the years, I’ve honed my own “intuition” – if I may be bold enough to call it that – on vetting startups. My intuition today is very different beast from my intuition 2.5 years back. This essay is a product of such constantly evolving self-discovery.

The spark of my intuition

When I first started my career in VC at Berkeley’s SkyDeck, I reached out to about 70-80 investors for a coffee chat, in which I posed one of my now favorite questions. What is the difference between a good and a great VC? Unsurprisingly, but frustratingly enough, most of the answers came in the form of “intuition.” Or its cousin, “pattern recognition.”

To me, who was still so new to venture, that was the best and worst non-answer I could get. Yet despite knowing that there was truth in their answer, I was still directionless. It wasn’t until an afternoon walk through San Francisco’s South Park with a very generous, but curt gentleman who carried quite the luggage beneath both of his eyes that I got the answer I wasn’t looking for.

“See a shitload of startups. When you see 10, pick your top 2. Then see 100, pick your top 2. Then see 1000, and again, pick your top 2. You’re going to notice that your podium will look quite different the more founders you meet with and the more startups you see.”

Recently, Plexo‘s Lo Toney told our fellows at DECODE the exact same thing:

And so, in hopes to guide someone in my shoes when I first started, here’s how I think about building intuition. Of course, I am a human and will always be a work in progress. It’s likely that next year I will see things differently than I see them today. Nevertheless this essay is a record of my thoughts today in early 2022.

Where to find a “shitload” of startups

There are multiple avenues these days for deal flow, including, but not limited to:

When I first jumped into venture, I used to ask my friends who I knew were early adopters (a product of going to a school in the Bay Area, like Berkeley) of products to recommend me 3-5 startups/products every other week. When they did, I would treat them out to boba. And if they introduced me to the founders for those products that I’d be excited to talk to, I’d treat my friends out to a small meal – around $10-15. At the same time, at SkyDeck, I tried to sit in on as many meetings as I could, particularly the ones around deal evaluation at the beginning of every cohort.

While I do recommend all of the above, the best training grounds for developing intuition is when you talk to founders yourself.

The five senses

Google defines intuition as “the ability to understand something immediately, without the need for conscious reasoning.”

Source: Google

So, by definition, intuition is subconscious – built upon the brain’s natural ability to recognize patterns. An apt synonym, according to the trillion-plus dollar company… “sixth sense.” A sixth sense birthed from the intense neural processing of the five other senses. So, it was only logical for me to understand the sixth sense by first fully comprehending my five others. That said, I use the five-sense nomenclature loosely, but it nevertheless has become my guiding framework for venture decisions over the years.

Smell

I invested based on my sense of smell.” These are the very words Softbank’s Masayoshi Son shared about his early investment in Alibaba. And he said the same about his investment into Yahoo! In fairness, his words make for good PR. And may just seem like smokes and mirrors. But for Son to have chosen Jack Ma out of the 20 prospective Chinese entrepreneurs he met with to invest in, he must be onto something.

There are two ways to develop an acute sense of smell as an investor, which you can develop in tandem.

  1. Spending a lot of time looking into the market
  2. Talking to many founders

On the former, we’ve been seeing a number of funds incubate their own startup ideas as a result of investors becoming deep subject-matter experts, but are discontent with the current ideas or teams on the market right now. Two examples include General Catalyst and Founders Fund. Draw market maps. Write research reports. Follow the experts on socials or on their blogs. Even better, talk to them as well. As a general warning, it’s hard being a generalist here. I would pick a few industries and/or functions you’re excited about or knowledgeable in already. Go deep before you go wide.

A few questions that have served me well include:

  1. What kind of inflection points are we at in the market? In what areas have headwinds become tailwinds?
  2. What are the technological, political, and/or socio-economic trends to be aware of right now? And where do these trends set up the world tomorrow to be?
    • I really encourage investors here to dream a little bit. To envision a world given these trends in which you’d be excited to have future generations live in.

On the latter, while Masayoshi talked to only 20, you can assume you he went through at least ten times that number of decks and business ideas. There’s no better practice than being in the field. Assuming you’ve taken step one (i.e. researching the market), one of the best litmus tests I’ve used to gauge a founder is their ability to riff on adjacent subjects to the business with me. Are they capable of going on tangents that really demonstrate domain expertise? Or are they caught up in the myopia of just their business?

Taste

There’s two kinds of tastes in which I look for, almost subconsciously, now.

  1. Have they tasted excellence?
  2. Have they tasted blood?

On excellence, many investors out there look for prior success in the field. For instance, previously founder of a unicorn exit, early employee or key executive at a now-successful company, or former big-time investor. Admittedly, there are only a small handful of these individuals out there. But I knew in my early days of scouting, I was at a massive disadvantage here for two major reasons.

  1. I didn’t have strong connections with most of this subset of the entrepreneurial market.
  2. This was also a founder persona I didn’t have unique insight to. In fact, it was general consensus to always take first meetings with these individuals in the venture industry. And as I learned early in my venture career, you make money either if you’re right on consensus or right on non-consensus. The latter of which is counted in multiples instead of percentages, which I’ve written about here and here.

In knowing so, I look for excellence, period. Have they tasted earned glory in any discipline? Do they know what it’s like to succeed in their field? And do they know what it takes to get there? On the flip side, do they know how hard it was to get there?

On the other hand, for blood, I want to know a founder’s propensity for conflict resolution. When was the last time they fundamentally disagreed with their co-founders? And how did they resolve it? Conflicts are inevitable. They’re bound to arise when you’re putting so much at stake for a common goal. I care less about the fact that they do come up, but more about that when they do, the team doesn’t just fall apart.

Every once in a while, I might disagree with the founder as well. And hear I look for the founder’s knee-jerk reaction and their ability to engage in thoughtful discussion. That does not mean they cannot disagree. Neither am I looking for another yes-person. But are they capable of helping me, and themselves, explore new horizons? Are they open-minded enough to entertain new possibilities, but still hold a remarkable level of focus to their 12-month horizon?

Touch

How high-touch or low-touch is this business? How much legwork does an investor need to do for this business to 10x its KPIs (within the next 12 months)?

For me, during my first meeting with the founder, ideally before, I try to answer two very simple questions:

  1. What is the biggest risk of this business?
  2. And is the person who can solve this risk on the team slide/in the room?

99% of the time, the person who can solve the biggest risk of the business has to be in the room. For instance, if it’s a machine-learning (ML) product, it’s a technical risk. So at least one of the co-founders must be a technical genius, not three MBAs. If it’s a B2B SaaS product, it’s a distribution risk. Meaning someone on the team must have deep connections to key decision makers to their target customers. In the early days, that’s really just at least one to two big-name customers. And ten other referenceable businesses. The second biggest risk is sales, and that I count on the founders’ ability to hustle.

1% of the time, and this is probably an exaggeration, you just have to really believe in the founder AND the product or market.

Hearing

Do founders spend more time talking, or more importantly, listening to their customers than they do in Rapunzel’s tower?

While I don’t ask all of them (since we’re guaranteed to run out of time before we run out of topics), here are the questions I consider when assessing how boots-on-the-ground a founder is:

What are customers saying about their product? The good? And the bad?

How did they acquire their first users/customers outside of their existing first degree network? Where from? What messaging do they use?

What is their customer win rate? In knowing so, what worked and what didn’t? At what point in the onboarding process do customers churn? What are their assumptions for why churn happens?

Do they know the numbers of their business (and ideally the market) like the back of their hand? For numbers of the market, are they able to recall the sources of most important numbers? For product metrics, how well do they know the main ones, like engagement, churn, monthly growth rates (over the past 3 months), net retention, and so on? Every so often, there’s a number or two, the founders are not aware of. And it’s fine. The test is once they realize their blind spot, how quickly do they move to patch it up? Subsequently, report back to me about their updated data measurements.

Of course, my job is not to distract founders. And I really try my best not to, so I don’t ask they measure superfluous metrics, unless I really do believe they’re crucial to the business.

Because I usually talk with founders who are pre-product-market fit, I usually lead with the question, “what does product-market fit look like to you?” Are they able to arrive at an actionable and measurable metric to optimize for? And can they back up why that metric is a good proxy for product-market fit?

(In)Sight

Can this founder teach me something new? Something that I never thought of or heard before, but makes complete sense. Is it a preposterous idea but backed by logic? Or does the founder have an original (and money-making) angle to what is already unoriginal? As an investor, especially as you see more startup ideas, the latter question is likely to surface more than the former.

Once the original insight is uncovered, it is then up to me to figure out the potential energy of the insight. How far can this insight take this team? Is it likely that this insight will uncover more insights down the road?

As an investor, you want to be right on the insight and team, not one or the other. Mike Maples Jr. articulates it best when he said, “We realize, oh no, this team doesn’t have the stuff to bend the arc of the present to that different future. Because I like to say, it’s not enough. […] I’d say that’s the first mistake we’ve made is we were right about the insight, but we were wrong about the team.”

“I’d say the reverse mistake we’ve made is the team just seems awesome, and we just can’t look past the fact that they didn’t articulate good inflections, and they can’t articulate a radically different future. They end up executing to a local maximum, and we have an okay, but not great outcome.”

In closing

Seedscout’s Mat Sherman wrote a great Twitter thread last month to help founders who are outsiders raise venture funding.

The fact of the matter is that despite the venture industry being a rather well-connected circle of individuals and firms, most entrepreneurs – both currently and aspiring – are outsiders. If you can’t hit up a close friend to write you a couple million dollars, you’re an outsider. This essay, while written for new investors, hopefully, is equally useful as a guide for founders looking for some insight as to how investors think. Or at the very minimum, how I think.

Photo by Liam Shaw on Unsplash


Any thoughts here are mine and mine alone. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal or investment advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.


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Bigger Funds, Larger Spotlight, Bigger Mistakes

spotlight, bigger mistakes

I was doomscrolling through Twitter when I stumbled on Samir Kaji‘s recent tweet:

I’ve written before that the difference between an emerged fund manager and an emerging manager is one’s raised a Fund III and the other hasn’t.

In Fund I, you’re selling a promise – a dream – to your LPs. That promise is often for angels, founders, and other GPs who write smaller checks. You’re split testing among various investments, trying to see what works and what doesn’t. More likely than not, you’re taking low to no management fees, and only carry. No reserve ratio either. And any follow-on checks you do via an SPV, with preference to your existing LPs. You’re focused on refining your thesis.

In Fund II, you’re pitching a strategy – the beginnings of pattern recognition of what works and what doesn’t. You’re thesis-driven.

Fund III, as Braughm Ricke says, “you’re selling the returns on Fund I.” On Fund III and up, many fund managers start deviating from their initial thesis – minimally at first. Each subsequent fundraise, which often scales in zeros, is a lagging indicator of your thesis and strategy. And across funds, the thesis becomes more of a guiding principle than the end all, be all of a fund. There are only a few firms out there that continue to exercise extreme fundraising discipline in. Which, to their credit, is often hard to do. ‘Cause if it’s working, your LPs want to put more money into you. And as your fund size scales, so does your strategy.

Subsequently, it becomes a race between the scalability of a fund’s strategy and fund size.

Softbank’s mistake

In 2017, Softbank’s Vision Fund I (SVF I) of $100B was by far the largest in the venture market. In fact, 50 times larger than the largest venture funds at the time. Yet, every time they made a bad bet, the media swarmed on them, calling them out. The reality is that, proportionally speaking, Softbank made as many successful versus unsuccessful bets as the average venture fund out there. To date, SVF I’s portfolio is valued at $146.5 billion, which doesn’t put it in the top quartile, but still performs better than half of the venture funds out there. But bigger numbers warrant more attention. Softbank has since course-corrected, opting to raise a smaller $40B Fund II (which is still massive by venture standards), with smaller checks.

While there are many interpretations of Softbank’s apparent failure with SVF I (while it could be still too early to tell), my take is it was too early for its time. Just like investors ask founders the “why now” question to determine the timing of the market, Softbank missed its “why now” moment.

Bigger funds make sense

I wrote a little over a month ago that we’re in a hype market right now. Startups are getting funded at greater valuations than ever before. Investors seem to have lost pricing discipline. $5 million rounds pre-product honestly scare me. But as Dell Technologies Capital‘s Frank told me, “VCs have been mispricing companies. We anchor ourselves on historical valuations. But these anchors could be wrong.” Most are vastly overvalued, yet future successes are grossly undervalued.

Allocating $152 billion into VC funds, LPs are excited about the market activity and that the timeline on returns are shorter. Namely:

  • Exits via SPAC,
  • Accelerated timelines because of the pandemic (i.e. healthcare, fintech, delivery, cloud computing, etc.)
  • And secondary markets providing liquidity.

We’ve also seen institutional LPs, like pension funds, foundations, and endowments, invest directly into startups.

Direct Investments by Pension Funds Foundations Endowments
Source: FactSet

Moreover, we’re seeing growth and private equity funds investing directly into early-stage startups. To be specific over 50 of them invested in over $1B into private companies in 2021 so far.

As a result of the market motions, the Q2 2021 hit a quarterly record in the number of unicorns minted. According to CB Insights, 136 unicorns just in Q2. And a 491% YoY increase. As Techcrunch’s Alex Wilhelm and Anna Heim puts it, “Global startups raised either as much, or very nearly as much, in the first two quarters of 2021 as they did in all of 2020.”

Hence, we see top-tier venture funds matching the market’s stride, (a) providing opportunity for their LPs to access their deal flow and (b) meeting the startup market’s needs for greater financing rounds. Andreessen recently raised their $400M seed fund. Greylock with their $500M. And most recently, NFX with their $450M pre-seed and seed Fund III.

In his analysis of a16z, writer Dror Poleg shares that “you are guaranteed to lose purchasing power if you keep your money in so-called safe assets, and a handful of extremely successful investments capture most of the available returns. Investors who try to stay safe or even take risks but miss out on the biggest winners end up far behind.” The a16z’s, the Greylocks and the NFXs are betting on that risk.

Fund returners are increasingly harder to come by

As more money is put into the private markets, with startups on higher and higher valuations, unicorns are no longer the sexiest things on the market. A unicorn exit only warrants Greylock with a 2x fund returner. With the best funds all performing at 5x multiples and up, you need a few more unicorn exits. In due course, the 2021 sexiest exits will be decacorns rather than unicorns. Whereas before the standard for a top performing fund was a 2.5%+ unicorn rate, now it’s a 2.5% decacorn rate.

The truth is that in the ever-evolving game of venture capital, there are really only a small handful of companies that really matter. A top-tier investor once told me last year that number was 20. And the goal is an investor is to get in one or some of those 20 companies. ‘Cause those are the fund returners. Take for example, Garry Tan at Initialized Capital, earlier this year. He invested $300K into Coinbase back in 2012. And when they went public, he returned $2B to the fund. That’s 6000x. For a $7M fund, that’s an incredible return! LPs are popping bottles with you. For a half-billion dollar fund, that’s only a 4x. Still good. But as a GP, you’ll need a few more of such wins to make your LPs really happy.

I also know I’m making a lot of assumptions here. Fees and expenses still to be paid back, which lowers overall return. And the fact that for a half-billion dollar seed fund, check sizes are in the millions rather than hundreds of thousands. But I digress.

There is more capital than ever in the markets, but less startups are getting funded. The second quarter of this year has been the biggest for seed stage activity ever, measured by dollars invested. Yet total deal volume went down.

Source: Crunchbase

Each of these startups will take a larger percentage of the public attention pie. Yet, most startups will still churn out of the market in the longer run. Some will break even. And some will make back 2-5x of investor’s money. Subsequently, there will still be the same distribution of fund returners for the funds that make it out of the hype market.

In closing

As funds scale as a lagging indicator of today’s market, the discipline to balance strategy and scale becomes ever the more prescient. We will see bigger flops. “Startup raises XX million dollars closes down.” They might get more attention in the near future from media. Similarly, venture capitalists who empirically took supporting cast roles will be “celebretized” in the same way.

The world is moving faster and faster. As Balaji Srinivasan tweeted yesterday:

But as the market itself scales over time, the wider public will get desensitized to dollars raised at the early stages. And possibly to the flops as well. Softbank’s investment in Zume Pizza and Brandless turned heads yesterday, but probably won’t five years from now. It’s still early to tell whether a16z, Greylock, NFX, among a few others’ decisions will generate significant alphas. I imagine these funds will have similar portfolio distributions as their smaller counterparts. The only difference, due to their magnitudes, is that they’re subject to greater scrutiny under the magnifying glass. And will continue to stay that way in the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, I’m thrilled to see speed and fund size as a forcing function for innovation in the market. There’s been fairly little innovation at the top of the funnel in the venture market since the 1970s. VCs meet with X number of founders per week, go through several meetings, diligence, then invest. But during the pandemic, we’ve seen the digitization of venture dollars, regulations, and new fund structures:

Quoting a good friend of mine, “It’s a good time to be alive.” We live in a world where the lines between risk and the status quo are blurring. Where signal and noise are as well. The only difference is an investor’s ability to maintain discipline at scale. A form of discipline never before required in venture.

Photo by Ahmed Hasan on Unsplash


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