Four Signs of Startup Founders Prioritizing Growth Too Soon

scale, too soon, founders, startup growth metrics

Humans are one of the most awe-inspiring creatures that have ever graced this planet. Even though we don’t have the sharpest claws or toughest skins nor can we innately survive -50 degrees Fahrenheit, we’ve crafted tools and environments to help us survive in brutal nature. But arguably, our greatest trait is that we’re capable of writing huge epics that transcend our individual abilities and contributions. And share these narratives to inspire not only ourselves but the fellow humans around us.

A member of the our proud race, founders are no different. They are some of the greatest forecasters out there. To use Garry Tan’s Babe Ruth analogy, founders have the potential of hitting a home run in the direction they point. They build worlds, universes, myths and realities that define the future. They live in the future using the tools of today. In fact, there’s a term for it. First used by Bud Tribble in 1981 to describe Steve Jobs’ aura when building the Macintosh – the reality distortion field.

Yet, we humans are all prone to anxiety. A story nonetheless. Simply, one we tell ourselves of the future that restricts our present self’s ability to operate effectively. Anxiety comes in many shapes and sizes. For founders, one of said anxieties is attempting and worrying about the future without addressing the reality today. In the early days, it’s attempting scale before achieving product-market fit (PMF). Building a skyscraper without surveying the land – land that may be quicksand or concrete.

Here are four signs – some may not be as intuitive as the others:

The snapshot

  1. Your code architecture looks beautiful.
  2. You’re onboarding expensive experienced talent.
  3. Your cultural values lag behind the talent you hire (plan to hire).
  4. You’re bundling the market before you unbundle the needs.
Continue reading “Four Signs of Startup Founders Prioritizing Growth Too Soon”

Fantastic Unicorns and Where to Find Them

As a venture scout and as someone who loves helping pre-seed/seed startups before they get to the A, I get asked this one question more often than I expect. “David, do you think this is a good idea?” Most of the time, admittedly, I don’t know. Why? I’m not the core user. I wouldn’t count myself as an early adopter who could become a power user, outside of pure curiosity. I’m not their customer. To quote Michael Seibel of Y Combinator,

… “customers are the gatekeepers of the startups world.” Then comes the question, if customers are the gatekeepers to the venture world, how do you know if you’re on to something if you’re any one of the below:

  • Pre-product,
  • Pre-traction,
  • And/or pre-revenue?

This blog post isn’t designed to be the crystal ball to all your problems. I have to disappoint. I’m a Muggle without the power of Divination. But instead, let me share 3 mental models that might help a budding founder find idea-market fit. Let’s call it a tracker’s kit that may increase your chances at finding a unicorn.

  1. Frustration
  2. The highly fragmented industry with low NPS
  3. Right on non-consensus
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A Startup Hiring Philosophy

There’s a saying in venture that: “A-players hire A-players; B-players hire C-players.” Your ability to grow a business is often closely correlated with your ability to attract and acquire talent. But what does it mean to attract and hire world-class talent? Especially for functions you, as a founder, yourself may not be an expert in.

“A-players hire A-players;
B-players hire C-players.”

How does a first-time founder how to vet a seasoned sales executive? Or on the flip side, how does a non-technical founder learn to differentiate a good AI engineer from a great AI engineer?

While even the best founders, leaders, and managers make hiring mistakes, hopefully this post can act as a reference point as to what to look for. And while I have yet to master the craft, I’ll borrow 5 lessons from some of the best that has served as a guiding principle for me and for some of the founders I’ve worked with.

5 Lessons from 4 of the Greatest

  1. Hire passion; train skill.
  2. Desire/obsession > passion.
    • And, the ephemeral nature of passion.
  3. Hire VPs who can hire.
  4. Attract and hire intentionally.
    • On building trust.
    • On scaling yourself.
  5. To hire your best complements, ask people in your network 2 questions.
    • Who to ask? And what’s next?
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On Scale – Lessons on Culture, Hiring, Operating, and Growth

flower, scale

One of my favorite thought exercises to do when I meet with founders who have reached the A- and B-stages (or beyond) is:

“What will his/her company look like if he/she is no longer there?”

The Preface

While the question looks like one that’s designed to replace the founder(s), my intention is everything but that. Rather, I ask myself that because I want to put perspective as to how the founder(s) have empowered their team to do more than they could independently. Where the collective whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Have the founders built something that is greater than themselves? And is each team member self-motivated to pursue the mission and vision?

It reminds me of the story of a NASA janitor’s reply when President Kennedy asked: “Hi, I’m Jack Kennedy. What are you doing?”

“Well, Mr. President,” the janitor responded, “I’m helping put a man on the moon.”

From the astronaut who was to go into space to the janitor cleaning the halls of NASAs space center, each and every one had the same fulfilling purpose that they were doing something greater than themselves.

And if the CEO is able to do that, their potential to inspire even more and build a greater company is in sight. Can he/she scale him/herself? And in doing so, scale the company past product-market fit (PMF)?

For the purpose of this post, I’ll take scale from a culture, hiring, operating, and product perspective, though there are much more than just the above when it comes to scale. Answering the questions, as a founder:

  • How do you expand your audience?
  • How do you build a team to do so?
  • And, how do you scale yourself?

And to do so, I’ll borrow the insights of 10 people who have more miles on their odometer than I do.

While many of these lessons are applicable even in the later stages of growth, I want to preface that these insights are largely for founders just starting to scale. When you’ve just gone from zero to one, and are now beginning to look towards infinity.

The TL;DR

  1. Build a (controversial) shocking culture.
  2. Hire intentionally.
  3. Retaining talent requires trust.
  4. Build and follow an operating philosophy.
    • Create, hold, and share excitement.
    • Align calendars.
  5. Upgrade adjacent users as your next beachhead.
  6. Capture adoption by changing only 1 variable per user segment.
Continue reading “On Scale – Lessons on Culture, Hiring, Operating, and Growth”

Finding the Sweet Spot – Iterating What and How You Measure Product Metrics

iterating product metrics, measure, measuring tape

Many founders I meet focus on, and rightly so, optimizing their core metrics – a set of units that surprisingly don’t change after its initial inception. But metrics and the way you measure them should undergo constant iteration. Metrics are a way to measure and test your assumptions. 9/10 assumptions, if not all, are honed through the process of iteration. And by transitive property, the metrics we measure, but more importantly, the way we measure them, is subject to no less.

Though I’m not as heavily involved on the operating side as I used to be, although I try to, the bug that inspires me to build never left. So, let’s take it from the perspective of a project a couple friends and I have been working on – hosting events that stretch people’s parameters of ‘possible’. Given our mission, everything we do is to help actuate that. One such metric that admittedly had 2 degrees of freedom from our mission was our NPS score.

The “NPS”

“How likely would you recommend a friend to come to the last event you joined us in?” Measured on a 1-10 scale, we ended up seeing a vast majority, unsurprisingly in hindsight, pick 7 (>85%). A few 9’s, and a negligible amount of 5s, 6s, and 8s. 7 acted as the happy medium for our attendees, all friends, to tell us: “We don’t know how we feel about your event, but we don’t want to offend you as friends.”

We then made a slight tweak, hoping to push them to take a more binary stance. The question stayed the same, but this time, we didn’t allow them to pick 7. In forcing them to pick 8 (a little better than average) and 6 (a little worse than average), we ended up finding all the answers shift to 6s and 8s and nothing else. Even the ones that previously picked 9s regressed to 8s. And the ones who picked 5s picked 6s. Effectively, we created a yes/no question with just this small tweak.

There’s 3 fallacies with this:

  1. Numbers are arbitrary. An 8 for you, may not be an 8 for me. Unless we create a consolidated rubric that everyone follows when answering this question, we’re always going to variability in semi-random expectations.
  2. It’s a lagging indicator. There’s no predictive value in measuring this. By the time they answer this question, they’d already have made their decision. Though the post-mortem is useful, the feedback cycle between events was too long. So, we had to start looking into iterating the event live, or while it was happening.
  3. Answers weren’t completely honest. All the attendees were our friends. So their answers are in part, a reflection of the event, but also in part, to help us ‘save face’.

In studying essentialism, Stoicism, and Rahul Vohra‘s Superhuman, we found a solution that draws on the emotional spectrum that answered 1 and 3 rather well. Instead of phrasing our questions as “How much do you value this opportunity?”, we instead phrased them as “How much would you sacrifice to obtain this opportunity?” Humans are innately loss-averse. Losing your iPhone will affect you more negatively and for longer, than if you won a $1000 lottery.

So, our question transformed into: “How distraught would you be if we no longer invited you to a future event?”, paired with the answers “Very”, “Somewhat”, and “Not at all”. Although I’m shy to say we got completely honest answers, the answers in which we did give allowed for them to follow-up and supplement why they felt that way, without us prompting them.

The only ‘unaddressed’ fallacy by this question – point #2 – was resolved by putting other methods in place to measure attention spans during the event, like the number of times people checked their phone per half hour or the number of unique people who were left alone for longer than a minute per half hour (excluding bio breaks).

Feedback

“How can we improve our event?” We received mostly logistical answers. Most of which we had already noticed either during the event or in our own post-mortem.

In rephrasing to, “How can we help you fall in love with our events?”, we helped our attendees focus on 2 things: (1) more creative responses and (2) deep frustrations that ‘singlehandedly’ broke their experience at the event.

And to prioritize the different facets of feedback, we based it off the answers from the questions:

  • “What was your favorite element of the event?”
  • And, “How distraught would you be if we no longer invited you to a future event?”

For the attendees who were excited about elements closely aligned with our mission, we put them higher on the list. There were many attendees who enjoyed our event for the food or the venue, though pertinent to the event’s success, fell short of our ultimate mission. That said, once in a while, there’s gold in the feedback from the latter cohort.

On the flip side, it may seem intuitive to prioritize the feedback of those who were “Very distraught” or “Not at all”. But they exist on two extremes of the spectrum. One, stalwart champions of our events. The other, emotionally detached from the success of our events. In my opinion, neither cohort see our product truly for both its pros and cons, but rather over-index on either the pros or the cons, respectively. On a slight tangent, this is very similar to how I prioritize which restaurants to go to or which books to read. So, we find ourselves prioritizing the feedback of the group that lie on the tipping point before they “fall in love” with our events.

Unscalability and Scalability

We did all of our feedback sessions in-person. No Survey Monkey. No Google Forms, Qualtrics, or Typeform. Why?

  1. We could react to nuances in their answers, ask follow-up questions, and dig deeper.
  2. We wanted to make sure our attendees felt that their feedback was valued, inspired by Google’s Project Aristotle.
  3. And, in order to get a 100% response rate.

We got exactly what we expected. After our post-mortem, as well as during the preparation for our next event, I would DM/call/catch up with our previous attendees and tell them which feedback we used and how much we appreciated them helping us grow. For the feedback we didn’t use, I would break down what our rationale was for opting for a different direction, but at the same time, how their feedback helped evolve the discourse around our strategic direction. Though their advice was on the back burner now, I’ll be the first to let them know when we implement some element of it.

The flip side of this is that it looks extremely unscalable. You’re half-right. Our goal isn’t to scale now, as we’re still searching for product-market fit. But as you might notice, there are elements of this strategy that can scale really well.

In closing

Of course, our whole endeavor is on hold during this social distancing time, but the excitement in finding new and better ways to measure my assumptions never ceases. So, in the interim, I’ve personally carried some of these interactions online, in hopes of discovering something about virtual conversations.

Photo by Jennifer Burk on Unsplash


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A Small Nuance with Early Growth Numbers

startup growth
Photo by Ales Me on Unsplash

My friend, Rouhin, sent me this post by a rather angry fellow, which he and I both had a good chuckle out of, yesterday about how VC is a scam. In one part about startup growth, the author writes that VCs only care about businesses that double its customer base.

The author’s argument isn’t completely unfounded. And it’s something that’s given the industry as a whole a bad rap. True, growth and scalability are vital to us. That’s how funds make back their capital and then some. With the changing landscape making it harder to discern the signal from the noise, VCs are looking for moonshots. The earlier the stage, the more this ROI multiple matters. Ranging from 100x in capital allocation before the seed stage to 10x when growth capital is involved. But in a more nuanced manner, investors care not just about “doubling”, unilaterally, but the last time a business doubles. We care less if a lemonade stand doubles from 2 to 4 customers, than when a lemonade corporation doubles from 200 to 400 million customers, or rather bottles, for a more accurate metric.

After early startup growth

Of course, in a utopia, no businesses ever plateau in its logistical curve – best described as it nears its total TAM. That’s why businesses past Series B, into growth, start looking into adjacent markets to capitalize on. For example, Reid Hoffman‘s, co-founder of LinkedIn, now investor at Greylock, rule of thumb for breaking down your budget (arguably effort as well) once you reach that stage is:

  • 70% core business
  • 20% business expansion – adjacent markets that your team can tackle with your existing resources/product
  • 10% venture bets – product offerings/features that will benefit your core product in the longer run

And, the goal is to convert venture bets into expansionary projects, and expansionary projects to your core business.

Simply put, as VCs, we care about growth rates after a certain threshold. That threshold varies per firm, per individual. If it’s a consumer app, it could be 1,000 users or 10,000 users. And only after that threshold, do we entertain the Rule of 40, or the minimum growth of 30% MoM. Realistically, most scalable businesses won’t be growing astronomically from D1. (Though if you are, we need to talk!) The J-curve, or hockey stick curve, is what we find most of the time.

The Metrics

In a broader scope, at the early stage, before the critical point, I’m less concerned with you doubling your user base or revenue, but the time it takes for your business to double every single time.

From a strictly acquisition perspective, take day 1 (D1) of your launch as the principal number. Run on a logarithmic base 2 regression, how much time does it take for your users (or revenue) to double? Is your growth factor nearing 1.0, meaning your growth is slowing and your adoption curve is potentially going to plateau?

Growth Factor = Δ(# of new users today)/Δ(# of new users yesterday) > 1.0

Why 1.0? It suggests that you could be nearing an inflection point when your exponential graph start flattening out. Or if you’re already at 1.0 or less, you’re not growing as “exponentially” as you would like, unless you change strategies. Similarly, investors are looking for:

ΔGrowth Factor > 0

Feel to replace the base log function with any other base, as the fundamentals still hold. For example, base 10, if you’re calculating how long it takes you to 10x. Under the same assumptions, you can track your early interest pre-traction, via a waitlist signup, similarly.

While in this new pandemic climate (which we can admittedly also evaluate from a growth standpoint), juggernauts are forced to take a step back and reevaluate their options, including their workforce, providing new opportunities and fresh eyes on the gig economy, future of work, delivery services, telehealth, and more. Stay safe, and stay cracking!


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The Marketplace of Startups

books about startups

Over the past decade, stretching its roots to the dot-com boom, there have been more dialogue and literature around entrepreneurship. In a sense, founding a business is easier than it’s ever been. But like all things in life, there’s a bit more nuance to it. So, what’s the state of startups right now?

Lower Barriers to Entry

A number of factors have promoted such a trend:

  • There are an increasing number of resources online and offline. Online courses and ed-tech platforms. Fellowships and acceleration/incubation programs. Investor office hours and founder talks. YouTube videos, online newsletters, and podcasts.
  • The low-code/no-code movement is also helping bridge that knowledge gap for the average person. Moreover, making it easier for non-experts to be experts.
  • The gig economy have created a fascinating space for solopreneurship to be more accessible to more geographies.

Demand (by consumers and investors) fuels supply of startups, through knowledge and resource sharing. Likewise, the supply of startups, especially in nascent markets, fuels demand in new verticals. So, the ecosystem becomes self-perpetuating on a positive feedback loop. As Jim Barksdale, former Netscape CEO, once said:

“There are only two ways I know of to make money – bundling and unbundling.”

BundlingUnbundling
Market MaturityMarket Nascency
HorizontalizationVerticalization
BreadthDepth
Execution Risk
Bias
Market/Tech Risk
Bias

Right now, we’re at a stage of startup market nascency, unbundling the knowledge gap between the great and the average founder. This might seem counter-intuitive. After all, there’s so much discourse on the subject. There’s a good chance that you know someone who is or have thought about starting a business. But, I don’t believe we’re even close to a global maximum in entrepreneurship. Why?

  1. Valuations are continuing to rise.
  2. Great founders are still scarce.
startup growth
Photo by Isaac Smith on Unsplash

Valuations are shooting up

Valuations are still on the rise. Six years back, $250K was enough runway for our business to last until product-market fit. Now, a typical seed round ranges from $500K-$2M. A decade ago, $500M was enough to IPO with; now it only warrants a late-stage funding round. By capitalistic economic theory, when a market reaches saturation, aka perfect competition, profit margins regress to zero. Not only are there still profits to be made, but more people are jumping into the investing side of the business.

Yes, increasing valuations are also a function of FOMO (fear of missing out), discovery checks (<0.5% of VC fund size), super duper low interest rates (causing massive sums of capital to surge in chase yields), and non-traditional venture investors entering as players in the game (PE, hedge funds, other accredited investors, (equity) crowdfunding platforms). It would be one thing if they came and left as a result of a (near) zero sum game. But they’re here to stay. Here’s a mini case study. Even after the 2018 drop in Bitcoin, venture investors are still bullish on its potential. In fact, there are now more and more specialized funds to invest in cryptocurrency and blockchain technology. Last year, a16z, one of the largest and trendsetting VC players, switched from a VC to an RIA (registered investment advisor), to broaden its scope into crypto/blockchain.

Great founders are scarce

“The only uncrowded market is great. There’s always a fucking market for great.”

– Tim Ferriss, podcaster, author, but also notably, an investor and advisor for companies, like Facebook, Uber, Automattic and more

Even if founders now have the tools to do so, it doesn’t mean they’ll hit their ambitious milestones. For VCs, it only gets harder to discern the signal from the noise. Fundamentally, there’s a significant knowledge delta – a permutation of misinformation and resource misallocation – in the market between founders and investors, and between average founders and great founders.

The Culinary Analogy

Here’s an analogy. 30 years prior, food media was still nascent. Food Network had yet to be founded in 1993. The average cook resorted to grandma’s recipe (and maybe also Cory’s from across the street). There was quite a bit of variability into the quality of most home-cooked dishes. And most professional chefs were characteristically male. Fast forward to now, food media has become more prevalent in society. I can jump on to Food Network or YouTube any time to learn recipes and cooking tips. Recipes are easily searchable online. Pro chefs, like Gordon Ramsay, Thomas Keller, and Alice Waters, teach full courses on Masterclass, covering every range of the culinary arts.

Photo by Brooke Lark on Unsplash

Has it made the average cook more knowledgeable? Yes. I have friends who are talking about how long a meat should sous vide for before searing or the ratio of egg whites to egg yolks in pasta. Not gonna lie; I love it! I’ll probably end up posting a post soon on what I learned from culinary mentors, friends, and myself soon.

Is there still a disparity between the average cook and a world-class chef? Hell ya! Realistically I won’t ever amount to Wolfgang Puck or Grant Achatz, but I do know that I shouldn’t deep fry with extra virgin olive oil (EVOO) ’cause of its low smoke point.

Great businesses are scarcer

The same is true for entrepreneurship. There are definitely more startups out there, but there hasn’t been a significant shift in the number of great startups. And the increase in business tools has arguably increased the difficulty to find business/product defensibility. It’s leveled the playing field and, simultaneously, raised the bar. So yes, it’s easier to start a business; it’s much harder to retain and scale a business.

It’s no longer enough to have an open/closed beta with just an MVP. What startups need now is an MLP (minimum lovable product). Let’s take the consumer app market as an example.

The Consumer App Conundrum

Acquiring consumers has gotten comparatively easier. Paid growth, virality, and SEO tactics are scalable with capital. More and more of the population have been conditioned to notice and try new products and trends, partly as a function of the influencer economy. But retaining them is a different story.

So, consumers have become:

  1. More expensive to acquire than ever before. Not only are customer acquisition costs (CAC) increasing, with smaller lifetime values (LTV), but your biggest competitors are often not directly in your sector. Netflix and YouTube has created a culture of binge-watching that previously never existed. And since every person has a finite 24 hours in a day, your startup growth is directly cutting into another business’s market share on a consumer’s time.
  2. And, harder to retain. It’s great that there’s a wide range of consumer apps out there right now. The App Store and Play Store are more populated than they’ve ever been. But churn has also higher now than I’ve seen before. Although adoption curves have been climbing, reactivation and engagement curves often fall short of expectations, while inactive curves in most startups climb sooner than anticipated. Many early stage ventures I see have decent total account numbers (10-30K, depending on the stage), but a mere 10-15% DAU/MAU (assuming this is a core metric). In fact, many consumers don’t even use the app they downloaded on Day 2.

Luckily, this whole startup battlefield works in favor of consumers. More competition, better features, better prices. 🙂

So… what happens now?

It comes down to two main questions for early-stage founders:

  1. Do you have a predictable/sensible plan to your next milestone? To scalability?
    • Are you optimizing for adoption, as well as retention and engagement?
      • With so many tools for acquisition hacks, growth is relatively easy to capture. Retention and engagement aren’t. And in engagement, outside of purely measuring for frequency (i.e. DAU/MAU), are you also measuring on time spent with each product interaction?
    • How are you going to capture network effects? What’s sticky?
      • Viral loops occur when there’s already a baseline of engagement. So how do you meaningfully optimize for engagement?
    • From a bottom-up approach (rather than top-down by taking percentages of the larger market), how are you going to convert your customers?
    • How do you measure product-market fit?
  2. What meaningful metric are you measuring/optimizing?
    • Why is it important?
    • What do you know (that makes money) that everyone else is either overlooking or severely underestimating?
    • What are you optimizing for that others’ (especially your biggest competitors) cannot?
      • Every business optimizes for certain metrics. That have a set budget used to optimize for those metrics. And because of that, they are unable to prioritize optimizing others. So, can you measure it better in a way that’ll hold off competition until you reach network effects/virality?

Building a scalable business is definitely harder. And to become the 10 startups a year that really matter is even more so. By the numbers, less likely than lightning striking you. In my opinion, that just makes trying to find your secret sauce all the more exciting!

If you think you got it or are close to getting it, I’d love to chat!