Tag: samir kaji

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We’re More Similar Than You Think: The Founder and the Funder

Last weekend, I tuned into Samir Kaji’s recent episode with LPs (limited partners). Not once, but twice. And as you might’ve guessed, was damn inspired by their conversation. The more I listened to it, the more synonymous the paths of a founder and an emerging manager (EM) seemed to be. Or what I call the entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial VC. If you’re a regular here, you’ll know I love writing about the intellectual horsepower of both sides of the table. But in this post, rather than delineating the two, I’d love to share how similar founders and funders actually are.

Surprises suck, but pivots are okay

On Samir’s podcast, Guy Perelmuter of GRIDS Capital voiced: “There’s only one thing that LPs hate more than losing money. It’s surprises.”

Be transparent. Be clear on your expectations, and steer clear of left hooks. As a fund, something I’ve heard a number of GPs and LPs say is don’t deviate on your thesis. LPs invest in you for your strategy. But as soon as you deviate from that initial strategy, you become increasingly unpredictable.

Take, for example, you go to a steakhouse and order steak. But they serve you sushi instead. If it’s not good sushi, obviously you’re not coming back. Not only did they surprise you, but it was also a poorly executed one. This goes in the column of one-star Yelp reviews.

But, say it was great sushi. You had one great dining experience and you’re a happy customer. Some time in the future, you think of getting sushi again. And you remember what a great experience you had at the steakhouse. So you go back to the steakhouse, only to realize it was a fluke and the sushi wasn’t like the last time you’ve had it. Your inability to replicate surprises scares LPs, which limits your ability to raise a subsequent fund.

Nevertheless, these days markets are changing quickly. And sometimes your initial thesis may not serve you as well in today’s market as it did yesterday. As John Maynard Keynes, father of Keynesian economics, once said, “When the facts change, I change my mind.” But, if you do need to deviate, communicate it clearly, formulate a new strategy, and preemptively tell your LPs. Then at that point, it’s no longer a surprise, but a strategy. Great examples include:

  • Accelerators making discovery checks part of their core business
    • Note: LPs historically dislike GPs (general partners) writing discovery checks because they’re:
      1. Not investing via their fund strategy (i.e. typically ad hoc),
      2. Require less diligence and therefore less conviction,
      3. Send negative signals to other investors if the GP doesn’t do a follow-on check at the next round, and
      4. Because of (2) and (3) are usually cash sinks.
  • The On Deck Accelerator (ODX) – Backing founders at the earliest stages (i.e. pre-product, pre-revenue) as long as they have deep conviction in their own business.
  • The recent announcement of The Sequoia Fund – a systematic and predictable strategy to invest in not just startups, but venture funds backing incredible founders as well.

The same holds for founders. Don’t get me wrong. Startups pivot. And they should. Mike Maples Jr., founder of one of the best performing seed stage venture firms, recently shared: “Most investors are going to look at what the company does and evaluate the business for what it is, but 90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.” And just like fund managers, clearly convey why, how, and what you’re pivoting to to your shareholders. It’s always better to preempt these conversations than leave these as surprises. Often times, you’ll find your investors, having seen as many pivots as they have and knowing that is the name of the game, can offer you much more feedback and insight than you imagined for your pivot.

Optimize for the “Oh shit! moment*

In every conversation, your goal should just be to teach your investors something. An earned secret. A unique insight. What do you know that other people don’t, overlook, or underestimate? What do you know that other people would find it very hard to learn organically? This is especially true for consensus ideas – or obvious ideas. The best obvious products may seem obvious at first glance, but usually have non-obvious insights to back them up.

If you’re a fund, what is your insight – your access point – that’ll win you an asymmetric upside?

I’ve talked to too many founders and EMs that claim to be experts with X years of experience in a particular field. Yet after 30 minutes, I realized I learned nothing from them. I realize that for half an hour straight I ended up with a prep book full of buzzwords and vague jargon that would rival the SAT vocab section. But let’s be real. The SAT doesn’t get me excited to want to retake the test.

The best founders and funders out there are able to break down deep, technical, esoteric, and sometimes crazy concepts into simple bitesize ideas. The equivalent of taking the whole universe and simplifying it to its origin. A single point. The Big Bang.

I’ve also realized over the years that the world’s smartest teachers – and when you’re trying to convince people to join you in a non-obvious vision, you are teaching – lead with analogies. And the best analogies lead investors to that “Oh Shit! moment.”

COVID made capital cheaper

Equally true for startups and funds. Capital is digital. If you think about capital in the frame of investor acquisition cost, you no longer have to travel to your investors to pitch to them. This means you can take far more meetings than before. Less travel and more meetings mean your investor acquisition cost goes down.

Founders no longer have to book a week to Sand Hill Road or South Park to have introductory conversations with investors. Only to have 80-90% turn down a second conversation. This becomes even more costly the earlier you are in your startup journey. You have to have a lot more first conversations as a pre-seed founder than you do as a founder raising an A. At the same time, you have many more options for raising capital today: accelerators, syndicates, equity crowdfunding, and roll-up vehicles (RUVs). While it’s not that these resources didn’t exist before COVID, the pandemic made it much more apparent that VC money didn’t have to be the only way to raise capital. And that you can also leverage speed and your community to help you grow.

Similarly, EMs no longer have to travel across the states to talk to institutional capital. Even more so, as an EM, you’re most likely raising from individual investors. Raising a rolling fund or a 506c lets you generally solicit investments, where you couldn’t with a 506b. Subsequently, Twitter and having a community became your superpower. Mac at Rarebreed, Packy’s Not Boring Fund I, and Harry at 20VC all raised during the time of COVID, leveraging the power of their following and community to do so.

Keep it simple

“There’s no favorable wind for the sailor who doesn’t know where to go.” – Seneca

Two Saturdays ago, I caught up with my ridiculously smart engineer friend from college – “Fred”. We were reminiscing about the “good ol’ days” when we first started punching above our weight class. Particularly in regards to cold outreaches to individuals we really admired. While I was an operator at two startups that shaped my entrepreneurial career, I spent many a night struggling on how to best position our products in the market. Many hours of copy and rephrasing and reframing. In both we were competing against the existing saturation of information and solutions on the market. How do we tell our customers and investors the reason we’re awesome is because of A and B and C, and also D?

Most people, friends, customers, and investors didn’t understand the value we thought we were obviously conveying. And subsequently, we were rejected more often than I would have liked to admit. In the early days, we didn’t lose on price nor on quality, but on brand and messaging. And while we thought and strove to prove we were better in areas that mattered, both startups eventually ended up having exceedingly simple one-liners.

On the other hand, “Fred” was working on something related to liquid fuel and cold fires. Something extremely technical. But he was able to win proportionally more yes’s than I was able to. When I asked him how, he said it was simple. “We’re putting a rocket into space. That’s it. And that’s really exciting.”

I made something extraordinarily simple into something extraordinarily complex. In all honesty, I sounded really, really smart. And I felt like I was the shit. Except no one else did. “Fred” took something extraordinarily complex and made it extraordinarily simple. He didn’t sound as smart. But celebrities, sponsors, companies – people just got it.

The true value of a product is usually exceedingly simple. The fallacy of including a Rolodex of esoteric jargon comes in two-fold. Either you’re trying to sound smarter than you actually are. Or you’re trying to cram too many things in too little space. As economist Herbert A. Simon said, “A wealth of information creates of poverty of attention.”

In closing

Whether you’re an entrepreneur or an emerging manager, you’re swinging for the fences. I was chatting with an investor yesterday who had an incredible analogy. “It’s like a pinball machine. The ball goes up, and you never know how it’ll fall down. You don’t know how many bounce pads and flippers it will hit. You don’t know how many points you’re going to get. But no matter how many points you’ll get, the ball has to go up first.” Similarly, whether you start a company or a fund, you have to step up to the plate to bat. You don’t know what the upside will be. You don’t know if you’re going to return your investors 2x, 5x or a 100x.

You’re taking an asymmetric bet on the compelling future you bring. Your valuation as a startup is not how much your startups is worth, which is why the 409a valuation is always different from the valuation your investors set for you. Your valuation is a bet your investors made that you will be as big as the major players in the market. If you’re valued at $10M today, your investors are saying you are 10 in 1000, or a 1% chance, to be a unicorn. And a 0.1% chance to be a decacorn.

Valuations might seem crazy today. VC firms are also raising larger and larger funds, which lead many to be skeptical on their ability to return capital. In fairness, most funds will return a modest 2-3x over their lifetime, if at all. Most startups are and will be overvalued. On the same token, the best ones, despite their crazy price, are still undervalued. Imagine if you were an investor who could invest in Facebook’s then-unicorn valuation. You’d have made a lot of money. But we’re in an optimistic market.

At the end of the day, both parties are just managing someone else’s capital. And as such, through a fiduciary responsibility, in that regard, both are cut from the same cloth.

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Bigger Funds, Larger Spotlight, Bigger Mistakes

spotlight, bigger mistakes

I was doomscrolling through Twitter when I stumbled on Samir Kaji‘s recent tweet:

I’ve written before that the difference between an emerged fund manager and an emerging manager is one’s raised a Fund III and the other hasn’t.

In Fund I, you’re selling a promise – a dream – to your LPs. That promise is often for angels, founders, and other GPs who write smaller checks. You’re split testing among various investments, trying to see what works and what doesn’t. More likely than not, you’re taking low to no management fees, and only carry. No reserve ratio either. And any follow-on checks you do via an SPV, with preference to your existing LPs. You’re focused on refining your thesis.

In Fund II, you’re pitching a strategy – the beginnings of pattern recognition of what works and what doesn’t. You’re thesis-driven.

Fund III, as Braughm Ricke says, “you’re selling the returns on Fund I.” On Fund III and up, many fund managers start deviating from their initial thesis – minimally at first. Each subsequent fundraise, which often scales in zeros, is a lagging indicator of your thesis and strategy. And across funds, the thesis becomes more of a guiding principle than the end all, be all of a fund. There are only a few firms out there that continue to exercise extreme fundraising discipline in. Which, to their credit, is often hard to do. ‘Cause if it’s working, your LPs want to put more money into you. And as your fund size scales, so does your strategy.

Subsequently, it becomes a race between the scalability of a fund’s strategy and fund size.

Softbank’s mistake

In 2017, Softbank’s Vision Fund I (SVF I) of $100B was by far the largest in the venture market. In fact, 50 times larger than the largest venture funds at the time. Yet, every time they made a bad bet, the media swarmed on them, calling them out. The reality is that, proportionally speaking, Softbank made as many successful versus unsuccessful bets as the average venture fund out there. To date, SVF I’s portfolio is valued at $146.5 billion, which doesn’t put it in the top quartile, but still performs better than half of the venture funds out there. But bigger numbers warrant more attention. Softbank has since course-corrected, opting to raise a smaller $40B Fund II (which is still massive by venture standards), with smaller checks.

While there are many interpretations of Softbank’s apparent failure with SVF I (while it could be still too early to tell), my take is it was too early for its time. Just like investors ask founders the “why now” question to determine the timing of the market, Softbank missed its “why now” moment.

Bigger funds make sense

I wrote a little over a month ago that we’re in a hype market right now. Startups are getting funded at greater valuations than ever before. Investors seem to have lost pricing discipline. $5 million rounds pre-product honestly scare me. But as Dell Technologies Capital‘s Frank told me, “VCs have been mispricing companies. We anchor ourselves on historical valuations. But these anchors could be wrong.” Most are vastly overvalued, yet future successes are grossly undervalued.

Allocating $152 billion into VC funds, LPs are excited about the market activity and that the timeline on returns are shorter. Namely:

  • Exits via SPAC,
  • Accelerated timelines because of the pandemic (i.e. healthcare, fintech, delivery, cloud computing, etc.)
  • And secondary markets providing liquidity.

We’ve also seen institutional LPs, like pension funds, foundations, and endowments, invest directly into startups.

Direct Investments by Pension Funds Foundations Endowments
Source: FactSet

Moreover, we’re seeing growth and private equity funds investing directly into early-stage startups. To be specific over 50 of them invested in over $1B into private companies in 2021 so far.

As a result of the market motions, the Q2 2021 hit a quarterly record in the number of unicorns minted. According to CB Insights, 136 unicorns just in Q2. And a 491% YoY increase. As Techcrunch’s Alex Wilhelm and Anna Heim puts it, “Global startups raised either as much, or very nearly as much, in the first two quarters of 2021 as they did in all of 2020.”

Hence, we see top-tier venture funds matching the market’s stride, (a) providing opportunity for their LPs to access their deal flow and (b) meeting the startup market’s needs for greater financing rounds. Andreessen recently raised their $400M seed fund. Greylock with their $500M. And most recently, NFX with their $450M pre-seed and seed Fund III.

In his analysis of a16z, writer Dror Poleg shares that “you are guaranteed to lose purchasing power if you keep your money in so-called safe assets, and a handful of extremely successful investments capture most of the available returns. Investors who try to stay safe or even take risks but miss out on the biggest winners end up far behind.” The a16z’s, the Greylocks and the NFXs are betting on that risk.

Fund returners are increasingly harder to come by

As more money is put into the private markets, with startups on higher and higher valuations, unicorns are no longer the sexiest things on the market. A unicorn exit only warrants Greylock with a 2x fund returner. With the best funds all performing at 5x multiples and up, you need a few more unicorn exits. In due course, the 2021 sexiest exits will be decacorns rather than unicorns. Whereas before the standard for a top performing fund was a 2.5%+ unicorn rate, now it’s a 2.5% decacorn rate.

The truth is that in the ever-evolving game of venture capital, there are really only a small handful of companies that really matter. A top-tier investor once told me last year that number was 20. And the goal is an investor is to get in one or some of those 20 companies. ‘Cause those are the fund returners. Take for example, Garry Tan at Initialized Capital, earlier this year. He invested $300K into Coinbase back in 2012. And when they went public, he returned $2B to the fund. That’s 6000x. For a $7M fund, that’s an incredible return! LPs are popping bottles with you. For a half-billion dollar fund, that’s only a 4x. Still good. But as a GP, you’ll need a few more of such wins to make your LPs really happy.

I also know I’m making a lot of assumptions here. Fees and expenses still to be paid back, which lowers overall return. And the fact that for a half-billion dollar seed fund, check sizes are in the millions rather than hundreds of thousands. But I digress.

There is more capital than ever in the markets, but less startups are getting funded. The second quarter of this year has been the biggest for seed stage activity ever, measured by dollars invested. Yet total deal volume went down.

Source: Crunchbase

Each of these startups will take a larger percentage of the public attention pie. Yet, most startups will still churn out of the market in the longer run. Some will break even. And some will make back 2-5x of investor’s money. Subsequently, there will still be the same distribution of fund returners for the funds that make it out of the hype market.

In closing

As funds scale as a lagging indicator of today’s market, the discipline to balance strategy and scale becomes ever the more prescient. We will see bigger flops. “Startup raises XX million dollars closes down.” They might get more attention in the near future from media. Similarly, venture capitalists who empirically took supporting cast roles will be “celebretized” in the same way.

The world is moving faster and faster. As Balaji Srinivasan tweeted yesterday:

But as the market itself scales over time, the wider public will get desensitized to dollars raised at the early stages. And possibly to the flops as well. Softbank’s investment in Zume Pizza and Brandless turned heads yesterday, but probably won’t five years from now. It’s still early to tell whether a16z, Greylock, NFX, among a few others’ decisions will generate significant alphas. I imagine these funds will have similar portfolio distributions as their smaller counterparts. The only difference, due to their magnitudes, is that they’re subject to greater scrutiny under the magnifying glass. And will continue to stay that way in the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, I’m thrilled to see speed and fund size as a forcing function for innovation in the market. There’s been fairly little innovation at the top of the funnel in the venture market since the 1970s. VCs meet with X number of founders per week, go through several meetings, diligence, then invest. But during the pandemic, we’ve seen the digitization of venture dollars, regulations, and new fund structures:

Quoting a good friend of mine, “It’s a good time to be alive.” We live in a world where the lines between risk and the status quo are blurring. Where signal and noise are as well. The only difference is an investor’s ability to maintain discipline at scale. A form of discipline never before required in venture.

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DGQ 5: What startups would I love to have in my anti-portfolio?

ice cream, mistake, anti portfolio

In the venture world, there’s this concept of the anti-portfolio. A portfolio for incredible startups you had the chance to invest in, but chose to pass on. Usually the startups that qualify to be in this anti-portfolio have already reached mainstream – either having gone public and/or have reached unicorn status. For anti-portfolio references, I highly recommend checking out Bessemer‘s or tuning into Samir Kaji’s Venture Unlocked podcast, where he asks each guest about their anti-portfolio.

But having chatted with a number of incredible investors, what’s more important than names on an excel sheet is the lesson or lessons we take away from passing on the greats. Those lessons are the very answer to one of the most insightful questions an LP (limited partner) can ask. “How does your anti-portfolio advise your current investment thesis?”

In a similar way, life is a mixed bag of engineered serendipity and endured scar tissue. Our past mistakes inform our future decisions. You learn how to handle kitchen cutlery after cutting yourself a few times. You learn to walk after stumbling. And you learn to communicate after making a fool of yourself. We are a product of the scar tissue we’ve accumulated.

I’m in my first inning in the venture world, and admittedly, way too early to have any true hall-of-famers in my anti-portfolio. So rather than looking into the past from the present, I thought I’d look into the “past” from the future. A “past” that has yet to come, but will be defining of my future. Something Mike Maples Jr calls backcasting. Starting from the future and making my way back to today, along the way, figuring out what I need to do to get to that future. If you’ve been following this blog for a while, you know I’m a big fan of his mental model. “The future doesn’t happen to us; it happens because of us. […] Breakthrough builders are visitors from the future, telling us what’s coming.”

Rather than what startups are in my anti-portfolio, what startups would I love to have in my anti-portfolio?

On a similar note, for non-investors: Ten years from now, what are mistakes you’d want to have made that you tell yourself that it was a decade well-spent?

Photo by Sarah Kilian on Unsplash

The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.

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Why Career VCs Emerge at Fund III

fund administration fund management

Though I’ve spent a minute in venture capital, I’ve never raised a fund. So I’m not going to pretend I know everything. Because I don’t. Every single idea here is one I’ve borrowed from someone with more miles on their odometer in this industry.

When does an emerging fund manager turn into an emerged fund manager? I’ve always heard the general rule of thumb is by Fund III. But in all honesty, I took that for granted and never knew why.

I found out why this week. Samir Kaji has this great conversation on his podcast with Braughm Ricke of Aduro Advisors and former CFO at True Ventures. And Braughm says:

“The other [successful trait in fund managers] that we see a lot of is really having a defined strategy, and really sticking to it and executing on it. Straying away from your strategy is one of the best ways to create issues for you down the road. Yes, it might be successful and it might create returns for you today, but it will create difficulties down the road when you’re looking to raise that next fund. Because that’s what you’re selling to me at the end of the day.

“Fund I, basically what you’re selling is a promise. You’re selling a dream. You’re selling the concept around the strategy.

“Fund II, you’re selling the execution on that strategy. Depending at what stage you’re investing at, for the most part, you’re not going to have returns to be pointing to. You’re going to be selling your ability to execute on that strategy.

“Fund III, you’re selling the returns on Fund I.”

Samir then follows up: “Fund III’s are the hardest [to raise] because by then, it’s four, five, six years in and you have to show something. It is return-based.”

Phil Libin, co-founder and CEO of All Turtles, mmhmm, and Evernote, and former Managing Director at General Catalyst, in his recent interview with Tyler Swartz, said: “We don’t need scale to make a good product, in fact, it’s a distraction if you focus on scale prematurely.” In venture, your fund is your product. And like an entrepreneur, an emerging manager shouldn’t worry about scaling the size of their fund in the Fund I and II days. Stay small. Focus on delivering on the strategy and promise you made to your LPs. After all, it’s much easier to return a $10M fund than it is to return a $100M fund. Especially since a 3-5x multiple means you’re just average these days. As Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate says, “Your fund size is your strategy.”

By the time you get to Fund III, you now have a track record of financial return (or not). And by then, you and the market should have a good idea if you have a longer time horizon in venture or not.

And even if not, many former VCs go back to the operating side of the table, armed with the knowledge, skills, and relationships they gain on the VC side.

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Think like an LP to Get a Job in VC

I want to preface this piece by first saying, though I have LP (limited partner) friends, I’ve never been an LP. So take everything with a grain of salt. For that matter, even I have been an LP, still take this with a grain of salt. After all it’s just my one perspective on the world. Nevertheless, I hope this perspective helps to provide some context around the venture space. As it did for me.

For years, I’ve recommended my friends who were looking at startup job opportunities to think like a VC. And having chatted a number of firms over the years about scout, associate/analyst, venture partner roles, I’ve come to a new revelation. Or rather one that I’ve practiced for a while, but haven’t connected the dots until recently.

When you’re looking for VC job opportunities, think like an LP. I’ve written about the LP calculus a few times before, like:

Here are some questions I usually consider:

  • How have you thought about your own differentiation that gets you access to some of the uniquely fund-defining opportunities you have?
  • What are the startups in your anti-portfolio? And what have you learned since from them?
  • [if their funds are wildly different in fund size (i.e. Fund I – $20M, Fund II – $100M)] How do you think about fund strategy now versus Fund [t_now-1]?
    • For context, usually each subsequent fund doubles in size. i.e. Fund I $20M, Fund II $40-50M, Fund III $80-100M
  • [If they have fund advisors, EIRs, and/or scouts] How do you pick advisors? What is your mental model for picking scouts?
    • Or one of my favorite phrasings: How do you differentiate the good from the great [advisors/scouts]?

Over the weekend, my friend sent me a great podcast for me to unwind. In it, I found an unlikely hero soundbite. “Your library holds a lot of value that you may not know until the story arrives. […] No one’s selling characters ’cause they’re one story away from this character becoming a hit.” While its context is related to why Marvel won’t sell any of its superheroes, Alex Segura‘s, co-president of Archie Comic Publications, anecdote proves just as insightful to the world of venture.

Discovering first-time early-stage founders is hard. The same is true for finding the next killer GP or venture firm. AngelList’s Rolling Funds are democratizing access to capital, lowering the barrier to entry for emerging fund managers. And really the success of a fund is determined by its MOIC – multiple on invested capital. 5x and up would be ideal. And that, like I mentioned in my last blogpost, boils down to the fund’s top one or two winners. Loosely analogized to a fund’s unicorn rate (percent of portfolio that are unicorns). In other words, the “one [investment] away from this [fund] becoming a hit.”

To see if a fund can consistently find those stories boils down to its systems. Often times, you’re joining a fund that has yet to have a runaway success. Or a fund that has a fund returner. So, instead, you’re looking at their thesis and if their thesis allows them to be:

  1. The best dollar on the cap table of a startup in their scope
  2. Forward-thinking enough to see where the market is heading, rather than where it’s been
    • And by definition of being forward-thinking, taking bets/risks that few other VCs would, yet calculated enough to make logical sense given the trajectory of the market. In other words, is the thesis grounded on first principles, yet able to capture their second-order effects?
    • That, in turn, requires you as a VC applicant to have decent literacy in the market the firm is betting in.

As James Clear, author of Atomic Habits, wrote, “You do not rise to the level of your goals. You fall to the level of your systems.” What are their mental models? Fund strategy? How do they think about portfolio construction? About capital allocation? And more importantly, time allocation?

If you’re looking to learn more about GP-LP dynamics, I highly recommend Samir Kaji’s Venture Unlocked podcast and Notation Capital’s Origins podcast.

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The Smoke Signals of a Great Startup From the Lens of the Pitch Deck

best startup pitch deck

Founders often ask me, what slides on my pitch deck do I have to make sure I get right? The short answer, all of them. Then again, if you’re focusing on all of them, you’re focusing on none of them. So I’ll break it down by fundraising stages:

  1. Pre-seed/seed (might as well include angels here too)
  2. Series A/B

Since I spend almost no time in the later stages, I’ll refrain from extrapolating from any anecdotes there.

If you’re using DocSend, you already have the numbers for your deck viewership in front of you. As DocSend’s CEO Russ Heddleston said in his interview with Jason Calacanis, VCs often spend ~3.5 minutes on your deck. Though I’ve never timed myself, it seems to be in the same ballpark for myself as well. After all, it’s the deck that gets the meeting, not the deck that determines if you get funding or not.

Nevertheless, I hope the below contextualizes the time spent beyond the numbers, and what goes on in an investor’s head when we’re skimming through.

Pre-seed/seed

Team

  1. What is the biggest risk this business is taking on?
  2. Is the person who can address the biggest risk of this business on this slide?
    • And does this person have decision-making power?

Let’s say your biggest risk is that you’re creating a market where there isn’t one. Do you have that marketing/positioning specialist – either yourself or on your team – to tackle this problem? As much as I love techies, three CS PhDs are going to give me doubts.

Similarly, the biggest risk for a hypothetical enterprise SaaS business is often a sales risk. Then I need proof either via your network/experience or LOIs (letters of intent) that you have corporations who will buy your product.

Or if it’s a tech risk, I’ll be hesitant if I see two MBAs pursuing this. Even if their first hire is an ML engineer, who owns 2% of the business. Because it doesn’t sound like the one person who can solve the biggest risk for the business has been given the trust to make the decisions that will move the needle.

This might be a bit controversial, but having talked with several VCs, I know I’m not alone here. I don’t care about quantity – number of years in the industry or at X company. Maybe a little more if you were a founding team member who helped scale a startup to $100M ARR. I do care for quality – your earned secret, which bleeds into the next slide.

Solution/product

The million-dollar question here is: What do you know that makes money that everyone else is overlooking, underestimating, or just totally missed? If you’re a frequent reader of this blog, you’ll be no stranger to this question. I’ve talked about it here and here, just to name a few.

Or in other words, having spent time in the idea maze, what is your earned secret? Here are two more ways of looking at it is:

  1. Is there an inflection point you found, as Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate calls it, in the socio-economic/technological trends that makes the future you speak of more probable?
  2. Is it a process/mental model that you’ve built over X years in the industry that grafts extremely well to an adjacent or a broader industry?

I believe that’s what’ll greatly increase the chances of your startup winning. Or at least hold your incumbents at bay until you reach product-market fit. If you’re able to find the first insight, then you’ll be able to find the second. And by pattern recognition, you’ll be able to find the third, fourth, and fifth in extreme velocity. It’s what we, on the VC side, call insight development. And your product/solution is the culmination of everything you and your team has learned faster and better than your competitors.

Of course, your product still has to address your customers’ greatest pain points. You don’t have to be the best at everything, but you have to be the best (or the only) one who can solve your customers’ greatest frustration. So VCs, in studying how you plot out the user journey, look for: do you actually solve what you claim this massive problem in the market is?

Series A/B

Traction

  • What are your unit economics? I’m looking for something along the lines of LTV:CAC ~3-5x.
  • Who’s paying?
    • For enterprise, which big logo is your customer? And who are your 5-7 referenceable customers?
    • For consumer:
      • If it’s freemium, what percent of premium users do you have? I’m looking for at least a 3-5% here.
      • If your platform is free, how are people paying with their time? DAU/MAU>25-30%? Is your virality coefficient k>1? 30- and 90-day retention cohorts > 20%, ideally 40%.
  • What does your conversion funnel look like? What part of the funnel are you really winning? Subsequently, what might you need more work on?

The competition

95 out of every 100 decks, I see two kinds of competitor slides:

  • 2×2 matrix/Cartesian graph, where the respective startup is on the upper right hand corner
  • The checklist, where the respective startup has all the boxes checked and their competitors have some percentage of the boxes checked

Neither are inherently wrong in nature, but they give rise to two different sets of questions.

The former, the graph, often leads to the trap of including vanity competitors. For the sake of populating the graph, founders include the logos of companies who hypothetically could be their competitors, but when it comes down to reality, they never or rarely compete on a deal with their target user/customer. April Dunford, author of Obviously Awesome, calls these “theoretical competitors.”

A simple heuristic is if you jumped on a call with a customer right now and ask: “What would you use currently if our solution did not exist?”, would the names of the competitors you listed actually pop up during the call? Or with a potential customer, what did they use before you arrived? For enterprise software, Dunford says that startups usually lose 25% of their customers when the answer to the above question is “nothing”. When your greatest incumbent is a habitual cycle deeply engrained in your user’s behavior, you need to either reposition your solution, or find ways to educate the market and greatly reduce the friction it takes to go from 0 to 60.

The latter, the checklist, usually sponsors a second kind of trap – vanity features. Founders often list a whole table’s worth of “awesome features” that their competitors don’t have, but many of which may not resolve a customer’s frustration. And on the one that does, their competitors have already taken significant market share. The key question here: Do all features listed resolve a fundamental problem your customers/users have? Which are necessary, which are nice-to-have’s? Are you winning on the features that solve fundamental problems?

The question I ask, as it pertains to competition, in the first or second meeting is: What are your competitors doing right? If you were to put yourself in your competitor’s shoes, what did they ace and what can you learn from the success of their experiment?

Financial projections

  1. What are you basing the numbers off of?
  2. What are your underlying assumptions?

How fast do you claim you can double the business growth? Is it reasonable? If we’re calculating bottom-up, can you actually sell the number of units/subscriptions you claim to? What partnerships/distribution channels are you already in advanced talks with? Anything further than 2 years out, for the most part, VCs dismiss. The future is highly unpredictable. And the further out it is, the less likely you’re able to predict that.

I also say financial projections for Series A/B decks is because only with traction can you reasonably predict what the 12-month forward revenue is going to look like. Maybe 18 months, depending on your pending contracts as well. In the pre-seed/seed, when you’re still testing out the product with small set of beta users, it’s hard to predict. And pre-seed/seed decks that have projections without much traction are often heavily scrutinized than their counterparts that don’t have that slide.

In closing

Of course, that doesn’t mean you should neglect any slide on your deck. Rather, the above is just a lens for you to see which slides an investor might allocate special attention to. If you can answer the above questions well in your pitch deck, then you’re one step closer to a winning strategy not only in fundraising, but in building a company that will change the world.

Photo by Ricardo Gomez Angel on Unsplash

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