Folks coming out of school and/or are still in school often ask me how they should break into venture. It’s surprisingly a timeless question. The goalposts change every era. And as the signal-to-noise ratio and regression line oscillates in bull and bear markets, young professionals chase a moving target.
That said, while my opinions will likely change when the facts change, as of now, this is my best proxy for a timeless answer. Market risk versus execution risk.
Let me elaborate.
Early in your career, you should take market risk. Bet where others are not willing to bet. Or have the same starting point as you do. If the starting line is even, it’s all about how much faster you can run compared to your peers. And if you can outlearn them, ideally because of internal drive and motivation, you’ll be the incumbent in the space in the future.
Execution risk is what you pursue as you grow. Your network, your expertise, and your experiences make you a more robust executioner. You’re an incumbent. You’re a juggernaut. There’s no reason to focus on this risk when you’re younger because you don’t have an unfair advantage here. In fact, you have an unfair disadvantage. Others more senior to you have a better network, more expertise, and have done more reps than you have.
Steve Jurvetson recently shared the only rule of business that is inviolate. “Take any company that is large or top three in their industry. They will never lead the charge to disrupt that industry.” He goes on to say, that even in recent years, Google didn’t fight to change search until OpenAI. Apple is innovative outside their core business, but never in their core business. So as a result, innovation needs to come from the bottom. People who are willing to take market risk.
Similarly, in venture, as a young VC, you need to build your own thesis. For as long as you are investing on the basis of someone else’s thesis, you are competing on execution risk. And every VC who’s older, wiser, and more connected than you are on that thesis will out-execute you.
So… the risk you have to take is betting on a brand new thesis. That no one else is pursuing. No one else is investing by it. And that… is market risk.
The above is no less true if you’re an emerging GP. Your fund lacks the resources, likely the connections, the experience, the talent, and the ability to out-execute your incumbent on your incumbent’s thesis. The solution is to just not play when they have the home field advantage.
It’s why thesis and the question “Why does another venture fund need to exist?” matter so much to LPs betting on new fund managers.
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
Whether you’re a founder or investor or just friends of the afore-mentioned job titles, you’ve most likely been asked for warm intros. The sage advice in the world has always been, that it is better to ask for warm introductions than send cold outreach, leaving the latter to be severely underestimated. Anecdotally, some of my best friends and mentors today came and continue to come from cold outreach.
Most people in this world love to help others. They derive joy and fulfillment in doing so. It enriches their life just as much, if not more so than, it does yours. There are a number of academic studies, like this 2020 one, that show positive correlation between giving kindness and your own happiness. The Ben Franklin effect extrapolates that you are more likely to like someone by doing them a favor. In sum, people want to help others. Investors (and friends of investors) are no exception.
But… the world does not make it easy to do so.
I’m not here to preach kindness. Nor do I think I need to. There are plenty of more incredible individuals in the world who are more capable of relaying that message than I am. But as the title of this blogpost alludes to, what tactical advice is there to:
Help friends of investors/investors help you
Get investors excited to meet you
Why even bother with a forwardable
Founders often ask me: Do you know any investors you can introduce me to? Which, in fairness, is an understandable question when you don’t know who you don’t know. In a world where I’m only helping 10 or less founders total, it’s a great question.
The problem is I, like many other people in the venture ecosystem, am often trying to help more than 10 founders. For me, I’m helping founders I’m actively advising, On Deck founders, Techstars founders, Alchemist founders, founders who are intro-ed to me, founders who cold email me, and founders who come to my weekly office hours. The number varies, but in any given week, I’m sending between 20-40 founder intros. And given that, I face a few obstacles:
The colder the connection and the longer the time since we last spoke, the more likely I am to forget what you’re building. I’m sorry; I wish I had photographic memory.
As much as I would like, I physically don’t have time to write a curated intro to every person who asks me.
I don’t want to ping the same investor/advisor multiple times in a week without clear reasons why. The investors who have more social clout get more intros than others. And they only have so much time and attention they can give in their inbox/socials to new people.
Rather, I flip the question on founders. Build a preliminary list of people you would like to chat with. See who you know that’s connected with these individuals. Do note I did not say firms. Long term marriages begin with each human not their last name. If I’m a 1st degree connection to them, then reach out to me and ask:
“I’m currently raising for [startup], [context]. I saw you’re connected to [name], [name] and [name]. Would you be comfortable reaching out to them for a double opt-in intro? And if so, happy to send you forwardable to make your life easier.”
To which I respond…
What goes into a forwardable
While everyone has their own preference, I prefer all the forwardables I send to have three things – nothing more, nothing less. Nothing more, since busy individuals don’t have time to read essays. Nothing less, well, it is what I call the minimum viable forwardable. And yes, I just made that term up.
The one metric you think you’re doing better than 95% (99th percentile is ideal) of the industry. On the off chance that the afore-mentioned metric isn’t obvious as to why it’s crucial to the business, spend another sentence explaining why. For example, if you’re a marketplace, the metric you’re slaying at might be the percent of your demand who organically converts to supply. While it may not be obvious to most, it is one of the earliest signs of network effects. Your customers love your product so much they want to pay it forward.
1-2 sentences as to what your startup does
Why this recipient would be the best dollar on your cap table
The first two are things you, as a founder, should have readily on hand. The third is often the one I get the most questions on. What does “the best dollar on my cap table” mean? And how would I find that?
Why the best dollar is important
Fundraising is often seen as a numbers game. Analogously, so is networking. Both of which I agree and disagree with. I agree with the fact that you have to engineer serendipity. You have to increase the surface area for luck to stick. And to do that, you need to talk to a s**t ton of people. I get it. The part I disagree with is that a game optimized for quantity is often conflated with templated conversations. Or worse, purely transactional ones. Relationships don’t scale if you approach it from scale.
… which is why I need the third point in every forwardable. If you are unable to provide why an investor would be the best dollar on your cap table, then:
You don’t need a warm intro. And that’s fine. Some investors’ inboxes are less saturated than others. If it might help, here is also my cold email “template.”
I’m not your person. I, like any other person facilitating an intro, am putting my social capital on the line to get you in front of the person you want. And if you don’t think it’s worth the time to tailor your email to one that I would be comfortable sending, then I just can’t be your champion.
Examples of the best dollar
Predictably and unpredictably so, there are many ways to make someone feel special. While I will list some of my favorite that I’ve seen over the years, the list is, by no means, all-inclusive. In fact, I’m sure some of the best and most timeless ways to showcase an investor’s value add is still out there waiting to be discovered. And for that, I leave it to you, my reader, to surprise me and the world. The below, hopefully, serves as inspiration for you to be tenaciously and idiosyncratically creative.
I’ll break it down into two parts: (1) what do you need help on, and (2) what help can they provide.
What is the 3 biggest risks of your business? The biggest one should be solved by you or someone on the team slide. The biggest risk should be the minimum viable assumption you need to prove that people want your product. At the early stages, sometimes that’s showing you have a waitlist of folks begging for your product. Sometimes, it’s just proving you can build the product (i.e. a deep tech product or AI startup). The next two risks, which aren’t as great in magnitude, but still prescient, requires you to be scrappy and at times, bring in external help.
What are your potential investors’ value adds? Where does their tactical expertise lie in? There’s no one-stop shop for every investor for this… yet (hit me up if you’re building something here). But nevertheless, I find it useful to search “databases” of value adds on:
Lunchclub profiles under “Ask [name] about…” Note: I forget if Polywork and Lunchclub are still invite-only, but if they are, feel free to use my invite codes here for Polywork and Lunchclub. For those curious, this is not a sponsored post.
Doom-scrolling to the bottom of their LinkedIn profile and reading their references
Who, of their existing investors, if they were to build a new business tomorrow in a similar sector, is the one person who would be a “no brainer” to bring back on their cap table? And why?
Who did they pitch to that turned them down for investment, but still was very helpful?
Subsequently, referencing (with the founders’ permission) those founders when reaching out/getting introed to those VCs. Note: Generally, Crunchbase and Pitchbook has more exhaustive lists of portfolio companies oftentimes than their website of “selected investments.”
Any publication/press release (i.e. Techcrunch, Forbes, etc.) where founders share how helpful their investors were. This may require a bit of digging.
As a general rule of thumb, the more specific you are, the better.
On the flip side, some examples of lackluster “best dollars” include:
Just stating which industry they invest in
Stating that they’re ideal because they work at X firm. You’re drafting individual team members for your all-star team, not brands.
Stating that they’re ideal because they USED to work at X firm
Using the recipient as a means to an ends. In other words, you want to get in touch with someone they know rather than they themselves. No one feels special when you like them only because they know someone else you like more. Either find a warmer connection to the “end” person or cold email.
Being generic
In closing
As my friend “James” says, “Do all of the leg work. Help them help you as much as possible. Everyone wants to be the hero that helps someone else, but people have lives – and if you’re the one that is getting the value, bring the value as much as possible.”
If you were the recipient of said email, what would make you say: “Absolutely?”
May 9th, 2022 Update: Added the “Why even both with a forwardable” section
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Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Founders often ask me, what slides on my pitch deck do I have to make sure I get right? The short answer, all of them. Then again, if you’re focusing on all of them, you’re focusing on none of them. So I’ll break it down by fundraising stages:
Pre-seed/seed (might as well include angels here too)
Series A/B
Since I spend almost no time in the later stages, I’ll refrain from extrapolating from any anecdotes there.
If you’re using DocSend, you already have the numbers for your deck viewership in front of you. As DocSend’s CEO Russ Heddleston said in his interview with Jason Calacanis, VCs often spend ~3.5 minutes on your deck. Though I’ve never timed myself, it seems to be in the same ballpark for myself as well. After all, it’s the deck that gets the meeting, not the deck that determines if you get funding or not.
Nevertheless, I hope the below contextualizes the time spent beyond the numbers, and what goes on in an investor’s head when we’re skimming through.
Pre-seed/seed
Team
What is the biggest risk this business is taking on?
Is the person who can address the biggest risk of this business on this slide?
And does this person have decision-making power?
Let’s say your biggest risk is that you’re creating a market where there isn’t one. Do you have that marketing/positioning specialist – either yourself or on your team – to tackle this problem? As much as I love techies, three CS PhDs are going to give me doubts.
Similarly, the biggest risk for a hypothetical enterprise SaaS business is often a sales risk. Then I need proof either via your network/experience or LOIs (letters of intent) that you have corporations who will buy your product.
Or if it’s a tech risk, I’ll be hesitant if I see two MBAs pursuing this. Even if their first hire is an ML engineer, who owns 2% of the business. Because it doesn’t sound like the one person who can solve the biggest risk for the business has been given the trust to make the decisions that will move the needle.
This might be a bit controversial, but having talked with several VCs, I know I’m not alone here. I don’t care about quantity – number of years in the industry or at X company. Maybe a little more if you were a founding team member who helped scale a startup to $100M ARR. I do care for quality – your earned secret, which bleeds into the next slide.
Solution/product
The million-dollar question here is: What do you know that makes money that everyone else is overlooking, underestimating, or just totally missed? If you’re a frequent reader of this blog, you’ll be no stranger to this question. I’ve talked about it here and here, just to name a few.
Or in other words, having spent time in the idea maze, what is your earned secret? Here are two more ways of looking at it is:
Is there an inflection point you found, as Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate calls it, in the socio-economic/technological trends that makes the future you speak of more probable?
Is it a process/mental model that you’ve built over X years in the industry that grafts extremely well to an adjacent or a broader industry?
I believe that’s what’ll greatly increase the chances of your startup winning. Or at least hold your incumbents at bay until you reach product-market fit. If you’re able to find the first insight, then you’ll be able to find the second. And by pattern recognition, you’ll be able to find the third, fourth, and fifth in extreme velocity. It’s what we, on the VC side, call insight development. And your product/solution is the culmination of everything you and your team has learned faster and better than your competitors.
Of course, your product still has to address your customers’ greatest pain points. You don’t have to be the best at everything, but you have to be the best (or the only) one who can solve your customers’ greatest frustration. So VCs, in studying how you plot out the user journey, look for: do you actually solve what you claim this massive problem in the market is?
Series A/B
Traction
What are your unit economics? I’m looking for something along the lines of LTV:CAC ~3-5x.
Who’s paying?
For enterprise, which big logo is your customer? And who are your 5-7 referenceable customers?
For consumer:
If it’s freemium, what percent of premium users do you have? I’m looking for at least a 3-5% here.
If your platform is free, how are people paying with their time? DAU/MAU>25-30%? Is your virality coefficient k>1? 30- and 90-day retention cohorts > 20%, ideally 40%.
What does your conversion funnel look like? What part of the funnel are you really winning? Subsequently, what might you need more work on?
The competition
95 out of every 100 decks, I see two kinds of competitor slides:
2×2 matrix/Cartesian graph, where the respective startup is on the upper right hand corner
The checklist, where the respective startup has all the boxes checked and their competitors have some percentage of the boxes checked
Neither are inherently wrong in nature, but they give rise to two different sets of questions.
The former, the graph, often leads to the trap of including vanity competitors. For the sake of populating the graph, founders include the logos of companies who hypothetically could be their competitors, but when it comes down to reality, they never or rarely compete on a deal with their target user/customer. April Dunford, author of Obviously Awesome, calls these “theoretical competitors.”
A simple heuristic is if you jumped on a call with a customer right now and ask: “What would you use currently if our solution did not exist?”, would the names of the competitors you listed actually pop up during the call? Or with a potential customer, what did they use before you arrived? For enterprise software, Dunford says that startups usually lose 25% of their customers when the answer to the above question is “nothing”. When your greatest incumbent is a habitual cycle deeply engrained in your user’s behavior, you need to either reposition your solution, or find ways to educate the market and greatly reduce the friction it takes to go from 0 to 60.
The latter, the checklist, usually sponsors a second kind of trap – vanity features. Founders often list a whole table’s worth of “awesome features” that their competitors don’t have, but many of which may not resolve a customer’s frustration. And on the one that does, their competitors have already taken significant market share. The key question here: Do all features listed resolve a fundamental problem your customers/users have? Which are necessary, which are nice-to-have’s? Are you winning on the features that solve fundamental problems?
The question I ask, as it pertains to competition, in the first or second meeting is: What are your competitors doing right? If you were to put yourself in your competitor’s shoes, what did they ace and what can you learn from the success of their experiment?
Financial projections
What are you basing the numbers off of?
What are your underlying assumptions?
How fast do you claim you can double the business growth? Is it reasonable? If we’re calculating bottom-up, can you actually sell the number of units/subscriptions you claim to? What partnerships/distribution channels are you already in advanced talks with? Anything further than 2 years out, for the most part, VCs dismiss. The future is highly unpredictable. And the further out it is, the less likely you’re able to predict that.
I also say financial projections for Series A/B decks is because only with traction can you reasonably predict what the 12-month forward revenue is going to look like. Maybe 18 months, depending on your pending contracts as well. In the pre-seed/seed, when you’re still testing out the product with small set of beta users, it’s hard to predict. And pre-seed/seed decks that have projections without much traction are often heavily scrutinized than their counterparts that don’t have that slide.
In closing
Of course, that doesn’t mean you should neglect any slide on your deck. Rather, the above is just a lens for you to see which slides an investor might allocate special attention to. If you can answer the above questions well in your pitch deck, then you’re one step closer to a winning strategy not only in fundraising, but in building a company that will change the world.
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Friday last week, I jumped on a phone call with a founder who reached out to me after checking out my blog. In my deep fascination on how she found and learns from her mentors, she shed some light as to why she feels safe to ask stupid questions. The TL;DR of her answer – implicit trust, blended with mutual respect and admiration. That her mentors know that when she does ask a question, it’s out of curiosity and not willing ignorance – or naivety.
But on a wider scope, our conversation got me thinking and reflecting. How can we build psychological safety around questions that may seem dumb at first glace? And sometimes, even unwittingly, may seem foolish to the person answering. The characteristics of which, include:
A question whose answer is easily Google-able;
A question that the person answering may have heard too many times (and subsequently, may feel fatigue from answering again);
And, a question whose answer may seem like common sense. But common sense, arguably, is subjective. Take, for example, selling losses and holding gains in the stock market may be common sense to practiced public market investors, but may feel counter-intuitive to the average amateur trader.
We’re Human
But, if you’re like me, every so often, I ask a ‘dumb’ question. Or I feel the urge to ask it ’cause either I think the person I’m asking would provide a perspective I can’t find elsewhere or, simply, purely by accident. The latter of which happens, though I try not to, when I’m droning through a conversation. When my mind regresses to “How are you doing?” or the like.
To fix the latter, the simple solution is to be more cognizant and aware during conversations. For the former, I play with contextualization and exaggeration. Now, I should note that this isn’t a foolproof strategy and neither is it guaranteed to not make you look like a fool. You may still seem like one. But hopefully, if you’re still dying to know (and for some reason, you haven’t done your homework), you’re more likely to get an answer.
Over the weekend, my friend and I were chatting about the next steps in her career. After spending quite some time ironing out a startup idea she wants to pursue, she was at a crossroads. Should she leave her 9-to-5 and pursue this idea full-time, or should she continue to test out her idea and keep her full-time job?
Due to my involvement with the 1517 Fund and since some of my good friends happen to be college dropouts, I spend quite a bit of time with folks who have or are thinking about pursuing their startup business after dropping out. This is no less true with 9-to-5ers. And some who are still the sole breadwinner of their family. Don’t get me wrong. I love the attention, social passion, literature and discourse around entrepreneurship. But I think many people are jumping the gun.
Ten years back, admittedly off of the 2008 crisis, the conversations were entirely different. When I ask my younger cousins or my friends’ younger siblings, “what do you want to be when you grow up?” They say things like “run my own business”, “be a YouTuber”, and most surprisingly, “be a freelancer”. From 12-yr olds, it’s impressive that freelancing is already part of their vocabulary. It’s an astounding heuristic for how far the gig economy has come.
Moreover, media has also built this narrative championing the college dropout. Steve Jobs and Apple. Bill Gates and Microsoft. And, Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook. There’s nothing wrong in leaving your former occupation or education to start something new. But not before you have a solid proof of concept, or at least external validation beyond your friends, family and co-workers. After all, Mark Zuckerberg left Harvard not to start Facebook, but because Facebook was already taking off.
Honing the Idea
The inherent nature of entrepreneurship is risk. As an entrepreneur (and as an investor), the goal should always be to de-risk your venture – to make calculated bets. To cap your downside.
Marc Benioff started his idea of a platform-as-a-service in March 1999. Before Marc Benioff took his idea of SaaS full-time, he spent time at Oracle with his mentor, Larry Ellison, honing this thesis and business idea. When he was finally ready 4 months later, he left on good terms. Those terms were put to the test, when in Salesforce’s early days, VCs were shy to put in their dollar on the cap table. But, his relationship he had built with Larry ended up giving him the runway he needed to build his team and product.
Something that’s, unfortunately, rarely talked about in Silicon Valley and the world of startups is patience. We’ve gotten used to hearing “move fast and break things”. Many founders are taught to give themselves a 10-20% margin of error. What started off as a valuable heuristic grew into an increase in quantity of experiments, but decrease in quality of experiments. Founders were throwing a barrage of punches, where many carried no weight behind them. No time spent contemplating why the punch didn’t hit its mark. And subsequently, founders building on the frontlines of revolution fight to be the first to market, but not first to product-market fit. Founders fight hell or high water to launch their MVP, but not an MLP, as Jiaona Zhang of WeWork puts it.
In the words of the one who pioneered the idea of platform-as-a-service,
The more transformative your idea is, the more patience you’ll need to make it happen.”
– Marc Benioff
As one who sits on the other side of the table, our job is to help founders ask more precise questions – and often, the tough questions. We act more as godmothers and godfathers of you and your babies, but we can’t do the job for you.
The “Tough” Questions
To early founders, aspiring founders, and my friends at the crossroads, here is my playbook:
What partnerships can/will make it easier for you to go-to-market? To product-market fit? To scalability?
What questions can you ask to better test product feasibility?
How can you partner with people to ask (and test) better questions?
What is your calculus that’ll help you systematically test your assumptions?
Do you have enough cash flow to sustain you (and your dependents) for the next 2 years to test these assumptions?
Simultaneously, it’s also to important to consider the flip side:
What partnerships (or lack thereof) make your bets more risky?
How can you limit them? Eliminate them?
And in sum, these questions will help you map out:
At this point in your career, does part-time or full-time help you better optimize yourself for reaching my next milestone?
Founders take on many different types of risk when creating a business. Subsequently, investors constantly put founders and their businesses under scrutiny using risk as a benchmark. In broad terms, in my experience, they largely fall under two categories: execution risk and market risk.
Where I first introduced the dichotomy of market and execution risk in the frame of idea-market fit.
Some Background
Contrary to popular belief, VCs are some of the most risk-averse people that I know. As an investor, the two goals are to:
Take calculated bets, via an investment thesis and diligence;
And de-risk each investment as much as possible.
From private equity to growth equity to venture capital, more and more investors are writing ‘discovery checks.’ Typically, funds write checks that are 2-4% of their fund size. For example, $100M fund usually write $2-4M initial checks. Yet, more and more investors are writing increasingly smaller check sizes (0.1-0.5% fund size). In the $100M fund example, that’s $100-500K checks. This result is a function of FOMO (fear of missing out), as well as a proving grounds for founders before the fund’s partners put in their core dollar. Admittedly, this upstream effect does lead to:
Less diligence before checks are written (closing within 48-72 hours on the extreme end, and inevitably, more buyer’s remorse);
Less bandwidth allotted per portfolio startup (even less for startups given discovery checks);
The risks for a startup investor are fairly obvious, and so are the rewards. Effectively, an early-stage investor is betting millions of dollars on a stranger’s claim. But not all risks are the same.
In the eyes of a VC, an execution risk is categorically less risky than a market risk. Furthermore, even within the category of execution, a product risk is usually less risky than a team risk.
Execution Risk
Why are more and more early-stage investors defaulting to enterprise over consumer startups?
Two reasons.
Enterprise startups often run on a SaaS (software-as-service) subscription business model. There will always be recurring revenue, assuming the product makes sense. For an investor, that’s foreseeable ROI.
It’s an execution risk, not a market risk. Often times, an enterprise tech startup is the culmination of existing frustrations prevalent in the respective industry already. And therefore, have reasonably stable distribution channels and go-to-market strategies.
Using discovery checks, and playing pre-core business, VCs can evaluate team risk. Between the discovery check and their usual ‘core checks’, VCs can also test their initial hypotheses on their founders.
As a startup grows, especially after realizing product-market fit, market risk becomes more of a product risk. Best illustrated by market share, product risk is when a product fails to meet the expectations of their (target) customers. It can be evaluated via a permutation of key metrics, like unit economics, NPS, retention and churn rate. There is an element of technological risk early on in the startup lifecycle for deep tech ventures, but admittedly, it’s not a vertical I have my finger on the pulse for and can share insight into.
Given that VCs are either ex-operators or have seen a breadth of startup life-cycles, VCs can best use their experience to mitigate a startup’s execution risk.
Market Risk
Market risk requires a prediction of human/market behavior. And unfortunately, the vast majority of investors can predict about the constant evolution of human behavior as well as a founder can. What does that mean? Founders and VCs are walking hand-in-hand to gain market experience. It, quite excitingly, is an innovator’s Rubrik’s cube to solve.
Market risk is frequently attributed to consumer tech products. In an increasing proliferation of consumer startups, consumers have become more expensive to acquire and harder to retain. Distribution channels change frequently and are determined by political, economic, technological, and social trends.
In Closing
Every VC specializes in tackling a certain kind of risk. But founders must quickly adapt, prioritize, and tackle all the above risks at some point in the founding journey. As Reid Hoffman, co-founder of LinkedIn, famously said:
“An entrepreneur is someone who will jump off a cliff and assemble an airplane on the way down.”
