When Should You Sell Your Shares As An Investor?

options, comparison, relative selection, when to sell

Recently, I stumbled across a captivating perspective on aphorisms via Tim Ferriss’ 5-Bullet Fridays. The Procrustean Bed. To be fair, before reading it on Tim’s newlsetter, I haven’t even heard of the concept. In one of his newsletters, he cites two incredible sources:

” ‘Something designed to produce conformity by unnatural or violent means. In Greek mythology, Procrustes was a robber who tied his victims to a bed, either stretching or cutting off their legs in order to make them fit it.’ (Source: Oxford Dictionary of English Idioms).

Nassim Taleb has a related book of aphorisms titled The Bed of Procrustes. He explains the title thusly: ‘Every aphorism here is about a Procrustean bed of sorts—we humans, facing limits of knowledge, and things we do not observe, the unseen and the unknown, resolve tension by squeezing life and the world into crisp commoditized ideas, reductive categories, specific vocabularies, and prepackaged narratives, which, on the occasion, has explosive consequences.’ “

Down the investing rabbithole

There exist a number of aphorisms in the investing world. Chief of which reads “buy low, sell high.” Public market assets are quite liquid. Hypothetically, you can cash out whenever you want. Such liquidity has paved way for psychological inconsistencies to maximize gratification. In language with unnecessary jargon redacted, the option to sell is less motivated by rational thinking but more by fear of losing money – loss aversion. If you invest $100 into the public market, you can choose if you want to cash out at $95, $90, or $120 or $200. While there is a non-zero chance of you losing your entire principal, chances are you’ll liquidate your positions before that happens.

On the other hand, private market investments are illiquid. Upon investment, there is no liquid market in which you can sell immediately. At best, you have to wait 3-5 years before a rapidly marked-up investment creates opportunities for distributions in the secondary market. In other words, cash money while companies are still private. In the private markets, your principal either appreciates in multiples, rather than percentages, or bottoms out. Any in-betweens will neither make or break your investment strategy, and are often out of your immediate control. So in this case, illiquidity is a feature, not a bug.

The notion of exiting positions as a private market investor, therefore, gravitates towards a singularity – when you make a damn good investment. The only time you really have an option to choose whether you can sell or not, when otherwise, it becomes a tax write-off or a small exit outside of your immediate control.

When should you sell?

Should you ever sell?

And if you sell, how much should you sell?

To answer all the above questions…

With the help of Shawn and Ratan, I wrote a blogpost on how to think about exiting positions at the beginning of this year. A topic of which I am still very much a rookie at, which may be quite apparent in this essay as well. Nevertheless I’m going to try to elaborate more on the notion of selling positions as an early-stage investor.

In a memo earlier this year, Howard Marks wrote that there are two main reasons people choose to sell: “because they’re up and because they’re down.”

When “they’re down”

Let’s start with the latter. When “they’re down.” Like I mentioned before, there are often very few options to sell when things are down. While I’m not proud that these investors exist in the early-stage private markets, I’ve seen and heard of some investors who try to make a last ditch effort to regain some of their principal when the startup goes south. Selling off IP. As well as assets. Or forcing the founders to make a modest exit, so that the investors cap their downside. Maybe at best, this returns them 2x on their capital (rarely the case).

But let’s say that’s the “best” case scenario. And let’s say it’s a $25M Fund I, writing $250K checks. A 2x net return means they got back $750K. $750K is far from returning the $25M fund. Not even close to doing so. You need over 30 of those “exits” to just break even for your fund. So, if you’re an investor penny pinching here, you’re in the wrong game AND you’re going to lose out on the relationships with the founding team.

Why the wrong game?

Venture is a hit-driven business. It’s not about your batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit. We bat for 100x returns, which also increases the probability of misses, determined by ability to return the fund or not. If you’re optimizing for local maximums, you’d probably do better as a public market investor.

And why do relationships matter?

One, the startup world is a smaller world than you think. People gossip.

Two, statistically, first swings at bat rarely work out. In research done by Cowboy Ventures, they found 80% of unicorns had at least one co-founder with previous founding experience. Paris Innovation Review also found that “86% started their project with a partner, after having created other companies.” Two of many other studies. So, even though this venture didn’t achieve financial success for an investor, the next might. Or the one after that. Assuming you bet on the right people, it’ll just take a couple iterations before timing, market, and product also match up. If you leave on bad terms on this deal, you won’t be able to get in when things do work out.

Three, what makes early-stage investing incredible is the relationships you build along the way. The ability to learn and grow with really smart people.

When “they’re up”

The question of if to sell often leads to controversial debate. I know of some investors who never sell any of their stock. And that if they sell, to them, it is a measure of their lack of faith in a founder. And they would never want to feel that they’re betting against the founders. That’s okay if you’re an angel. But if you’re a VC, you have a fiduciary responsibility to your investors, which means you’ll eventually have to sell.

The question of when to sell is often answered in broad strokes with laws around QSBS, which states that if you hold a qualified small business stock for longer than five years, you’re not subject to capital gains taxes in the US. But should you sell in the 6th year or 10th year? And under what market conditions? Do you sell in a boom market or on the precipice of a bust market? For a company you believe in the long-term potential, regardless of short-term fluctuations, I’m a big fan of what Bill Miller said in his Q3 2021 Market Letter. “We believe time, not timing, is the key to building wealth in the [market].”

But when things are going really, really, really well, it’s okay to take money off the table, even ahead of the end of the fund’s 10-year lifespan. In fact, Union Square Ventures generally sells 15-30% of their position in their top portfolio companies to distribute back to their LPs. Fred Wilson‘s personal framework lies around “[selling] one third of the position immediately, put one third away for a long term hold, and actively manage the other third.”

To most, including myself, the goalposts for selling how much seem arbitrary. USV sold 30% of their position in Twitter to return twice the entire fund. Menlo Ventures sold almost half of their stake in Uber when Softbank offered to buy. Whereas, Benchmark sold 15% of its Uber shares. I also have really smart friends who liquidate 50% of their stake in a token if a single cryptocurrency reaches double digit percentages of their net worth.

It’s all about the opportunity cost

In a game where arbitrage matters, and the “why” matter more than the “what”, it was love at first sight when Howard Marks shared his mental model on selling. He boils it down to the simple economic concept of opportunity cost:

  1. “If your investment thesis seems less valid than it did previously and/or the probability that it will prove accurate has declined, selling some or all of the holding is probably appropriate.
  2. “Likewise, if another investment comes along that appears to have more promise – to offer a superior risk-adjusted prospective return – it’s reasonable to reduce or eliminate existing holdings to make room for it.”

In sum, the option to sell is not an isolated decision, but rather one which considers the other investment opportunities you have available to you. For a number of VCs, this breaks into the calculus of recycling carry and what to use early distributions to invest in next. If you’re a VC with consistent AND high-quality deal flow, you’d probably want to reinvest. If you’re a VC without either of the two (i.e. only consistency or quality) or an emerging angel, your goal is to get both. In having both, you then have access to relative selection.

Photo by Sina Asgari on Unsplash


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Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal or investment advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.

No One Talks About Selling

Seemingly, everyone these days – from Twitter to podcasts to blogposts (including mine) – talk about buying and investing in startups. What are best practices for investment theses? How do I pick the best companies to invest in? Conversely, how do I get picked or get allocation into hot startups? But people rarely seem to be talking about selling positions. So, if you know me, I hit up two of the smartest people I know – one early-stage, the other growth-stage. Both of whom might be familiar faces on this blog. So I asked them:

How do you think about selling a position? How much does DPI matter for your investors?

The below insights include minor edits for clarity.

The notice that you’ve all seen a million times

None of this is investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.

Shawn Merani (Parade Ventures)

Shawn was instrumental in my early career growth in venture. When I met him years ago, he was still running Flight Ventures, where he wrote early checks into Dollar Shave Club and Cruise Automation and was one of the first syndicates on AngelList. There he led a network-based model of syndicate leads, which I’ve heard been described by others as a “venture partner program on steroids.” Now he’s the solo GP at Parade Ventures, a seed stage venture fund investing in enterprise-themed companies.

“I would preface all of this with the fact we have never fully exited a position before a traditional liquidity event, but more so, have managed our position given the duration of our ownership and to generate returns for our LPs and manage risk. 

“We talk to founders all the time, and foster a relationship that grows. When I was writing check sizes for 1-5% of ownership, my engagement then is very different from my engagement with founders now, where we take more concentrated bets.

“When it comes to selling, it’s about influence and information. The larger our ownership, the more information we have access to. And if a company is doing well, we don’t think about selling. In fact, it’s the exact opposite; we buy more. If things are working, we take our pro rata. In some cases, we take more than my ownership target. And founders are willing since we’ve been helping them from the beginning. We know when there’s going to be a 3-4x uptick every 12-18 months. Compounding is powerful.

“Our investors back the fund because they trust us. They don’t talk to the founders as often as we do. They trust our decision when we say we should buy more or keep our shares. There are two ways to talk about DPI:

1. Making money for your current investors, and
2. Telling the story.

“Selling is really a case-by-case scenario, and it really depends on my relationship with the founder. All the equity in which I sold so far has been before Parade. But if we know the company is doing well, we buy more. There are also holding periods to consider under QSBS, which has huge tax benefits.”

For those that are unfamiliar with the terminology, DPI means distributions to paid-in capital. Effectively, how much money you actually return to your investors versus “paper returns”. QSBS, or qualified small business stock, tax exemption allows investors in qualified businesses to avoid 100% of the capital gains tax incurred if they hold their stock for more than 5 years.

Ratan Singh (Fort Ross Ventures)

I posed the same question to someone I’ve been a huge fan of the day I met him – Ratan Singh, Partner at Fort Ross Ventures. He’s an investor in some of the most recognizable businesses today, including the likes of Rescale and Clearcover, as well as holds board seats at Blueshift and Ridecell. You may remember Ratan from a previous essay about speed as a competitive advantage for investors. And you’ll likely see him a lot more on this blog. He summed it up best in our chat when he said, “There are two reasons why an investor needs to care about DPI: time horizon and fund strategy.” Both of which are variables, not constants, between early- and growth-stage investments.

“The true metric at the end of the day is DPI. DPI is turning in money to your investors. And there are two reasons why an investor needs to care about DPI: time horizon and fund strategy.

“Let’s start with time horizon. For a seed stage fund, as you get close to the end of your fund cycle, that’s when DPI matters. What type of vintage is the fund in? In 2021, it’s going to be the 2010 and 2011 funds.

“For the majority of the time, you want to ride your winners. At the end of your time horizon, ask for a one- to two-year extension. Usually LPs want more money or their shares distributed. They’ve already waited 10 years. Two more won’t make a difference, especially if you have some big fund returners in the making.

“For fund strategy, did you meet the objectives for your LPs already? If you have, and you want to sell some of your winnable deals in your portfolio to help raise your Fund II because those are the same LPs that would re-up in your next fund, then you might consider selling.

“The worst reason to sell is that you want to take the wins you currently have since you think the market is overvalued. ‘I’m at the peak.’ Or ‘I want to take chips off the table because there’s something bad that will happen, but that is very hard to predict.’

“There were a bunch of funds at the beginning of this year that sold their entire positions. They were desperate to lock in a win. They sold because they thought the market was at the top. And, they were wrong. I’m against it. Selling early doesn’t fully realize the strategy you have put forth. For us, at the growth stage, we shoot for 48 months to an exit. If it takes longer, did we underwrite it wrong? But even if it does, the case may be that the company is growing a little slower than expected.

“At the early stage, all funds will say 2 to 3x cash-on-cash in the LP presentation. Most funds return 1 to 1.5x, on average, with most funds total DPI at 1.2 to 1.5x, which barely returns the fund. Before your time horizon, everyone likes to cite unrealized gains and mark ups because TVPI’s all they have.

“DPI matters most for funds in the top quartile – the top returners, funds with more than $500 million, or nowadays, $1 billion mega-funds. For the bottom majority of funds, early DPI won’t matter. They would be limiting their upside.

venture returns
Author’s Note: Notice that 65% of financings lost money for their investors.
Source: Correlation Ventures

“The new interesting commentary is that – where the job is getting harder – a lot of crossover funds are making binary bets. Finding the one deal that’s the next Salesforce – the next industry-defining company. And putting a lot of capital to find that one or two companies. Tiger and Coatue, still maintain that 10-12% IRR, but spend a lot to find the company that’ll be the next Databricks. Every generation has their industry-defining companies. And, they’re willing to lose it all to find that one.

“You usually don’t see this at the growth stage. It’s bad for innovation. Everyone is trying to find investments that are scaling. 1000 investments in the past year became unicorns. And there are 3000+ unicorns. Yet, the top five to seven companies are still undercapitalized.”

In closing

As we closed the selling part of our conversation, Ratan shared a great quote from an Economist article:

“Flush with cash amid a deal frenzy, what is the industry to do? One option would be to liquidate portfolios, that is, to sell more assets than it buys, in effect trying to cash in some chips when prices are high. As yet, however, this does not seem to be happening. Take the figures for three big managers, Blackstone, Carlyle and KKR. So far this year for every $1 of assets, in aggregate, that they have sold, they have bought $1.30. Although Carlyle is being more cautious than the other two firms, these figures indicate that the industry overall thinks the good times will roll on.”

In fairness, as the saying goes, the high risk, high reward. Data does show that the funds with the greatest track records have more deals that lose money than those make them more money than they invested.

Interestingly enough, there’s also a huge differential between the world’s most valuable and most funded startups. According to Founder Collective, “the most valuable companies raised half as much capital and produced nearly 4X the value!” All of which echo Ratan’s words. “The top five to seven companies are still undercapitalized.”

Source: Founder Collective

The public often looks towards invested capital as a proxy of startup performance. But the data suggests that isn’t the case. In the words of the team at Founder Collective, “capital has no insights.” One of my favorite lines from Ashmeet Sidana of Engineering Capital frames it is still: “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation.”

But when DPI boils down to selling on multiples at the end of the day, I often reference Samir Kaji‘s tweet on the return hurdles expected of different stages of investors. As you might guess, the return expectations of each type of fund varies based on fund strategy.

As all things in the world, exiting is just as nuanced and complicated as entering. Hopefully, the above insights will be another set of tools for your toolkit.

If this essay has inspired more questions, here are some further reading materials, courtesy of Ratan:

Photo by Visual Stories || Micheile on Unsplash


Thank you Shawn and Ratan for reading over early drafts.


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Speed As A Competitive Advantage

race car

Last week, I had an incredible fireside chat with GC’s Niko Bonatsos, who has played a key role in some incredible investments, from Livongo Health to Snap to Wag! and most recently, Saturn. In all honesty, I took much of that experience to scratch my own itch. As always, we ran out of time before we ran out of topics. But I was lucky enough to ask one of which I happened to be losing sleep over. “How do you balance speed and diligence in the increasingly competitive market of venture?”

COVID changed us

In the midst of the pandemic, COVID became a forcing function for investors to deploy capital without ever meeting founders in-person. Frankly, they couldn’t meet anyone in-person. Even if they wanted to, investors, like everyone else, was subject to a series of lockdowns, curfews, and eventually the vaccine.

Yet, as life returns to a sense of normality, many investors have gotten comfortable investing virtually. And for a handful, only virtually. At the same time, in today’s increasingly competitive venture market, capital’s become more of a commodity. And I’ve heard a number of LPs find speed to be a competitive advantage. As a product of speed, investors compete on shortened timelines. It’s a given for angels and super angels out there who have to have conviction on a fairly limited set of data. But how do top-tier funds compete in that same market yet maintain the same discipline as before?

I got my answer from Niko.

“We try to pre-empt the stuff we really care about. It basically translates to us being prepared, having frontloaded a lot of the diligence for the companies and opportunities we care about. We have a more educated conversation with the founders, and are the first ones to get to a term sheet than anyone else. That’s something we do a lot more often. And we’ve leaned into seed, which is the new series A.”

Moreover, with all the diligence they do prior to sourcing, funds, like General Catalyst and Founders Fund, have started to incubate startups where they couldn’t find solutions to problems they found.

Slowing things down

Earlier this week, over a lunch, I posed the same question to Fort RossRatan Singh, from whom I got a slightly different variation. “VCs are doing their homework before every meeting and going in with a thesis so that they can deploy fast. VCs used to play catcher and do all their homework after the meeting. But now it’s changed, so they can say yes faster.

“While speed is a differentiator, things are moving too fast today. I met every founder I’ve invested in in-person. Even during the pandemic, I invested in seven founders, and every single one I’ve met in-person.”

To which, I had to ask, “What do you find out from meeting a founder in-person that a virtual meeting lacks in?”

Without missing a beat, Ratan said, “It’s in the small things. The way they interact with their teammates. The way they treat each other. As we finish our chat and walk back to the car, are they still an intelligent being outside of the script? A Zoom call is a 30-minute scripted call. There’s a deck. There’s the presentation they prepared. An in-person interaction is more than that.”

Ratan’s comment reminded me of something Sequoia’s Doug Leone said in his interview with Harry Stebbings recently. “It takes about thirty minutes for someone to relax, which is why I refuse to interview someone for thirty minutes.” Similarly, while a 30-minute coffee chat may just be 30 minutes, the time it takes to shake hands, order your cup of coffee, have the conversation, finish it, and walk back to your car or wait for your Uber helps anyone, not just a VC, understand so much more depth to your character.

In closing

In the words of my friend Ruben:

As if he didn’t drop enough mics in our lunch, Ratan left me with one last hot take, “In VC, you’re either asked to stay, or you’re asked to leave.” In today’s ever-changing climate, having deep domain expertise and pre-empting diligence keeps you if not ahead, at least on the curve of evolution. And for many investors, it’s one of their best bets to be asked to stay – either by the firm’s senior partners or your LPs.

Photo by toine G on Unsplash


Thank you Niko and Ratan for looking over earlier drafts.


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