In the past few months, Rolling Funds by AngelList have been the talk of the town. Instead of having to raise a new fund every 2-3 years, fund managers can now continuously accept capital on a quarterly basis, where LPs (limited partners, like family offices or endowments or fund of funds (FoF)) typically invest with 1-2 year minimum commitments. Under the 506c designation, you can also publicly talk about your fundraise as a fund manager. Whereas the traditional Fund I typically took 11 months to fundraise for a single GP (general partner of a VC fund), 11.9 if multiple GPs, now with Rolling Funds, a fund manager can raise and invest out of a fund within a month – and as quick as starting with a tweet. AngelList will also:
Help you set up a website,
Verify accredited investors,
Help set up the fund (reducing legal fees),
And with rolling funds, you can invest as soon as the capital is committed per quarter, instead of waiting before a certain percentage of the whole fund is committed as per the usual 506b traditional funds.
Moreover, Rolling Funds, under the same 506c general solicitation rules, are built to scale. Both for the emerging fund manager playing the positive sum game of investing upstream as a participating investor, and for the experienced fund manager who’s leading Series A rounds. In the former example with the emerging fund manager, say a solo GP investing out of a $10M initial fund size, 20 checks of $250K, and 1:1 reserves. Or the latter, $50-100M/partner, writing $2-3M checks. Maybe up to $7-10M for a “hot deal“, which by its nature, are rare and few in between. In the words of Avlok Kohli, CEO of AngelList Venture, Rolling Funds are what funds would have looked like if they “were created in an age of software”.
I’m not gonna lie, Rolling Funds really are amazing. Given the bull case, what is the bear case? And how will that impact both emerging and experienced fund managers?
In a number of recent conversations with friends outside of venture and “aspiring entrepreneurs”, a couple myths, which I’m going to loosely define here as popular beliefs held by many people, were brought to my attention. 4 in particular.
If I have a great idea and build it, it’ll sell itself.
That idea/startup is over-hyped.
The startup/venture capital landscape is over-saturated.
If it doesn’t make sense to me, it’s not a good idea.
Quite fortuitously, a question on Quora also inspired this post and discussion.
If I have a great idea and build it, it’ll sell itself.
Unfortunately, most times, it won’t. As Reid Hoffman puts it: “A good product with great distribution will almost always beat a great product with poor distribution.” As a founder, you have to think like a salesperson (for enterprise/B2B businesses) or a marketer (for consumer/B2C businesses). People have to know about what you’re building. ’Cause frankly you could build the world’s best time machine in your basement, but if no one knows, it’s just a time machine in your basement. Probably a great story to tell for Hollywood one day (even then you still need people to find out), but not for a business.
That idea/startup is over-hyped.
I’ll be honest. This really isn’t a myth, more of a common saying.
Maybe so, at the cross-section in time in which you’re looking at it. But if you rewind a couple months or a year or 2 years ago, they were under-hyped. In fact, there’s a good chance no one cared. While everyone has a different technical definition of over- and under-hyped, by the numbers, time will tell if it’ll be a sustainable business or not. If it’s keeping north of 40% retention even 6 months after the hype, we’re in for a breadwinner.
Take Zoom, for example. Pre-COVID, if you asked any rational tech investor, “would you invest in Slack or Zoom?” Most would say Slack. Zoom existed, but many weren’t extremely bullish on it. Today, well, that may be a different story. As of this morning (Oct. 12, 2020), while I’m editing this post before the market opens, the stock price of Zoom is $492 (and same change). Approximately 343% higher than it was on March 17th, the first day of the Bay Area shelter-in-place. And, right now, the price of Slack is $31. Approximately 56% up from the beginning of quarantine.
Neither are startups anymore, but the analogy holds. Also, a lesson that predictions, even by experts, can be wrong.
The startup/venture capital landscape is over-saturated.
“There’s too much money being invested (wasted) on startups.”
From the outside, it may very well look that way. Every day, every week we see this startup gets funded for $X million or that startup gets funded for $YY million. According to the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), $133 billion were invested into startups last year. Yet, it pales in comparison to the capital that’s traded in the public markets.
VC funds see thousands of startup pitches a year. Per partner (most funds 2–3 partners), they each invest in 3–5 per year (aka about once per quarter). Meaning >99% of startups that a single VC sees are not getting funded by them. That doesn’t mean 99% never get funded, but it’s just to illustrate that proportionally, capital isn’t being spent willy-nilly.
If we look at it from a macro-economic perspective, if we are reaching saturation in the startup market, we should be getting closer to perfect competition. And in a perfectly competitive market, profit margins are zero. The thing is profits aren’t nearing zero in the startup/venture capital market. In fact, though the median fund isn’t returning much on invested capital. A good fund is returning 3–5x. A great one >5x. And well, if you were in Chris Sacca’s first fund, which included Uber, Twitter, and more, 250x MOIC. That’s $250 returned on every $1 invested.
If it doesn’t make sense to me, it’s not a good idea.
Revolutionary ideas aren’t meant to conform. If an idea is truly ground-breaking, people have yet to be conditioned to think that a startup idea is great or not. As Andy Rachleff, co-founder of Wealthfront and Benchmark Capital, puts it: “you want to be right on the non-consensus.” Think Uber and Airbnb in 2008. If you asked me to jump in a stranger’s car to go somewhere then, I would have thought you were crazy. Same with living in a stranger’s home. I write more about being right on the non-consensus here and in this blog post.
Frankly, you may not be the target market. You’re not the customer that startup is serving. The constant reminder we, on the venture capital side of the table, have is to stop thinking that we are the core user for a product. Most products are not made for us. Equally, when a founder comes to us pre-traction and asks us “Is this a good idea?”, most of the time I don’t know. The numbers (will) prove if it’s a good idea or not. Unless I am their target audience, I don’t have a lot to weigh in on. I can only check, from least important to most important:
How big is the market + growth rate
Does the founder(s) have a unique insight into the industry that all the other players are overlooking or underestimating or don’t know at all? And will this insight keep incumbents at bay at least until this startup reaches product-market fit?
How obsessed about the problem space is the founder/team, which is a proxy for grit and resilience in the longer run? And obsession is an early sign of (1) their current level of domain expertise/navigating the “idea maze”, and (2) and their potential to gain more expertise. If we take the equation for a line, y = mx + b. As early-stage investors, we invest in “m’s” not “b’s”.
In closing
While I know not everyone echoes these thoughts, hopefully, this post can provide more context to some of the entrepreneurial motions we’re seeing today. Of course, take it all with a grain of salt. I’m an optimist by nature and by function of my job. Just as a VC I respect told me when I first started 4 years back,
“If you’re going to pursue a career in venture, by nature of the job, you have to be an optimist.”
Happened to also be one of the VCs who shared his thoughts for my little research project on inspiration and frustration last week.
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The other day, I saw a post on r/venturecapital (and now you know what my Reddit handle is) asking how prospect theory relates to venture capital. Admittedly, quite thought-provoking! Ever since college, I’ve been a huge behavioral economics buff – how human psychology dictates market motions. And, prospect theory happens to fall in that category.
First developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, prospect theory is a behavioral model that says humans are naturally loss-averse. Oh, you might know the former Nobel Prize bugger from authoring Thinking, Fast and Slow, a book I highly recommend if you’re curious about the intricacies of how our brain understands the data around us. Simply put, we react stronger to losing something than when we gain something.
*As you can see, this graph is safe for family-friendly programming
For example, I’m more likely to feel the loss after losing my $1500 cellphone than the ephemeral gain of winning a grand and a half in the lottery. On one end, you’re probably thinking that makes sense. On the other end, you’re probably calling me a loser for spending so much on a cellphone. Well, joke’s on you. I got my phone for $250 on Black Friday. But I digress. In another instance, if you look at kids, they’re more likely to throw a tantrum if you take away a marshmallow on their plate than give you a hug for giving them an extra marshmallow.
Similarly…
As you might expect, prospect theory informs many of my investing/sourcing decisions, including:
So, you’re probably now thinking: “Gimme the deets.”
While prospect theory suggests people typically weigh the impact of their losses more than they so their wins, VCs are humans at the end of the day. Just like your amateur naive stock trader will hold on to losses, and sell their wins, many VCs tend to do the same, as a reactionary measure.
It’s counterintuitive. But the name of the game in early-stage investing is not about how many losses you’ve sustained (especially when 7 out of every 10 go out of business, 2-3 break even, and hopefully 1 makes it), but about the magnitude of the wins an investor makes.
For instance, if you’ve invested in 100 companies, and 99 go out of business, and 1 makes 200x, you just doubled your fund. Of course, a successful fund typically makes 3-5x cash on cash multiple. Just our fancy way of saying your fund returns $3-5 for every dollar invested by a limited partner (LP). Although there are some nuances, many VC investors use cash on cash and multiple on invested capital (MOIC) quite interchangeably.
Guess for you to be counted as a successful investor, that one investment’s gotta go to 300x, at the minimum. In reality, you’re probably not going to have just one investment perform. Especially if you’re in the top quartile of VCs out there. You’re looking at a ~2.5% unicorn rate. So 2-3 investments of your 100 investments should be valued at over a billion dollars. Unless you’re Chris Sacca, who I hear returned 250x cash on cash for his first $8.4M seed fund, which included the likes of Uber, Twitter, and Instagram.
Of course, larger funds are harder to return. It’s easier to return a $10M fund than a $1B, much less a $100B. While I’m not supporting the only $100B vehicle known to date, the losses that fund sustained made the front page news a while back. And though by monetary value, they lost more than most other funds out there. Percentage-wise, they’re not alone. But in the public and media’s eyes, their losses are weighted more heavily than smaller funds.
In closing/Disclaimer
But hey, I’m no registered investment advisor. If you’re looking for which specific startups to invest in, please do consult with a professional. While I may share what startups have attracted my attention here and there, my thoughts are just my own thoughts. And, this post is merely me sharing the correlation between venture capital and prospect theory, plus a few digressions.
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