“A true friend is one who stabs you in the front.”— Oscar Wilde
Many years ago, in what seemed like another lifetime, I made a girl cry. Nothing to boast about. In fact, even today, I’m quite embarrassed that I did so. In a negotiation where I prioritized one small committee in a club’s priorities above the priorities of other committees, I felt that I was right in every way. I conceived a million reasons why rationally I was right — cost, our future members’ preferences, down to the stable marriage algorithm. I fell prey to pride and ego. And she broke down. Instead of apologizing, I walked away, asserting that the data supported my case.
The next day, I found solace among classmates and friends. They told me I didn’t do anything wrong. That they would’ve done the same thing. That the facts proved I was right. Until that evening, a good friend and someone I’d known since middle school, said, “You’re fucking stupid.”
He told me to drop everything and to go apologize in person right that instant. To hell with data and facts. He said that I forgot the very first principle of any negotiation… that there was a human being on the other side. And I didn’t treat her as one. He was the one person who opened my eyes up to the ego I was blinded by. So I did. In my realization, I felt terrible and even worse for needing someone else to tell me that I had to. But that’s the friend I needed. That’s what I needed to hear.
Something you might have realized if you’re a frequent visitor to this small piece of virtual real estate is that I’m not perfect. Nor do I pretend to be. The above example is evidence of that.
I was reminded of that when I was listening to Jonathan Abramson Venture Unlocked earlier this week. Where they brought up the topic of being founder friendly — a term that indubitably carries a lot of baggage. From the VC side, it’s jargon that’s been thrown around so much over the past decade, it’s lost its luster and meaning. From the founder side, many founders frankly just don’t get what it means. Why? Because no one actually defines it.
Over the years, I’ve seen and heard explicit and implicit definitions, including:
Not firing the CEO (even when they don’t do a good job)
Helping the founder grow as the company and CEO job description grows
Having answers to every question the founders ask
Asking (good) questions
Telling the founders what to do
The thing is, all the above are right and wrong at the same time. It’s situationally dependent. Ok, maybe except the last one. That one’s wrong all the time. Something you realize pretty quickly is that the investor is not in the driver’s seat. At best, we sit shotgun.
So, what does “founder friendly” mean?
Jonathan Abrams and the 8-Bit team says, “Do no harm.”
Fred Wilson says, “Saving your company from yourself may well be founder friendly.”
To YC, it’s being honest, transparent, responsive, and acting in the best interests of the company, shareholders, employees, and founders.
The truth is everyone has a different, but similar definition. Like product-market fit, it’s hard to measure and an amorphous term. It’s obvious in hindsight. But mysterious in foresight. Yet, as a founder, there are still many telltale signs on how helpful an investor actually will be.
Leading indicators to helpfulness
One of the reasons I love working with smaller checkwriters — be it angels or emerging fund managers — is that they often punch above their weight class. They’re insanely responsive. And are often more helpful than their check size. They may not be able to single-handedly fill the round, nor can their check get you to profitability, but they’re there when you need them. In other words, they hit high on the check size-to-helpfulness ratio, which I’ve written about before.
The first meeting
Interestingly enough, the first meeting is quite telling of how helpful investors are — regardless of the decision outcome. It could be in the form of investor intros, strategic advice, hard questions to consider, or key hires to make. In fact, they’ll make you feel like you got back days if not weeks, out of a 30-minute meeting. If you, as the founder, get nothing out of the first meeting, then you likely won’t get much when they are on your cap table. The most helpful investors don’t waste time. Not theirs. But more importantly, not yours either. They know that each time you meet with them is time away from building. And they’ll make that time worthwhile.
As an investor, the golden standard should be to be helpful in every meeting. And I don’t mean ending the conversation with “Let me know how I can be helpful.” That’s reactive.
For one of my good friends, that means that if he takes a meeting with you — whether he chooses to invest or not, he will write a 3-5 page bug report on your product. For some of my other friends, it’s that if they take a meeting, they’ll nine out of ten times set up an intro. Instead of asking “How can I be helpful?”, one should ask “What do you need help on?” or “What are the biggest obstacles that prevent you from reaching your 6-12 month goals?” Then, proactively trying to find some way to help.
That said, the afore-mentioned investors’ bar for taking a meeting is rather high.
Response rate
Another proxy for helpfulness is how fast they reply to your emails. Many of the investors who I know are insanely helpful have a system to respond to founders quickly. Moreover, if the decision is a ‘No’, they don’t shy away from sharing that and why they decided to pass. Of course, the latter is not possible for every inbound pitch. But at the very minimum, are table stakes if you’ve already jumped on an initial live conversation with them.
Here, within 24 hours is epic. 48-72 hours is great. And anything longer becomes a dime a dozen.
Inactive founders sing them high praise
It’s always important to do your homework on your investor. One of such ways is talking to other founders they backed, especially the ones who are no longer founders or no longer pursuing the original idea they were backed on. Active portfolio companies are likely to still give lip service to their investors, especially when they are a large portion of their cap table. So, when you ask, “Was this investor helpful?”, you’re likely to get an overly politically correct answer. Rather, the question I recommend asking is:
“If you were to start a new company, who are the three investors — big or small — on your current cap table that you would kill to have back on?”
Conversely, if you talk to former portfolio founders, they’re likely to be a lot more honest as they don’t have a currently active relationship with the investor. Or if they still do, the investor must have done something right.
Lagging indicators to helpfulness
While not the intended purpose of this blogpost, I can’t help but shed some additional context for investors out there. In my recent conversations with GPs and LPs, I noticed a common thread among the GPs who are capable of raising a fund even in a down market. It’s that the founders they back who went on to raise A, B rounds, or greater, come back to invest in their early believers. The people who made a difference in these founders’ lives.
So, whenever I meet an emerging GP asking for fundraising advice, one of the first questions I ask, outside of these five questions which determine if they’re ready to start a fund, is:
Have any of the founders you backed before committed to your fund?
Goodwill and helpfulness builds flywheels. When your founders go on to win, if you’ve been helpful, they’ll want to pay it back.
Tangentially, it’s why the team at Ludlow Ventures says, “There is no greater compliment, as a VC, than when a founder you passed on — still sends you deal-flow and introductions.” So, getting deal flow from founders you pass on means, either:
They still want something from you; or
You were really helpful that they want to send all their best founder friends to you.
Hopefully, it’s the latter.
In closing
At the end of the day, no one’s perfect. Not the founders. Not the investors. No one. And it’s okay.
In the current world of chaotic down markets, high interest rates, and more, this is the time to build goodwill. This is the time to be truly founder friendly. If you have less liquidity, you can always help in many ways outside of pure capital. After all, capital for founders is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. Sometimes it’s just being honest, candid, and transparent with the founder.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
The past 2 weeks brought me a whirlwind of conversations with emerging managers and LPs, catalyzed by the emerging LP playbook. And of the former, I’ve come across two main themes:
Everyone — I kid you not… everyone — has top-tier VCs as their follow-on and/or their co-investors. What was once upon unique is no longer so.
Eric was right. There’s an overabundance of the word “signal” in venture wonderland these days — to the point the word itself has lost its meaning. By definition, it should mean that is unique and stands above a sea of noise. For many investors, that means either investing in brand-name startups (i.e. SpaceX, Figma, etc.) or investing alongside brand-name investors. The latter, unfortunately, is also a product of the ecosystem as many LPs seek social proof about your investment thesis from others’ who have a proven track record. The former gets a bit sticky. A lot of these logos are either off-fund-thesis or came as a Series B syndicate investment (but the fund itself is investing in pre-seed or seed).
After publishing the emerging LP playbook last week, I've been lucky to chat with quite a few emerging managers raising their Fund I's
And there are 2 common themes I see in their decks:
1. Tier 1 VCs as follow on investors are table stakes 2. There's a lot of logo shopping
To piggyback on the above, the notion of signal is worth elaborating on, likely a vestigial appendage of the past two years.
Let me preface by saying that it takes a lot to get to conviction.
In 2020 and 2021, many investors’ calculus of startup signal boiled down to three things: great investors, great traction, and great team. And in that order. That is first and foremost what I see a lot of professionalizing investors do. I can’t entirely blame them since the ecosystem itself propagates the belief that if a Tier 1 VC jumps in, you’re more likely to get to a great exit. Or at the minimum, get a great mark-up to make your IRRs and TVPIs look better. On paper, of course.
But what I believe a lot of investors are missing is that… venture is a game that’s not about your batting average, but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit. You’ve heard it before, and you’ll continue to hear more of it. Unlike other financial services, VC is driven by the power law. 80% of your returns will be driven by 20% of your bets. That’s the 10,000 foot view. Let’s be honest. Most of us, myself included, don’t take that panoramic view every day or even every week. In fact, I see many emerging managers only take that view when they’re forced to. In other words, when they’re in fundraising mode.
For many professionalizing angels and syndicate leads, that becomes trying to string a narrative from seemingly disparate data points. Or at least, it seems that way.
As Asher Siddiqui told me, “[after] you look at their whole life and career history, and look at their thesis, if the thesis doesn’t make complete and perfect sense, then I don’t think this is a ‘great‘ fund manager. If it fits like a glove, then yes, they could be.”
The best GPs are disciplined even before they start fundraising. They focus on the thesis they want to raise on when they do. That’s not to say they don’t invest off-thesis every so often. But they don’t pitch their off-thesis angel or syndicate investments as part of their thesis-driven track record. But I digress.
In chasing signal for the sake of signal, when you hear of a hot deal every other day, many investors forget to be that belief capital for founders. I’m not saying that an investor should do so for every founder out there. But to pick a few, or even just one. One that they’re willing to take the swing before others do.
The signal is their own conviction in the founder.
The first half
Because of this progression, there’s been a new two-part question I really enjoy asking emerging GPs. The first half:
Which company in your portfolio you think is still underestimated?
Which company in your portfolio didn’t get the investor attention you expected but are still extremely bullish on their growth? And why do you still believe in them? What are other investors missing out on?
It’s not about track record or social proof here. It’s about the ability to recognize exceptional talent and articulate it clearly. Hopefully, a rose growing in concrete.
Well, in terms of the odds, you’re likely to be wrong. But that’s okay. You need to be willing to be wrong to achieve outlier success.
Fund I is often the proof-of-concept fund for the emerging managers I’ve talked to. They start by writing small checks, don’t lead rounds, and don’t fight for ownership targets. They claim to be extremely helpful and hands on. Then again, expectation often differs from reality, especially if they’ve never been so before (where LPs discover through reference checks). And because they’re writing smaller checks now, I’ve seen many implicitly hold off on developing a framework to get to conviction until Fund III. Whereas the best GPs start thinking about it early on.
You can think about it this way. As long as you’re benchmarking on signal via other investors, why should an LP back your thesis when they can back your “signal”?
For individuals and smaller family offices, they’ll still back you. What they’re buying is access, since they can’t afford nor have the relationship to be an LP in the “signals.” Larger LPs have the optionality to do so. And if you’re an emerging GP hoping to grow as a professional manager by having larger and larger funds, you eventually need to raise from large LPs. At least, until the SEC changes their 99 limit. And to do so, from larger LPs, means you need to bet where their existing portfolio has not bet before. Plus do it well.
The second half
If you haven’t already, a great way to build a referenceable track record is to sweat the details. Yes. The details matter. Nate Silver, one of the best poker players of our generation, said earlier this year, “you can’t just get the big things right in poker. You have to get the small things right too. It’s too competitive of a field right now.”
Though he said venture is different, I believe he’s half right. Most investors don’t sweat the small things. But investors should. Today, that’s how you stand out.
It might not have been true a decade ago, but now it is. Just last year, in 2021, there were 730 funds created. To put that number into perspective, on average, that literally means two firms closed every single day last year, including the holidays and weekends!
Capital has become a commodity. In 2021, speed was a differentiator. Clearly, in 2022, it is not. Today, it’s tough being a founder. If you’ve raised in the last two years, you’re considering extending your runway. That means having tough conversations to reduce your workforce, your benefits, or your salaries. If you haven’t raised, it’s a hard market to be raising in now. And so the differentiator today, is in two parts:
Helping founders navigate these tough situations. In other words, being (proactively) helpful.
And helping founders raise their next round. Mac Conwell recently shared a great thread on how powerful a founders’ network is to get funding. The same applies to an investors’ ability to help their portfolio raise capital. How liquid is your network? It’s not about who you know, but how well you know your friends downstream, and how can you get them over the activation energy to invest. Don’t get me wrong. There still needs to be a certain level of hustle from the founders themselves. But a great investor often steps in to reduce as much friction as we can in that process.
Both of which have long been the job description of being a VC. It’s in the small things. Jump on a 2AM call. Help your founders figure out the wording for a reduction-in-force. Fix the sales copy to better close leads.
There are 10-15 character-building moments in a founder’s journey where the moat they build around the business (as opposed to just the product) is not IP or early product traction, but rather from the lessons obtained from scar tissue.
It’s hard to predict looking through the windshield when these moments are, but quite obvious via the rearview mirror. And the best an investor can do is be there as much as he/she can. Albeit hard to do for every company in your portfolio, and that’s the truth. The wealth of information creates a poverty of attention. The larger your portfolio, the harder it is to be truly helpful to every single one. So focus on founders who need you, rather than those who will do great without you. Reputation is built in wartime and realized in peacetime.
So, the second part to the above question is:
What did you do for this company that no other investor or advisor did?
… where I’m looking for answers on how this investor went above the call of duty to help a company they believed in grow.
In closing
In summary,
Which company in your portfolio you think is still underestimated?
What did you do for this company that no other investor or advisor did?
This is by no means original, but heavily inspired by the recent conversations I’ve had, as well as helps me build my own framework for analysis. In parts, this question is a derivation to the check size to helpfulness ratio (CS:H). How helpful are you as an investor? When you say you’re founder-friendly, do you mean it?
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Back in mid-2020, I started writing a piece on 99 Pieces of Unsolicited, (Possibly) Ungooglable Startup Advice. There was no ETA on the piece. I had no idea when I would publish it, other than the fact, that I would only do so once I hit the number 99. Yet, just like how I was inspired to write how similar founders and funders are, it finally dawned on me to start writing a similar piece for investors around mid-2021. The funny thing, is though I started this essay half a year later, I finished writing it one and a half months sooner while I was still on advice #95 for the former.
Of course, you can bet your socks I’ve started my next list of unsolicited advice for investors already. Once again, with no ETA. As I learn more, the subsequent insight that leads to an “A-ha!” moment will need to go deeper and more granular. And who knows, the format is likely to change.
I often find myself wasting many a calorie in starting from a simple idea and extrapolating into something more nuanced. And while many ideas deserve more nuance, if not more, some of the most important lessons in life are simple in nature. The 99 soundbites for investors below cover everything, in no particular order other than categorical resonance, including:
Unfortunately, many of the below advice came from private conversations so I’m unable to share their names. Unless they’ve publicly talked about it. Nevertheless, I promise you won’t be disappointed.
As any Rolodex of advice goes, you will not resonate with every single one, nor should you. Every piece of advice is a product of someone’s anecdotal experience. While each may differ in their gravitas, I hope that each of the below will serve as a tool in your toolkit for and if the time comes when you need it most.
To preface again, none of this is legal investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.
General advice
1/ To be in venture capital, you fundamentally have to be an optimist. You have to believe in a better tomorrow than today.
2/ “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.” – Mike Tyson. Told to me by an LP who invests in emerging and diverse managers.
3/ Have good fluidity of startup information. “No founder wants to meet a partner and have to answer the same questions again and again. Best partnerships sync and with every discussion, process the questioning.” – Harry Stebbings
4/ The lesson is to buy low, sell high. Not to buy lowest, sell highest.
5/ “The New York Times test. Don’t do anything you wouldn’t want to see on the front page of the NY Times.” – Peter Hebert
6/ “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.” – Warren Buffett
7/ When you’re starting off as an investor, bet on one non-obvious founder – a real underdog. Support them along their entire journey. Even if there’s no huge exit, the next one will be bigger. When their VPs go off and start their own businesses, they’ll think of you first as well.
8/ When planning for the next generation of your firm’s successors, hire and mentor a cohort of brilliant investors, instead of focusing on finding the best individual. Investing is often a lonely journey, and it’s much easier to grow into a role if they have people to grow together and commiserate with.
9/ “When exit prices are great, entry prices are lousy. When entry prices are great, exit prices are lousy.” – David Sacks
10/ Illiquidity is a feature, not a bug. – Samir Kaji
11/ Three left turns make a right turn. There is no one way to break into VC. Oftentimes, it’s the ones with the most colorful backgrounds that provide the most perspective forward.
12/ “Whenever you find yourself in the majority, it is time to pause and reflect.” As an early stage investor, I find Mark Twain’s quote to be quite insightful.
13/ “It’s not about figuring out what’s wrong; it’s about figuring out what is so right. The job of an investor is to figure out what is so overwhelmingly great, or so tantalizingly promising that it’s worth dealing with all the stuff that’s broken.” – Pat Grady retelling a story with Roelof Botha
15/ Track your deal flow. Here’s how I track mine. Another incredible syndicate lead with over 5x TVPI (total value to paid in capital) I met keeps it even simpler. A spreadsheet with just 4 columns.
Company
Valuation in
Valuation out
Co-investors – This is where you start sharing deal flow with each other here.
16/ One of your best sources of deal flow might not be from other investors, but those who are adjacent to the venture ecosystem, like startup lawyers and VC attorneys.
17/ A WhatsApp group with your portfolio is a great tool for diligencing investments, not as much for sourcing deals.
18/ “Decide once you have 70% conviction.” – Keith Rabois. Don’t make decisions with 40% conviction since that’s just gambling. Don’t wait till 90% conviction because you’ll miss the deal for being too slow.
19/ Ask questions to founders where they show grit over a repeated period of time. They need to show some form of excellence in their life, but it doesn’t have to be in their current field. From a pre-seed manager with 3 unicorns in a portfolio of 70.
20/ As an emerging manager, one of the best reasons for investing in emerging markets: Do you want to see the deals that the top 0.1% see? Or do you want to see the deals that the 0.1% passed on? From the same pre-seed manager with 3 unicorns in a portfolio of 70.
21/ Every day, open your calendar for just one hour (two 30-minute slots) to founders you wouldn’t have had otherwise. Your network will compound. From a manager who’s invested in multiple unicorns and does the above from 10-11PM every night.
22/ The bigger your check size, the harder you have to fight to get into the round.
23/ The best investors frontload their diligence so they can have smarter first conversations with founders.
24/ Perform immersion-based diligence. Become super consumers and super users of a category, as close as you can get to subject-matter experts. That way you know very quickly after meeting a founder if their product is differentiated or unique. While you’re at it, write 2-3 page bug report stress-testing the product. Founders really do appreciate it.
26/ When a founder can’t take no for an answer and pushes back, “I always have to accept the possibility that I’m making a mistake.” The venture business keeps me humble, but these are the benchmarks that the team and I all believe in. Inspired by JCal and Molly Wood.
27/ Win deals by “sucking the oxygen out of the air.” In investing there are two ways to invest: picking or getting picked. Picking is naturally in a non-competitive space. Getting picked is the exact opposite. You have to eat competition for breakfast. And when you’re competing for a deal everyone wants to get into, you have to be top-of-mind. You need to increase the surface area in which founders remember you, not just to take their time, but to be really, really valuable in as much time as you can spend with them. Inspired by Pat Grady on an anecdote about Sarah Guo.
Pitching to LPs
28/ Surprises suck. On Samir Kaji’s podcast, Guy Perelmuter of GRIDS Capital once said: “There’s only one thing that LPs hate more than losing money. It’s surprises.” More here.
29/ Fund I: You’re selling a promise. Fund II: You’re selling a strategy. And, Fund III: You’re selling the returns on Fund I.
30/ Steven Spielberg didn’t know what E.T. should look like, so he had everyone write down people they respected. And so E.T. looked a bit like everyone on that list, including Carl Sandburg, Albert Einstein and Ernest Hemingway. In a very similar way, come up with a list of your ideal LPs. And create a fund based on what they like to see and what you can bring to the table. Oftentimes, it’s easier to ask them for personal checks than checks out of their fund.
31/ Ask the founders you back for intros to their other investors as potential LPs in your fund.
32/ The return hurdles for LPs are different per fund type: *subject to market motions. Timestamped in Sept 2021 by Samir Kaji
Nano-fund (<$20M): 5-7x+
Seed fund: 3-5x+
Series A: 3x+
Growth: 2-2.5x+
Crossover/late growth (driven by IRR, not multiples): 10-12%+
33/ “If you know one family office, you know one family office.” Said by one of the largest LPs in venture funds. Each family office situation is uniquely different.
34/ Family offices are surprisingly closed off to cold emails, but often share a lot of deal flow with each other. Have co-investors or founders introduce you to them.
35/ It takes on average 2 months for an institutional LP to do diligence and reference checks. Plan accordingly.
36/ LPs look for:
Track record (could be as an individual angel as well)
Value add
Operational excellence
37/ Data shows that first-time/emerging managers are more likely to deliver outperformance than their counterparts, but as one, you still need to show you have experience investing.
38/ People, including LPs, tend to remember stories, more than they do data. Teach your LPs something interesting.
39/ LPs have started looking more into two trends: private investments and impact/ESG initiatives. By nature of you reading this blogpost, you’re most likely the former already. The latter is worth considering as part of your thesis.
40/ Every coffee is worthwhile in some form.
41/ LP diligence into VCs break down into two types: investment and operational DD.
Investment DD includes team, incentive alignment, strategy, performance, current market, and terms/fees.
Team: What does leadership look like? How diverse are you?
Alignment: Do you have performance-based compensation?
Strategy: What sectors are you investing into? What does your underwriting discipline look like?
Performance: What do your exits look like? Are you exits repeatable?
Market: What are the current industry valuations? Economies of scale?
Terms/fees: Are they LP friendly? Are the fees based on alphas or betas? Are they aligned with your value add?
Operational DD includes business model, operational controls, tech platforms, service providers, compliance and risk.
42/ If you’re pitching to other venture funds to be LPs, say for $250K checks, larger funds (i.e. $1B fund) typically have fund allocations because check size is negligible. And a value add as deal flow for them at the A. Whereas, smaller funds don’t because it is a meaningful size of their fund. So, GPs write personal checks.
43/ If you’re planning to raise a fund, think of it like raising 10 Series A rounds. For most Series A rounds, a founder talks to about 50 investors. So for a Fund I, you’re likely to talk to 500 LPs to close one.
44/ Send potential LPs quarterly LP updates, especially institutions. Institutions will most likely not invest in your Fund I or II, but keep them up to date on the latest deals you’re getting into, so you’re primed for Fund III.
45/ Family offices want to get in top funds but most can’t because top funds have huge waitlists. Yet they still want access to the same deals as top funds get access to. They’re in learning mode. Your best sell to family offices is, therefore, to have:
Tier 1 investors as your fund’s LPs
Tier 1 investors as co-investors
Deals that they wanted to get into anyway
46/ Your Fund I LPs are going to be mostly individual angels. They believe in you and your promise, and are less worried about financial returns.
47/ Institutional LPs are looking for returns and consistency. If you say you’ll do 70% core checks and 30% discovery checks, they’re checking to see if you stick to it. Institutions aren’t in learning mode, instead you as a fund manager fit into a very specific category in their portfolio. Subsequently, you’re competing with other funds with similar foci/theses as you do.
48/ Be transparent with your IRRs. If you know you have inflated IRRs due to massive markups that are annualized, let your (potential) LPs know. For early stage, that’s probably 25-30%+. Especially when you’re in today’s frothy market (timestamped Jan 2022). Or as Jason Calacanis says it for his first scout fund that had crazy IRRs, “It’s only down from here.”
49/ Don’t waste a disproportionate amount of time convincing potential LPs about the viability of your thesis. Shoot for folks who can already see your vision. If you manage to convince an LP that didn’t previously agree, they may or may not end up micromanaging you if your thesis doesn’t work out as “expected.” Inspired by Elizabeth Yin.
50/ “The irony for us was LPs asking about portfolio construction was a sign that the meeting was going poorly.” – Jarrid Tingle.
51/ Institutional LPs prefer you to have a concentrated startup portfolio – less than 30 companies. They already have diversification across funds, so they’re maximizing the chance that their portfolio has fund returners. That said, you’re probably not raising institutional capital until Fund III. Inspired by Jarrid Tingle.
52/ If you’re an emerging manager with a fund is less than 4 years old, boasting high IRR (i.e. 50%+) is meaningless to sophisticated and institutional LPs. Focus on real comparative advantages instead. – Samir Kaji.
53/ When raising early checks from LPs, ask for double the minimum check size. Some LPs will negotiate down, and when they only have to commit half of what they thought they had to, they leave feeling like they won.
54/ When potential LPs aren’t responding to your follow ups/LP updates, send one more follow up saying: “I am assuming you are not interested in investing into our fund. If I am wrong, please let me know or else this will be your last update.” Told to me by a Fund III manager who used this as her conversion strategy.
55/ It’s easier to have larger checkwriters ($500K+) commit than smaller checkwriters (<$100K). $500K is a much smaller proportion of larger checkwriters’ net worth than checkwriters who write $100K checks. And as such, smaller checkwriters write less checks, have less “disposable income”, and push back/negotiate a lot more with fund managers before committing. Told to me by a Fund III manager.
Fund strategy/management
56/ As an investor, if you want to maintain your ownership, you have to continue requesting pro-rata rights at each round.
58/ “Opportunity funds are pre-established blind pool vehicles that eliminate the timing issues that come with deal-by-deal SPVs. Opportunity funds sometimes have reduced economics from traditional 2/20 structures, including management fees that are sometimes charged on deployed, not committed capital. Unlike individual SPVs, losses from one portfolio company in an opportunity fund offset gains from another when factoring in carried interest.” – Samir Kaji. See the full breakdown of pros and cons of opportunity funds here.
59/ There are two ways to generate alphas.
Get in early.
Go to where everyone else said it’ll rain, but it didn’t. Do the opposite of what people do. That said, being in the non-consensus means you’ll strike out a lot and it’ll be hard to find support.
60/ Sometimes being right is more important than being in the non-consensus. Inspired by Kanyi Maqubela.
Market risk as a function of ownership – What is the financial upside if exit happens? Is it meaningful enough to the fund size?
Judgment risk – Are you picking the right companies?
Win rate risk – How can you help your portfolio companies win? What is your value add?
62/ By Fund III, you should start having institutional capital in your investor base.
63/ The closer you get to investing in growth or startups post-product-market fit, the closer your capital is to optimization capital. Founders will likely succeed with or without you, but your name on the cap table will hopefully get them there faster and more efficiently.
64/ If you’re a traditional venture fund, you have to invest in venture-qualifying opportunities, like direct startup investments. But you can invest up to 20% of your fund’s capital in non-venture-qualifying opportunities, like tokens/SAFTs (simple agreement for future tokens), real estate, secondaries, and so on.
65/ If increased multiples coming out of various vintage funds, feel free to deviate from the normal 2-20. Many funds have 25 or 30% carry now, or accelerators where 20% scales with multiples (and often with a catch-up back to 1.0x at higher carry). – Samir Kaji
66/ Normally, fund managers take 2% management fees, usually over 10 years, totaling 20% over the lifetime of the fund. These days, I’m seeing a number of emerging managers take larger management fees over less years. For example, 10% as a one-off. Or 5% over 2-3 years.
67/ “The razor I apply to investing and startups is that every decision that increases your probability of wild outlier success should also increase your probability of total failure. If you want to be a shot at being a 10x returning fund? You’ll have to take on the higher likelihood of being a 1x. If you think you’re going to build the next Stripe? You’re going to have to run the risk of going nowhere.” – Finn Murphy
69/ The longer you delay/deprioritize having diverse partners, the harder it’ll be to hire your first one.
Advising founders/executives
70/ A founder’s greatest weakness is his/her/their distraction. Don’t contribute to the noise.
71/ It’s far more powerful to ask good questions to founders than give “good answers”. The founders have a larger dataset about the business than you do. Let them connect the dots, but help them reframe problems through questions.
72/ You are not in the driver’s seat. The founder is.
73/ A great reason for not taking a board seat is that if you disagree with the founders, disagree privately. Heard from a prolific late-stage VC.
74/ Advice is cheap. Differentiate between being a mentor and an ally. Mentors give free advice when founders ask. Allies go out of their way to help you. Be an ally.
75/ The best way to be recognized for your value-add is to be consistent. What is one thing you can help with? And stick to it.
76/ Productize your answers. Every time a founder asks you a question, it’s likely others have the same one. Build an FAQ. Ideally publicly.
77/ If you have the choice, always opt to be kind rather than to be nice. You will help founders so much more by telling them the truth (i.e. why you’re not excited about their business) than defaulting on an excuse outside of their control (i.e. I need to talk with my partners or I’ve already deployed all the capital in this fund). While the latter may be true, if you’re truly excited about a founder and their product, you’ll make it happen.
78/ Help founders with their firsts. It doesn’t have to be their first check, but could also be their first hire, engineer, office space, sale, co-founder, team dispute, and so on.
79/ There are four big ways you can help founders: fundraising, hiring, sales pipeline, and strategy. Figure out what you’re good at and double down on that.
80/ Focus on your check-size to helpfulness ratio (CS:H). What is your unique value add to founders that’ll help them get to their destination faster? Optimize for 5x as a VC. 10x as an angel.
81/ “The job of a board is to hire and fire the CEO. If you think I’m doing a bad job, you should fire me. Otherwise, I’m gonna have to ask you to stay out of my way.” – Frank Slootman to Doug Leone after he was hired as CEO of ServiceNow.
SPVs and syndicates
82/ The top syndicates out there all have 3 traits:
Great team
Great traction
Tier 1 VC
If your deal has all of the above, and if you raise on AngelList, your deal is shared with the Private Capital Network (PCN), which AngelList’s own community of LPs and investors, a lot of which are family offices, who allocate at lest $500K of capital per year.
83/ If you’re raising an AngelList syndicate, you need to raise a minimum of $80K or else the economics don’t really make sense. AL charges an $8K fee.
84/ If you want to include Canadian investors in your syndicate, for regulation purposes, you need to invest 2% of the allocation size or $10K.
85/ Investing a sizeable check as a syndicate lead (e.g. $10K+) is good signal for conviction in the deal, and often gets more attention.
86/ 99% of LPs in syndicates want to be passive capital because they’re investing in 50 other syndicates. You can build relationships individually with them over time, but don’t count on their strategic value.
87/ Historically, smaller checkwriters take up 99% of your time. Conversely, your biggest checkwriters will often take up almost no time. Even more true for syndicates.
88/ LPs don’t care for deals where syndicate leads have time commitment without cash commitment.
89/ Don’t give LPs time to take founders’ time. Most of the time LPs don’t ask good questions, so it’s not worth the effort to set up time for each to meet with founders individually. On the other hand, a good LP update would be to host a webinar or live Q&A session. One to many is better than one to one.
90/ There’s a lot of cannibalism in the syndicate market. The same LPs are in different syndicates.
91/ Choose whether you will or will not send LP updates. Set clear expectations on LP updates. And if you do, stick to that cadence. The people who write you the $1-5K checks are often the loudest and demand monthly updates. If you choose not to, one of my favorite syndicate leads says this to their LPs, “We won’t give any LP updates. I’ve done my diligence, and I won’t give information rights. I have a portfolio of hundreds of deals, and I can’t be expected to give deal-by-deal updates every month or every quarter. So if you are investing, just know you’re along for the ride.” Some LPs won’t like that and won’t invest, but mentioning that upfront will save you from a whole lot of headaches down the road.
92/ If you’re setting up an SPV to solely invest in a fund (or where more than 40% of the SPV is going into the fund), all your SPVs can’t against the 249 LPs cap on a fund <$10M and a 99 cap on a fund >$10. But you can invest in funds if you’re setting up an SPV to invest in more than one fund. Context from Samir Kaji and Mac Conwell.
Evergreen/Rolling funds
93/ Just like vintage years/funds are important for traditional funds, vintage quarters matter to your LPs. If they didn’t give you capital during, say Q2 of 2021, when you invested in the hottest startup on the market, your Q1 and your Q3 LPs don’t have access to those returns.
94/ Whereas GPs typically make capital calls to their LPs every 6 months, AngelList’s Rolling Funds just institutionalized the process by forcing GPs to make capital calls every 3 months.
Angel investing
95/ “The best way to get deal access isn’t to be great with founders—it’s to have other investors think you’re great with founders. Build a high NPS with investors, since they have meaningfully more reach than an operator. But of course, fight hard to be great with founders too or else this will all crash down.” – Aaron Schwartz
96/ Make most of your personal mistakes on your own money as an angel (before you raise a fund).
97/ When you’re starting off, be really good at one thing. Could be GTM, growth, product, sales hires, etc. Make sure the world knows the one thing you’re good at. From there, founders and investors will think of you when they think of that one thing. Unless you’re Sequoia or a16z, it’s far better to be a specialist than a generalist if you want to be top of mind for other investors sharing deal flow.
98/ “As an angel investor, it’s more important to be swimming in a pool of good potential investments than to be an exceptionally good picker. Obviously if you’re able to be both, it’s better 🙂 but if you had to choose between being in a position to see great deals and then picking randomly, or coming across average deals and picking expertly, choose the former.” – Jack Altman
99/ “Just like the only way to get good at wine is to drink a lot of wine. The only way to get good at investing is to see a lot of deals.” – Lo Toney.
Disclaimer: None of this is investment advice. This content is for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. Please consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal or investment advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Not too long ago, I quoted Phil Libin, founder of All Turtles and mmhmm (which has been my favorite virtual camera in and most likely post-pandemic), who said: “I think the most important job of a CEO is to isolate the rest of the company from fluctuations of the hype cycle because the hype cycle will destroy a company. It’ll shake it apart. In tech the hype cycles tend to be pretty intense.”
Hype is the difference in expectation and reality. Or more specifically, the disproportionate surplus of expectation. A month ago, Sarah Tavel at Benchmarkwrote: “Hype — the moment, either organic or manufactured, when the perception of a startup’s significance expands ahead of the startup’s lived reality — is an inevitability. And yet, it’s hard not to view hype with a mix of both awe and fear. Hype applied at the right moment can make a startup, while the wrong moment can doom it.”
Right now, we are in a hype market. And hype has taken the venture market by storm.
We’ve all been seeing this massive and increasing velocity and magnitude of capital deployment over the last few months. Startups are getting valued more and more. In the past, the pre-money valuations I was seeing ranged from 2-on-8 to 3-on-9. Or in not so esoteric VC jargon, $2M rounds on $8M pre-money valuations ($10M post-money) to $3M rounds on $9M pre-money valuations ($12M post-money). These days, I’ve been seeing 5-on-20 or 6-on-30. Some of which are still pre-traction, or even pre-product.
Founders love it. They’re getting capital on a discount. They’re getting greater sums of money for the same dilution. Investors who invested early love it. Their paper returns are going through the roof. When looking at IRR or TVPI (total value to paid-in capital – net measurement on realized and unrealized value), higher valuations in their portfolio companies are giving investors jet fuel to raise future funds. And greater exit values on acquisition or IPO mean great paydays for early investors. Elizabeth Yin of Hustle Fundsays “this incentivizes investors to throw cash at hyped up companies, instead of less buzzy startups that may be better run.”
Sarah further elaborated, “In the reality distortion field of hype, consumers lean in and invest in a platform with their time and engagement ahead of when they otherwise might have. They pursue status-seeking-work, not because they necessarily get the reward for it relative to other uses of their time, but because they expect to be rewarded for it in the future, either because of the typical rich-get-richer effect of networks, or just in the status of being an early adopter in something that ends up being big.” The same is true for investors investing in hyped startups. It’s status-seeking work.
Frankly, if you’re a founder, this is a good time to be fundraising.
Why?
Capital is increasingly digital.
There is more than one vehicle of early stage capital.
There are only two types of capital: Tactical capital and distribution capital.
1. Capital is increasingly digital.
Of the many things COVID did, the pandemic accelerated the timeline of the venture market. Pre-pandemic, when founders started fundraising, they’d book a week-long trip to the Bay Area to talk to investors sitting on Sand Hill Road. Most meetings that week would be intro meetings and coffee chats with a diverse cast of investors. Founders would then fly back to their home base and wait to hear back. And if they did, they would fly in once again. This process would inevitably repeat over and over, as the funnel grew tighter and tighter. And hopefully, at the end of a six-to-twelve month fundraise, they’d have one, maybe a few term sheets to choose from.
Over the past 18 months, every single investor took founder meetings over Zoom. And it caused many investors to realize that they can get deals done without ever having to meet founders in-person. Of course, the pandemic forced an overcorrection in investor habits. And now that we’re coming out of isolation, the future looks like: every intro meeting will now be over Zoom, but as founders get into the DD (due diligence) phases or in-depth conversations, then they’ll fly out to meet who they will marry.
It saves founders so much time, so they can focus on actually building and delivering their product to their customers. And,
VCs can meet many more founders than they previously thought possible.
This has enabled investors to invest across multiple geographies and build communities that breathe outside of their central hub or THE central hub – formerly the SF Bay Area. Rather, we’re seeing the growth of startup communities around the nation and around the world.
2. There is more than one vehicle for early stage capital.
While meetings have gone virtual, the past year has led to a proliferation of financing options in the market as well. Capital as jet fuel for your company is everywhere. Founders now have unprecedented optionality to fundraise on their terms. And that’s great!
Solo capitalists
Individual GPs who raise larger funds than angels and super angels, so that they can lead and price rounds. The best part is they make faster decisions that funds with multiple partners, which may require partner buy-in for investments.
Rolling funds
With their 506c general solicitation designation, emerging fund managers raise venture funds faster than ever and can start deploying capital sooner than traditional 506b funds.
Micro- and nano-VCs
Smaller venture funds with sub-ten million in fund size deploying strategic checks and often leverage deep GP expertise. No ownership targets, and can fill rounds fast after getting a lead investor.
Equity crowdfunding
Platforms, like Republic and SeedInvest, provide community-fueled capital to startups. Let your biggest fans and customers invest in the platform they want to see more of in the future. With recent regulations, you can also raise up to $5 million via non-accredited and accredited investors on these platforms.
Accelerators/incubators
Short three-month long programs, like Y Combinator, 500 Startups, and Techstars, that write small, fast checks (~$100K) to help you reach milestones. Little diligence and one to two interviews after the application. Often paired with an amazing investor and/or advisor network, workshops, powerful communities, and some, even opportunity funds to invest in your next round.
Syndicates/SPVs
Created for the purpose of making one investment into a company a syndicate lead loves, syndicates are another ad hoc way of raising capital from accredited investor fans, leveraging the brand of syndicate leads and deploying through SPVs. Or special purpose vehicles. I know… people in venture are really creative with their naming conventions. In turn, this increases discoverability and market awareness for your product.
SPACs and privates are going public again
Companies going public mean early employees have turned into overnight millionaires. In other words, accredited investors who are looking to grow their net worth further by investing in different asset classes. Because of the hype, investing in venture-scale businesses tend to be extremely lucrative. These investors also happen to have deep vertical expertise, high-value networks, as well as hiring networks to help startups grow faster. More investors, more early stage capital.
Growth and private equity are going upstream
Big players who usually sat downstream are moving earlier and earlier, raising or investing in venture funds and acceleration programs to capture venture returns. And as a function of such, LPs have increased percent distributions into the venture asset classes, just under different names.
Pipe
Pipe‘s existed before the pandemic, but founders have turned their eye towards different financing options, like Pipe. They turn your recurring revenue into upfront capital. Say a customer has an annual contract locked in with you, but is billed monthly. With Pipe, you can get all that promised revenue now to finance your startup’s growth, instead of having only bits and pieces of cash as your customers pay you monthly. Non-dilutive capital and low risk.
3. There are only two types of capital: Tactical capital and distribution capital.
There’s an increasingly barbell distribution in the market. Scott Kupor once toldMark Suster that: “The industry’s gonna bifurcate. You’re going to end up with the mega VCs. Let’s call them the Goldman Sachs of venture capital. Or the Blackrock of venture capital. And on the other end, you’re going to end up with niche. Little, small people who own some neighborhood whether it’s video, or payments, or physical security, cybersecurity, physical products, whatever. And people in the middle are going to get caught.”
Those “little, small” players have deep product and go-to-market expertise and networks. Their checks may be small. But for an early stage company still trying to figure out product-market fit, the resources, advice, and connections are invaluable to a startup’s growth. They’re often in the weeds with you. They check your blind side. And they genuinely empathize with the problems and frustrations you experience, having gone through them not too long ago themselves. Admittedly, many happen to be former or active operators and/or entrepreneurs.
On the flip side, you have the a16z’s and Sequoias on their 15th or 20th fund. Tried and true. Brilliant track record with funds consistently north of 25% IRR. Internal rate of return, or how fast their cash is appreciating annually. LPs love them because they know these funds are going to make them money. And as any investor knows, double down on your winners. More money for the same multiples means bigger returns.
The same is true for historical players, like Tiger, Coatue, and Insight, who wire you cash to scale. They assume far less risk. Which admittedly means a smaller multiple. And to compensate for a lower multiple, they invest large injections of capital. By the time you hit scale, you already know what strategies work. All you need is just more money in your winning strategies.
You find product-market fit with tactical capital. You find scale with distribution capital.
Product-market fit is the process of finding hype. When you stop pushing and start finding the pull in the market. Scale is the process of manufacturing hype.
The bear case
But there are downsides to hype. Last month, Nikhil, founding partner at Footwork, put it better than I ever could.
If I could add an 8th point to Nikhil’s analysis, it’d be that investors in today’s market are incentivized to “pump and dump” their investments. Early stage investors spike up the valuations, which leads to downstream investors like Tiger Global, Coatue, Insight, and Softbank doubling down on valuation bets. Once there’s a secondary market for private shares, early stage investors then liquidate their equity to growth investors who are seeking ownership targets, or just to get a slice of the pie. This creates an ecosystem of misaligned incentives, where early stage investors are no longer in it for the long run with founders. Great fund strategy that’ll make LPs happy campers, but it leaves founders with uncommitted, temporary partners.
Sundeep Peechu of Felicis Ventures has an amazing thread on how getting the right founder-investor fit right is a huge value add. And getting founder-investor fit takes time, and sometimes a trial by fire as well. After all, it’s a long-term marriage, rather than a one-night stand. Those who don’t spend enough time “dating” before “marriage” may find a rocky road ahead when things go south.
By my count, ~30% of Felicis companies that have done well had trouble raising Series As in some fashion.
As an example, Matterport which went public last week had little appetite at the A. Non-recurring revenue, hardware business and selling to real estate was a triple whammy.
On a 9th point, underrepresented and underestimated founders are often swept under the rug. In a hype market, VCs are forced to make faster decisions, partly due to FOMO. With faster decisions, investors do less diligence before investing. Which to the earlier point of misaligned incentives, has amplified the already-existing notion of buyer’s remorse.
When VCs go back to habits of pattern recognition, they optimize for founder/startup traits they are already familiar with. And often times, their investment track record don’t include underrepresented populations. To play devil’s advocate, the good news is that there is also a simultaneous, but comparatively slow proliferation of diverse fund managers, who are more likely to take a deeper look at the problems that underestimated founders are tackling.
What kind of curve are we on?
When many others seem to think that this hype market will end soon, last week, I heard a very interesting take on the current venture market in a chat with Frank Wang, investor at Dell Technologies Capital. “VCs have been mispricing companies. We anchor ourselves on historical valuations. But these anchors could be wrong.
“We’re at the beginning of the hype and I don’t see it slowing down. VC has been so stagnant, and there hasn’t been any innovation in venture in a long time. Growth hasn’t slowed. And Tiger [Global] and Insight [Partners] is doing venture right. Hypothetically speaking, if you invest in everything, the IRR should be zero. They are returning 20% IRR because they seem to have found that VC rounds are mispriced. So, there can be an arbitrage.
“There will be a 20% market correction in the future, but we don’t know if that’s going to happen after 100% growth, or correct then grow again. The current hype is just another set of growing pains.”
Part of me is scared for the market correction. When many founders will be forced to raise flat or down rounds. The fact is we haven’t had a serious market correction since 2009. It’s going to happen. It’s not a question of “if” but rather “when” and “how much”, as Frank acutely points out.
Investors who deploy capital fast win on growing markets – on bull markets. Or investors who deploy across several years, or what the afore-mentioned Mark Suster defines as having “time diversity“, who win on correcting markets – bear markets. Think of the former as putting all your eggs in one basket. And if it’s the winning basket, you’re seen as an oracle. If not, well, you disappear into obscurity. Think of the latter as diversifying your risk appetite – a hedging strategy. More specifically, (1) being able to dollar-cost average, and (2) having exposure to multiple emerging trends and platforms. You’re not gonna lose massive amounts of capital even in a bear market, but you also will be losing out on the outsized returns on a bull market.
Only time will tell how seriously the market will correct and when. As well as who the “oracles” are.
In closing
At the end of the day, there are really smart capital allocators arguing for both sides of the hype market. Like with all progress, the windshield is often cloudier and more muddled than the rearview mirror. As Tim Urban once wrote, “You have to remember something about what it’s like to stand on a time graph: you can’t see what’s to your right.“
And as founders are going to some great term sheets from amazing investors, I love the way Ashmeet Sidana of Engineering Capitalframes it earlier this year. “A company’s success makes a VC’s reputation; a VC’s success does not make a company’s reputation. In other words to take a concrete example, Google is a great company. Google is not a great company because Sequoia invested in them. Sequoia is a great venture firm because they invested in Google.”
Whether you, the founder, can live up to the hype or not depends on your ability to find distribution before your competitors do and before your incumbents find innovation. Unfortunately, great investors might help you get there with capital, but having them on your cap table doesn’t guarantee success.
Nevertheless, the interpretation of hype is always an interesting one. There will continue to be debates if a market, product, or trend is overhyped or underhyped. The former assumes that we are on track for a near-term logarithmic curve. The latter assumes an immediate future looking like an exponential curve. The interpretation is, in many ways, a Rorschach test of our perception of the future.
Over the course of human civilization, rather than an absolutely smooth distribution, we live something closer to what Tim Urban describes as:
If the regression line is the mean, then we’d see the ebbs and flows of hype looking something like a sinusoidal function. As Mark Twain once said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”
It won’t be a smooth ride. The world never is. But that’s what makes the now worth living through.
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There is an incredible wealth of people in this world who self-proclaim to have insights or secrets to unlocking insights. From parents to teachers to the wise soul who lives down the street. From coaches to gurus to your friendly YouTube ad. To mentors. To investors. While there are a handful who do have incredibly insightful anecdotes, their stories should serve as reference points rather than edicts of the future. Another tool in the toolkit. No advice is unconditionally right nor unconditionally wrong. All are circumstantial.
After all, a friend once told me: All advice is autobiographical.
The same is true for anything I’ve ever written. Including this blogpost in itself.
Over the past two weeks, as a first-time mentor, I’ve had the incredible fortune of working alongside and talking to some amazing founders at Techstars LA. At the same time, I was able to observe some incredible mentors at work. And in this short span of time so far, I’ve gotten to understand something very acutely. The dichotomy between mentors and investors. For the purpose of this blogpost, I’m going to focus on startup mentors, rather than other kinds of mentors (i.e. personal mentors). Although I imagine the two cohorts of mentors are quite synonymous.
While the two categories aren’t mutually exclusive, there are differences. A great mentor can be a great investor, and vice versa. But they start from two fundamentally different mindsets.
Investors/mentors
An investor tries to fit a startup in the mold they’ve prescribed. A mentor fits themselves into the mold a startup prescribes.
An investor thinks “Will this succeed?” A mentor thinks “Assuming this will succeed, how do we get there?”
An investor starts with “Why you?” A mentor starts with “Why not you?”
An investor evaluates how your past will help you get to your future. A mentor helps you in the present to get to your future.
An investor has a fiduciary responsibility to their investors (i.e. LPs). A mentor doesn’t. Or a mentor, at least, has a temporal responsibility to their significant other. Then again, everyone does to the people close to them.
An investor will be on your tail to hold you accountable because they’ve got skin in the game. A mentor might not.
You can’t fire your investor. You can theoretically “fire” your mentor. More likely, you’re going to switch between multiple mentors over the course of your founding journey.
An investor has a variable check size-to-helpfulness ratio. Who knows if this investor will be multiplicatively more helpful with intros, advice, operational know-how than the size of their check? A mentor has theoretically an infinite CS:H ratio. Check size, zero. Helpfulness, the sky’s the limit.
It’s also much harder to find a mentor than an investor, outside of startup communities, like On Deck and Indie Hackers, and acceleration and incubation programs, like Y Combinator and Techstars. Frankly, being a mentor is effectively doing free consultations over an extended period of time. And if you’re outside of these communities, the best way to bring on mentors is to bring them on as advisors with advisor equity. I would use Founder’s Institute’s FAST as a reference point. And Tim Ferriss‘ litmus test for bringing on advisors: If you could only ask 5-10 very specific questions to this person once every quarter, would they still be worth 0.5% of your company without a vesting schedule?
In closing
As I mentioned above, being a mentor and an investor isn’t mutually exclusive. The best investors are often incredible mentors. And some of the greatest mentors end up being investors into your startup as well. Having been in the venture world for a while, I’ve definitely seen all categories on this Venn diagram. Sometimes you need more of one than the other. Sometimes you need both. It’s a fluid cycle. And for the small minority of venture-scalable startups, it’s worth having both.
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I’ve written about product-market fit on numerous occasions including in the context of metrics, pricing, PMF mindsets, just to name a few. And one of the leading ways to measure PMF is still NPS – the net promoter score. The question: On a scale of one to ten, how likely would you recommend this product to a friend?
As investors, while a lagging indicator, it’s a metric we expect founders to have their finger always on the pulse for their customers. Yet how often do investors measure their own NPS? How likely would you, the founder, recommend this fund/firm/partner(s) to your founder friend(s)?
Let’s look for a second from the investor side of the table…
Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate pioneered the saying, “Your fund size is your strategy.” Your fund size determines your check size and what’s the minimum you need to return. For example, if you have a $10M pre-seed fund, you might be writing 20 $250K checks and have a 1:1 reserve ratio (aka 50% of your funds are for follow-on investments, like exercising your pro rata or round extensions). Equally so, to have a great multiple on invested capital (MOIC) of 5x, you need to return $50M. So if you have a 10% ownership target, you’re investing in companies valued around $2.5M. If two of your companies exit at $200M acquisition, you return $20M each, effectively quadrupling your fund. You only need a couple more exits to make that 5x for your LPs. And that’s discounting dilution.
On the flip side, if you have a $100M fund with a $2-3M check size and a 20% ownership target, you’re investing in $10-15M companies. Let’s say your shares dilute down to 10% by the time of a company’s exit. If they exit at unicorn status, aka $1B, you’ve only returned your fund. Nothing more, nothing less. Meaning you’ll have to chase either bigger exits, or more unicorns. But that’s hard to do. Even one of the best in the industry, Sequoia, has around a 5% unicorn rate. Or in other words, of every 20 companies Sequoia invests in, one is a unicorn. And that means they have really good deal flow. Y Combinator and SV Angel, who have a different fund strategy from Sequoia, sitting upstream, have around 1%.
Up to a $20m fund, there are are many ways to do 3x+
Up to a $60m fund, there are several ways
After $150m fund, there is probably 1 way
— Jason ✨Be Kind✨ Lemkin 🇮🇱 (@jasonlk) April 5, 2017
Why does a VC’s fund strategy matter to you as the founder?
A fund with a heavily diversified portfolio, like an angel’s or accelerator’s or participating investors (as opposed to leads), means they have less time and resources to allocate to each portfolio startup. The greater the portfolio size, the less help on average each startup team will get. That’s not to say you shouldn’t seek funding from funds with large AUMs (assets under management). One example is if you have an extremely passionate champion of your space/product at these large funds, I’d go with it.
I wrote late last year about founder-investor fit. And in it, I talk about Harry Hurst‘s check-size-to-helpfulness ratio (CS:H). In this ratio, you’re trying to maximize for helpfulness. Ideally, if the fund writes you a $1M check, they’re adding in $10M+ in additive value. And based on a fund’s strategy (i.e. lead investors vs not, $250K or $5M checks, scout programs or solo capitalist + advisory networks, etc.), it’ll determine how helpful they can be to you at the stage you need them.
If you were to plan out your next 18-24 months, take your top three priorities. And specifically, find investors that can help you address those. For example, if you’re looking for intros to potential companies in your sales pipeline and all a VC has to do is send a warm intro to their network/portfolio for you, bigger funds might be more useful. On the other hand, if you’re struggling to find a revenue model for your business, and you need more help than one-offs and quarterly board meetings, I’d look to work with an investor with a smaller portfolio or a solo capitalist. If you’re creating a brand new market, find someone with deep operating experience and domain expertise (even if it’s in an adjacent market), rather than a generalist fund.
While there’s no one-size-fits-all and there are exceptions, here are two ways I think about helpfulness, in other words, value adds:
The uncommon – Differentiators
The common – What everybody else is doing
The uncommon
Of course, this might be the more obvious of the pair. But you’d be surprised at how many founders overlook this when they’re actually fundraising. You want to work with investors that have key differentiators that you need at that stage of your company. By nature of being uncommon, there are million out there. But here are a few examples I’ve seen over the years:
Ability to build communities having built large followings
Content creation + following (i.e. blog, podcast, Clubhouse, etc.)
Getting in’s to top executives at Fortune 500 companies
Closing government contracts
Access/domain expertise on international markets
In-house production teams
They know how to hustle (i.e. Didn’t have a traditional path to VC, yet have some of the biggest and best LPs out there in their fund)
Ability to get you on the front page of NY Times, WSJ, or TechCrunch
Strong network of top executives looking for new opportunities (i.e. EIRs, XIRs)
Influencer network
Category leaders/definers (i.e. Li Jin on the passion economy, Ryan Hoover on communities)
Having all accelerator portfolio founder live under the same roof for the duration of the program (i.e. Wefunder’s XX Fund pre-pandemic)
Surprisingly, not as common as I thought, VCs that pick up your call “after hours”
The common
Packy McCormick, who writes this amazing blog called Not Boring, wrote in one of his pieces, “Here’s the hard thing about easy things: if everyone can do something, there’s no advantage to doing it, but you still have to do it anyway just to keep up.” Although Packy said it in context to founders, I believe the same is true for VCs. Which is probably why we’ve seen this proliferation of VCs claiming to be “founder-friendly” or “founder-first” in the past half decade. While it used to be a differentiator, it no longer is. Other things include:
Money, maybe follow-on investments
Access to the VC’s network (i.e. potential customers, advisors, etc.)
Access to the partner(s) experience
Intros to downstream investors
That said, if an investor is trying to cover all their bases, that is a strategy not to lose rather than a strategy to win, to quote the conversation I had with angel investor Alex Sok recently. As long as it doesn’t come at the expense of their key differentiator. At the same time, it’s important to understand that most VCs will not allocate the same time and energy to every founder in their portfolio. If they are, well, it might be worth reconsidering working with them. It’s great if you’re not a rock-star unicorn. Means you still get the attention and help that you might want. But if you are off to the races and looking to scale and build fast, you won’t get any more help and attention that you’re ‘prescribed’. If you’re winning, you probably want your investor to double down on you.
Even if you’re not, the best investors will still be around to be as helpful as they can, just in more limited spans of time.
Finding investor NPS
You can find CS:H, or investor NPS, out in a couple of ways:
The investors are already adding value to you and your company before investing. Uncommon, but it really gives you a good idea on their value.
You find out by asking portfolio founders during your diligence.
Your founder friends are highly recommending said investor to you.
Then there’s probably the best form of validation. I’ve shared this before, but I still think it’s one of the best indicators of investor NPS. Blake Robbins once quotedBrett deMarrais of Ludlow Ventures, “There is no greater compliment, as a VC, than when a founder you passed on — still sends you deal-flow and introductions.”
In closing
“How likely would you, the founder, recommend this fund/firm/partner(s) to your founder friend(s)?” is a great question to consider when fundraising. But I want to take it a step further. NPS is usually measured on a one to ten scale. But the numbering mechanic is rather nebulous. For instance, an 8/10 on my scale may not equal an 8/10 on your scale. So your net promoter score is more so a guesstimate of the true score. While any surveying question is more or less a guesstimate, I believe this question is more actionable than the above:
If you were to start a new company tomorrow, would you still want this investor on your cap table?
With three options:
No
Yes
It’s a no-brainer.
And if you get two or more “no-brainers”, particularly from (ex-)portfolio startups that fizzled off into obscurity, I’d be pretty excited to work with that investor.
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