My friend, Rouhin, sent me this post by a rather angry fellow, which he and I both had a good chuckle out of, yesterday about how VC is a scam. In one part about startup growth, the author writes that VCs only care about businesses that double its customer base.
The author’s argument isn’t completely unfounded. And it’s something that’s given the industry as a whole a bad rap. True, growth and scalability are vital to us. That’s how funds make back their capital and then some. With the changing landscape making it harder to discern the signal from the noise, VCs are looking for moonshots. The earlier the stage, the more this ROI multiple matters. Ranging from 100x in capital allocation before the seed stage to 10x when growth capital is involved. But in a more nuanced manner, investors care not just about “doubling”, unilaterally, but the last time a business doubles. We care less if a lemonade stand doubles from 2 to 4 customers, than when a lemonade corporation doubles from 200 to 400 million customers, or rather bottles, for a more accurate metric.
After early startup growth
Of course, in a utopia, no businesses ever plateau in its logistical curve – best described as it nears its total TAM. That’s why businesses past Series B, into growth, start looking into adjacent markets to capitalize on. For example, Reid Hoffman‘s, co-founder of LinkedIn, now investor at Greylock, rule of thumb for breaking down your budget (arguably effort as well) once you reach that stage is:
70% core business
20% business expansion – adjacent markets that your team can tackle with your existing resources/product
10% venture bets – product offerings/features that will benefit your core product in the longer run
And, the goal is to convert venture bets into expansionary projects, and expansionary projects to your core business.
Simply put, as VCs, we care about growth rates after a certain threshold. That threshold varies per firm, per individual. If it’s a consumer app, it could be 1,000 users or 10,000 users. And only after that threshold, do we entertain the Rule of 40, or the minimum growth of 30% MoM. Realistically, most scalable businesses won’t be growing astronomically from D1. (Though if you are, we need to talk!) The J-curve, or hockey stick curve, is what we find most of the time.
The Metrics
In a broader scope, at the early stage, before the critical point, I’m less concerned with you doubling your user base or revenue, but the time it takes for your business to double every single time.
From a strictly acquisition perspective, take day 1 (D1) of your launch as the principal number. Run on a logarithmic base 2 regression, how much time does it take for your users (or revenue) to double? Is your growth factor nearing 1.0, meaning your growth is slowing and your adoption curve is potentially going to plateau?
Growth Factor = Δ(# of new users today)/Δ(# of new users yesterday) > 1.0
Why 1.0? It suggests that you could be nearing an inflection point when your exponential graph start flattening out. Or if you’re already at 1.0 or less, you’re not growing as “exponentially” as you would like, unless you change strategies. Similarly, investors are looking for:
ΔGrowth Factor > 0
Feel to replace the base log function with any other base, as the fundamentals still hold. For example, base 10, if you’re calculating how long it takes you to 10x. Under the same assumptions, you can track your early interest pre-traction, via a waitlist signup, similarly.
While in this new pandemic climate (which we can admittedly also evaluate from a growth standpoint), juggernauts are forced to take a step back and reevaluate their options, including their workforce, providing new opportunities and fresh eyes on the gig economy, future of work, delivery services, telehealth, and more. Stay safe, and stay cracking!
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Over the past decade, stretching its roots to the dot-com boom, there have been more dialogue and literature around entrepreneurship. In a sense, founding a business is easier than it’s ever been. But like all things in life, there’s a bit more nuance to it. So, what’s the state of startups right now?
Lower Barriers to Entry
A number of factors have promoted such a trend:
There are an increasing number of resources online and offline. Online courses and ed-tech platforms. Fellowships and acceleration/incubation programs. Investor office hours and founder talks. YouTube videos, online newsletters, and podcasts.
The low-code/no-code movement is also helping bridge that knowledge gap for the average person. Moreover, making it easier for non-experts to be experts.
The gig economy have created a fascinating space for solopreneurship to be more accessible to more geographies.
Demand (by consumers and investors) fuels supply of startups, through knowledge and resource sharing. Likewise, the supply of startups, especially in nascent markets, fuels demand in new verticals. So, the ecosystem becomes self-perpetuating on a positive feedback loop. As Jim Barksdale, former Netscape CEO, once said:
“There are only two ways I know of to make money – bundling and unbundling.”
Bundling
Unbundling
Market Maturity
Market Nascency
Horizontalization
Verticalization
Breadth
Depth
Execution Risk Bias
Market/Tech Risk Bias
Right now, we’re at a stage of startup market nascency, unbundling the knowledge gap between the great and the average founder. This might seem counter-intuitive. After all, there’s so much discourse on the subject. There’s a good chance that you know someone who is or have thought about starting a business. But, I don’t believe we’re even close to a global maximum in entrepreneurship. Why?
Valuations are still on the rise. Six years back, $250K was enough runway for our business to last until product-market fit. Now, a typical seed round ranges from $500K-$2M. A decade ago, $500M was enough to IPO with; now it only warrants a late-stage funding round. By capitalistic economic theory, when a market reaches saturation, aka perfect competition, profit margins regress to zero. Not only are there still profits to be made, but more people are jumping into the investing side of the business.
Yes, increasing valuations are also a function of FOMO (fear of missing out), discovery checks (<0.5% of VC fund size), super duper low interest rates (causing massive sums of capital to surge in chase yields), and non-traditional venture investors entering as players in the game (PE, hedge funds, other accredited investors, (equity) crowdfunding platforms). It would be one thing if they came and left as a result of a (near) zero sum game. But they’re here to stay. Here’s a mini case study. Even after the 2018 drop in Bitcoin, venture investors are still bullish on its potential. In fact, there are now more and more specialized funds to invest in cryptocurrency and blockchain technology. Last year, a16z, one of the largest and trendsetting VC players, switched from a VC to an RIA (registered investment advisor), to broaden its scope into crypto/blockchain.
Great founders are scarce
“The only uncrowded market is great. There’s always a fucking market for great.”
– Tim Ferriss, podcaster, author, but also notably, an investor and advisor for companies, like Facebook, Uber, Automattic and more
Even if founders now have the tools to do so, it doesn’t mean they’ll hit their ambitious milestones. For VCs, it only gets harder to discern the signal from the noise. Fundamentally, there’s a significant knowledge delta – a permutation of misinformation and resource misallocation – in the market between founders and investors, and between average founders and great founders.
The Culinary Analogy
Here’s an analogy. 30 years prior, food media was still nascent. Food Network had yet to be founded in 1993. The average cook resorted to grandma’s recipe (and maybe also Cory’s from across the street). There was quite a bit of variability into the quality of most home-cooked dishes. And most professional chefs were characteristically male. Fast forward to now, food media has become more prevalent in society. I can jump on to Food Network or YouTube any time to learn recipes and cooking tips. Recipes are easily searchable online. Pro chefs, like Gordon Ramsay, Thomas Keller, and Alice Waters, teach full courses on Masterclass, covering every range of the culinary arts.
Has it made the average cook more knowledgeable? Yes. I have friends who are talking about how long a meat should sous vide for before searing or the ratio of egg whites to egg yolks in pasta. Not gonna lie; I love it! I’ll probably end up posting a post soon on what I learned from culinary mentors, friends, and myself soon.
Is there still a disparity between the average cook and a world-class chef? Hell ya! Realistically I won’t ever amount to Wolfgang Puck or Grant Achatz, but I do know that I shouldn’t deep fry with extra virgin olive oil (EVOO) ’cause of its low smoke point.
Great businesses are scarcer
The same is true for entrepreneurship. There are definitely more startups out there, but there hasn’t been a significant shift in the number of great startups. And the increase in business tools has arguably increased the difficulty to find business/product defensibility. It’s leveled the playing field and, simultaneously, raised the bar. So yes, it’s easier to start a business; it’s much harder to retain and scale a business.
It’s no longer enough to have an open/closed beta with just an MVP. What startups need now is an MLP (minimum lovable product). Let’s take the consumer app market as an example.
The Consumer App Conundrum
Acquiring consumers has gotten comparatively easier. Paid growth, virality, and SEO tactics are scalable with capital. More and more of the population have been conditioned to notice and try new products and trends, partly as a function of the influencer economy. But retaining them is a different story.
So, consumers have become:
More expensive to acquire than ever before. Not only are customer acquisition costs (CAC) increasing, with smaller lifetime values (LTV), but your biggest competitors are often not directly in your sector. Netflix and YouTube has created a culture of binge-watching that previously never existed. And since every person has a finite 24 hours in a day, your startup growth is directly cutting into another business’s market share on a consumer’s time.
And, harder to retain. It’s great that there’s a wide range of consumer apps out there right now. The App Store and Play Store are more populated than they’ve ever been. But churn has also higher now than I’ve seen before. Although adoption curves have been climbing, reactivation and engagement curves often fall short of expectations, while inactive curves in most startups climb sooner than anticipated. Many early stage ventures I see have decent total account numbers (10-30K, depending on the stage), but a mere 10-15% DAU/MAU (assuming this is a core metric). In fact, many consumers don’t even use the app they downloaded on Day 2.
Luckily, this whole startup battlefield works in favor of consumers. More competition, better features, better prices. 🙂
So… what happens now?
It comes down to two main questions for early-stage founders:
Do you have a predictable/sensible plan to your next milestone? To scalability?
Are you optimizing for adoption, as well as retention and engagement?
With so many tools for acquisition hacks, growth is relatively easy to capture. Retention and engagement aren’t. And in engagement, outside of purely measuring for frequency (i.e. DAU/MAU), are you also measuring on time spent with each product interaction?
How are you going to capture network effects? What’s sticky?
Viral loops occur when there’s already a baseline of engagement. So how do you meaningfully optimize for engagement?
From a bottom-up approach (rather than top-down by taking percentages of the larger market), how are you going to convert your customers?
How do you measure product-market fit?
What meaningful metric are you measuring/optimizing?
Why is it important?
What do you know (that makes money) that everyone else is either overlooking or severely underestimating?
What are you optimizing for that others’ (especially your biggest competitors) cannot?
Every business optimizes for certain metrics. That have a set budget used to optimize for those metrics. And because of that, they are unable to prioritize optimizing others. So, can you measure it better in a way that’ll hold off competition until you reach network effects/virality?
Building a scalable business is definitely harder. And to become the 10 startups a year that really matter is even more so. By the numbers, less likely than lightning striking you. In my opinion, that just makes trying to find your secret sauce all the more exciting!
If you think you got it or are close to getting it, I’d love to chat!
Over the weekend, my friend and I were chatting about the next steps in her career. After spending quite some time ironing out a startup idea she wants to pursue, she was at a crossroads. Should she leave her 9-to-5 and pursue this idea full-time, or should she continue to test out her idea and keep her full-time job?
Due to my involvement with the 1517 Fund and since some of my good friends happen to be college dropouts, I spend quite a bit of time with folks who have or are thinking about pursuing their startup business after dropping out. This is no less true with 9-to-5ers. And some who are still the sole breadwinner of their family. Don’t get me wrong. I love the attention, social passion, literature and discourse around entrepreneurship. But I think many people are jumping the gun.
Ten years back, admittedly off of the 2008 crisis, the conversations were entirely different. When I ask my younger cousins or my friends’ younger siblings, “what do you want to be when you grow up?” They say things like “run my own business”, “be a YouTuber”, and most surprisingly, “be a freelancer”. From 12-yr olds, it’s impressive that freelancing is already part of their vocabulary. It’s an astounding heuristic for how far the gig economy has come.
Moreover, media has also built this narrative championing the college dropout. Steve Jobs and Apple. Bill Gates and Microsoft. And, Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook. There’s nothing wrong in leaving your former occupation or education to start something new. But not before you have a solid proof of concept, or at least external validation beyond your friends, family and co-workers. After all, Mark Zuckerberg left Harvard not to start Facebook, but because Facebook was already taking off.
Honing the Idea
The inherent nature of entrepreneurship is risk. As an entrepreneur (and as an investor), the goal should always be to de-risk your venture – to make calculated bets. To cap your downside.
Marc Benioff started his idea of a platform-as-a-service in March 1999. Before Marc Benioff took his idea of SaaS full-time, he spent time at Oracle with his mentor, Larry Ellison, honing this thesis and business idea. When he was finally ready 4 months later, he left on good terms. Those terms were put to the test, when in Salesforce’s early days, VCs were shy to put in their dollar on the cap table. But, his relationship he had built with Larry ended up giving him the runway he needed to build his team and product.
Something that’s, unfortunately, rarely talked about in Silicon Valley and the world of startups is patience. We’ve gotten used to hearing “move fast and break things”. Many founders are taught to give themselves a 10-20% margin of error. What started off as a valuable heuristic grew into an increase in quantity of experiments, but decrease in quality of experiments. Founders were throwing a barrage of punches, where many carried no weight behind them. No time spent contemplating why the punch didn’t hit its mark. And subsequently, founders building on the frontlines of revolution fight to be the first to market, but not first to product-market fit. Founders fight hell or high water to launch their MVP, but not an MLP, as Jiaona Zhang of WeWork puts it.
In the words of the one who pioneered the idea of platform-as-a-service,
The more transformative your idea is, the more patience you’ll need to make it happen.”
– Marc Benioff
As one who sits on the other side of the table, our job is to help founders ask more precise questions – and often, the tough questions. We act more as godmothers and godfathers of you and your babies, but we can’t do the job for you.
The “Tough” Questions
To early founders, aspiring founders, and my friends at the crossroads, here is my playbook:
What partnerships can/will make it easier for you to go-to-market? To product-market fit? To scalability?
What questions can you ask to better test product feasibility?
How can you partner with people to ask (and test) better questions?
What is your calculus that’ll help you systematically test your assumptions?
Do you have enough cash flow to sustain you (and your dependents) for the next 2 years to test these assumptions?
Simultaneously, it’s also to important to consider the flip side:
What partnerships (or lack thereof) make your bets more risky?
How can you limit them? Eliminate them?
And in sum, these questions will help you map out:
At this point in your career, does part-time or full-time help you better optimize yourself for reaching my next milestone?
Founders take on many different types of risk when creating a business. Subsequently, investors constantly put founders and their businesses under scrutiny using risk as a benchmark. In broad terms, in my experience, they largely fall under two categories: execution risk and market risk.
Where I first introduced the dichotomy of market and execution risk in the frame of idea-market fit.
Some Background
Contrary to popular belief, VCs are some of the most risk-averse people that I know. As an investor, the two goals are to:
Take calculated bets, via an investment thesis and diligence;
And de-risk each investment as much as possible.
From private equity to growth equity to venture capital, more and more investors are writing ‘discovery checks.’ Typically, funds write checks that are 2-4% of their fund size. For example, $100M fund usually write $2-4M initial checks. Yet, more and more investors are writing increasingly smaller check sizes (0.1-0.5% fund size). In the $100M fund example, that’s $100-500K checks. This result is a function of FOMO (fear of missing out), as well as a proving grounds for founders before the fund’s partners put in their core dollar. Admittedly, this upstream effect does lead to:
Less diligence before checks are written (closing within 48-72 hours on the extreme end, and inevitably, more buyer’s remorse);
Less bandwidth allotted per portfolio startup (even less for startups given discovery checks);
The risks for a startup investor are fairly obvious, and so are the rewards. Effectively, an early-stage investor is betting millions of dollars on a stranger’s claim. But not all risks are the same.
In the eyes of a VC, an execution risk is categorically less risky than a market risk. Furthermore, even within the category of execution, a product risk is usually less risky than a team risk.
Execution Risk
Why are more and more early-stage investors defaulting to enterprise over consumer startups?
Two reasons.
Enterprise startups often run on a SaaS (software-as-service) subscription business model. There will always be recurring revenue, assuming the product makes sense. For an investor, that’s foreseeable ROI.
It’s an execution risk, not a market risk. Often times, an enterprise tech startup is the culmination of existing frustrations prevalent in the respective industry already. And therefore, have reasonably stable distribution channels and go-to-market strategies.
Using discovery checks, and playing pre-core business, VCs can evaluate team risk. Between the discovery check and their usual ‘core checks’, VCs can also test their initial hypotheses on their founders.
As a startup grows, especially after realizing product-market fit, market risk becomes more of a product risk. Best illustrated by market share, product risk is when a product fails to meet the expectations of their (target) customers. It can be evaluated via a permutation of key metrics, like unit economics, NPS, retention and churn rate. There is an element of technological risk early on in the startup lifecycle for deep tech ventures, but admittedly, it’s not a vertical I have my finger on the pulse for and can share insight into.
Given that VCs are either ex-operators or have seen a breadth of startup life-cycles, VCs can best use their experience to mitigate a startup’s execution risk.
Market Risk
Market risk requires a prediction of human/market behavior. And unfortunately, the vast majority of investors can predict about the constant evolution of human behavior as well as a founder can. What does that mean? Founders and VCs are walking hand-in-hand to gain market experience. It, quite excitingly, is an innovator’s Rubrik’s cube to solve.
Market risk is frequently attributed to consumer tech products. In an increasing proliferation of consumer startups, consumers have become more expensive to acquire and harder to retain. Distribution channels change frequently and are determined by political, economic, technological, and social trends.
In Closing
Every VC specializes in tackling a certain kind of risk. But founders must quickly adapt, prioritize, and tackle all the above risks at some point in the founding journey. As Reid Hoffman, co-founder of LinkedIn, famously said:
“An entrepreneur is someone who will jump off a cliff and assemble an airplane on the way down.”
In the first startup I joined, we messed up our initial business model by not providing a reason for small- and medium-sized business (SMB) owners to stay. We created a marketplace between SMBs to transact with each other. But, after the first one to three transactions, they had no need for our platform. The scary thing about marketplaces isn’t that you’re connecting suppliers to their demand network, but not providing any bonuses after onboarding – a reason to stay.
Some of the stickiest companies are marketplaces because they provide that reason to stay. More often than not, providing a lovable product so convenient, it’s much easier to use the marketplace platform than to do the transaction themselves, and an easy, passive way to be discovered by future clients/customers that would be much more difficult on their own.
Why Multiplayer Video Games Work
In his book The Messy Middle, Scott Belsky, Chief Product Officer at Adobe and founder of Behance (acq. by Adobe), a discovery platform where creatives can showcase their portfolios and engage with others’, shares that when crafting the ‘first mile’ experience, you need to optimize for three questions:
Why are your customers here?
What can they accomplish?
What can they do next?
Arguably, I believe that founders should always have these three questions hovering above their product strategies, beyond the ‘first mile’, only embedded more implicitly. Video games do an amazing job in this regard, especially massively multiplayer online role-playing games, or MMORPGs for short.
Why play the game? Find escape and sanctuary to be someone players want to be but can’t in the confines of reality.
What can they accomplish? Achieve that endgame that players see in the trailers and in the tutorial (the onboarding for an MMORPG user). The endgame is self-defined as well. Of course, the game optimizes for the power creep meta endgame. Yet, players can always opt for a ‘destiny’, a story, they find compelling, like becoming a fashionista, a wealthy merchant, a mentor, a content creator, and with faster computing systems and more robust infrastructure, a contributor to the game itself, through user-generated content (UGC). The Steam Workshop is an excellent example of UGC.
What can they do next? Level up their character and gear. Tackle the next quest – main or side – towards something larger than themselves. There’s always a defined goal, as well as actionable steps and additional incentives laid out for the players. This creates high retention value – a reason to stay.
The same is true for many other types of genres of multiplayer games – multiplayer online battle arenas (MOBA), battle royale (BR), first-person shooters (FPS), and more. It’s just the narrative of the endgame may change a little towards leaderboard domination. E-sports, content creation, and live streaming then offers a new tier of recognition and endgame for many veteran players.
Back to Marketplaces
I’ve always argued that as a founder, you want to focus on unscalable wins before thinking of scale pre-product-market fit. Focus on the individual experiences. As Li Jin, partner at the reputable a16z, wrote in a post about the passion economy, “[great founders] view individuality as a feature, not a bug.” The best marketplaces, like Uber, Airbnb, and Medium, started off focusing on the unscalable wins for a small individual subset of their potential users. These products offered their early users a reason to stay:
(Additional) Incentives and tools, to make their stay worthwhile;
Discovery platform to help them grow their brand and customer base, actively and passively;
And, subsequent community and network effects.
Early adopters jump on a new product, as fast as they jump off one. They’re finicky. They’re window shoppers, but at the same time, the most willing and likely to try out your product. Luckily and unluckily, the San Francisco Bay Area has no shortage of these folks, and being a tech startup, with its initial user base here, often inflates your early metrics. In short, the goal of your product is to make these technological butterflies fall madly in love with you and your product. That’s the tough part, but it’ll also mean you’ve found product-market fit (PMF).
Where do we find ‘love’?
Instead of a minimum viable product, or MVP, Jiaona Zhang, Senior Director of Product at WeWork, in her First Round Review piece, chases the “pixie dust”, or what I like to call the secret sauce – a truly unique, money-making insight. This magic is found through diligent iteration on consumer feedback, especially in the beta stages of a product. During the beta, users have the serendipity to discover “that magical moment in the user journey where the user realizes that this product is different from anything else they’ve ever experienced”. Her framework, designed from the perspective of the consumer:
Wouldn’t it be cool if users could [a process/action that would 10X their lives]?
What We Learned
The same was true for us at Localwise. Of course, we were motivated by poor retention metrics. But, we learned what businesses truly needed by asking each of them in person, as well as flyering (and getting rejected, or worse, ignored) to college students and to shops. So, still deeply in love with the community we built, we found that need when connecting local talent to SMBs. For businesses with high churn rate with temporary employees and a need to build a brand, that was their reason to stay.
I was chatting with an founder-investor last Friday about the complexities of the founder-idea and the investor-founder discovery process. Eventually, our conversation arrived at the “idea maze“, coined by Balaji Srinivasan – which describes how one’s past life experiences position her/him best to tackle a new problem. And it bled into how great investors, or people who have a track record for backing entrepreneurs who change the world, differentiate good founders from great founders. And I turned the question many of my friends, who are interested in angel and early-stage investing, have asked me to her:
How can one, without necessarily having gone through the entire entrepreneurial experience, better understand and empathize with the founder journey?
It’s a question I have tried to resolve myself, since I’ve only experienced the two extremes of building a startup – at its conception till product-market fit and right before an acquisition – and at two different ventures. I’ve heard many answers over the years:
Read books or listen to podcasts about startups,
Chat with founders,
Shadow them for a month or more,
Advise them at their early stages,
Join an angel group to hold office hours for them,
And, start your own business…
…. each from at least ten different sources. But she said something that I have never thought of before. Live with an entrepreneur.
A simple answer, yes. But a spectacularly profound one, nonetheless. I’ve had the fortune of living with an aspiring e-sports athlete, an aspiring Korean pop star, and a property manager. In all three cases, I learned, even passively, about the lifestyle of each – their wins, their stressors, even how meticulous they think about their apparel for the day, but most importantly, how hard they each worked to realize their dream. It’s not something any interview, book, podcast, blog post, and even shadowing experience can teach you.
I’ve been taught since I was a kid in elementary school to work smart, not hard, or its better cousin: work smart and hard. But in both mantras, working hard is always overshadowed by working smart. In fact, over time, I learned it wasn’t just me. Media portrays society’s hardest workers in biased, unflattering light. I remember watching a bunch of movies and TV shows as a kid where the janitor or the bus driver, playing a side character, is either a 300-pound man or an old spindly soul with hollowed eyes. Mike Rowe, host of one of my favorite childhood TV shows, Dirty Jobs, is definitely more illustrious on this stigma than I am, which he explains in his 2009 TED talk. In Silicon Valley, the occupation of being an entrepreneur isn’t too different. Yes, there’s the supposed glamour of being the next Mark Zuckerberg or Steve Jobs. But whether it’s Shikhar Ghosh‘s study that 75% of startups fail, or the 90% or 95% many others reference, the truth is the numbers work against you. Moreover, unless you’re “venture-backed”, when people see “entrepreneur” on your resume, many think “unemployed”.
Yet, I’ve realized people with the entrepreneurial spirit are some of the hardest working individuals I’ve ever met, given that there are still many who seek the title over the commitment – what I’ve come to call “wantrapreneurs.” None of my apartment-mates ever called themselves an entrepreneur or a founder, but in every sense, each of them was and is the definition of a hard worker, a hustler, and an entrepreneur. They were scrappy. They were ambitious. Or like I mentioned in my post last week, they were obsessed. They’ve navigated their own idea mazes to set themselves up for success. For example, one of my suitemates saw the value of stacking chairs every week during work study and turned it into efficient inventory management and an opportunity to get in front of the music director without an official audition. Many of the entrepreneurs around me I respect the most never had the B-school education and weren’t classically trained in the Porter’s Five Forces or the SWOT analysis. A few even dropped out of school, but they all have the capacity to work hard, then synthesize the data around them. The commitment to work hard prefaces the facility to find a shortcut. One founder, to keep his business afloat, biked up and down the hills of San Francisco delivering Uber Eats, since he couldn’t afford a car and its insurance plan. Another went to his dream client’s headquarters every day at 9AM for two months straight to secure a meeting, and subsequently, a contract. A third flew back to meet with clients that were about to bail on his startup, despite still not having recovered from four fractures in his vertebrae, leaving him paralyzed below the chest.
I’m not saying my apartment-mates or the founders aren’t smart. In fact, they’re some of the smartest folks I know, but it’s their constant willingness to get their hands dirty that has my utmost respect. Though I’ve lived with my apartment-mates, I’ve never lived with any founders, but I can only imagine the depth of understanding and empathy one would have by being in such close proximity. And in doing so, how one can appreciate the founder journey beyond the facts, and experience the emotional pain points as well.
