Possibly the quiet thing out loud, one of the best parts about demo days is the excuse to catch up with old friends. Yes, we do go there to see deals, but realistically, many of us would have started the conversations with many of the demoing class before demo day. This is not only true for VCs at startup demo days, but equally so for LPs at emerging manager demo days.
Earlier this week, my friend invited me to go to his emerging manager demo day. I’ve always admired how intentional he’s been with picking, so it was a natural yes. The pitches came and gone. And as the networking part kicked off after, a few LP friends and I came together to catch up but also to compare notes. What did we think of Fund A? Fund D? Who was interesting? Who would we take a second conversation with? And why?
Naturally, we shared our respective decision-making frameworks. A lot of which overlapped. Others were more unique to each LP themselves. Simply because the motivations of LPs often differ from each other. Some do so for co-investment opportunities. Others invest in VC as an asset class. And there are also those that invest to pay it forward.
So while it’s not my place to share the words whispered to me in confidence, here are some general takeaways:
Unlike startup pitches, there is no consistency of pitch format among emerging managers.
Most GPs don’t seem to know what kinds of metrics/facts immediately stand out to an LP. One such GP buried an amazing angel track record TVPI as one line in his deck.
Humor sells.
Spinouts are only interesting if your track record is portable. In other words, if you were too junior on the team to have pounded the table for deals, you don’t count as a spinout in some LP’s minds.
Unscripted moments are memorable. At least ones that feel unscripted.
DPI earned within 5 years (as opposed to 5+ years) begs the question of where does it come from (i.e. secondaries, acquisition, etc. Former will lead to yellow flags.)
Track records that began post-2019 have an asterisk next to them.
That said, if it may be helpful to not only GPs, or other LPs out there, I’ll share my own calculus below.
I want to preface that the goal of the below “checklist” is for me to quickly decide which GPs I should follow up with, given limited information in the format of a 5-minute pitch. As such, this isn’t all-inclusive, but simply answers the question: Is this fund/manager interesting enough for me to spend another hour with them?
I will also say that this works best for me particularly for Funds I and II.
And one more thing, I’m still a WIP. In other words, this is the checklist that suits my current needs the best, but your mileage may vary.
The Demo Day checklist
At a high level, below are the five categories that are the most interesting to me.
Sourcing — Are they fishing in differentiated pools? Do they have proprietary access to deals? Where are they finding diamonds in the rough?
Picking — This can be interesting in two ways: (a) track record (which only starts to become interesting after 5+ years with 20+ deals), and/or (b) decision-making framework/algorithm.
Winning — Why do the best founders pick you? How much ownership can you get in these companies? Some examples here.
Likability — You’re either very likeable or contrarian. Anything else just isn’t memorable. And if not memorable for me, likely not memorable for founders. In many ways, I’m looking for ways you stay rent free in a founder’s mind when they know nothing else other than the fact that you invest in early stage companies. ‘Cause let’s be honest; most firm’s websites say just that and nothing more. Some might call this GP-founder fit. Others call it vibes.
Uniqueness — A bit amorphous here, but really, it’s just: Is there something I’ve never heard of before?
As a caveat, I only started including this “pillar” after I saw about 200 decks and pitches. Before that, I simply didn’t know what counted as unique and what didn’t.
And for each category, I give 4 different kinds of scores.
✔️
There’s something special here. Worth digging deeper. If I continue on to diligence, this is usually the first thing I reference check.
〰️
No strong opinion here and/or there’s no edge here.
❌
I use this extremely sparingly. This is a sign of a red flag. In fact, there are very few red flags that can even come out in a 5-minute pitch. So really, I only use an X when I feel the fund manager is sharing something dishonest.
Yes, that’s a blank space. Meaning the pitch itself failed to offer any reference point or evidence on this variable.
And for the five categories above, having a check mark in at least two of them is enough for me to say yes to another conversation. No single A+ trait standing in pure isolation. But only one X is enough for me to pass.
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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.
When winds and waves a mutual contest wage, These foaming anger, those impelling rage; Thy blissful light can cheer the dismal gloom, And foster hopes beyond a wat’ry doom.
– John William Smith, “The Lighthouse,” 1814
Marc Andreessenanswered a few weeks back to a question that has been ringing in many founders’ minds. What product do founders want to buy from investors? For the past few years, the natural answer rose as operational expertise. A notion that still holds true for the earliest stages of starting a business when you bring on strategic angels as small checks to help you find product-market fit. As you continue down the path and start raising institutional capital, the answer becomes more and more amorphous.
I've always thought the biggest thing a founder buys from a VC is a bridge loan of credibility in advance of tangible evidence.
Why do investors look for signal in the first place? A means to de-risk a very early, and very risky bet. A product of asymmetric information. Investors invest in lines not dots, but the truth is, most investors don’t have the time – luxury or ability – to see all lines. So what they must do instead is look for specific dots – be it traction, co-investors, or founding team “legitimacy” – that would help them trace out of a line of best fit. As Precursor’s Charles Hudson wrote earlier this week,
After 8ish years of pre-seed investing in 300+ companies, the biggest gap I see between VCs and founders is the relative weight placed on current traction by founders and the importance the next VC puts on market opportunity. Only gets bigger with each extra round raised.
1. Founders focus on traction – it's quantitative, many want fundraising to be deterministic (it isn't) 2. VCs have better market intel on what "great" traction looks like 3. For a co w top 10% traction, that can be the story. Applies to very few.
By definition, signal should be a leading indicator of long-term business value. Yet, for most investors in the world, what they look for are lagging indicators of conviction.
The signal paradox
In the investing world, there’s a paradoxical notion of signal. Through many conversations with syndicate leads, data teams of investing platforms, and LPs, I realized a common thread. For the majority of investors in the world, at the early stages, signal comes not from the founder, but from other funders.
In a syndicate, there are three things that make a deal move fast:
Great co-investors
Great traction
And, great team
Arguably in that order. Synonymously, as an emerging fund manager, the best way to raise from family offices* (I’ll explain below why FO’s are my reference point here) who are notoriously closed off to cold emails, you need:
Tier 1 VCs as your co-investors
Tier 1 GPs as your fund’s LPs
Or, deals that family offices wanted to get into anyway (which isn’t mutually exclusive from the above as well)
Quite noticeably, for many investors out there, signal comes in the form of people with a proven track record already. Or to break it down even more. Signal comes in the form of familiarity. Familiarity in the form of warm intros or college classmates or pattern recognition. The easiest pattern to follow for any investor without needing to do too much diligence or requiring too much personal conviction (I know, it’s funny), but to be able to write fast checks, is other top-tier investors. If you’re a founder who’ve fundraised before, you’re probably very familiar with this notion. Consciously or subconsciously. I’m gonna bet money that you’ve been asked, “Which other investors are you talking to? And how far along the process are you with them?” Or simply, “Do you have a lead investor?”
While there are some nuances to the last question, like the inability for smaller investors to pay for legal counsel fees, to have the resources to completely diligence a startup, or just that the check size required to lead/fill the round is just too large for them, generally speaking, my argument still stands. Put nicely, for many investors, they’re looking for external validation of the product. Put harshly, that question is a band-aid approach to their inability to get to conviction.
As a founder, you have to realize that capital has become a commodity. Investors are in the business of selling money. And subsequently, making $1 become $2. Or for a great early-stage investor, $1 becomes $5. There are many ways to underwrite risk. The one that requires the least amount of new thinking, or thought leadership, is following firms who have proven their investing acumen already and consistently.
*Additional context on family offices
I specifically mention family offices above since most LPs in Fund I’s are individuals and angels. Mostly small checks. And can quickly fill up the limit the SEC has set for how many accredited investors you can have investing in your fund. And their reason to invest is based on the founding GPs – very similar to why investors would back startups at the pre-seed stage.
While some GPs do pitch to institutional LPs (i.e. endowments, pension funds, fund of funds, etc.), very, very little institutional capital goes to Fund I’s and II’s – very similar to the fact that Tiger or Coatue very rarely invest before the A. You have yet to have a track record where they can fit into their financial model. They’re underwriting a very different type of risk. And so, if you’re a Fund I GP looking for larger checks, you’re looking to generational wealth in the form of family offices, who are surprisingly closed off to cold emails. But I digress.
The surplus of “signal” in 2021
In the last year, we’ve seen some record-breaking numbers. We’ve been in an exciting boom market. There have never been more venture dollars poured into the ecosystem. In fact, there were 1,148 concurrent unicorns in 2021. Half of which were new. In comparison, 2020 minted just 167 unicorns. Just looking at the two charts from Crunchbase below, we see just how crazy 2021 was.
And quite reflectively, there have never been as many “experts” in the market. To be fair, when everyone’s portfolio and/or startup is raising consecutive rounds of funding and mark ups are a dime a dozen, psychologically, I would also feel good about myself too. Everyone’s an “expert” in a boom market, especially if a16z or Tiger is leading the round. And a16z’s done double the number of deals they did in 2020. And Tiger’s invested 4 out of every 5 business days. In full disclosure, I did feel quite proud of myself as well. Nevertheless, I do my best to stay humble in this business.
Interestingly enough, while there were more seed, pre-seed and angel dollars going into startups, progressively, less startups were getting funded. Effectively, while the overall number of dollars invested look great, less founders come to bat. A smaller top of funnel means a more concentrated funnel in consecutive rounds.
The truth is fundraising will get harder over the next year and valuations won’t be as high. You can expect the current market correction in the public markets to soon be reflected in the private ones. So you may need to spend 12 months longer growing into your next round’s target valuation.
So where should investors look for signal?
In fairness, I am ill-equipped to answer this question for the masses. And most likely will never be fully equipped to make generalist statements. That said, I have and will continue to share what signal looks like for me. And if you’re a founder, here’s my template to conviction.
Two weeks ago, I broke down my sense of intuition around startup investing. I won’t go too deep in this essay, but I do share a more detailed internal calculus there. To put it simply, I look for different signals across the spectrum of idea plausibility and stages.
Signal by idea plausibility
Idea Plausibility
Key Question
Context
Plausible
Why this?
Most people can see why this idea should exist. Because of the consensus, you’re competing in a saturated market of similar, if not the same ideas. Therefore, to stand out, you must show traction.
Possible
Why now?
It makes sense that this idea should exist, but it’s unclear whether there’s a market for this. To stand out, you have to convince investors on the market, and subsequently the market timing.
Preposterous
Why you?
Hands down, this is just crazy. You’re clearly in the non-consensus. Now the only way you can redeem yourself is if you have incredible insight and foresight. What’s the future you see and why does that make sense given the information we have today? If an investor doesn’t walk out of that meeting having been mind-blown on your lesson from the future, you’ve got no chance.
Signals by stage
Stage of investment
Key Question
Context
Pre-seed
Why you?
The earlier you go, the less quantitative data you have to support your bet. And therefore, your bet is largely on the founder. For me, it matters less their XX years of experience, but more so their expertise. In other words, insight. Can I learn something new in my first meeting (and consecutive ones too) with them?
At the pre-seed, there is also one more key signal I look for in founders – their level of focus. Rather than wanting to do everything, can they streamline their resources to tackle one thing? What is their minimum viable assumption they have to prove before they can build their MVP (or MLP – minimum lovable product)? Startups often die of indigestion, not starvation.
Seed
Why now?
By the seed stage these days, you’ve either found your product-market fit or really close to finding it. The larger your round, the more you’re feeling the pull of the market. Whereas pull can come be measured (i.e. daily organic sign ups, demand converting to supply in a marketplace, etc.), sometimes when you’re at the cusp of it, there’s a level of foresight that is required. Some leading indicator for the business often comes as a lagging indicator from industry trends. What is the inflection point(s) (political, socio-economic, technological, cultural) we are at today that is going to have compounding effects on the business?
Series A
Why this?
By the time you get to the A, you’re ready to scale. In other words, what you mainly need is to add fuel to the fire. I place a larger emphasis on traction here. Admittedly for me, compared to the two earlier stages, this is more of a numbers conversation. The best founders here have a very clear picture of what worked and didn’t work for the business. They’re already familiar with their main GTM channel, but are exploring new opportunities for channel-market fit where they need capital to test.
Not incredibly pertinent yet, but founders will have started thinking about their Act II. What’s the next product they’re going to offer to secure their immortality in the market?
In closing
A simple litmus test I often share with founders on signal is:
Your ability to raise capital is directly correlated with your ability to inspire confidence in your investor that you will get straight A’s with little to no help.
This isn’t just true for myself, but also most investors out there. While the best investors out there will always be there for you in your time of need, before they decide to jump aboard the same ship with you, you need to convince them that you’re a top 10% founder. Or a top 1% in-the-making.
While I dislike using the dating analogy, it’s an apt comparison in this case. You’re not going to share your deepest, least desirable secrets on your first date. You’re also not going around saying you’re the perfect – and I underscore perfect – partner without any flaws. ‘Cause that’s as much baloney as an unknown African prince in your inbox telling you to help him secure $5 million in gold bars by helping him set up a Swiss bank account with a deposit of $10K. It’s too good to be true. In reality, you’re most likely going to share that you have a number of great qualities, but you’re still growing in many ways.
Admit what you don’t know or don’t have. As long as it’s not mission critical or the biggest risk in your business (and if it is, figure that out before you raise VC funding), the investors who truly believe in you will understand. Always err on the side of honesty, but not bravado.
‘Cause you yourself are a signal. If you’ve got your bases covered and still have to go out of your way to convince an investor or try to flip their “no”, they’re probably not worth your time.
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Any views expressed on this blog are mine and mine alone. They are not a representation of values held by On Deck, DECODE, or any other entity I am or have been associated with. They are for informational and entertainment purposes only. None of this is legal or investment advice. Please do your own diligence before investing in startups and consult your own adviser before making any investments.
Last weekend, I tuned into Samir Kaji’s recent episode with LPs (limited partners). Not once, but twice. And as you might’ve guessed, was damn inspired by their conversation. The more I listened to it, the more synonymous the paths of a founder and an emerging manager (EM) seemed to be. Or what I call the entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial VC. If you’re a regular here, you’ll know I love writing about the intellectual horsepower of both sides of the table. But in this post, rather than delineating the two, I’d love to share how similar founders and funders actually are.
Surprises suck, but pivots are okay
On Samir’s podcast, Guy Perelmuter of GRIDS Capital voiced: “There’s only one thing that LPs hate more than losing money. It’s surprises.”
Be transparent. Be clear on your expectations, and steer clear of left hooks. As a fund, something I’ve heard a number of GPs and LPs say is don’t deviate on your thesis. LPs invest in you for your strategy. But as soon as you deviate from that initial strategy, you become increasingly unpredictable.
Take, for example, you go to a steakhouse and order steak. But they serve you sushi instead. If it’s not good sushi, obviously you’re not coming back. Not only did they surprise you, but it was also a poorly executed one. This goes in the column of one-star Yelp reviews.
But, say it was great sushi. You had one great dining experience and you’re a happy customer. Some time in the future, you think of getting sushi again. And you remember what a great experience you had at the steakhouse. So you go back to the steakhouse, only to realize it was a fluke and the sushi wasn’t like the last time you’ve had it. Your inability to replicate surprises scares LPs, which limits your ability to raise a subsequent fund.
Nevertheless, these days markets are changing quickly. And sometimes your initial thesis may not serve you as well in today’s market as it did yesterday. As John Maynard Keynes, father of Keynesian economics, once said, “When the facts change, I change my mind.” But, if you do need to deviate, communicate it clearly, formulate a new strategy, and preemptively tell your LPs. Then at that point, it’s no longer a surprise, but a strategy. Great examples include:
Not investing via their fund strategy (i.e. typically ad hoc),
Require less diligence and therefore less conviction,
Send negative signals to other investors if the GP doesn’t do a follow-on check at the next round, and
Because of (2) and (3) are usually cash sinks.
The On Deck Accelerator (ODX) – Backing founders at the earliest stages (i.e. pre-product, pre-revenue) as long as they have deep conviction in their own business.
The recent announcement of The Sequoia Fund – a systematic and predictable strategy to invest in not just startups, but venture funds backing incredible founders as well.
The same holds for founders. Don’t get me wrong. Startups pivot. And they should. Mike Maples Jr., founder of one of the best performing seed stage venture firms, recently shared: “Most investors are going to look at what the company does and evaluate the business for what it is, but 90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.” And just like fund managers, clearly convey why, how, and what you’re pivoting to to your shareholders. It’s always better to preempt these conversations than leave these as surprises. Often times, you’ll find your investors, having seen as many pivots as they have and knowing that is the name of the game, can offer you much more feedback and insight than you imagined for your pivot.
Optimize for the “Oh shit! moment*
In every conversation, your goal should just be to teach your investors something. An earned secret. A unique insight. What do you know that other people don’t, overlook, or underestimate? What do you know that other people would find it very hard to learn organically? This is especially true for consensus ideas – or obvious ideas. The best obvious products may seem obvious at first glance, but usually have non-obvious insights to back them up.
If you’re a fund, what is your insight – your access point – that’ll win you an asymmetric upside?
I’ve talked to too many founders and EMs that claim to be experts with X years of experience in a particular field. Yet after 30 minutes, I realized I learned nothing from them. I realize that for half an hour straight I ended up with a prep book full of buzzwords and vague jargon that would rival the SAT vocab section. But let’s be real. The SAT doesn’t get me excited to want to retake the test.
The best founders and funders out there are able to break down deep, technical, esoteric, and sometimes crazy concepts into simple bitesize ideas. The equivalent of taking the whole universe and simplifying it to its origin. A single point. The Big Bang.
I’ve also realized over the years that the world’s smartest teachers – and when you’re trying to convince people to join you in a non-obvious vision, you are teaching – lead with analogies. And the best analogies lead investors to that “Oh Shit! moment.”
COVID made capital cheaper
Equally true for startups and funds. Capital is digital. If you think about capital in the frame of investor acquisition cost, you no longer have to travel to your investors to pitch to them. This means you can take far more meetings than before. Less travel and more meetings mean your investor acquisition cost goes down.
Founders no longer have to book a week to Sand Hill Road or South Park to have introductory conversations with investors. Only to have 80-90% turn down a second conversation. This becomes even more costly the earlier you are in your startup journey. You have to have a lot more first conversations as a pre-seed founder than you do as a founder raising an A. At the same time, you have many more options for raising capital today: accelerators, syndicates, equity crowdfunding, and roll-up vehicles (RUVs). While it’s not that these resources didn’t exist before COVID, the pandemic made it much more apparent that VC money didn’t have to be the only way to raise capital. And that you can also leverage speed and your community to help you grow.
Similarly, EMs no longer have to travel across the states to talk to institutional capital. Even more so, as an EM, you’re most likely raising from individual investors. Raising a rolling fund or a 506c lets you generally solicit investments, where you couldn’t with a 506b. Subsequently, Twitter and having a community became your superpower. Mac at Rarebreed, Packy’s Not Boring Fund I, and Harry at 20VC all raised during the time of COVID, leveraging the power of their following and community to do so.
Keep it simple
“There’s no favorable wind for the sailor who doesn’t know where to go.” – Seneca
Two Saturdays ago, I caught up with my ridiculously smart engineer friend from college – “Fred”. We were reminiscing about the “good ol’ days” when we first started punching above our weight class. Particularly in regards to cold outreaches to individuals we really admired. While I was an operator at two startups that shaped my entrepreneurial career, I spent many a night struggling on how to best position our products in the market. Many hours of copy and rephrasing and reframing. In both we were competing against the existing saturation of information and solutions on the market. How do we tell our customers and investors the reason we’re awesome is because of A and B and C, and also D?
Most people, friends, customers, and investors didn’t understand the value we thought we were obviously conveying. And subsequently, we were rejected more often than I would have liked to admit. In the early days, we didn’t lose on price nor on quality, but on brand and messaging. And while we thought and strove to prove we were better in areas that mattered, both startups eventually ended up having exceedingly simple one-liners.
On the other hand, “Fred” was working on something related to liquid fuel and cold fires. Something extremely technical. But he was able to win proportionally more yes’s than I was able to. When I asked him how, he said it was simple. “We’re putting a rocket into space. That’s it. And that’s really exciting.”
I made something extraordinarily simple into something extraordinarily complex. In all honesty, I sounded really, really smart. And I felt like I was the shit. Except no one else did. “Fred” took something extraordinarily complex and made it extraordinarily simple. He didn’t sound as smart. But celebrities, sponsors, companies – people just got it.
The true value of a product is usually exceedingly simple. The fallacy of including a Rolodex of esoteric jargon comes in two-fold. Either you’re trying to sound smarter than you actually are. Or you’re trying to cram too many things in too little space. As economist Herbert A. Simon said, “A wealth of information creates of poverty of attention.”
In closing
Whether you’re an entrepreneur or an emerging manager, you’re swinging for the fences. I was chatting with an investor yesterday who had an incredible analogy. “It’s like a pinball machine. The ball goes up, and you never know how it’ll fall down. You don’t know how many bounce pads and flippers it will hit. You don’t know how many points you’re going to get. But no matter how many points you’ll get, the ball has to go up first.” Similarly, whether you start a company or a fund, you have to step up to the plate to bat. You don’t know what the upside will be. You don’t know if you’re going to return your investors 2x, 5x or a 100x.
You’re taking an asymmetric bet on the compelling future you bring. Your valuation as a startup is not how much your startups is worth, which is why the 409a valuation is always different from the valuation your investors set for you. Your valuation is a bet your investors made that you will be as big as the major players in the market. If you’re valued at $10M today, your investors are saying you are 10 in 1000, or a 1% chance, to be a unicorn. And a 0.1% chance to be a decacorn.
Valuations might seem crazy today. VC firms are also raising larger and larger funds, which lead many to be skeptical on their ability to return capital. In fairness, most funds will return a modest 2-3x over their lifetime, if at all. Most startups are and will be overvalued. On the same token, the best ones, despite their crazy price, are still undervalued. Imagine if you were an investor who could invest in Facebook’s then-unicorn valuation. You’d have made a lot of money. But we’re in an optimistic market.
At the end of the day, both parties are just managing someone else’s capital. And as such, through a fiduciary responsibility, in that regard, both are cut from the same cloth.
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