How to Pick Emerging Managers in 2026

Pavel Prata asked me if I was interested in writing a guest post on his blog a few months back. To which I responded with the fact, that I’m not sure there was much for me to add to the LP ecosystem that I haven’t written about already. And bless how supported he is, but he challenged me to write an updated summation of everything I’ve learned about investing in emerging managers as a progression of how much I’ve learned since I first wrote my initial blogpost that put me on the map in LP-GP land. Which to this point, I hadn’t written something public-facing on that. So eventually, after much inspiration, I finally did.

Now a few months later, I’m finally glad to share it here as well on this blog. I’m not going to include the nice formatting and graphics that Pavel and his team made, so if you want to check those out and for potentially, easier readability, check out my post here.

But without further ado, and thank you Pavel for the inspiration, voila!


david zhou, cup of zhou, superclusters
Author’s note: God, I put on some weight for this photo.

The preface

In many ways, I sit in a place of privilege. I grew up in the Bay Area, and while I was not born into a household of tech, nor did I have any relatives who were deep in the tech ecosystem, I was fortunate to have friends who were and are far more tech forward than I was.

I remember being in elementary school in โ€˜05 and my best friends were deadset on trying to get an account on this new-ish website called Thefacebook. And the primary reason was that we got bored of Club Penguin. The site needed us to be 18 or older (or at least we needed to be some age that we werenโ€™t. We were still living out our best single-digit lives), but I donโ€™t think anyone was really checking. Three misfits. One of us usually received detention for getting in fist fights. His brother would receive principal office visits for making other kids cry. Blunt guy. If your drawing was ugly, heโ€™d be sure you knew. But both were and are good people.

The first would get in fights defending his friends from getting bullied. The second, while lacking social cues, would always sit down with you to help you improve your skills. And me, the supposed โ€œgoody-two-shoesโ€ of our misfits who would follow rules, yet get in trouble trying to get them out of detention. And frankly, none of us were good with our words. Then and maybe still now. Yet nevertheless, one of my buddies found his way to a .edu email address from volunteering at the school library. And that was all we needed to get into the โ€œbig kids club.โ€

I went to a school in the Bay Area, due to it being the far cheaper alternative of the schools I would have loved to go to. There I got involved in the startup ecosystem really early on because of my zealotic obsession with free food in college. (Story for another day.) I became a startup investor because the accelerator was short on hands, and it was through the first startup I was with that I knew they existed as a non-profit at the time. I became an LP because of a community I was helping run and someone asked me to invest as an individual LP for only $1,000 to his oversubscribed fund that โ€œI [had] been really helpful in building.โ€ To this day, I still donโ€™t think I did anything. Then, I somehow built a network of LPs and GPs because I wrote one blogpost that was supposed to be my personal how-to-be-an-LP 101 that went serendipitously further than I expected.

And I say all of that to preface that:

  1. My life is full of accidents and being lucky at the right place at the right time with the right people.
  2. As a caveat that you should take all the words that will populate below with the biases that I may be coming to the table with.

That said, I do believe that life is all about increasing the surface area for luck to stick. Thereโ€™s a line I really like that I came across a few years ago by Qi Lu, who created Bing, Microsoftโ€™s search engine and is the former COO of Baidu: โ€œLuck is like a bus. If you miss one, thereโ€™s always the next one. But if youโ€™re not prepared, you wonโ€™t be able to jump on.โ€

When Pavel asked me to write a step-by-step guide on how to choose managers in 2026, my immediate thought was that I couldnโ€™t ever write it from the stance I have today, but if I were starting all over from nothing, except capital to invest, where would I begin?

Yet knowing what I know now, with the network I have now, with the brand I have nowโ€”though I still have a long way to go, how is investing in emerging managers today different from the last few years?

As such this essay will be split in two overarching sections:

  1. For the LP whoโ€™s just reached the block
  2. For the LP whoโ€™s been around the block

A big thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading, guiding and helping me frame early drafts of this piece.

For the emerging LP

One of my good friends described investing in venture funds in the 2020s as โ€œexpert modeโ€, as opposed to when he started in 2001 as โ€œthe tutorial.โ€ He said that in 2001, there were 200 firms in total in the market. That he met with half of the firms in the market. Then invested in two-thirds of the firms he met with. And that resulted from three vintages that returned 5X net on his venture fund portfolio. According to him, every fund he invested in was an emerging manager. The whole asset class was an emerging asset class.

Today is undeniably harder than itโ€™s ever been to be a venture fund LP. Thousands of firms in-market. Everyone tells you theyโ€™re the greatest fund since sliced bread. Or in their words, theyโ€™re top quartile, if not top decile. Everyone tells you they have unique access. Yet most people generally have access to the same โ€œlegibleโ€ deals. Or at least, โ€œlegibleโ€ founders which include a river of backwards bias. So, who has โ€œbetterโ€ access? Time horizons are realistically 12-15 years, instead of the 10 years people pitch you. Plenty of GPs quietly โ€œretireโ€ after 2-3 years to go work at a portfolio company or โ€œget acquiredโ€ by a larger platform. IPO markets havenโ€™t fully opened yet, and there just isnโ€™t enough private capital to deploy into the largest companies. 2025 has been an interesting year of one of the lowest years in dollars raised, but one of the highest, with respect to dollars deployed. Six-layer SPVs, where the individual who manages the sixth layer has no idea who actually owns the underlying asset, just a forward contract towards the stock.

The first question you need to ask yourself, and likely the most important question, you need to ask yourself is if someone pitches you their fund, and itโ€™s Wonderbread, why are you so lucky?

How are you luckier than the most established institutions whoโ€™ve done this for decades? How are you luckier than people who are college roommates with Sam Altman? How are you luckier than multi-stage venture funds who have a strong brand AND an active fund-of-funds program that invests in managers sharing their deal flow with them? How are you luckier than content creators who get pitched VC guests all the time? How are you luckier than the owner of Buckโ€™s or Coupa or the real estate firms who own buildings on Sand Hill Road?

More likely than not, youโ€™re not. Iโ€™m not.

A long-time private equity allocator friend of mine has this great line, โ€œThere are only two kinds of people who make money. Really smart people and dumb people who know theyโ€™re not smart enough to beat the market. Everyone in between has just enough knowledge to make dumb decisions.โ€

Thereโ€™s a great line by the legendary Richard Feynman. โ€œThe first principle is that you must not fool yourselfโ€”and you are the easiest person to fool.โ€ Remember that.

So, after all those disclaimers, do you just not invest?

If the above scares you, probably not. Youโ€™re more likely to generate consistent returns by investing in the indices. But if youโ€™re willing to put in the blood, sweat and tears, maybe the below might be of value to you.

The first step is to see a lot of deals. You have no idea what quality looks like until youโ€™ve seen quality. Otherwise youโ€™re spending a good chunk of time imagining what could be and what should be, but not is. Just like the GPs we evaluate need to prove they can โ€œsee, pick and winโ€, we as LPs have to do the legwork to see the best deals, to build the framework to pick them, and to win the deals that are hard to come by. But first, on seeingโ€ฆ

Itโ€™s like dating for the first time. I donโ€™t know about you, and this might be TMI (too much information). Before I dated my first girlfriend, I had all these ideas implanted in me from Hollywood, Hallmark movies, Matthew McConaughey, Sandra Bullock, Anne Hathaway, Hugh Grantโ€”you get the point. I had these faint, rose-tinted ideas of how my future partner should, would, could act. But when I finally started dating, reality was wildly different from expectations.

The same is true when you look at funds. Whether itโ€™s media, podcasts, or newsletters, they all tell you a warped perception of the reality of the market, told through the lens of a world that is most beneficial to their incentives. You need to figure it out your own. And when you do in the first year, maybe a bit longer, you will inevitably talk to more noise than signal. Accept that fact.

To get inbound, you need to do a combination of a few things. Pick your battles here:

  • Put โ€œLPโ€ on LinkedIn. You will have random GPs find you in their search engines and reach out. Almost all will be noise here, unfortunately.
  • Go to events that attract GPs (i.e. EMC Summit, RAISE Global, Bridge Funding Global, SuperVenture, FII, Upfront Summit, etc.). Your priority here is to go to the side events that arenโ€™t publicly disclosed that have LPs and GPs. If you canโ€™t get in there, go find the LP/GP Happy Hours and dinners that are shared on Eventbrite, Luma, and/or Partiful. And if still you canโ€™t get in, at these events, there are occasional speed dating breakout sessions.
  • Reach out to LPs and ask to buy them coffee as you are learning to be an LP. You can find these LPs either on:
    • Podcasts (i.e. Swimming with Allocators, Origins, Venture Unlocked, How I Invest, Superclustersโ€”mentioning my friendsโ€™ platforms before my own)
    • Reacting to LP and emerging manager content. There are a few LP โ€œinfluencersโ€ out there. Note not only who reads and comments on these posts, but whether the original poster also replies back to those comments (which is a loose indicator on the depth of their relationship and if that commenter is somewhat respected in the ecosystem). FYI, donโ€™t use me as a barometer, since I try to reply back to everyone. But a couple โ€œinfluencersโ€ that might help you kickstart your search. Beezer Clarkson, David Clark, John Rikhtegar, Meghan Reynolds, Endowment Eddie (on X), Dan Gray, James Heath, Matt Curtolo, and so on. Occasionally, Hunter Walk, Charles Hudson, Rick Zullo, Peter Walker and a few other VCs also post good LP content. OpenLP is also a great platform that captures the most interesting thoughts regularly, as well as what Pavel is building now too.

Now, that you have a list of GPs and your calendar has a few meetings set up, you ideally get GPs to share their decks with you before the meeting. Although, understandably, it is harder for GPs to trust you with their decks if you havenโ€™t yet built up social capital and trust.

If you can get the deck, I look for a few things. At least one interesting thing on the deck that can help the GP see more deals, pick better deals, or win competitive deals. And (b) is that โ€œthingโ€ an insight that the GPโ€™s prior background would have made explicit or obvious to that GP? For me, thatโ€™s enough to take a first meeting. Do note that most decks look the same. And if you canโ€™t tell one deck from another (thatโ€™s okay, I started like that too), ask the GP before the interview, something along the lines of: โ€œOf everything that is on your deck about the fund, is there one thing about you or your fund you hope that I catch that youโ€™re really proud of but thereโ€™s a chance I might not notice?โ€

Naturally, you can ask that question, even if you donโ€™t have the deck, and if their answer impresses you, take the meeting. I call that โ€œsuspense.โ€ Partial information that I am privy to that elicits further questions and curiosity. To engage with any GP, I need that first.

So then I share my calendar. I use Calendly, but youโ€™re welcome to use any alternative. And I include the below text along with the calendar invite to set expectations.

calendly

Do note that the meeting is only 15 minutes long. You donโ€™t have to do this, but I find it useful because Iโ€™ve seen a number of GPs already. My CRM tells me just under 1000 that Iโ€™m actively tracking. But there are definitely more in the universe. All that to say, Iโ€™ve come to realize for myself that I figure out if I want to continue a conversation with a GP or not within the first 5-10 minutes.

The only thing Iโ€™m looking for in the meeting is โ€œsurprise.โ€ Is there something I can learn from the GP that I didnโ€™t know before? About them? About the industry? About the technologies? Ideally, you also consume quite a bit of information outside of each conversation. For instance, I read research papers, talk to people I think are smart, listen to podcasts, read newsletters, and build things here and there. The more information you consume outside, the higher your bar for โ€œsurpriseโ€ will be over time.

And if I learn something, only then, do I actually start doing homework around the fund opportunity. And spending more time with a GP.

Diligence

For the purpose of this section, Iโ€™m going to prioritize diligence as it relates to people. Iโ€™ll talk about portfolio sizing and construction in the section below. Iโ€™m also going to assume you donโ€™t have the ideal network to diligence the opportunity. What does the ideal network look like?

A small selection of A-players (founders, operators, co-investors, and LPs) that you trust AND they trust you to withhold judgment about them, as well as keep what they tell you in the highest level of confidence.

Admittedly, this will take time to build. Some longer than others. Your mileage may vary from multiple months to many years, sometimes decades. And this will be a part of your job as an LP to continually refine.

But in lieu of that, hereโ€™s where Iโ€™d start:

  1. Find who are A-players. Needless to say, before you can build a relationship with A-players, you must first be able to recognize A-players. Admittedly, this is a lot of legwork. And everyone approaches this part differently. For me, I have to consume a large amount of information from disparate knowledge networks, talk to different people and see who they respect, listen to a lot of podcasts, read a lot of books and content, in hopes of triangulating clarity of thought, as well as executional discipline. I donโ€™t have a silver bullet here unfortunately, but here are a few traits Iโ€™ve seen over the years that seem to have moderate to high correlation with A-players.
  2. Find out what motivates and drives them. What do they need? What do they want? What do most people fail to understand about them? This will also take time, potentially longer than the first step. Your job for now is to establish trust and rapport. โ€œWhat you share with me will never find its way back to the person I am calling about.โ€
  3. And as youโ€™re doing all the above, and still looking at deals. For people you know well and you can attest to their intellectual and executional rigor, ask them for their opinion. For everyone else, focus on asking about the facts. Youโ€™ll need to use the facts to piece together a narrative. Instead of โ€œWho do you likeโ€, ask โ€œWhen did you last talk to X?โ€ or โ€œHow many intros did this GP make for you? And how were you introduced?โ€

Naturally as part of diligence, you need to figure out and corroborate if a GP has an edge. Risks and weaknesses will always be present. Also, expect to get negative references. Any ambitious person is bound to ruffle feathers and rub people the wrong way. If you donโ€™t find any, youโ€™re either talking to the wrong people or you havenโ€™t given those people a safe space to talk. Also I want to note, as Cendanaโ€™s Kelli Fontaine once told me: โ€œNeutral references are worse than negative references.โ€

Negative referencesUnderstanding why itโ€™s negative is important. Is it merely a disagreement on perspective? Or is it evidence or an account of poor work ethic, abrasiveness, lack of open-mindedness, or poor morals?

For instance, โ€œGP didnโ€™t work that hard at our companyโ€ is not all bad, depending on their answer to โ€œWhat did they do outside of work?โ€ If the answer is โ€œI donโ€™t knowโ€, then your job is to find out what they did and if they worked hard there instead because working at their last company didnโ€™t align with their goals.

To give another example, a friend of mine once did a reference on a founderโ€”the lesson is the sameโ€”where a reference told him, โ€œI really hated how X always wore tank tops and sandals when the office culture required us to be put together.โ€ And many of his former colleagues all said the same thing. Yet no one ever complained about the work he did. Because despite his poor dress code, his output was in the top percentile on the team.

GPs, by nature of pitching a (hopefully) new narrative and charting their own path, will be controversial. Itโ€™s just part of the game. But obviously, it should not discount any bad behavior.

Other comments that belie a referenceโ€™s negative sentiment about someone:
โ€œThe GP is interesting.โ€ Interesting is usually a quiet opinion withheld. Itโ€™s always helpful in these situations to prod deeper.

โ€œI like the GP as a friend/human.โ€ Why donโ€™t you like this GP as an (investment) professional?
Neutral referencesNeutral references come in different shapes and sizes. Note that if you ask leading questions, youโ€™ll get safe answers. For example, โ€œDo you like X?โ€ leads to an answer of โ€œOh yes, I like X.โ€

The most common form of neutral references are often masked by positive, generic adjectives, but canโ€™t be substantiated by real examples. Other forms include not remembering who the GP was despite the GP being on the cap table, or working together. Also, on-list references who opt to text/email you about their commentary on a GP instead of call. Or taking a really long time to schedule time with you to talk about the GP, versus immediately leaping out of their chair to tell you about a GP. In addition to that, references (usually on-list or their most notable co-investors or founders) who didnโ€™t even know that the GP was raising a fund or what the GP would be investing into.
Positive referencesPositive ones luckily are the easiest to spot. And itโ€™s not just the words you hear, but the emotions you feel when someone tells you about the GP. These references, whether they say it explicitly or not, would go to war for the GP.

Peter Fenton at Benchmark recently shared a line I really like. “The highest accolade of a firm that they seek is a manifestation of a value system.” Most investmentsโ€”both at the level of an angel investment, but also a number of institutional investmentsโ€”are written as one-night stands. The majority, if not all, of the conversations happen T-3 months before an investment is made. Then as soon as the investment happens, outside of the monthly or quarterly updates, and maybe the board meetings, no other meaningful conversation happens post-investment. And the truth is if an investor hasnโ€™t built their value system (and for that matter, value-add system) before they start their firm, theyโ€™re not likely to change their behavior and their habitual cycles after they start their firm. Moreover, noting my bias, I prefer to invest in GPs where I am investing in the worst version of their firm on the day I invest. That itโ€™ll only get better. And to do so, certain things need to compound: brand, value, network, among others. In order for that to happen, they need to have built a relationship, as opposed to a one-night stand, with many of their investments, even beyond their best ones. So the point of doing diligence is to find evidence of their firmโ€™s value system before they start it.

Having shared the above, now that you have time with the GPs and some of their references, what do you ask?

Note that the below arenโ€™t all-encompassing nor exhaustive questions and that you usually get more from asking follow-up questions instead of building a checklist of questions to ask. Merely, the below serve as a point of inspiration as you do your own due diligence. As such, Iโ€™ve structured the below into categories on how I assess a GPโ€™s ability to see, pick and win through the reference calls I do, segmented by reference archetype.

Seeing

What does their sourcing engine look like? How much is inbound? How much is outbound? Do they have access to proprietary channels for deal flowโ€”even if momentarily? Do they know people who add value to the innovation ecosystem, but arenโ€™t well connected to the rest of the innovation ecosystem?

I will note that most GPs will say most of their deal flow comes from founder referrals.

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPHow do you find opportunities before anyone else?Are they fishing in new uncharted territories? Do they have non-redundant networks and access points?
FoundersHow did you first meet this GP? Do you remember the type of conversation you initially had with said GP?
If the GP met this person via an event: How often do you go to these events? Outside of meeting this GP, whoโ€™s the most memorable friend youโ€™ve made via the event?
If the two met via an intro: How often do you catch up with your mutual friend? Has your mutual friend introduced you to other investors?
Iโ€™m trying to understand how much of a GPโ€™s deal flow is inbound versus outbound. As well as how repeatable certain deal flow channels and nodes are.
Co-InvestorsHow is this GPโ€™s deal flow different from yours? Why havenโ€™t you pursued building out your own network in this field?Can [insert big firm] just do what this GP can? Is there a structural moat?
LPsFor the funds you were also looking at or have in your portfolio, who seems to have the same deal flow channels as this GP?Institutional LPs see a lot, and as a function, they likely see a lot of overlap in inbound channels. So for people who have the same channels, why does a certain GP capture value from it better than the rest?
Ex-colleaguesIn what situations do you typically find this GP to be proactive when you used to work with her/him?
What has this GP done that no one with her/his job title has ever done in the past?
How entrepreneurial is the GP? Is the new firm the first instance of their entrepreneurial nature or is this part of the GPโ€™s inherent nature?

Picking

Thereโ€™s a saying in the land of LPs. โ€œYou donโ€™t have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in has to be great.โ€

So the question comes down to: how do you know if someone is great?

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPWhy have you and havenโ€™t you put the most amount of capital behind your portfolioโ€™s greatest value driver?
If we could go through each of your past investmentsโ€”good and badโ€”can you enlighten me on why you invested in each?
The first question is figuring out if a GP understands how early and how much to put in their greatest outperformers. What signals do they rely on? Are they ready to invest with reserves?
The second question is to understand how the GPโ€™s ability to recognize excellence and insights has evolved. How quickly they ramp up. How many investments it takes for them to shift the way they think. At what point, do previous investments impact the way they make future investments?
FoundersWhat kinds of conversations did you have with the GP before they gave you a term sheet? How long did that journey take? Were you surprised at all? How did the conversations with this GP differ from the other ones you had?From the perspective of a recipient, how much of a GPโ€™s intention is well-understood before the GP embarks on a commercial relationship with the founder(s)?
Co-InvestorsHow often do you take intros the GP sends your way? Was that always the case?
How has your relationship with this GP evolved over time? Where do you foresee it evolving towards?
Do investors understand and value a GPโ€™s eye for people and opportunities?
With the second set of questions, Iโ€™m trying to understand how much a co-investor values this GPโ€™s deals. If the co-investor works at a multi-stage fund, have they ever tried to hire this GP into their firm? Or had them as a scout? Or is it a purely, โ€œitโ€™s nice to have you in our orbitโ€ kind of relationship?
LPsHow have you directly experienced the value of being an LP?Have the GPs provided any value to their existing LPs? Iโ€™m primarily looking at GPs who claim to offer co-invest opportunities. Do they (a) know the founders well enough to get allocation for people the founders likely donโ€™t know or trust yet, and (b) how much do they optimize for whatโ€™s best for the fund versus whatโ€™s best for the LPs?
With (b), itโ€™s not a bad thing to optimize for the fund, but setting expectations is important, instead of claiming to be helpful to LPs without actually being helpful.
Ex-colleaguesHas this GP hired anyone in the past that youโ€™ve genuinely impressed with? Why were you impressed by these individuals? Has this GP done anything to help these individuals succeed over time?Thereโ€™s no direct parallel between hiring and investing, but in terms of recognizing talent, there are some similarities.

Winning

Why do the worldโ€™s best founders want to work with you? What do you have to offer that others donโ€™t? Why would a world-class founder have you on the cap table when there are so many great options out there (and even when thereโ€™s that much inbound interest)?

RecipientQuestionsWhat I Look For
The GPWhat is your proudest piece of advice you gave a founder or the proudest thing you did for a founder?
What’s something you did for a founder or a piece of advice you give that didn’t work out? What’s something you did/piece of advice that did better than you expected?
Can I see every single version of your pitch deck to date? (If thereโ€™ve been previous vintages, ask for those as well.)
Iโ€™m primarily looking for specificity. Was it proactive or reactive? And when corroborating with said founder later on, will that founder reflect the same sentiment?
With regards to the second and third questions, do you measure when things deviate from expectationsโ€”good or bad?
My goal with the last question is to understand how the GPโ€™s thinking has evolved over time. How has the GPโ€™s ability to storytell changed? Do they have a better grasp of how they can add value and what founders actually want over time?
FoundersWhich other investors did you talk to before you took this GPโ€™s check?
Did you know that you were going to be a hot commodity? When and how did you know?
How did the GP help when things werenโ€™t going well? How did the GP react when things turned downwards?
Was there competition for the round? Itโ€™s neither good nor bad if there was. And if there was, why did they end up taking this GPโ€™s check? Would they still take it if this GP wrote double the check and asked for double the ownership?
Co-InvestorsWhat value does this GP bring to the table that seems to be a constant ask from your portfolio companies?Why will fellow investors fight for this GP to be on the cap table?
LPsWho were the most elucidating individuals you talked to best appreciate this GPโ€™s value-add?Are there people you should have talked to but have yet to? Or are there people you talked to but asked the wrong set of questions? Or whom youโ€™ve yet to build rapport with?
Ex-colleaguesWhat would you say is this GPโ€™s greatest asset/skillset? How have you seen it in practice?
Whoโ€™s the best person you know of for [insert what the GP claimed as value add]? Why? On that same scale, where this person is a 10, where does the GP sit? What would help this GP get to a 10?
A-players typically know other A-players, and understanding how they rank a GP among all the other practitioners they know is valuable intel.

Gravitational pull

To tie the above together, there is no perfect emerging GP. And if they are, theyโ€™re probably not an โ€œemergingโ€ GP. I look for emerging GPs who excel in two of the three areas (see, pick, win). One in isolation wonโ€™t help. If youโ€™re the worldโ€™s best sourcer, but you donโ€™t know how to pick the right one even when it falls on your lap, or you donโ€™t know how to get the founder to choose you over others, then sourcing alone is for naught.

I look for GPs to have an unfair advantage in two of the three areas. I need the cards stacked in their favor. Oftentimes, their unfair advantages are further accented by what first surprised me in the first meeting or two. Furthermore, gravitational pull comes from acknowledgement of their unfair strengths, as well as the constant refinement of the craft that increases the firmโ€™s leverage over time.

Partnership risk

One other important element to underwrite is partnership risk. To many experienced allocators, like Ben Choi once told me, this may even be the single biggest risk an LP has to underwrite. If youโ€™re investing in a partnership, chemistry really matters. They may look great on paper. They may have complementary skillsets. But do they talk about each other in ways that raise each other up? How are decisions made? Is there a power imbalance? How is compensation shared (salary and carry)? How much do they not only respect but adore the othersโ€™ strengths? How do they resolve conflict? Have they disagreed with each other before?

Portfolio construction and sizing

By the time you decide to invest in funds (or directly into startups too), you need to understand that youโ€™re building a portfolio. Unless your hands are blessed by a higher being or that you have the Midas touch, there is a ridiculously low chance you can pick 2-3 funds and expect theyโ€™ll outperform. Naturally, you want all the funds you do invest in to do well, but sometimes in this world, you can do everything right and have things still not work out. So expect, on average, most funds will return you 0.8-5X their money back to you.

So there are a few things you need to figure out:

  1. Assuming things go right, and youโ€™ve invested in this 5X fund:
    • Is a 5X net (which is roughly a little over 6X gross) return on your investment meaningful to you and your net worth?
      • If not, then the question comes down to: Is there something else you value from investing in this fund? Some value co-investment opportunities. I know of a number of venture funds, traditional fund-of-funds, and multi-family offices, who see their fund-of-fund program as a loss leader, with the primary goal of the fund-of-funds to generate deal flow for their direct investment practice. As an emerging LP, do consider that if you want co-investment opportunities, are you the largest (or at the minimum, one of the largest LP checks who care about co-investments)? If not, then consider the reality of why would the GP ever give you the best deal flow if youโ€™re not their greatest (monetary) supporter.
      • If so, great. But at the risk of it being a 0.8X net fund, meaning you not only lost money to decision-making, but also to inflation and the opportunity cost of investing in a public market index, can you stomach the loss 12-15 years from now?
        • If not, invest a smaller check size.
        • If so, great.
    • Whatever is needed to 5X the fund, what is the exit value necessary for that?
      • If a GP has no reserves and invests pre-seed/seed, assume 75-80% dilution by the time of exit for the fundโ€™s greatest value drivers. This does not account for acquisitions, which will have a little more nuance. This also assumes that there will be 5-6 rounds of investment after the one the GP invests in.
      • If a GP has reserves, depending on the industry, and how much they continue doubling down on the investment, itโ€™s safe to assume 55-60% dilution. If the GP plans to continue doubling down on pro-rata past the Series A, do account for how much of the overall fund is allocated in a singular deal. Usually limited partner agreements cap it at around 15% of the overall fund, to allow for minimum diversification at the portfolio construction level.
      • And assuming you know the exit and enterprise value thatโ€™s needed to 5X the fund, do you believe thatโ€™s possible? Your job is to go into the internet archives and find, if in the last few years, what percent of companies in that industry has exited for that size. And how likely will it be for future companies to exit at that size? And even if so, do you believe the GP is in the right information flows to capture that outcome?
    • Is the number of companies the GP wants allocation into, reasonable to you? Every person has a different level of tolerance in this regard. To make some gross assumptions, if a GP invests in 50 companies in a fund, then they need a single company to 50X to return your money back once (obviously Iโ€™m taking the gross, not the net numbers). And they need a single company to 150X to 3X the fund. At a $10M post-money valuation, a 150X would turn the company into a $1.5B company. Again, do open a spreadsheet for this. Iโ€™m not accounting for dilution, fees, recaps, and a bunch of other things. This is purely a back-of-the-napkin version of: Do you believe a $1.5B outcome in this sector of choice is possible?
      • Do also note that given that venture is a power law business, a single value driver for a fund usually accounts for at least 60% of the overall fundโ€™s returns. 1-2 companies account for another 20-30%. And the rest, the last 10%. I also want to play my own devilโ€™s advocate that almost nothing in this industry is โ€œusual.โ€

Miscellaneous thoughts

  1. Donโ€™t invest in the first 50 funds you see. You will miss great deals. Thatโ€™s okay. You donโ€™t have to invest in every great fund, but every fund you invest in should be great.
  2. If youโ€™ve been out-of-market for more than a year, do the same. You need to know how people are hiding skeletons in their closet?
  3. Trust the data, but not the judgments of people who see a plethora of deals in venture. Have they seen other funds with the same strategy before investing in this one? What was different?
  4. Almost every fund you meet will say theyโ€™re top quartile or top decile. Be skeptical of benchmarking data, or for that matter, publicly available data that will suffer from availability and selection bias. Theyโ€™re either too opaque or delayed, and in the words of some institutional LPs, โ€œtotally fabricated.โ€
    • To borrow the words of my friend Peter Walker, whoโ€™s constantly cited for his Carta reports, โ€œโ€œYou should probably, if youโ€™re a founder, for instance, selectively ignore at least half of what Iโ€™m saying because it doesnโ€™t apply to you. And your job as a founder, your job as an investor, your job as a thoughtful person is to figure out which half.โ€
  5. Ignore the marketing jargon associated with โ€œselectโ€ track records GPs share with you. Ask for their schedule of investments (SOI), which should include all their investments to date, not just the ones they want you to see. Figure out your own valuation methodology, and prescribe that to their SOI.
    • For me, SAFE notes donโ€™t count as markups, only priced rounds. Any company that hasnโ€™t gotten reevaluated in the market for over 2 years receives a discount. The only exception is strong revenue growth since last round. Discount is based on public market comparables and their revenue multiples. Usually 7-8X on revenue for me. Not always.
    • If a GP gives you โ€œtargetโ€ or โ€œprojectedโ€ multiples, youโ€™re welcome to ignore the number outright. Whatโ€™s more interesting and important are what were the assumptions that led to the projection. What is the expected dilution? How many rounds is a company expected to raise before their projected exit? What is the assumed graduation rate per stage? What is the conservative estimate?
  6. Never trust the word of a GP. Spend more time on reference calls than you do with the GP. When doing references, if you know people really well AND believe they are the top 1% in what they do, ask for their opinion. Everyone else, ask for the facts.
  7. Make sure the data corroborates with the narrative. Is the data/track record repeatable? Being 0.1% on the cap table in three rocketship companies is very different from an investor co-founding a company. The relationship is different. In the former case, the founders, much less the executives, even remember a GP exists.
  8. When asking questions, roughly a third to a half of your questions should be the same across all managers, only then can you compare apples to apples.
  9. When spending time with the GP, find out what they donโ€™t want you to know. What are they scared of, that if you know, they think will look bad on them? Everyone has insecurities. Thatโ€™s okay. But only once you figure that out, can you better assess the information theyโ€™re telling you. And better yet, the information theyโ€™re not telling you. Which is what you eventually go to diligence.
  10. Sometimes thereโ€™s just no LP/GP fit. They might be a great fund, but you just donโ€™t feel the pull.
  11. Set expectations clear from the get-go. If youโ€™re in exploratory mode, say it. If youโ€™re actively deploying, say it.
  12. At any point in time, if you are no longer interested, and know that youโ€™re most likely not going to invest, say it. Itโ€™s better that a GP thinks youโ€™re not going to invest, then you do, than think youโ€™re going to invest, but you end up not.
  13. Be mindful of a GPโ€™s time. If youโ€™re not going to write the largest check as a function of a GPโ€™s fund, know you have limited time with them. Do not waste their time. Know you will have to do most of your homework without the help of the GP. If you want to be spoonfed diligence, this is the wrong asset class for you.

On spinouts, my primary concern is always: Were you successful because of your last firm or in spite of your last firm? If you no longer had the title you did last month or this month, would people engage with you differently? If youโ€™re the keynote for a large conference (i.e. SuperVenture, FII, iConnections, etc.) when you held your last position, will they still invite you back as a headliner when youโ€™re starting a new firm? When people talk about you behind your back about how amazing you are, do they talk in the past or present tense? Tactically, are you the ex-Redpoint partner or Tomasz? Are you ex-Greylock or Sarah? Are you ex-[insert big firm] or you?

As most insights, these will very rarely come out in conversation with the GP. More often than not, theyโ€™ll come out in diligence. Particularly off-list references. If you donโ€™t have the network, you have to rely on on-list references and maybe a few good friends, but know that there is no incentive for people to speak ill of someone else to a stranger. So diligence only the facts. Youโ€™re likely not going to get the honest โ€œopinionsโ€ you want to adequately understand an opportunity.

For established LP

If youโ€™re an established LP, you know most of the above. So instead, Iโ€™ll share a couple reminders that you may have heard before, but are paramount more today than before. Before I share them, hereโ€™s how Iโ€™m categorizing the difference between an emerging and an established, just because I know everyone has a different definition (i.e. AUM size, number of investments made, track record that extends for at least a decade, etc.). Do note, you donโ€™t have to check all the boxes. As long as you have most of the below traits of an โ€œestablished LPโ€, youโ€™re probably established. One of those touchy-feely things where when you see it, you know it.

Emerging LPEstablished LP
No prior network to lean onA robust network to source and diligence deals (meaning you get at least 5-10 quality referrals per month from legible people)
No brandA brand where people will start a conversation with you purely because of the jersey you have on
You need to go out hunting for deals. Show up/host events. Build a platform. Actively book time on peopleโ€™s calendars to find out whatโ€™s going on.(Related to the above) Inbound deal flow exceeds outbound, but with the understanding, to do your job well, you still need to do outbound.
You take time to deliberate on decisions. Understanding whatโ€™s going on takes time. If you were to look only at a pitch deck, outside of the metrics, you might struggle to understand whatโ€™s important. BTW, this is both good and bad. But good in the sense that you donโ€™t have prejudice. And youโ€™re more willing to uncover diamonds in the rough.You make fast โ€œnoโ€ decisions (at least internally). A function of the scar tissue and the training youโ€™ve had up to this point.
You invest opportunistically. You might not have the quality of deal flow to start a consistent deployment strategy. Thatโ€™s ok, BTW.You can invest opportunistically, but if you wanted, or have already, have capital and the network to deploy consistently against some schedule. Could be annually. Could be quarterly.
If you show up at any LP-only event, you might know the host and one other person at best.If you show up at a random LP only event, you know at least a few other LPs in the room by name.
Youโ€™re on an email basis, maybe LinkedIn basis with other allocators and investors. It will take time to build the relationships.Youโ€™re on a text/Whatsapp basis with other experienced LPs and they respond to you within a few hours, if not minutes.
You need to build out your systems for managing deal velocity and future volume. Easier to start when you have less volume. (Building out systems is an article to write for another day.)You have a system for tracking your deal flow pipeline, diligence, and keeping track of your portfolio and anti-portfolio investments.
Youโ€™re not intimately familiar with SEC (and others) regulations around the rules of engagement in LP land.You know exactly what compliance will let you and not let you say. And you know the right verbiage to dance around these topics.

So the reminders:

  1. Be open-minded. To have gotten this far in your investing career so far means youโ€™ve built biases to help you make better decisions. Likely, also faster decisions. Youโ€™ve probably used some phrase along the lines of โ€œThere will always be another train leaving the station.โ€ And youโ€™re right. Most are worth waiting on. But there will be a small, small select few that is worth breaking every rule you know for. The truly once-in-a-lifetime relationship (not just opportunity). Know that the greatest firms tomorrow do not look like the firms from before.
  2. To check your biases, ask yourself three questions:
    • What do you typically gravitate towards? Why? Was there a part of your past that led you to gravitate towards X?
    • What, for whatever reason, do you not like? What gives you allergic reactions? Why?
    • What, for whatever reason, do you not notice at all? Of all the skimming you do, what are the parts of the narrative that you most easily gloss over? Why?
  3. Numbers tell a very small part of the story.
  4. Whatโ€™s worth underwriting more than anything else is motivation. Motivation to outperform. Motivation why this upcoming fund means theyโ€™ll work harder than before. Motivation to get better at what they might already be good at. That means most of the work is qualitative, not quantitative.
  5. If youโ€™re an established institution, you already have a brand. You likely donโ€™t have to hunt for deals (regardless of what you tell your stakeholders). And itโ€™s probably all true. But you wonโ€™t always have that brand. So itโ€™s your job not to do a disservice to the brand. And almost always means you communicate expectations quickly and accurately.

There are two angles here.

  1. Do you want to play in emerging venture today?
  2. Do you want to re-up?

Emerging venture today is an asset class in and of itself. High attrition rates. Too many players. Lack of data. Lack of track record. Sometimes, even lack of network. The underwriting for someone who invests $250-500K checks is different from someone who typically leads rounds. The underwriting of a partnership potentially not yet fully formed until Fund N+2. Data rooms with missing data. A portfolio construction model that is a guestimate at best, completely made up at worst. Assuming youโ€™re reading this, you know that. And that it is a full-time job.

  1. How are you continually refreshing your networkโ€”both for sourcing and for diligence? Are you making sure your network isnโ€™t stale? All networks atrophy over time. How are you keeping your most helpful contacts fresh, incentivized, and willing to give you their honest thoughts? You donโ€™t need a lot here. It helps to optimize for at least 20 relationships, leaning largely into, and likely in the below order:
    • Fund-of-funds who see many deals and whose sole job is to evaluate emerging managers, and/or any institution who has a dedicated emerging manager program (i.e. Vanderbilt, Babson, Gresham, etc.)
    • Service providers (i.e. lawyers, fund accountants, fund admin) who get to know many emerging managers from a different angle
    • A select few hot founders who also angel invest and are superconnectors in their own right
    • Multi-stage fund GPs and partners who often co-invest with emerging managers. Focus on those who have dedicated event series and/or communities for emerging managers. I personally spend less time with venture funds with their own fund-of-funds programโ€”not because theyโ€™re not great, but theyโ€™re often biased to promote their own fund managers. Different story if I knew them before they launched their FoF program and I can get honest thoughts here. If you donโ€™t know who to target, thereโ€™s a select few namesโ€”say around 15-20โ€”that most active emerging managers love to have on their deck.

On re-ups:

  1. What are the incentives of the organization? Do your incentives as an institution still align as strongly with the GP as it did when you first invested?
  2. If not, have you communicated that pre-emptively with the manager?

In closing

Despite the surplus of information and the sheer number of venture funds (in the mid-to high thousands), none of us can do it alone. At least I donโ€™t believe we can. Why? Unlike the public markets where there is as close as we can get to parity of information. The private markets, especially early-stage investments, exhibit none of that. People win on asymmetry of information.

Jacob Miller once told me on the podcast that in investing, there are three things you need to understand. Inputs, frameworks, outputs. Outputs, you canโ€™t always control. But as long as you have good inputs and a great framework, your outputs should speak for themselves. With my blog, Iโ€™ve always tried to empower people with frameworks. With The Side Letter that Sam and I launched, weโ€™re trying to empower people with inputs you canโ€™t find anywhere else.

While Iโ€™d love to surmise all of LP investing in one fell swoopโ€”Pavelโ€™s given me quite the task at handโ€”the truth is I canโ€™t. The best I can do is to share the frameworks I use. The next step is for you to find the inputs that will drive your investment decisions. Those can come from leveraging a platform or community. Hell, even investing in other funds-of-funds. Or collecting asymmetric information yourself. Or a combination of both. Itโ€™s only a matter of how much time, attention, and energy you have on your hands.

As always, and I have to say this at the end of everything I write, the views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.


Again, a huge thank you to Beezer Clarkson, Dave McClure, and Narayan Chowdhury for proofreading early drafts of this piece to help me better refine my thoughts here. I wouldn’t be here without you.


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Goldilocks and the 3 Secondaries

3, three, hot air balloon

โ€œWe need to rewrite our early DPI blogpost.โ€

Two years ago, Dave and I sat down less than five blocks away from where we were sitting when those words escaped the clutches of Daveโ€™s mindscape. That piece has since been cited a number of times from fund managers Iโ€™ve come across. And sometimes, even LPs. While each part of that piece was written to be evergreen knowledge, what we want to do is to add nuance to that framework, along with examples of how we might see the internal conflict of early distributions and long-term thinking manifest.

In effect, and the premise for this blogpost, youโ€™re in Year 7 of the fund. Youโ€™re now raising Fund III. What do you need to do?

The urgency to sell at Year 7 is relatively low. Although booking some amount of DPI may motivate LPs to re-up or invest in Fund III. The urgency to sell at Year 12 is much higher. So, what happens between Years 7 and 12? If you do sell, do you sell to the market or to yourself via a continuation vehicle?

For starters:

  1. Knowing when to sell WHEN you have the chance to sell is crucial. The window of opportunity only lasts so long.
  2. Consider selling some percentage of your winners on the way up to diversify, but be careful not to sacrifice too much potential future DPI. Yes, this is something weโ€™ll elaborate more on with examples of what exactly we mean.

At the moment the next round is being put together, you have no discount to the current round price. The longer you wait to transact, the more doubt settles in from outsiders, the deeper the discount as time goes on. And so, if you have the chance to sell, sell into the (oversubscribed) primary rounds in order to optimize for price efficiency. Unless maybe, youโ€™re selling SpaceX, OpenAI, Anthropic, Anduril, Ramp, just to name a few. There is a BIG tradeoff in TVPI (versus future DPI) when selling a fast-growing asset early (assuming it keeps its pace of growth). There is also a BIG risk to holding on to a large unrealized gain if the company stumbles or the market crashes.

We live in a world now that multi-stage venture funds have become asset management shops. Their primary goal will be to own as much of an outlier company as possible to maximize their potential for returns. As such, they will choose, at times, to buy out earlier shareholdersโ€™ equity.

To sell your secondaries, you have a very small window of opportunity to sell. Realistically, you have one to two quarters to sell where you can probably get a fair market value of 90 cents to the dollar of the last round valuation. Ideally, you sell into the next round at the price the next round values the company. As Hunter Walk once wrote, โ€œoptimally the secondary sales will always occur with the support/blessing of the founders; to favored investors already on the cap table (or whom the founders want on the cap table); without setting a price (higher or lower than last mark) which would be inconsistent with the companyโ€™s own fundraising strategy; and a partially exited investor should still provide support to the company ongoing.โ€ If you wait a year, some people start questioning the data. If you wait 2 years, youโ€™re looking at a much steeper discount. And if itโ€™s not a โ€œMag 10โ€ of the private marketsโ€”for instance, Stripe, SpaceX, Anduril, just to name a few, where there is no discountโ€”youโ€™re likely looking at 30-60% discounts. As Hunter Walk, in the same piece, quotes a friend, โ€œโ€˜I think friendly secondaries are easy, everything else feels new.โ€™โ€ As such, Dave and I are here to talk through what feels โ€œnew.โ€

First of all, lemons ripen early. In Years 1-5, youโ€™re going to see slow IRR growth. Most of that will be impacted by businesses that fall by the wayside in the early years. In Years 5-10, IRR accelerates, assuming you have winners in your portfolio. And in the latter years, Years 10 onward, IRR once again slows.

Before we get too deep, letโ€™s address some elephants in the room.

Why are we starting the dialogue around secondaries at Year 5? Five things. Year 5, 5 things. Get it? Hah. Iโ€™m going to see myself out later.

One, most investment recycling periods are in the first four years of the fund. So, any non-meaningful DPI is recycled back into the fund to make new investments. While this may not always happen, it usually is a term that sits in the limited partner agreement (LPA).

Two, most investments have not had time to mature. Imagine if you invested in a company in Year 1 of the fund. Five years in, this company is likely to have gone through two rounds of additional funding. If you come in at the pre-seed, the company is now at either a Series A or about to raise a Series B, assuming most companies raise every 18-24 months. If you were to sell now, before the company has had a chance to really grow, youโ€™re losing out on the vast majority of your venture returns. And especially so, if youโ€™ve invested in a company in Year 3 of the fund, you really didnโ€™t give the company time to mature.

Three, by Year 5, but really Year 7, ventureโ€™s older sibling, private equity, should have had distribution opportunities. And even if weโ€™re different asset classes by a long margin, allocators will, even subconsciously, begin to look towards their venture portfolio expecting some element of realized returns.

Four, QSBS grants you full tax benefits at Year 5. And yes, you do get some benefits with new regulation sooner by Year 3. But if youโ€™re investing in venture and hoping to get to liquidity by Year 3, youโ€™re in the wrong asset class.

Five, you will likely need to show (some) DPI in Fund I, in order to raise Fund III or IV. Itโ€™ll show that youโ€™re not only a great investor, but also a great fund manager.

Outside of our general rule of thumb in our writeup two years ago, letโ€™s break down a few scenarios. The obvious. The non-obvious. And the painful.

  1. The obvious. Your fund is doing well. Youโ€™re north of 5X between Years 7 and 10. You have a clear outlier. Maybe a few.
  2. The non-obvious. Your fund is doing okay. This is the middle of the road case. Youโ€™re at 3-5X in Years 7-10.
  3. Then, the painful. Youโ€™re not doing well. Even in Year 7, you havenโ€™t crested 3X. And really, you might have a 1.5-2X fund, if youโ€™re lucky. 1X or less if you arenโ€™t. But your job as a fund manager isnโ€™t over. You are still a professional money manager.

In each of the three scenarios, what do you do?

Itโ€™s helpful to frame the above scenarios through four questions:

  1. How much do you sell?
  2. When do you sell it?
  3. What is the pricing efficiency of those assets?
  4. And what is the ultimate upside tradeoff?

The obvious (5X+ TVPI)

Here, itโ€™s almost always worth booking in some distributions to make your LPs whole again. Potentially, and then some. At the end of the day, our job as investors is toโ€”to borrow a line from Jerry Colonnaโ€™s Rebootโ€”โ€œbuy low, sell high.โ€ Not โ€œbuy lowest, sell highest.โ€ As such, you should sell some percentage of your big winners to lock in some meaningful DPI. Selling at least 0.5X DPI at Year 7 is meaningful. Selling 1-2X DPI at Year 10 is meaningful. As you might notice, the function of time impacts what โ€œmeaningfulโ€ means. The biggest question you may have when you have solid fund performance is: How much should you sell knowing that in doing so, it might meaningfully cap your upside? Or if you should even sell at all?

Screendoorโ€™s Jamie Rhode once said, โ€œIf youโ€™re compounding at 25% for 12 years, that turns into a 14.9X. If youโ€™re compounding at 14%, thatโ€™s a 5. And the public market which is 11% gets you a 3.5X. […] If the asset is compounding at a venture-like CAGR, donโ€™t sell out early because youโ€™re missing out on a huge part of that ultimate multiple. For us, weโ€™re taxable investors. I have to go pay taxes on that asset you sold out of early and go find another asset compounding at 25%.โ€ Taking it a step further, assuming 12-year fund cycles, and 25% IRR, โ€œthe last 20% of time produces 46% of that return.โ€ Sheโ€™s right. Thatโ€™s the math. And thatโ€™s your trade off.

But for a second, we want you to consider selling some. Not all, just some. A couple other assumptions to consider before we get math-y:

  • 20% of your portfolio are home runs. And by Year 5 of your fund, theyโ€™re growing 30% year-over-year (YoY). And because they are great companies, growth doesnโ€™t dip below 20%, even by Year 15.
    • For home runs, weโ€™re also assuming you sell into the upcoming fundraising round. In other words, perfect selling price efficiency. Obviously, your mileage, in practice, may vary.
  • 30% of your portfolio are doubles, growing at 15% YoY. And growth doesnโ€™t fall below 10%, even by Year 15.
    • For doubles, just because theyโ€™re less well-known companies, weโ€™re assuming youโ€™re selling on a 50% discount to the last round valuation (LRV).
  • 20% of your portfolio are singles, growing at 7% YoY. Growth flatlines.
    • For singles, even less desirable, weโ€™re assuming youโ€™re selling on an 80% discount to LRV.
  • The rest (30%) are donuts. Tax writeoffs.
  • For every home run and double, their growth decays by 5% every year.
  • Weโ€™re assuming 15-year fund terms.

Example 1:
Say you have a $25M fund, and at Year 10, you choose to sell 50% of the initial fund size ($12.5M). If you didnโ€™t sell at Year 10, by Year 15, youโ€™d have a 5.7X fund. But if you did sell at Year 10, youโ€™d have a 3.8X fund. To most LPs, still not a bad fund.

vc secondary

The next few examples are testing the limits of outperformance and early distributions. Purely for the curious soul. For those, looking for what to do in the non-obvious case, you can jump to this section.

Example 2:
Now, letโ€™s say, in an optimistic case, your home runsโ€”still 20% of your portfolioโ€”are growing at 50% YoY in Year 5. All else equal. If you didnโ€™t sell at Year 10, by Year 15, youโ€™d have a 11.6X fund. If you did sell at Year 10, by Year 15, youโ€™d have a 9.3X. In both cases, and even when you do sell $12.5M of your portfolio at Year 10, you still have an incredible fund. And not a single LP will fault you for selling early.

secondary sale on 50% growth

Example 3:
Now, letโ€™s assume your home runs are still growing at 50% YoY at Year 5, but only 10% of your portfolio are home runs and 40% are strikeouts. All else equal. If you sell $12.5M at Year 10, at the end of your fundโ€™s lifetime, youโ€™re at 4.8X. Versus, if you didnโ€™t, 6.6X.

secondary sale 10% outlier

Hell, letโ€™s say youโ€™re not sure at Year 10, so you only sell a quarter of your initial fund size ($6.25M). All else equal to the third example. If you did sell, 5.6X. If you didnโ€™t, 7.4X.

vc secondary sale 25% at year 10

Example 4:
Now letโ€™s stretch the model a little. And play make believe. Letโ€™s take all the assumptions in Example 1, but the only difference is your home runs are growing at 100% YoY by Year 5.

If you sell at Year 10, by fund term, youโ€™re at 108.8X. If you donโ€™t sell at Year 10, you have 110.7X.

vc secondary 100% growth

And as we play with the model some more, we start to see that assuming the above circumstances and decisions, selling anything at most 1X your initial fund size at Year 10, at Year 15, you lose somewhere between 2X and 3X DPI.

If you sell three times your fund size, assuming you can by Year 10, you lose at most around 5X of your ultimate DPI at Year 15. If you sell five times your initial fund size (again, assuming the odds are in your favor), you lose at most 7X of your final DPI by Year 15.

Now, weโ€™d like to point out that Examples 2, 3, and 4 are merely intellectual exercises. As we mentioned in our first blogpost on this topic, if your best assets are compounding at a rate higher than your target IRR (say for venture, thatโ€™s 25%), you should be holding. Even a company growing 50% YoY at Year 5, assuming 5% decay in growth per year, will still be growing at 39% in Year 10, which is greater than 25%. That said, if a single asset accounts for 50-80% of your portfolioโ€™s value, do consider concentration risk. And selling 20-30% of that individual asset may make sense to book in distributions, even if the terms may not look the best (i.e. on a discount greater than feels right).

Remember what we said earlier? To re-underscore that point, itโ€™s worth saying it again. There is a BIG tradeoff in TVPI (versus future DPI) when selling a fast-growing asset early (assuming it keeps its pace of growth). There is also a BIG risk to holding on to a large unrealized gain if the company stumbles or the market crashes.

If youโ€™d like to simulate your own secondary sales, weโ€™ll include the model at the very bottom of this post.

The non-obvious (3-5X TVPI)

This is tricky territory. Because by Year 7-10, and if youโ€™re here, you donโ€™t have any clear outliers (where it might make more sense to hold as the assets are compounding faster than your projected IRR), but you donโ€™t have a bad fund. In fact, many LPs might even call yours a win, depending on the vintage and public market equivalents. So the question becomes how much DPI is worth selling before fund term to make your LPs whole, and how much should you be capping your upside. How much of your TVPI should you be selling for your DPI knowing that you can only sell on a discount?

Weโ€™re back in Example 1 that we brought up earlier, especially if you have a single asset that accounts for 50-80% of the overall portfolio value. Here if the companies are collectively growing faster than your target IRRโ€”say 25% on a revenue growth perspective, hold your positions. If your companies are growing slower than your target IRR and are valued greater than 1.5X public market comparables, you should consider selling 20-30% of your positions to book meaningful distributions.

The painful (1-3X TVPI)

Youโ€™ve got a dud. No two ways about it. Youโ€™re really looking at a 1.5X net fund. Maybe a 1X. And mind we remind you, itโ€™s Years 7-10. Itโ€™s either you sell or you ride out the lie you have to tell LPs. LPs will almost always prefer the former. And for the latter, letโ€™s be real โ€” hope is not a (liquidity) strategy. And if put less charitably, check this Tina Fey and Amy Poehler video out. I donโ€™t have the heart to put whatโ€™s alluded to in writing, but the video encapsulates, while humorously framed, the situation youโ€™re in. Youโ€™re going to have to try to sell your positions on heavy discounts.

If you made it thus far, first off, youโ€™re a nerd. We respect that. We are too. And second off, youโ€™re probably looking for the model we used. If so, here you go.

We also do cover how this blogpost came to be in the first ever episode of the [trading places] podcast. And if you’re interested in the topic of secondaries, the [trading places] podcast might be your new guilty pleasure.

Photo by Tucker Monticelli on Unsplash


Shoutout to Dave for the many iterations of this blogpost and building the model in which this blogpost is based around!


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Good Misses and Bad Hits

basketball shot, swoosh

The espresso shot:

  • What are the essential elements of a โ€œgoodโ€ VC fund strategy vs. โ€œluckyโ€?
  • What elements can you control and what can you not?
  • How long does it take to develop โ€œskillโ€ and can you speed it up w/ (intentional) practice?

Anyone can shoot a three-pointer every once in a while.

Steph Curry is undeniably one of the best shooters of our time. If not, of all time. Even if you don’t watch ball, one can’t help but appreciate what a marksman Steph is. In case you haven’t, just look at the clip below of his shots during the 2024 Olympics.

From the 2024 Olympics

As the Under Armour commercial with Michael Phelps once put it, “it’s what you do in the dark that puts you in the light.” For Steph, it’s the metaphoric 10,000 hours taking, making, and missing shots. For the uninitiated, what might be most fascinating is that not all shots are created equal, specifically… not all misses are created equal.

There was a piece back in 2021 by Mark Medina where he wrote, “If the ball failed to drop through the middle of the rim, Curry and Payne simply counted that attempt as a missed shot.” Even if he missed, the difference between missing by a wide margin versus hitting the rim mattered. The difference between hitting the front of the rim versus the backboard or the back rim mattered. The former meant you were more likely to make the shot after the a bounce than the other. Not all misses are created equal.

Anyone can shoot a 3-pointer. With enough tries. But not everyone can shoot them as consistently as Steph can.

The same holds for investing. Many people, by sheer luck, can find themselves invested in a unicorn. But not everyone can do it repeatedly across vintages. It’s the difference between a single outperforming fund and an enduring firm.

The former isn’t bad. Quite good actually. But it also takes awareness and discipline to know that it may be a once-in-a-lifetime thing. The latter takes work. Lots of it. And the ability to compound excellence.

When one is off, how much are you off? What are the variables that led you to miss? What variables are within your control? And what aren’t? Of those that are, how consistent can you maintain control over those variables?

As such, let me break down a few things that you can control as a GP.

Are you seeing enough deals? Are you seeing enough GREAT deals? Do you find yourself struggling in certain quarters to find great deals or do you find yourself struggling to choose among the surplus of amazing deals that are already in your inbox? Simply, are you struggling against starvation or indigestion? Itโ€™s important to be intellectually honest here, at least to yourself. I know thereโ€™s the game of smokes and mirrors that GPs play with LPs when fundraising, but as the Richard Feynman line goes, โ€œThe first principle is that you must not fool yourselfโ€”and you are the easiest person to fool.โ€

Whereas deal flow is about what companies you see, value add is more about how you win deals. Why and how do you attract the worldโ€™s best entrepreneurs to work with you? In a world where the job of a VC is to sell money โ€“ in other words, is my dollar greener or is another VCโ€™s dollar greener โ€“ you need to answer a simple question: Why does another VC fund need to exist?

What can you provide a founder that no other, or at least, very few other, investors can

While there are many investors out there who say โ€œfounders just like meโ€ or โ€œfounders share their most vulnerable moments with meโ€, itโ€™s extremely hard for an LP to underwrite. And what an LP cannot grasp their head around means youโ€™ll disappear into obscurity. The file that sits in the back of the cabinet. Youโ€™ll exist, and an LP may even like you, but never enough for them to get to conviction. And to a founder, especially when theyโ€™ve previously โ€œmade itโ€, already, you will fall into obsolescence because your value-add will be a commodity at scale. Note the term โ€œat scale.โ€ Yes, youโ€™ll still be able to win deals on personality with your immediate network, and opportunistically with founders that you occasionally click with. But can you do it for the three best deals that come to your desk every quarter for at least the next four years? If youโ€™re building an institutional firm, for the next 20+ years. Even harder to do, when youโ€™re considering thousands of firms are coming out of the woodwork every year. Also, an institutional LP sees at least a few hundred per year.

For starters, I recommend checking out Daveโ€™s piece on what it means to help a company and how it impacts your brand and perception.

Deal flow is all about is your aperture wide enough. Are you capturing enough light? Portfolio size is all about how grainy the footage is. With the resolution you opt for, are you capturing enough of the details that could produce a high definition portfolio? In venture, a portfolio of five is on the smaller side. And unless youโ€™re a proven picker, and are able to help your companies meaningfully or youโ€™re in private equity, as a Fund I, you might want to consider a larger portfolio. Itโ€™s not uncommon to see portfolios at 30-40 in Fund I that scale down in subsequent funds once the GPs are able to recognize good from great from amazing.

I will also note, with too big of a portfolio, you end up under optimizing returns. As Jay Rongjie Wang once said, โ€œโ€œThe reason why we diversify is to improve return per unit of risk taken.โ€ At the same time, โ€œbear in mind, every fund that you add to your portfolio, youโ€™re reducing your upside as well. And that is something a lot of people donโ€™t keep in mind.โ€

Moonfire Ventures did a study in 2023 and found that โ€œthe probability of returning less than 1x the fund decreases as the size of your portfolio grows, and gets close to zero when your portfolio exceeds 200 companies.โ€ That said, โ€œitโ€™s almost impossible to 10x a fund with more than 110 companies in your portfolio.โ€

While thereโ€™s no one right answer in the never-ending diversified versus concentrated debate, nevertheless, itโ€™s worth doing the work on how size and the number of winners in your portfolio impact returns.

First off, how are you measuring your marks? Marc Andreessen explains the concept of marks far better than I can. So not to do the point injustice, Iโ€™m just going to link his piece here.

Separately, the earliest proxies of portfolio success happens to revolve around valuations and markups, but to make it more granular, โ€œvaluationโ€ really comes down to two things:

  1. Graduation rates
  2. Pro rata / follow-on investments

When your graduation rates between stages fall below 30%, do you know why? What kinds of founders in your portfolio fail to raise their following round? What kinds of founders graduate to the next stage but not the one after that? Are you deeply familiar with the top reasons founders in your portfolio close up shop or are unable to raise their next round? What are the greatest hesitations downstream investors have when they say no? Is it the same between the seed to Series A and the A to B?

Of your greatest winners, are you owning enough that an exit here will be deeply meaningful for your portfolio returns. As downstream investors come in, naturally dilution occurs. But owning 5% of a unicorn on exit is 5X better than owning 1% of a unicorn. For a $10M fund, itโ€™s the difference for a single investment 1X-ing your fund and 5X-ing it.

When you lose out on your follow-on investment opportunities, what are the most common reasons you didnโ€™t capitalize? Capital constraints? Conviction or said uglier, buyerโ€™s remorse? Overemphasis on metrics? Lack of information rights?

Then when your winners become more obvious in the late stages and pre-IPO stages, itโ€™s helpful to revisit some of these earlier decisions to help you course-correct in the future.

I will note with the current market, not only are the deal sizes larger (i.e. single round unicorns, in other words, a unicorn is minted after just one round of financing), there are also more opportunities to exit the portfolio than ever before. While M&A is restricted by antitrust laws, and IPOs are limited by overall investor sentiment, there have been a lot of secondary options for early stage investors as well. But thatโ€™s likely a blogpost for another day.

To sum it all up… when you miss, how far do you miss?

Obviously, itโ€™s impossible to control all the variables. You cannot control market dynamics. As Lord Toranaga says in the show Shogun when asked โ€œHow does it feel to shape the wind to your will?โ€, he says โ€œI donโ€™t control the wind. I only study it.โ€ You canโ€™t control the wind, but you can choose which sails to raise, when you raise them, and which direction they point to. Similarly, you also canโ€™t completely control which portfolio companies hit their milestones and raise follow-on capital. For that matter, you also canโ€™t control cofounder splits, founders losing motivation, companies running out of runway, lawsuits from competitors, and so on.

But there are a select few things that you can control and that will change the destiny of your fund. To extend the basketball analogy from the beginning a bit further, you canโ€™t change how tall you are. But you can improve your shooting. You can choose to be a shooter or a passer. You can choose the types of shots you take โ€” 3-pointers, mid-range, and/or dunks. In the venture world, itโ€™s the same.

The choice. Or, things you can change easily:

  1. Industry vertical
  2. Stage
  3. Valuation
  4. Portfolio size
  5. Check size
  6. Follow-on investments

The drills. Or, things you can improve with practice:

  1. Deal flow โ€“ both quantity and quality
  2. The kinds of deals you pick
  3. Value add โ€“ Does your value-add improve over time? As you grow your network? As you have more shots on goal?
  4. The deals you win โ€“ Can you convey your value-add efficiently?

And then, the game itself. The things that are much harder to influence:

  1. Graduation rates
  2. Downstream dilution
  3. Exit outcomes
  4. The market and black swan events themselves

Venture is a game where the feedback cycles are long. To get better at a game, you need reps. And you need fast feedback loops. Itโ€™s foolhardy to wait till fund term and DPI to then evaluate your skill. Itโ€™s for that reason many investors fail. They fail slowly. While not as fast of a feedback loop as basketball and sports, where success is measured in minutes, if not seconds โ€“ where the small details matter โ€“ you donโ€™t have to wait a decade to realize if youโ€™re good at the game or not in venture. You have years. Two to three  What kinds of companies resonate with the market? What kinds of founders and companies hit $10M ARR? In addition, what are the most common areas that founders need help with? And what kinds of companies are interesting to follow-on capital?

Do note there will always be outliers. StepStone recently came out with a report. Less than 50% of top quartile funds at Year 5 stay there by Year 10. And only 3.7% of bottom-quartile funds make it to the top over a decade. Early success is not always indicative of long-term success. But as a VC, even though we make bets on outliers, as a fund manager, do not bet that you will be the outlier. Stay consistent, especially if youโ€™re looking to build an institutional firm.

One of my favorite Steph Curry clips is when he finds a dead spot on the court. He has such ball control mastery that he knows exactly when his technique fails and when there are forces beyond his control that fail him.

Source: ESPN

Cover photo by Martรญ Sierra on Unsplash


Huge thanks to Dave McClure for inspiring the topic of this post and also for the revisions.


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

VC Fund Secondaries Unlocked | Dave McClure | Superclusters | S3E2

dave mcclure

Dave McClure has been a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and investor for over 25 years. He has invested in hundreds of startups around the world, including 10+ IPOs and 40+ unicorns (Credit Karma, Twilio, SendGrid, Lyft, The RealReal, Talkdesk, Grab, Intercom, Canva, Udemy, Lucid, GitLab, Reddit, Stripe, Bukalapak).

Prior to launching PVC in 2019, he was the founding partner of 500 Startups, a global VC firm with $1B AUM that has invested in over 2,500 companies and 5,000 founders across 75 countries. Dave created 20 VC funds under the 500 brand and invested in 20 other VC funds around the world.

Dave began his investing career at Founders Fund where he made seed-stage investments in 40 companies, resulting in 4 unicorns and 3 IPOs. He led the Credit Karma seed round in 2009 (acq INTU, over 400X return). His $3M portfolio returned more than $200M (~65X) in under 10 years.

Before he became an investor, Dave was Director of Marketing at PayPal from 2001-2004. He was also the founder/CEO of Aslan Computing, acquired by Servinet in 1998. Dave graduated from the Johns Hopkins University (BS, Engineering / Applied Mathematics).

You can find Dave on his socials here:
Twitter: https://x.com/davemcclure
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/davemcclure/

And huge thanks to this episode’s sponsor, Alchemist Accelerator: https://alchemistaccelerator.com/superclusters

Listen to the episode on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. You can also watch the episode on YouTube here.

Brought to you by Alchemist Accelerator.

OUTLINE:

[00:00] Intro
[03:37] How did Narnia inspire the start of Dave’s entrepreneurship?
[08:32] On the brink of bankruptcy
[11:42] The lesson Dave took away from his first acquisition
[13:19] What did Dave do that no one else did as a marketing director?
[16:06] What do most people fail to appreciate about secondaries?
[22:31] The 3 bucket method for secondaries
[28:46] How much do fund returners matter for secondaries?
[33:01] When do LPs typically think about selling fund secondaries?
[42:04] What are two questions that Dave asks to see if a portfolio is good for a secondary?
[46:10] Why is it complicated if a GP wants to buy an LP’s stake?
[55:03] When do most funds return 1X? 2-3X?
[57:13] Underwriting VC vs PE secondaries
[1:01:49] How do institutional LPs react to VC secondaries?
[1:07:01] The founding story of Practical VC
[1:15:36] Closing Josh Kopelman in Fund I
[1:18:47] How often does the PayPal Mafia get together?
[1:23:49] What’s the most expensive lessons Dave learned over the years?
[1:27:38] Thank you to Alchemist Accelerator for sponsoring!
[1:28:29] If you enjoyed the episode, would deeply appreciate you sharing with one other friend!

SELECT LINKS FROM THIS EPISODE:

SELECT QUOTES FROM THIS EPISODE:

โ€œAnything worth doing is worth fucking up the first time. [But] hopefully you donโ€™t keep fucking it up.โ€ โ€“ Dave McClure

โ€œAnything worth doing is worth doing badly.โ€ โ€“ G. K. Chesterton

โ€œThereโ€™s a huge discount for illiquidity, and thereโ€™s a huge discount for a lack of buyers.โ€ โ€“ Dave McClure

โ€œSecondaries is a dish best served cold.โ€ โ€“ Dave McClure


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For podcast show notes: https://cupofzhou.com/superclusters
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The Science of Re-Upping

baseball, follow on

Sooooooooโ€ฆ (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.

The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.

But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping playersโ€™ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else whoโ€™s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!

As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!

While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpostโ€™s contributors chose to stay off the record.


The year was 1997.

Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples โ€“ the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino โ€“ a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.

Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss โ€œsignificant timeโ€ earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his โ€œfatal flaw.โ€

Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where itโ€™s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.

If you donโ€™t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.

And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse โ€“ The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.

But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. Itโ€™s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. Itโ€™s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, itโ€™s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomarโ€™s โ€œfatal flawโ€ was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.

So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a โ€œstupid questionโ€, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, โ€œTheo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.โ€

Theo said, โ€œNeither. But Iโ€™m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, theyโ€™ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.โ€

You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:

โ€œYou have to either:

  1. Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
  2. Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
  3. Be better at figuring out what the future holds.โ€

For the purpose of this blogpost, weโ€™re going to focus on the first one of the three.

To begin, we have to first define a term thatโ€™ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece โ€“ expected value.

Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:

The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence

On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.

Weโ€™re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, thatโ€™s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.

Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a strangerโ€™s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, โ€œThe biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you canโ€™t organize around them with AI.โ€ Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word โ€œmodel.โ€ And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to โ€œinvest in companies that canโ€™t be described in a single sentence.โ€

But I digress.

Value itself is a huge topic โ€“ a juggernaut of a topic โ€“ and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, Iโ€™ll triangulate on one subset of it โ€“ future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.

In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.

For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:

E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

For the sake of this blogpost and model, letโ€™s call E(v), appreciation value. So, letโ€™s break down each of the variables.

What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is itโ€™s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage โ€“ they all look different. Additionally, Sapphireโ€™s Beezer recently said that itโ€™s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but thatโ€™s the game we play.

On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.

How much greater is the next roundโ€™s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, youโ€™re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if youโ€™re a smaller sub-$100M fund.

Itโ€™s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:

  • Have a real chance at the championship title.
  • Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
  • And/or have a city whoโ€™s willing to pay the premium.

โ€ฆ can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding canโ€™t.

The Bulls didnโ€™t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didnโ€™t extend Peyton Manningโ€™s contract โ€˜cause they didnโ€™t have the team that would support Peytonโ€™s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.

Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the โ€œluxury taxโ€ when betting on the worldโ€™s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?

If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a playerโ€™s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness โ€“ harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning โ€“ will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?

Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there โ€˜s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, theyโ€™re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just donโ€™t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. Howโ€™s that compared with the teamโ€™s average?

Of course, thereโ€™s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.

How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you donโ€™t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then itโ€™s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.

And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.

If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then itโ€™s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. Itโ€™s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.

But if you lack a large enough sample size, Iโ€™d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.

The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didnโ€™t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.

It is also important to note that the data weโ€™ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.

Take for instanceโ€ฆ

Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.ย ย 

Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.

Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.

In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.

All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios โ€“ either as an LP or as a GP:

  1. Is your entry point a good entry point?
  2. Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?

For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if itโ€™s a biblical line. Itโ€™s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isnโ€™t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.

For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If youโ€™re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. Itโ€™s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.

If youโ€™re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. ๐Ÿ˜‰

Photo by Gene Gallin on Unsplash


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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

Timing is Only Obvious in the Rearview Mirror

watch, time, clock

There’s this line I love in Jerry Colonna’s Reboot, and I’m loosely paraphrasing just because I’m travelling and I don’t have the book in front of me, “The saying is buy low, sell high; not buy lowest, sell highest.”

The reason I bring up that line is that I’ve been hearing a lot of investors talk about timing the market. At least that was the case before this wonderful trip I’ve been taking across the Pacific, as I sip my hojicha atop my hotel in the backdrop of the Kyoto evening metropolis. When’s a good time to sell? What price makes sense on the secondary market? Should I be investing now? When’s a good time to re-up? Is it a good idea to re-up? Should I be generating DPI for my investors now? Or should I hold? When should I start my fund? When should I begin fundraising?

Now, I don’t pose the above questions as if I have all the answers. In fact, I don’t. I try to. But I don’t. Although I’ve heard 50-60% is the discount secondary buyers have been able to get for great companies that became overvalued in the pandemic days. On the flip side, while Dave and I did published a blogpost not too long ago on early DPI, the truth is there are different ways to make money. Ed Zimmerman shared some of his investments’ data recently to illustrate that exact point.

Another obvious truth is that as investors for an alternative asset class โ€” hell for any asset class, our job is to make our LPs money. Ideally, more money than we were given. For other asset classes, it’s measured in percentages. For venture, it’s multiples. And because of that raison d’รชtre, it’s our job to think not only about the upside, but also the downside protection. Hence, why early DPI matters in some of your best outliers. It always matters.

But from what I’m seeing and hearing, it matters more in a bear market, like today. Than the bull we were in yesterday. Why?

  1. Liquidity is a differentiator.
  2. Because of the point 1, giving LPs some liquidity back makes it easier to get to conviction as you raise your next fund.
  3. Point 2 holds the most weight if you’re an emerging manager on Funds I through III, or have sub $100M AUM. Although Funds I and II, you have little to go off of. As such, sticking to your strategy may be more important to some LPs. In other words, consistency.
  4. Also seems to matter more if your LPs are investing off balance sheet. For instance, corporates.

While I was in Tokyo earlier this trip, I caught up with a colleague. We spent the evening chatting about fund managers and current deployment schedules. (In case you’re wondering, no, we didn’t spend the whole time talking the biz.) And we see a lot of folks slowing down their pace of deployment. Could be the case of deal flow contraction, as Chris Neumann recently wrote about. Could be the case of loss of conviction behind initial fund strategy. We’ve also seen examples of VCs stretching their deployment schedule as their fundraises have been extended to 2024. All in all, that means VCs’ bar for “quality” has gone up.

But let me explain in a bit why I put “quality” in quotation marks.

So, timing comes down to two things:

  1. Entry point
  2. Exit point

I’ve seen a plurality of investors consider exit options as a means to *crossing fingers* convince existing LPs to re-up to the next fund. Debatable on how effective it is. As many LPs I’ve chatted with are “graduating” a lot more of their GPs than years prior. In other words, fancy shmancy word for they’re not re-upping on certain existing managers. Some LPs say it’s an AUM problem (but I’ve also seen them make exceptions). Others say it’s strategy drift. But more so say that certain GPs haven’t been a good fiduciary of capital, which ends being a combination of:

  • High entry points
  • Faster than promised deployment schedules (i.e. 1-1.5 years instead of 2-4 years)
  • Investing in a company where the preference stack is greater than the valuation of the company (similar to the first bullet point)
  • Reactive communication of strategy drift, instead of preemptive and proactive
  • Logo shopping which led to strategy drift

All that to say, there are a good amount of LPs who, though appreciate the extra liquidity from partial exits, are not re-investing in existing managers. In addition, they’re holding off until on new ones till earliest Q1 next year to build the relationship earlier. Especially those $5M+ checks.

So, quality, for both GPs and LPs, is this new sugar coating of a term to account for time it takes to figure out where they want to put the next dollar. Investors on both sides are waiting to pull the trigger at 90% conviction, instead of the usual 70%. And realistically, for pre-product market fit companies and firms (i.e. pre-seed, seed startups and Funds I-III), 90% usually never comes until it’s too late. Meaning one misses their entry point.

I have no doubt (as well as many if not all my peers) that the greatest companies of the next generation are being built today. But only a small handful will make it out the gauntlet of fire. Even good companies won’t make it, unfortunately.

So, for the one building, the importance of communicating focus and discipline will be more powerful than ever. My buddy Martin also recently tweeted by an unrelenting focus on a niche audience may serve more useful than targeting a seemingly large TAM.

For the one investing, there is no good time. Our job is to buy low, sell high. Not buy lowest, sell highest. Waiting for the right moment will only have you miss the moment. In the surfing analogy, where the market is the wave, the product is the board, the team is the surfer, and you need all three to be a great surfer, you don’t want to be on the shore when the wave hits. It is better to be paddling in the water before the wave hits than on the shore when the wave does hit. Timing is only obvious in hindsight, never in foresight.

There’s also a great Chinese proverb that the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago, the next best time is today.

So in this flight to quality, consider what quality actually means. Is it a function of you doubting your original thesis? Then re-examine what caused the doubt. Was your thesis founded on first principles? For consumer, which is where I know a little bit more about, is it founded on the basis and habits of the human condition? Is it secular from technological and hype trends?

Is quality waiting on numbers or external validation? That’s fine if you’re a growth or late stage investor. You’re never going to get it if you’re a true pre-seed and seed. If you’re waiting on a large amount of traction, you’re not an early-stage investor. Round-semantics aside.

You built a fund around a 10-15 year vision. Deploy against that. Or… although we don’t see this much these days, return any remaining capital back to your LPs.

Photo by Alex Perez on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

The Science of Selling – Early DPI Benchmarks

The snapshot

Some of you reading here are busy, so weโ€™ll keep this top part brief, as an abstract sharing our top three observations of leading fund managers.

Generally speaking, donโ€™t sell your fast growing winners early.

Except whenโ€ฆ

Selling on your way up may not be a crazy idea.

  1. You might sell when you want to lock in DPI. Donโ€™t sell more than 20% of your fundโ€™s positions unless you are locking in meaningful DPI for your fund. For instance, at each point in time, something thatโ€™s greater than 0.5X, 1X, 2X, or 3X of your fund size.
  2. You might consider selling when youโ€™ve lost conviction. Consider selling a position when you feel the market has over-priced the actual value, or even up to 100% if youโ€™ve lost conviction.
  3. You might consider selling when one is growing slower than your target IRR. If companies are growing slower and even only as fast as your target IRR, consider selling if not at too much of a discount (Note: there may be some political and/or signaling issues to consider here as well. But will save the topic of signaling for another blog post).

Do note that the above are not hard and fast rules. Every decision should be made in context to other moving variables. And that the numbers below are tailored to early-stage funds.

Net TVPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15
Net DPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15

Letโ€™s go deeperโ€ฆ

On a cloudless Friday morning, basking in the morning glory of Los Altos, between lattes and croissants, between two nerds (or one of whom might identify as a geek more than a nerd), we pondered one question:

How much of selling is art? How much is science?

Between USV selling 30% of their Twitter stake, Menlo selling half of their Uber, Benchmark only selling 15% of their Uber pre-IPO shares, and Blackbird recently selling 20% of its Canva stake, it feels more like the former than the latter. Then when Howard Marks says selling is all about relative selection and the opportunity cost of not doing so, it seems to reinforce the artistic form of getting โ€œmoolah in da coolahโ€ to borrow a Chris Douvos trademark.

Everyone seems to have a financial model for when and how to invest, but part of being a fiduciary of capital is also knowing when to distribute โ€“ when to sell. When RVPI turns into DPI. And we havenโ€™t seen many models for selling yet. At least none have surfaced publicly or privately for us.
The best thought piece weโ€™ve seen in the space has been Fred Wilsonโ€™s Taking Money โ€œOff the Tableโ€. At USV, they โ€œtypically seek to liquidate somewhere between 10% and 30% of our position in these pre-IPO liquidity transactions. Doing so allows us to hold onto the balance while de-risking the entire investment.โ€

Source: Fred Wilson’s Taking Money “Off The Table”

In aggregate, weโ€™ve seen venture fund distributions follow very much of the power law โ€“ whether youโ€™re looking at Correlationโ€™s recent findingsโ€ฆ

Source: Correlation Ventures

Or what James Heath has found across 1000+ firmsโ€™ data on Pitchbook.

Source: James Heath

As such, it gave birth to a thoughtโ€ฆ What if selling was more of a science?

What would that look like?

Between two Daves, it was not the Dave with sneakers and a baseball cap and with the profound disregard to healthy diets, given the fat slab of bacon in his croissanโ€™wich, who had the answer there.

โ€œTo start off, in a concentrated portfolio of 30 investments, a fund returner is a 30x investment. For a 50-investment fund, itโ€™s 50x. And while hitting the 0.5x DPI milestone by years 5-8, and a 2x DPI milestone by years 8-12, is the sign of a great fund, you shouldnโ€™t think about selling much of your TVPI for DPI unless or until your TVPI is starting to exceed 2-3x.โ€ Which seems to corroborate quite well with Chamath Palihapitiyaโ€™s findings that funds between 2010 and 2020 convert have, on average, converted about 25% of their TVPI to DPI.

โ€œMoreover, usually you shouldnโ€™t be selling more than 20% of the portfolio at one time (unless youโ€™re locking in / have already locked in 3X or more DPI). You should be dollar-cost averaging โ€“ ensuring time diversity โ€“ on the way out as well. AND usually only if a company thatโ€™s UNDER-growing or OVER-valued compared to the rest of your portfolio. Say your portfolio is growing at 30% year-over-year, but an individual asset is growing slower at only 10-20% OR you believe it is overvalued, thatโ€™s when you think about taking cash off the table. Sell part (or even all) of your stake, if selling returns a meaningful DPI for the fund, and if youโ€™re not capping too upside in exchange for locking in a floor.โ€

Meaningful DPI, admittedly, does mean different benchmarks for different kinds of LPs. For some, that may mean 0.25X. For others that may mean north of 0.5X or 1X.

โ€œOn the other hand, if a company is outperforming / outgrowing the rest of the portfolio, generally hold on to it and donโ€™t sell more than 10-20% (again, unless youโ€™re locking in meaningful DPI, or perhaps if itโ€™s so large that it has become a concentration risk).โ€

I will caveat that there is great merit in its counterpart as well. Selling early is by definition capping your upside. If you believe an asset is reaching its terminal value, that’s fine, but do be aware of signaling risk as well. The latter may end up being an unintended, but self-fulfilling prophecy.

So, it begged the question: Under the assumption that funds are 15-year funds, what is meaningful DPI? TVPI? At the 5-year mark? 7.5 years in? 10 years? And 12.5 years?

The truth is the only opportunities to sell come from the best companies in your portfolio. And probably the companies, if anything, you should be holding on to. By selling early, you are capping your downside, but at the same time capping your upside on the entire portfolio. When the opportunity arises to lock in some DPI, itโ€™s worth considering the top 3-5 positions in your fund. For instance, if your #2 company is growing quickly, you may not be capping the upside as much.

Do keep in mind that sometimes itโ€™s hard to fully conceptualize the value of compounding. As one of my favorite LPs reminded me, if an asset is growing 35% year-over-year, the last 20% of the time produces 56% of the return. Or if an asset is growing 25% YoY, if you sell 20% earlier (assuming 12 year time horizons), youโ€™re missing out on 45% of the upside.

As a GP, you need to figure out if youโ€™re IRR or multiple focused. Locking in early DPI means your IRR will look great, but your overall fund multiple may suffer.

As an LP, that also means if the gains are taxable (meaning they donโ€™t qualify for QSBS or are sold before QSBS kick in), you need to pay taxes AND find another asset thatโ€™s compounding at a similar or better rate. As Howard Marks puts it, you need to find another investment with โ€œsuperior risk-adjusted prospective returns.โ€

And so began the search for not just moolah in da coolah, but how much moolah in da coolah is good moolah in da coolah? And how much is great?

Net TVPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15
Net DPI Benchmarks from Years 5-15

Some caveats

Of course, if youโ€™ve been around the block for a minute, you know that no numbers can be held in isolation to others. No facts, no data points alienated from the rest.

Some reasons why early DPI may not hold as much weight:

  • Early acqui-hires. Usually not a meaningful DPI and a small, small fraction of the fund.
    • Thereโ€™s a possibility this may be the case for some 2020-2021 vintages, as a meaningful proportion of their portfolio companies exit small but early.
    • In other words, DPI is constructed of small, but many exits, rather than a meaningful few exits.
  • TVPI is less than 2-3x of DPI, only a few years into the fund. In other words, their overall portfolio may not be doing too hot. Obviously, the later the fund is to its term, the more TVPI and DPI are alike.
  • As a believer in the power law, if on average it takes an outlier 8 years to emerge AND the small percentage of winners in the portfolio drive your return, your DPI will look dramatically different in year 5 versus 10. For pre-seed and seed funds, itโ€™s fair to assume half (or more) companies go to zero within the first 3-5 years. And in 10 years, more than 80% of your portfolio value comes from less than 20% of your companies. Hell, it might even be 90% of your portfolio value comes from 10% of your companies. In other words, the power law.
  • GPs invested in good quality businesses. Some businesses may not receive markups, but may be profitable already, or growing consistently year-over-year that they donโ€™t need to raise another round any time soon.
  • Additionally, if you havenโ€™t been in the investing game for long, persistence of track record, duration, and TVPI may matter more in your pitch. If youโ€™ve been around the block, IRR and DPI will matter more.
  • As the great Charlie Munger once said, โ€œselling for market-timing purposes actually gives an investor two ways to be wrong: the decline may or may not occur, and if it does, youโ€™ll have to figure out when the time is right to go back in.โ€ For private market investors, unless you can buy secondaries, youโ€™ll never have a time to go back in until the public offering. As such, it is a one-way door decision.

Some LPs are going to boast better portfolios, and we do admit there will be a few with portfolios better than the above โ€œbenchmarks.โ€ And if so, thatโ€™s a reason to be proud. In terms of weighting, as a proponent of the power law, there is a high likelihood that weโ€™ve underestimated the percent of crap and meh investments, and overestimated the percent of great investments in an LPโ€™s portfolio. That said, that does leave room for epic fund investments that are outliers by definition. 

We do admit that, really, any attempt to create a reference point for fund data before results speak for themselves is going to be met with disagreement. But we also understand that it is in the discourse, will we find ourselves inching closer to something that will help us sleep better at night.

One more caveat for angelsโ€ฆ The truth is as an angel, none of the above really matter all that much. Youโ€™re not a fiduciary of anyone elseโ€™s capital. And your time horizons most likely look different than a fundโ€™s. Itโ€™s all yours. So itโ€™s not about capping your downside, but more so about capping your regret. In other words, a regret minimization framework (aka, โ€œspouse regret/yelling minimization insuranceโ€). 

That will be so unique to you that there is no amount of cajoling that we could do here to tell you otherwise. And that your liquidity timelines are only really constrained by your own liquidity demands.. For instance, buying a new home, sending kids to college, or taking care of your parents (or YOU!) in their old age.

But I do think the above is a useful exercise to think through selling if you had a fund. You would probably break it down more from a bottoms up perspective. What is your average check size? Do you plan to have a concentrated portfolio of sub-30 investments? Or more? Do you plan to follow on? How much if so? And that is your fund size.

In closing

Returning above a 3x DPI is tough. Donโ€™t take our words for it. Even looking at the data, only 12.5% of funds return over a 3x DPI. And only 2.5% return three times their capital back on more than 2 separate funds.

In the power law game we play, as Michael Mauboussin once said, โ€œA lesson inherent in any probabilistic exercise: the frequency of correctness does not matter; it is the magnitude of correctness that matters.โ€ Most will return zero, or as Jake Kupperman points out: More than 50%.

Source: Jake Kupperman’s The Time Has Come to Modernize the Venture Capital Fund of Funds

But itโ€™s in the outliers that return meaningful DPI, not the rest. Not the acqui-hire nor really that liquidation preference on that small acquisition.

At the end of the day, the goal isnโ€™t for any of the above to be anyoneโ€™s Bible, but that itโ€™d start a conversation about how people look at early returns. If there is any new data points that are brought up as a result of this blogpost, Iโ€™ll do my best to update this thread post-publication.

Big thank you to Dave McClure for inspiring and collaborating on this piece, and to Eric Woo and all our LP friends who’ve helped with the many revisions, sharing data, edits, language and more. Note: Many of our LP friends chose to stay anonymous but have been super helpful in putting this together.

Footnotes

For the purpose of this piece, we know that โ€œgoodโ€ and โ€œgreatโ€, in fact all of the superlative adjectives, are amorphous goalposts. And those words may mean different things to different people. This blogpost isnโ€™t meant to establish a universal truth, but rather serve as a useful reference point for both LPs, looking for โ€œbenchmarkingโ€ data, and GPs to know where they stand. For the latter, if your metrics do fall in the โ€œgoodโ€ to โ€œgreatโ€ range, theyโ€™re definitely worth bragging about.

And so with that long preamble, in the piece above, we defined โ€œgoodโ€ as top quartile, and โ€œgreatโ€ as top decile. โ€œGoodโ€ as a number on its own, enough for an LP to engage in a conversation with you. And โ€œgreatโ€ as a number thatโ€™ll make LPs running to your doorstep. Or at least to the best of our portfolios, leveraging both publicly reported and polled numbers as well as our own.

Our numbers above are also our best attempt in predicting steady state returns, divorcing ourselves from the bull rush of the last 3-5 vintage years. As such, we understand there are some LPs that prefer to do vintage benchmarking, as opposed to steady state benchmarking. And this blogpost, while it has touched on it, did not focus on the formerโ€™s numbers.

EDIT (Aug 18, 2023): Have gotten a few questions about where’s the data coming from. The above numbers in the Net DPI and Net TVPI charts are benchmarks the LPs and I agreed on after looking into our own anecdotal portfolios (some spanning 20+ years of data), as well as referencing Cambridge data. These numbers are not the end-all-be-all, and your mileage as an LP may very much vary depending on your portfolio construction. But rather than be the Bible of DPI/TVPI metrics, the purpose of the above is give rough reference points (in reference to our own portfolios + public data) for those who don’t have any reference points.

Cover Photo by Renate Vanaga on Unsplash


Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!


The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.