Tag: chris paik

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If 198 Pieces of Unsolicited, (Possibly) Ungoogleable Advice for Investors Were Not Enough

yoda, advice, wisdom

Having been to a number of talks and panels, my biggest frustration with these occasions is when a moderator asks a VC: “So what do you invest in?”

And the VC would respond, “Good people, good markets.” Or “Ambitious founders tackling ambitious problems.” Or some cousin of it. Well, of course. I’m not saying they’re wrong, but no venture capitalist ever says, “I want to invest in bad people building in bad markets.” It’s the kind of advice and “insight” that’s equivalent to a large company saying their company culture is a “family.” Not wrong, but tells me nothing about what you actually want. The same is true for most advice for investors. And well, advice in the investing world is given quite liberally, without liability and responsibility most of the time.

So I made it a mission to collect pieces of advice that were actually tactical or differentiated. Advice that would make you turn your heads and actually pay attention. And under the right circumstances, actually useful. It’s why I wrote this blogpost’s predecessors:

This is the third one in this 99 series for investors. And, if by chance, you’re a founder reading this, to understand the mentality of a differentiated investor, you might also like the 99 series for founders. But I digress.

In no particular order other than the chronological order I found them, below is the third set of 99 pieces of advice for investors:

  1. Investing – Deal flow, theses, diligence
  2. Fundraising from LPs
  3. Fund strategy/portfolio construction/exiting
  4. Fund structure
  5. Portfolio support
  6. Governance/managing LPs
  7. Building a team
  8. Compensation
  9. Miscellaneous

Investing – Deal flow, theses, diligence

1/ “Any company that is pure execution risk without any market risk is not a suitable venture investment.” — Chris Paik

2/ “[In the private markets,] I don’t think we’ve seen a 70% write down yet or 70% of these [private companies] worth less than the cash [they’ve spent to date].” Take public market comparables. To see how much public companies are worth as a function of the money they’ve spent to date, look at the “Cumulative Retained Earnings” (which tells you how much money they’ve burnt over their lifetime) compared to the “Enterprise Value” (or market cap minus the cash they have today). If their enterprise value is less than their cumulative retained earnings, that means they’re worth less than the money they’ve spent to date. — David Friedberg (timestamped 4/21/2023, when he said there are 70% of public companies that are worth less than the cash they’ve spent to date, but we haven’t seen a 70% haircut to private market valuations)

3/ The first best use of any consumer product is crime. — Pre-seed VC

4/ When looking for outliers, “Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.” — Chris Paik

5/ “Venture investing process as a two-stage process – the first where you ensure you avoid false negatives – that is, you ensure that there are no errors of omission, where you unwittingly pass on meeting a potential winner. The second stage is where you avoid a false positive or errors of commission, that is, picking the wrong company.” — Sajith Pai quoting Karthik Reddy

6/ How a lawyer diligences AI companies:

  • “How are you using AI? Is it a third-party? Let’s see those terms, contracts, etc.
  • How are you using customer data? Prior agreements? Prior policies in place? Subsequent policies in place? You could lose the data, the models, and the algorithms. If found in violation by the FTC. States privacy laws like Texas, California, and Virginia also should be looked at.”

7/ “When it’s cooler to be in a startup than in a band, we’re at the top of the market.” — A fund of funds General Partner

8/ “Buy when there is blood in the streets, and sell when there are trumpets in the air.” — A Warren Buffett attribution

9/ Does this founder have 20 years of experience of 20 one-year experiences? Depth vs breadth. Which does the industry/problem they’re building for require?

10/ While there is no one “right” way to run a partnership meeting, beware of conviction-led deals (as opposed to consensus-driven), since partners are incentivized to go into sales mode to convince the rest of the partnership and may make it harder for them to see the flaws in the deal.

11/ In early stage venture, debates on price is a lagging indicator of conviction, or more so, lack thereof.

  • Price also matters a lot more for big funds than small funds.
  • Price also matters more for Series B+ funds.
  • Will caveat that there’s an ocean of difference between $10M and $25M valuation. But it’s semantics between $10M and $12M valuation. How big your slice of the pie is doesn’t matter if the pie doesn’t grow.
  • Not saying that it’s correlated, but it does remind me of a Kissinger quote: “The reason that university politics is so vicious is because stakes are so small.”

12/ “Judge me on how good my good ideas are, not how bad my bad ideas are.” — Ben Affleck when writing Good Will Hunting. A lot of being a VC is like that.

13/ We like to cite the power law a lot. Where 20% of our investments account for 80% of our returns. But if we were to apply that line of thinking two more times. Aka 4% (20 x 20%) of our investments account for 64% of our returns. Then 0.8% account for 51.2% of our returns. If you really think about it, if you invest in 100 companies, we see in a lot of great portfolios where a single investment return more than 50% of the historical returns.

14/ “Early-stage investing is NOT about mitigating the possibility of failure It’s about discounting the probability of an outsized outcome – what is the size and likelihood of a HUGE win Investing in “safe” companies due to fear of failure is the surest way to a mediocre returns.” — Rick Zullo

15/ “[David Marquardt] said, ‘You know what? You’re a well-trained institutional investor. And your decision was precisely right and exactly wrong.’ And sometimes that happens. In this business, sometimes good decisions have bad outcomes and bad decisions have good outcomes.” — Chris Douvos

16/ When calling a reference and asking about someone’s weakness, “If you were to hire someone under that person, what would be the top traits you’d look for?”

17/ Give founders a blank P&L statement. Tell them that is not their P&L statement; it is their customer’s. And ask them where do they/their product sit on their customer’s P&L statement. Those who are aware of who they are and who they need to sell to do better than those who don’t.

18/ No one has a crystal ball. Well, the pessimists do. They’re right 90% of the time.

19/ “I want the guy who understands his limitations instead of the guy who doesn’t. On the other hand, I’ve learned something terribly important in life. I learned that from Howard Owens. And you know what he used to say? Never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.” — Charlie Munger

20/ “Instead of saying, ‘This risk exists,’ we reframe the risk and ask, ‘What do I have to believe for this to work?’ Doing this transforms risk from a source of fear and unknown into a set of clear assumptions to be systematically tested and de-risked.” For example, “We have to believe we can scale the hardware to XYZ performance metric by ABC date. What are the key engineering constraints bottlenecking that?” — Mike Annunziata

21/ Questions to ask investee (on-list and off-list) references by Graham Duncan:

  • How would you describe Jane to someone who doesn’t know her?
  • What’s your sample size of people in the role in which you knew Jane?
  • Who was the best person at this role that you’ve ever seen?
  • If we call that person a “100”, the gold standard, where’s Jane right now on a 1-100?
  • Does she remind you of anyone else you know?
  • If Jane’s number comes up on your caller ID, what does your brain anticipate she’s going to be calling about? What’s the feeling?
  • Three attributes I like to keep in mind are someone’s hunger, their humility, and how smart they are about people.  If you were to force rank those for Jane from what she exhibits the most to least, how would you rank them?
  • What motivates Jane at this stage of her life?
  • If you were coaching Jane, how would you help her take her game up?
  • If you were going to hire someone to complement Jane doing the same activity (NOT a different role), what would they be good at to offset Jane’s strengths and weaknesses?
  • How strong is your endorsement of Jane on a 1-10? (If they answer 7, say actually sorry 7s are not allowed, 6 or 8?  If the answer is an 8, “What is in that two points?”)

22/ “Neutral references are worse than negative references.” — Kelli Fontaine

23/ “If someone brags about their success or happiness, assume it’s half what they claim. If someone downplays their success or happiness, assume it’s double what they claim.” — George Mack

24/ “Historians now recognize the Roman Empire fell in 476 – but it wasn’t acknowledged by Roman society until many generations later. If you wait for the media to inform you, you’ll either be wrong or too late.” — George Mack

25/ “Joe Rogan and Warren Buffett are both entrepreneurs. But if you switched them, both businesses would fail. Rule of thumb: If a word is so broad that you can’t switch 2 things it describes, it needs unbundling.” — George Mack

26/ Are the founders at the same stage on the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs? If not, how have they come to terms with different motivations outside of the scope of the venture itself?

27/ $100K contracts take about 70 days to close. So a founder becomes interesting if they figure out how to close faster. — Gong State of Revenue Growth 2025 report

28/ Beware of “annual curiosity revenue.” “AI companies with quick early ARR growth can lead to false positives as many are seeing massive churn rates.” — Samir Kaji

29/ Data suggests that “never following on” beats “always following on” 63% of the time. “Outperformance for the typical portfolio is 12% better when you don’t follow on (3.52X vs 3.14X).” — Abe Othman

30/ “A successful reserve strategy depends both the chance of picking winners and the step up value at the next round. The stock price multiple * the probably of receiving funding = 1.” If the product of your variables is more than one, you should focus primarily on increasing your check size and ownership at entry. And as such, fewer to no reserves. If you’re below one, you’re better off with more reserves. — Clint Korver

31/ Be aware of “seed-strapping” among AI startups. Your SAFEs may never convert. “Watch for any revisions to *YC’s* SAFE or *YC’s* side letter (note: YC has a secret SAFE and side letter documentation not available on on their website, so careful with conclusions).” — Chris Harvey

32/ In underwriting AI companies in 2025, ARR and run rate are no longer signal. Instead, look at sales efficiency (how long it takes you to implement your product; if you charge more or double the price, will customers still buy your product?), the cost to acquire that revenue, and net dollar retention (gross churn, land and expand). — Nina Achadjian

33/ “The ‘raise very little’ strategy only works if you’re in a market that most people believe (incorrectly) is tiny or unimportant. If other people are paying attention, you have to beat the next guy.” — Parker Conrad

34/ Instead of asking founders/references what are their weaknesses, ask for 2-3 positive words that describe them and 2-3 positive words that DO NOT describe them.

35/ “You want to be pre-narrative. You want to position your capital in an area where the supply of capital increases over time and where those assets will be traded at a premium.” — Albert Azout

36/ “For Hard Tech companies, the only metric that matters before Series B is the ‘Speed of Hiring Impressive People’, aka the ‘SHIP’ rate.” — Mike Annunziata

37/ Beware of co-CEOs and founders who used to be VCs where their past firm isn’t investing. — Sriram Krishnan

38/ “If you don’t pay great people internally, then you’re a price taker.” — Ashby Monk

39/ “Buying junk at a discount is still junk.” — Abe Finkelstein

40/ “What do you do when you don’t know anything, you haven’t met anybody, you have no context, the human brain starts inventing rationale.” — Narayan Chowdhury

41/ “The bigger you get, the more established you get, the more underwriting emphasis goes into how this team operates as a structure rather than is there a star?” — Matt Curtolo

42/ “Price reflects the inefficiencies of the market.” — Albert Azout

43/ “You want to be pre-narrative. You want to position your capital in an area where the supply of capital increases over time and where those assets will be traded at a premium.” — Albert Azout

44/ “We don’t want a slow no. A slow no is bad for everybody.” — Sean Warrington

45/ “Today’s world is unpredictable, and this is as stable as it will ever be again.” — Seth Godin

46/ “Alfred is the worst e-commerce investor at Sequoia as he knows too much & I am the best biotech investor at Sequoia as I know nothing about biology.” — Roelof Botha, quoted by Finn Murphy

47/ “Since the job is not about simple pattern-matching but about finding true outliers, seniority and experience don’t guarantee success.” — Ian Park

48/ As your fund size grows, do be wary of investing in competing portfolio companies. While it’s always been a tradition in venture to not to, times may be changing. Be sure to be transparent and know how to separate church and state. “This is an issue where the business model for funds is at odds with what most founders want.” Ways you can do so. By Charles Hudson.

  • “Use a seed fund or scout strategy to meet as many promising, early-stage companies as you can.
  • “Focus on investing in Series A and Series B (instead of seed) rounds and pay up to get into the winners when it’s clear which companies are working.
  • “Buy secondary positions in the companies that matter but that you missed.
  • “Invest in competitors but have different investors take board seats and create firewalls to limit information spillover.”

49/ “I deeply subscribe to, ‘There’s always another train leaving the station.’” — Wendy Li

50/ “Alpha’s three things: information asymmetry, access, and, actually, taxes.” — Vijen Patel

51/ The worst mistake you can make as an early-stage investor is to believe you’re the smartest person in the room.

Fundraising from LPs

52/ “If you’re at 75-80% committed and then you say there’s a single close, that will drive urgency. If you’re at 10 to 30 to 40% committed, and you say there’s a single close, you have no catalyzing power. There’s just so much dirt to hoe. When I went out, when people would ask, ‘When are you closing?’ I would say, ‘We will close on this particular date and ideally it will be a single close. And here is where I am. I’ve closed X% of the pipeline and the total value of the pipe of interested investors was this amount of money.’ The goal was to show with a relatively small conversion rate, I could get to a single close.” — Tomasz Tunguz

53/ What to prepare for the due diligence questionnaire (DDQ) with institutional LPs. — Chris Harvey

  • Governance & Oversight
    • GP Removal Process
    • GP Conflicts of Interest Disclosures
    • GP Devotion of Time
    • Fiduciary Duties Owed by GP
    • Decision-Making Processes
    • LPAC Roles & Responsibilities
    • LP Reporting Guidelines
    • Deadlock Resolution (2 or 4 person GPs)
  • Economic & Tax Terms
    • Affiliated LPs (0 fees to GP team)
    • Capital Calls (Schedule/L. fees/Interest)
    • Distribution Waterfall
    • Fund Expenses/Cap vs. Mgmt Fees
    • Special Tax (ERISA, ECI, FATCA, etc)
    • Subscription Lines
    • Mandatory Tax Dist.
    • Warehoused Assets (QSBS)
  • Regulatory Compliance
    • IA §§203, 206—Code of Ethics, P2P, etc
    • CFIUS Compliance
    • VC & Private Fund Limits—§203(l)/(m)
    • NQI/Qualifying Investments (<20%)
    • Warehoused Investments (VC)
    • State ERA rules <$25M AUM
    • Look-through Rules & Beneficial Ownership—§3(c)(1)
  • Operations & Admin
    • Trademark Rights/IP
    • Vesting Schedules
    • Principal Office Location
    • List of Fund Assets + SPVs
    • Comp Policy for GP and Team
    • Verification of GP Track Record
    • Cybersecurity & Risk Management
    • Service Providers (Fund Admin, Ops, Tax, Legal)

54/ What Minal Hasan includes in the fund diligence room (specifically for Fund IIs)

  • Primary materials
    • Due Diligence Questionnaire
    • Pitch Deck
    • Appendix to Pitch Deck
    • Detailed Investment Thesis & Strategy
    • Term Sheet
    • LPA
    • Subscription Agreement
  • Legal
    • Incorporation Documents for LP, GP, and MC
    • Entity Org Chart
  • Team
    • Team Bios
    • Prior Partner Investment Performance
    • Hiring Plan
    • List of Advisors
    • List of References
    • List of Co-investors
    • List of Service Providers
  • Portfolio
    • One-pager on each company
    • Deal Pipeline
  • Governance
    • Board/Board Observer Seats
    • Policies
    • Sample Investment Memos
    • Sample Quarterly Report
    • Sample Capital Account Statement
    • Sample Capital Call Notice
    • Sample Distribution Notice
  • Financial Docs
    • Budget
    • IRR Spreadsheet
    • IRR Benchmarking
    • IRR Letter certified by accountant
  • Marketing
    • Press mentions
    • Authored thought leadership

55/ When fundraising, don’t share which other LPs you’re talking to. Even if LPs ask who you’re talking to. Unless money is in the bank, nothing counts. Tell the other LPs that you have non-disclosures with all your other LPs, but that you have a lot of interest. If you share the marquee names, the other LPs’ will base their decision on the closing of those LPs. If they commit, great. If not, it will materially impact how the new LPs view your fund.

56/ When working with overseas LPs, you should ask for their citizenship, where their capital is domiciled at, and who is the ultimate beneficial owner if not the person you are pitching? This would help you navigate CFIUS rules and knowing who you’re actually bringing on board.

57/ You should ask prospective overseas LPs what their citizenship is and who the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) is, if not the person you are talking to, as you are doing diligence on your prospective LPs.

58/ “Going to see accounts before budgets are set helps get your brand and your story in the mind of the budget setter. In the case of the US, budgets are set in January and July, depending on the fiscal year. In the case of Japan, budgets are set at the end of March, early April. To get into the budget for Tokyo, you gotta be working with the client in the fall to get them ready to do it for the next fiscal year. [For] Korea, the budgets are set in January, but they don’t really get executed on till the first of April. So there’s time in there where you can work on those things. The same thing is true with Europe. A lot of budgets are mid-year. So you develop some understanding of patterns. You need to give yourself, for better or worse if you’re raising money, two to three years of relationship-building with clients.” — David York

59/ “Getting an LP is like pulling a weight with a string of thread. If you pull too hard, the string snaps. If you don’t pull hard enough, you don’t pull the weight at all. It’s this very careful balancing act of moving people along in a process.” — Dan Stolar

60/ “Things that break the rules have a bigger threshold to overcome to grab the reader’s attention, but once they do, they tend to have a stronger, and more dedicated following. Blandness tends to get fewer dedicated followers.” — Brandon Sanderson on creative writing, but applies just as well to pitches

61/ In all great stories, the protagonist (in the case of a pitch, you) is proactive, capable, and relatable. Your pitch needs to show all three, but at the minimum two out of the three. — Brandon Sanderson

62/ “Data rooms are where fund-raising processes go to die.” Prioritize in-person and live conversations. When your investor asks you for documents, ask for 15 minutes on their calendar so you can “best prepare” the information they want. If they aren’t willing to give you that 15 minutes, you’ve lost the deal already. — Mark Suster

63/ “Funds can start with a private offering, then move to 506(c) after the prior offering is completed without a waiting period—new Rule 152(b) allows for a quick switch, you just can’t do them at the same time or start with Rule 506(c) then move to 506(b).” — Chris Harvey

64/ “Set your own agenda or someone else will.” — Melinda Gates

65/ To address key person risk if the GP, or one of the GPs, has a debilitating health condition within the fund term, include the below in the LPA, by Shahrukh Khan:
Each Key Person shall, as a condition to their designation, represent and covenant to the Partners [inclusive of the GP and LPs] that, to the best of their knowledge, they are not currently experiencing any medical condition reasonably expected to materially impair their ability to perform their duties over the Term [usually 10-12 years] of the Fund.
If, during the Investment Period [when the fund is actively making investments], a Key Person is diagnosed with or undergoes treatment for a condition that materially impacts their ability to fulfill their responsibilities, the General Partner shall promptly disclose to the Limited Partners that a Health-Related Key Person Event [we could define this broadly] has occurred. The specifics of the health condition need not be disclosed [maybe except to the LPAC if there is one?].
Upon such notification, the Investment Period will be suspended and cannot continue without the express approval of the Limited Partners. [I feel like this could mean that no new investments can be made until LPs review and vote on whether to proceed with the fund’s activities in light of the health-related situation.]

66/ When asking LPs what they invest in, sometimes what they don’t invest in is more helpful than what they say they invest in. Most LPs are trained to be generalists — by sector, by stage, by asset class — so asking what they do invest in often nets an answer like “We invest in everything” or “We only invest in the best,” which are often less helpful tells when you’re trying to figure out if you’re a good fit for them or not.

67/ If you have a 3(c)(1) fund, “if an investor owns >10% of your fund, the SEC’s look-through rule requires you to count ALL underlying beneficial owners toward your 100-investor limit.” The workaround is you create a side letter for large LPs that includes this statement: “The Investor’s Capital Commitment shall equal the lesser of [check size] or 10% of total fund commitments.” — Chris Harvey

68/ At your AGM, talk about categories of VCs you admire. For instance, “inception funds” or “superscale funds.” And the logos you admire in each category. Then show the funds that actually follow after your capital. This builds rapport with your LPs and that you’re not just shooting from the hip, where it “just so happens” that some random awesome fund follows your capital. Inspired by Gil Dibner.

69/ “If an LP isn’t following up with an ask for the data room, refs and lays out a path to a potential next meeting, then it’s a pass. Hint — don’t offer the dataroom. I always say yes.” — Endowment Eddie

70/ “[LPs] are underwriting your ability to create signal under uncertainty. If your fund slide can’t do that, your deck is already leaking trust.” — Thorsten Claus

71/ “I’m not here to tell you about Jesus. You already know about Jesus. He either lives in your heart or he doesn’t.” — Don Draper in Mad Men

72/ On GPs answering questions on operational excellence… “The best answer I could ask from a GP is for them to be super honest and say, ‘These are the people I’ve leaned on to help me understand what best practices look like.’” — Nicky Sugarman

73/ When reporting numbers, it’s helpful to have more than one TVPI number. One number should represent last round valuation prices. Another should be the number you believe is authentic to you, which likely includes some companies that have been proactively written down and revenue multiples that reflect where the company is currently at. Nevertheless, always explain your rationale as to why.

74/ When you’re fundraising from institutions, expect “27 months from first meeting to wire, 4.7% of prospects commit,” and “annual costs [of] $2.1M+ in infrastructure.” — Pavel Prata

75/ “Speed to fundraise does not always equate to a strong investor.” — Lisa Cawley

Fund strategy / portfolio construction / exiting

76/ If you have a follow-on strategy or a reserve strategy, track your “follow-on MOIC.” Return hurdles are 10x MOIC for initial capital. And 4-5x MOIC for follow-on capital. The more you invest in follow on, the less TVPI you’ll have. “If you’re going from pre-seed to seed, you’re tracking to a 5x MOIC. If you’re going from a seed to Series A, that goes down to 3x.” — Anubhav Srivastava (timestamped Apr 7, 2023)

77/ The reasons Fund I’s and II’s outperform are likely:

  • Chips on shoulders mean they hustle more to find the best deals. They have to search where big funds aren’t or come in sooner than big funds do.
  • Small fund size is easier to return than a larger fund size.
  • Rarely do they have ownership targets (nor do they need significant ownership to return the fund). Meaning they’re collaborative and friendly on the cap table, aka with most other investors, especially big lead investors.
  • Price matters less. Big funds really have to play the price game a little bit more since (1) likely to be investing in multiple stages with reserves, and price matters more past the Series A than before, and (2) they’re constrained by check size, ownership targets, and therefore price in order to still have a fund returner.

78/ “Strategy is choosing what not to do.” — Peter Rahal

79/ “We expect GPs to have 1% ownership for every $10M in fund size.” — Large multi-billion family office

80/ “Exiting a position in a company to return DPI to LPs is not a reflection of your stance on the company, but your stance on the market.” — Asher Siddiqui

Fund structure

81/ If you have more than $10M and are not a solo GP, consider separating your GP and management company entities. While there are about $5000-10,000 in costs per year, separating fund structures allows for more optimal tax planning, better liability protection, continuity across GP entities with future funds, and flexibility to adopt W2 employment for future employees which is hard to do under a partnership structure. — Chris Harvey

82/ If you’re a GP at a large fund making >$1-2M in annual fees, consider two metrics: (a) AUM times management fee divided by number of GPs, and (b) NPV of potential future carry on that AUM divided by number of GPs. You never want (a) to be greater than (b).

Portfolio Support

83/ “Just because I have a front row seat at a championships [basketball game] doesn’t mean I can coach an NBA team.” — Brian Chesky

84/ “The thing about working with self-motivated people and driven people, on their worst day, they are pushing themselves very hard and your job is to reduce the stress in that conversation.” — Nakul Mandan

85/ “The median value-add is about zero. The mean is less than zero. Most things work because they just work (right set of users wanted something at the right time) and the executive team builds the right culture to hire a great team to operate in that market, not because of what a VC does. Value-added service is ‘product as marketing’ for 90% of investors who pitch it.” — Kanyi Maqubela

86/ Get access to as many different offices of your portfolio company’s potential customers as possible. Even better if you know them so well, they give you their office keys. — John Gleeson

87/ “I find most meetings are best scheduled for 15-20 minutes, or 2 hours.  The default of 1 hour is usually wrong, and leads to a lot of wasted time.” — Sam Altman

88/ “Process drives repeatability.” — Andy Weissman

Governance/Managing LPs

89/ If you don’t know what to ask your LPAC, ask about extensions on fund length (i.e. past 10+2 years), exceeding limits on company concentration and recycling, investing in startups across funds, and early DPI. — Hunter Walk

90/ At the annual summit… “When you speak on market/themes, I don’t want to hear from the managing partners. Bring out your young guns and the members of the team who are your ground game/first line.” — Endowment Eddie

91/ After the third extension to a fund, control and decision usually shifts from GPs and LPAC to general LP base consent. 93% of LPAs allow for at least 2 years of an extension. — Runjhun Kudaisya, Natalia Kubik, Brian O’Neill, Thomas Howard (Goodwin)

  • “First extension: 63% of funds surveyed allow GPs to authorize the first extension at its sole discretion, typically for one year.
  • Second extension: 42% of funds surveyed require approval from the LPAC to authorize the second extension.
  • Third extension: 41% of funds surveyed require consent from the fund investors to authorize the third extension. Note that further extensions can always be approved by an amendment to the fund documents, but this would require consent from at least 50% and usually 75% of investors by commitment or interest.”

92/ “Too many calls I get on, it’s a re-hash of what the strategy is. Assume if I’m taking the call, I actually spent five minutes reminding myself of who you are and what you do.” — Chris Douvos

93/ “One thing I hate is when I meet with someone, they tell me about A, B, and C. And then the next time I meet with them, it’s companies D, E, and F. ‘What happened to A, B, and C?’ So I’ve told people, ‘Hey, we’re having serious conversations. Help me understand the arc.’ As LPs, we get snapshots in time, but what I want is enough snapshots of the whole scene to create a movie of you, like one of those picture books that you can flip. I want to see the evolution. I want to know about the hypotheses that didn’t work.” — Chris Douvos

94/ “Every letter seems to say portfolios have ‘limited exposure to tariffs.’ The reality is we’re seeing potentially the breakdown of the entire post-war Bretton Woods system. And that’s going to have radical impacts on everything across the entire economy. So to say ‘we have limited exposure to tariffs’ is one thing, but what they really are saying is ‘we don’t understand the exposure we have to the broader economy as a whole.’” — Chris Douvos

95/ “Bad performance is explainable, but operational failures erode trust and your LPs aren’t going to re-up.” — Liz Ferry

Building a team

96/ “You can’t exceed one associate per partner and expect those associates to have real influence.” — Mike Dauber

97/ “Scaling is not synonymous with increasing fund size. To me, scaling means you’re increasing in sophistication. You’re increasing in focus. And that’s really a sign of maturity and fund size is a byproduct of that.” — Lisa Cawley

Compensation

98/ In a 2024 survey, in regards to junior team members’ compensation, “AUM matters less than you think.” There’s only a 17% pay bump on base pay for associates between $1.5B funds and $156M funds. In addition, levers that can boost a GP’s take-home pay include GP staking and cashless contributions. — Chris Harvey, with reference to Deedy Das and Venture5 Media

Miscellaneous

99/ “Never sit alone at lunch.” — Alan Patricof

Photo by Emmanuel Denier on Unsplash

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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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Individuals as LPs and as GPs

alone, individual

Two friends independently pinged me for my reaction to two recent social posts while I was on vacation, and I felt so strongly about the below that I had to:

  1. Respond to both of my friends while I was out, and
  2. Write this blogpost after.

Caveat: I don’t tend to write time-and-place ephemeral blogposts, usually evergreen ones, but I feel this topic has been the soup du jour for the last few months, and I need to get it off my chest. I still think a lot of what I write below will stand the test of time, but some parts may not age as well five years from now.

One friend of mine who runs her family office texted me last week and asked what I thought about Harry Stebbings’ recent tweet and Jason Lemkin’s recent comment:

To which, I responded:

I agree with most of what’s said. 99% of people don’t truly understand venture. They see one of two polar extremes. Either it’s the thing that will make them rich and it’s all amazing or it’s overhyped and way too risky. They’re both right and wrong at the same time. In the context of those investing in VC funds, most individuals and new LPs see venture through rose-tinted lens.

That said, what the world needs isn’t ‘do this’ or ‘don’t do this,’ but why and how. That requires education. Not an oversimplification of ‘VC good’ or ‘VC bad.’ There’s a lack of unbiased education right now, but public discussions of such is step one. We need to put illiquidity into perspective. Yes, it’s 17+ years. That’s 4, going on 5, Summer Olympics. Or one and a half zodiacs. That’s another 2-4 American presidents. And that’s over 50 Marvel movies and 34+ Marvel TV series, assuming they stay on pace with what they’ve been putting out in the last 2 years. That’s a long frickin’ time. Time enough for you to have a baby AND send them off to college before you get all the money gained back.

Illiquidity is also at an all-time high. Lots of funds are long in the tooth. LP expectations used to be 10+2. Fancy lingo for 10-year funds with 2-year extensions, opportunistically. Now that companies are staying private for 10-12 years, instead of the old 7-8 years, funds are now 10+2+2. In other words, 10-year funds, with a 2-year extension by GP decision, and another 2 years by LP advisory committee majority vote. But really, it’s starting to become 10+2+2+1+… You can guess where the rest of the numbers come from.

Secondaries are only really popular among the marquee names. For instance, SpaceX, Anduril, Stripe, and so on as of now. Everything else is sold at a discount. Which, 30-50% seem normal. But if a company has raised their last round pre-2021, I’ve seen 60-80% discounts.

GPs are also now expected to actively understand and manage exits. Most GPs don’t know how to. And neither are exits in venture a classically-trained subject. Before it was primarily, IPOs and M&As. Now, this includes secondaries. Ask GPs about their exit strategies. It doesn’t have to be foolproof, but they better have thought of it. And compare what they say to what their best-in-class private equity counterparts say. If there’s a lack of intentionality in the former, things may get really tough in the future.

Venture, sure as hell, is opaque. 75% of VC managers will tell you their top quartile. Who’s right? Who’s wrong? Samir Kaji recently wrote something that rings increasingly true today: “People forget that quartile rankings in VC never account or adjust for valuation methodologies used by the Gps in the sample set.”

Some GPs are liberal with their marks. Marks that put them in the best light. Some even accounting SAFEs as markups, which is bad practice. Pretty sure illegal too, but many new first-time GPs aren’t even aware of it. All that to say, in the first first 5-6 years of a fund, when nothing is noticeably obvious yet, it’s easy to game numbers.

And even if a GP is in the top quartile, top quartile in VC sucks. Ok, it’s not THAT bad. Median definitely sucks in venture though. It’s really not worth putting money in an average VC. But you can put your money in the S&P 500 or the NASDAQ for the same vintage. Dollar-cost average in, once a year in the first four years. And hold it till Year 10. And in many vintages, your public indices will be between a 3X and 4X. Which is as good as most top quartile vintages. If not, it’ll only lag slightly, ever so slightly, behind. Which is a small price to pay for being a liquid asset. If you’re an LP in VC funds, out of thousands of funds, you need to be in the top 20 funds per vintage. Hands down. Not top quartile. And arguably top decile may not even cut it.

And the truth is, just by the numbers, most individuals and new LPs won’t have good access. When your mom, your cousin, that one drunk uncle from Thanksgiving, are all starting their own VC funds, we now and will continue to live in a world where knowing a VC will be as common as knowing someone who wants to start their own company. Whatever that may be. And to have a chance to be good at VC, the average VC must have both a non-redundant AND an economically important network AND knowledge advantage, to borrow a framework that Albert Azout recently said on my podcast. Most do not. Most will fail to compete with the super-scale firms. If you haven’t checked out Gib Dilner’s recent recording on kinds of firms in the ecosystem today, I highly recommend it.

What kinds of networks GPs need to be competitive in today’s market?

The truth is most large funds who will cannibalize smaller emerging managers don’t send their good deals to emerging managers. Although emerging managers do send their best deals to the large funds. Looks good for markups. Looks good at the annual meeting when they present to you. But clearly, this dynamic is unrequited. As such, it’s why I believe as an LP, you need to be in managers who go really, really early, where the large firms still cannot access or priced out of accessing. Managers who extend their thesis so that the net new checks coming out of their funds include seed and Series A (unless they can actively lead this and the next round):

  1. Lose out on access above a $250K check. These days, even above a $100K check. Because large funds want the whole round. It’s how they can make their economics work.
  2. Don’t have the war chest to provide the capital to founders so that they can weather the market. That said, a good friend of mine, Henry, created the Lean AI Leaderboard. It’s a great dashboard for companies who get to profitability with a lean team and often very little in external capital. And if they do, these companies are seed-strapped, meaning they raise a seed round with the goal of never raising another round again. For investors in these companies, the good news is that they retain most of their equity from entry. The bad news is that unless these companies have a clear exit path, your money as an LP doesn’t go anywhere. More so, most of the VCs investing invest on SAFE notes, with no maturity dates. On paper, revenue is up, but no markups and no exit path. After the $100M range, there are very few companies who would acquire any of these small players, especially after the AI craze. That said, it’s too early to tell. And I’m not sure I have the fortune cookie to tell you what happens next.

But also, as an FYI, if you’re investing in a large platform, don’t expect double-digit or even high single-digit returns, you’re likely going to get a solid 2.5-3X (optimistically), but it’s a stable machine. Still think if that’s the case though, you should be investing in buyout funds or private credit. If you don’t have access to those, just public equities.

Also, not every person needs to start a venture firm. Not every good investor needs to be a fund manager. Being a fund manager is tough. You need to worry about K-1s and reporting (yes, that’s chasing founders down for metrics even when you have information rights), fund admin, running a business, filing taxes, and knowing when and how to sell. It’s actually easier to be a great investor at another larger shop. It’s the same as not every smart person needs to start their own company.

All that said… I’m still bullish on venture. I think it truly is, one of the most promising asset classes we have available to us. And I mean venture in the raw, unfiltered first check, pre-seed play. Not the Series A+ play. At least for emerging managers. After the Series A, I can’t think of a sustainable way you won’t get outcompeted by the large ones. For true early stage exposure as first check, the large platforms often have no incentive to play. Given their large fund sizes, they’ve priced themselves out of that true first-check bucket.

Something that harkens back to a Chris Paik line. “Any company that is pure execution risk without any market risk is not a suitable venture investment.”

A few days later, another friend asked me if I saw this, and if I had any immediate thoughts. On LinkedIn, Pavel Prata had posted a reaction to Jared Friedman’s request for full-stack AI companies, saying that “80% of VC funds will be automated within 3 years.” To be fair, Pavel’s not wrong. Directionally, that is where the industry is heading. Having been to a few annual summits that VCs host so far this year already, every single — oh yes, I mean, EVERY SINGLE — one that I went to (I went to seven at the time of writing this post) talked about using AI to either or both source deals and/or qualify deals. Some also talked about supporting their portfolio using their digitally-twinned brain. Simply, AI is in.

That said, there were some things that Pavel suggested I disagreed with, or at least thought he was oversimplifying:

  1. “Process 100X more deals.” While there are firms that make investment decisions algorithmically, and while I do see this working past-Series A (where we enter growth), in true early-stage investing fashion, the best investors invest prior to data. Prior to traction. Prior to anything obvious enough to track. And while you, as a firm, can probably see and filter 100X more deals. As a human GP with only 24 hours in a day, and building a portfolio of 30 investments across 3-4 years, I still go back to a piece of advice I received early on in my career. “You don’t have to invest in every great company, but every company you invest in must be great.”
  2. “Maintain relationships with 1000+ founders.” I have my doubts here. Until I start seeing people build long-term friendships and happiness with AI, I’m still a strong believer that people trust people. And this rapid scaling of AI only further proves that. It’s hard to scale trust. To scale intimacy. There might be a world where this does happen one day. But I don’t think this is three years away. That said, I do think that you as a solo GP or a small team can support your portfolio as if you were a fully-staffed 20+ person team within three years though.
  3. “Deploy capital 5X faster.” There are some things in life where faster isn’t necessarily better. Like performing a surgery. Or simply, music. No one needs to listen to My Heart will Go On on 5X speed. Venture is one of them. While it’s unclear whether Pavel means shorter deployment periods or faster decision-making, to address both, shorter deployment periods may indirectly lead to more companies getting funded. Or more capital going to the same companies. We don’t need either. An LP shouldn’t index venture, nor should more capital go into companies where the preference stack exceeds the valuation of the companies or making companies financially impossible to 3-5X any of the companies’ investors. Faster decision-making may make sense if it’s a competitive round, but true venture is betting on the non-obvious. Most non-obvious bets don’t need capital 5X faster.

To be fair, I do agree with the vast majority of where Pavel thinks the venture industry will go.

Photo by Matthew Henry on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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The Complexity of the Simple Question (DGQ 20)

Last week, Youngrok and I finally launched our episode together on Superclusters. In the midst of it all, we wrestle with the balance between the complexity and simplicity of questions to get our desired answer. Of course, we made many an allusion to the DGQ series. One of which, you’ll find below.

In many ways, I started the DGQ series as a promise to myself to uncover the questions that yield the most fascinating answers. Questions that unearth answers “hidden in plain sight”. Those that help us read between the lines.

Superclusters, in many ways, is my conduit to not only interview some of my favorite people in the LP landscape, but also the opportunity to ask the perfect question to each guest. Which you’ll see in some of the below examples.

  1. Asking Abe Finkelstein about being a Pitfall Explorer and how it relates to patience (1:04:56 in S2E1)
  2. What Ben Choi’s childhood was like (2:44 in S1E6) and how proposing to his wife affects how he thinks about pitching (1:05:47 in S1E6)
  3. How selling baseball cards as a kid helped Samir Kaji get better at sales (45:05 in S1E8)

In doing so, I sometimes lose myself in the nuance. And in those times, which happen more often than I’d like to admit, the questions that yield the best answers are the simplest ones. No added flare. No research-flexing moments. Where I don’t lead the witness. And I just ask the question. In its simplest form.

For the purpose of this essay, to make this more concrete, let’s focus on a question LPs often ask GPs.

“Tell me about this investment you made.“

In my mind, ridiculously simple question. Younger me would call that a lazy question. In all fairness, it would be if one was not intentionally aware about the kind of answer they were looking to hear OR not hear.

The laziness comes from regressing to the template, the model, the ‘what.’ But not the ‘why’ the question is being asked, and ‘how’ it should be interpreted. For those who struggle to understand the first principles of actions and questions, I’d highly recommend reading Simon Sinek’s Start with Why, but I digress.

Circling back, every GP talks about their portfolio founders differently. If two independent thinkers have both invested Company A, they might have different answers. Won’t always be true, but if you look at two portfolios that are relatively correlated in their underlying assets AND they arrive at those answers in the same way, one does wonder if it’s worth diversifying to other managers with different theses and/or approaches.

But that’s exactly what makes this simple question (but if you want to debate semantics, statement) special. When all else is equal, VCs are left to their own devices unbounded from artificial parameters.

Then take that answer and compare and contrast it to how other GPs you know well or have invested in already. How do they answer the same question for the exact same investment? How much are those answers correlated?

It matters less that the facts are the same. Albeit, useful to know how each investor does their own homework pre- and post-investment. But more so, it’s a question on thoughtfulness. How well does each investor really know their investments? How does it compare to the answer of a GP I admire for their thoughtfulness and intentionality?

(Part of the big reason I don’t like investing in syndicates because most outsource their decision-making to larger logos in VCs. On top of that, most syndicate memos are rather paltry when it comes to information.)

The question itself is also a test of observation and self-awareness. How well do you really know the founder? Were you intentional with how you built that relationship with the founder? How does it compare to the founder’s own self-reflection? It’s also the same reason I love Doug Leone’s question, which highlights how aware one is of the people around them. What three adjectives would you use to describe your sibling?

Warren Buffett once described Charlie Munger as “the best thirty-second mind in the world. He goes from A to Z in one go. He sees the essence of everything even before you finish the sentence.” Moreover in his 2023 Berkshire annual letter, he wrote one of the most thoughtful homages ever written.

An excerpt from Berkshire’s 2023 annual letter

As early-stage investors, as belief checks, as people who bet on the nonobvious before it becomes obvious, we invest in extraordinary companies. I really like the way Chris Paik describes what we do. “Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”

And just like there are certain companies that can’t be described in a single sentence — not the Uber for X, or the Google for Y — their founders who are even more complex than a business idea cannot be described by a single sentence either. Many GPs I come across often reduce a founder’s brilliance to the logos on their resume or the diplomas hanging on their walls. But if we bet right, the founders are a lot more than just that.

Of course, the same applies to LPs who describe the GPs they invest in.

In hopes this would be helpful to you, personally some areas I find fascinating in founders and emerging GPs and, hell just in, people in general include:

  • Their selfish motivations (the less glamorous ones) — Why do this when they can be literally doing anything else? Many of which can help them get rich faster.
  • What part of their past are they running towards and what are they running away from?
  • All the product pivots (thesis pivots) to date and why. I love inflection points.
  • If they were to do a TED talk on a subject that’s not what they’re currently building, what would it be?
  • Who do they admire? Who are their mentor figures?
  • What kind of content do they consume? How do they think about their information diet?
  • What promises have they made to themselves? No matter how small or big. Which have they kept? Which have they not?
  • How do they think about mentoring/training/upskilling the next generation of talent at their company/firm?

The DGQ series is a series dedicated to my process of question discovery and execution. When curiosity is the why, DGQ is the how. It’s an inside scoop of what goes on in my noggin’. My hope is that it offers some illumination to you, my readers, so you can tackle the world and build relationships with my best tools at your disposal. It also happens to stand for damn good questions, or dumb and garbled questions. I’ll let you decide which it falls under.

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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Thesis is a Lagging Indicator of Outperformance

thread, yarn, pull

In the process of catching up with a number of fund managers this week, I was reminded of two things:

  1. That I still have an outstanding blogpost on intuition and discipline sitting on my desk, having gone through more revisions than I would like
  2. That Fund I’s mostly start by drawing trendlines in your previous portfolio’s winners.

Now it’s not my job to call anyone out, but many of those I caught up with this week, told me in confidence (no longer in confidence now that I’m writing about it) that their best investments were simply due to being in the right place at the right time. That they were lucky. Others invested often off-thesis to accommodate for a brilliant founder that looked and sounded like nothing they had seen before. Then retroactively, went back to LPs in a subsequent fundraise armed with the knowledge to account for their previous outlier.

Chris Paik once wrote, ““Invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”

Josh Wolfe said last year, “We believe before others understand.” And sometimes the investor themselves may not fully grasp what makes someone special other than that person is special.

Other times the company in which you initially bet on may not look like the company that earns you the most capital. As Mike Maples Jr. once said, “90% of our exit profits have come from pivots.

Of course, many LPs don’t want to hear that. They want to hear that you know exactly what you’re doing. That you can predict the future. But you can’t. In many ways, VCs invest in what stays the same. Not what changes. Human nature. Great hires. Network effects. Talent pools. Intellectual curiosity. Rigor. It’s a long list.

An amazing VC once told me. The job of a VC is to:

  1. Have a wide enough aperture so enough light can come in
  2. But have a fast enough trigger finger to catch the light, the reflections, the shadows just at the right time so that you get a good enough shot.

The rest is all done in the editing room, where you massage the photo with your expertise and experience to help it stand out.

I love that line. But simply put, the job of a VC is to:

  1. Cast a wide enough net so that you can see as many great companies as you can,
  2. Have the ability and awareness to know a great company when you see it.

After all, as an investor, you don’t have to invest in every great company, but every company you invest in must be great. Big anti-portfolios don’t mean much in this world if you can still get great returns.

All that to say, the job of an angel is to increase the surface area for luck to stick. And once enough do, a thesis blossoms.

A thesis, at the end of the day, is retroactive. And the best thing a fund manager can do is that the thesis the fund ends on is as close as possible to the initial. As LPs, it is our job to bet on the future of the thesis and the discipline of the fund manager. Both are equally as important. If things do change, a fund manager must preemptively communicate strategy drift and do so in the best interest of their investors.

It’s not ideal in many cases. For individual LPs and smaller family offices, strategy drift matters less. For large institutional LPs, it matters more. Because the latter don’t want you to be investing in the same underlying asset as other funds they’re invested into are.

Photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash

Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!

The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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The Science of Re-Upping

baseball, follow on

Soooooooo… (I know, what a great word to start a blogpost) I started this essay, with some familiarity on one subject. Little did I know I was going to learn about an entirely different industry, and be endlessly fascinated about that.

The analogy that kicked off this essay is that re-upping on a portfolio company is very much like re-signing a current player on a sports team. That was it. Simple as it was supposed to sound. The goal of any analogy was to frame a new or nuanced concept, in this case, the science of re-upping, under an umbrella of knowledge we were already familiar with.

But, I soon learned of the complexity behind re-upping players’ contracts, as one might assume. And while I will claim no authority over the knowledge and calculations that go into contracts in the sports arena, I want to thank Brian Anderson and everyone else who’s got more miles on their odometer in the world of professional sports for lending me their brains. Thank you!

As well as Arkady Kulik, Dave McClure, and all the LPs and GPs for their patience and willingness to go through all the revisions of this blogpost!

While this was a team effort here, many of this blogpost’s contributors chose to stay off the record.

The year was 1997.

Nomar Garciaparra was an instantaneous star, after batting an amazing .306/.342/.534. For the uninitiated, those are phenomenal stats. On top of batting 30 home runs and 11 triples – the latter of which was a cut above the rest of the league, it won him Rookie of the Year. And those numbers only trended upwards in the years after, especially in 1999 and 2000. Garciaparra became the hope for so many fans to end the curse of the Bambino – a curse that started when the Red Sox traded the legendary Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.

Then 2001 hit. A wrist injury. An injured Achilles tendon. And the fact he needed to miss “significant time” earned him a prime spot to be traded. Garciaparra was still a phenomenal hitter when he was on, but there was one other variable that led to the Garciaparra trade. To Theo Epstein, above all else, that was his “fatal flaw.”

Someone that endlessly draws my fascination is Theo Epstein. Someone that comes from the world of baseball. A sport that venture draws a lot of inspiration, at least in analogy, like one of my fav sayings, Venture is one of the only types of investments where it’s not about the batting average but about the magnitude of the home runs you hit.

If you don’t follow baseball, Theo Epstein is the youngest general manager in the history of major league baseball at 26. But better known for ending the Curse of the Bambino, an 86-year curse that led the Red Sox down a championship drought that started when the Red Sox traded Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Theo as soon as he became general manager traded Nomar Garciaparra, a 5-time All-star shortstop, to the Cubs, and won key contracts with both third baseman Bill Mueller and pitcher Curt Schilling. All key decisions that led the Red Sox to eventually win the World Series 3 years later.

And when Theo left the Red Sox to join the Chicago Cubs, he also ended another curse – The Curse of the Billy Goat, ending with Theo leading them to a win in the 2016 World Series. You see, in baseball, they measure everything. From fly ball rates to hits per nine innings to pitches per plate appearance. Literally everything on the field.

But what made Theo different was that he looked at things off the field. It’s why he chose to bet on younger players than rely on the current all-stars. It’s why he measures how a teammate can help a team win in the dugout. And, it’s why he traded Nomar, a 5-time All Star, as soon as he joined, because Nomar’s “fatal flaw” was despite his prowess, held deep resentment to his own team, the Sox, when they tried to trade him just the year prior for Alex Rodriguez but failed to.

So, when Danny Meyer, best known for his success with Shake Shack, asked Theo what Danny called a “stupid question”, after the Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the playoffs, and right after Houston was hit by a massive hurricane, “Theo, who are you rooting for? The Dodgers so you can say you lost to the winning team, or Houston (Astros), because you want something good to happen to a city that was recently ravaged by a hurricane.”

Theo said, “Neither. But I’m rooting for the Dodgers because if they win, they’ll do whatever every championship team does and not work on the things they need to work on during the off season. And the good news is that we have to play them 8 times in the next season.”

You see, everyone in VC largely has access to the same data. The same Pitchbook and Crunchbase stat sheet. The same cap table. And the same financials. But as Howard Marks once said in response how you gain a knowledge advantage:

“You have to either:

  1. Somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging; or you have to
  2. Be better at making qualitative judgments; or you have to
  3. Be better at figuring out what the future holds.”

For the purpose of this blogpost, we’re going to focus on the first one of the three.

What is value?

To begin, we have to first define a term that’ll be booking its frequent flier miles for the rest of this piece – expected value.

Some defined it as the expectation of future worth. Others, a prediction of future utility. Investopedia defines it as the long-term average value of a variable. Merriam-Webster has the most rudimentary definition:

The sum of the values of a random variable with each value multiplied by its probability of occurrence

On the other hand, venture is an industry where the beta is arguably one of the highest. The risk associated with outperformance is massive as well. And the greatest returns, in following the power law, are unpredictable.

We’re often blessed with hindsight bias, but every early-stage investor in foresight struggles with predicting outlier performance. Any investor that says otherwise is either deluding you or themselves or both. At the same time, that’s what makes modeling exercises so difficult in venture, unlike our friends in hedge funds and private equity. Even the best severely underestimate the outcomes of their best performers. For instance, Bessemer thought the best possible outcome for Shopify was $400M with only a 3% chance of occurring.

Similarly, who would have thought that jumping in a stranger’s car or home, or live streaming gameplay would become as big as they are today. As Strauss Zelnick recently said, “The biggest hits are by their nature, unexpected, which means you can’t organize around them with AI.” Take the word AI out, and the sentence is equally as profound replaced with the word “model.” And it is equally echoed by others. Chris Paik at Pace has made it his mission to “invest in companies that can’t be described in a single sentence.”

But I digress.

Value itself is a huge topic – a juggernaut of a topic – and I, in no illusion, find myself explaining it in a short blogpost, but that of which I plan to spend the next couple of months, if not years, digging deeper into, including a couple more blogposts that are in the blast furnace right now. But for the purpose of this one, I’ll triangulate on one subset of it – future value as a function of probability and market benchmarks.

In other words, doubling down. Or re-upping.

For the world of startups, the best way to explain that is through a formula:

E(v) = (probability of outcome) X (outcome)

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

For the sake of this blogpost and model, let’s call E(v), appreciation value. So, let’s break down each of the variables.

Graduation rates

What percent of your companies graduate to the next round? I shared general benchmarks in this blogpost, but the truth is it’s a bit more nuanced. Each vertical, each sub-vertical, each vintage – they all look different. Additionally, Sapphire’s Beezer recently said that it’s normal to expect a 20-30% loss ratio in the first five years of your fund. Not all your companies will make it, but that’s the game we play.

On a similar note, institutional LPs often plan to build a multi-fund, multi-decade relationship with their GPs. If they invest in a Fund I, they also expect to be there by Fund III.

Valuation step ups

How much greater is the next round’s valuation in comparison to the one in which you invested? Twice as high? Thrice? By definition, if you double down on the same company, rather than allocate to a net new company, you’re decreasing your TVPI. And as valuations grow, the cost of doubling down may be too much for your portfolio construction model to handle, especially if you’re a smaller sub-$100M fund.

It’s for the same reason that in the world of professional sports, there are salary caps. In fact, most leagues have them. And only the teams who:

  • Have a real chance at the championship title.
  • Have a lot in their coffers. This comes down to the composition of the ownership group, and their willingness to pay that tax.
  • And/or have a city who’s willing to pay the premium.

… can pay the luxury tax. Not to be too much of a homer, but the Golden State Warriors have a phenomenal team and are well-positioned to win again (at least at the time of this blogpost going out). So the Warriors can afford to pay the luxury tax, but smaller teams or teams focused on rebuilding can’t.

The Bulls didn’t re-sign the legendary Michael Jordan because they needed to rebuild. Indianapolis didn’t extend Peyton Manning’s contract ‘cause they didn’t have the team that would support Peyton’s talents. So, they needed to rebuild with a new cast of players.

Similarly, Sequoia and a16z might be able to afford to pay the “luxury tax” when betting on the world’s greatest AI talent and for them to acquire the best generative AI talent. Those who have a real chance to grow to $100M ARR, given adoption rates, retention rates, and customer demand. But as a smaller fund or a fund that has a new cast of GPs (where the old guard retired)… can you?

Dilution

If a star player is prone to injury or can only play 60 minutes of a game (rather than 90 minutes), a team needs to re-evaluate the value of said player, no matter how talented they are. How much of a player’s health, motivation, and/or collaborativeness – harkening back to the anecdote of Nomar Garciaparra at the beginning – will affect their ability to perform in the coming season?

Take, for instance, the durability of a player. If there ‘s a 60% chance of a player getting injured if he/she plays longer than 60 minutes in a game and a 50% of tearing their ACL, while they may your highest scorer this season, they’re not very durable. If that player missed 25% of practices and 30% of games, they just don’t have it in them to see the season through. And you can also benchmark that player against the rest of the team. How’s that compared with the team’s average?

Of course, there’s a parallel here to also say, every decision you make should be relative to industry and portfolio benchmarks.

How great of a percentage are you getting diluted with the next round if you don’t maintain your ownership? This is the true value of your stake in the company as the company grows.

How does one use the appreciation value equation?

E(v) = (graduation rate) X (valuation step up from last round) X (dilution)

If the expected value is greater than one, the company is probably not worth re-upping. And that probably means the company is overhyped, or that that market is seeing extremely deflated loss ratios. In other words, more companies than should be, are graduating to the next stage; when in reality, the market is either a winner-take-all or a few-take-all market. If it is less than or equal to one, then it’s ripe to double down on. In other words, the company may be undervalued.

And to understand the above equation or for it to be actually useful (outside of an abstract concept), you need market data. Specifically, around valuation step ups as a function of industry and vertical.

If you happen to have internal data across decades and hundreds of companies, then it’s worth plugging in your own dataset as well. It’s the closest you can get to the efficient market frontier.

But if you lack a large enough sample size, I’d recommend the below model constructed from data pulled from Carta, Pitchbook, and Preqin and came from the minds of Arkady Kulik and Dave McClure.

The model

The purpose of this model is to help your team filter what portfolio companies are worth diving deeper into and which ones you may not have to (because they didn’t pass the litmus test) BEFORE you evaluate additional growth metrics.

It is also important to note that the data we’ve used is bucketed by industry. And in doing so, assumptions were made in broad strokes. For example, deep tech is broad by design but includes niche-er markets that have their own fair share of pricing nuances in battery or longevity biotech or energy or AI/ML. Or B2B which include subsectors in cybersecurity or infrastructure or PLG growth.

Take for instance…

Energy

Energy sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The energy sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the seed stage, where all three factors contribute to such an output. Valuation step-up is just 1.71X, graduation rates are less than 50% and dilution is 38% on average.  

Second phase where re-upping might be a good idea is Series B. Main drivers as to such a decision are that dilution hovers around 35% and about 50% of companies graduate from Series A to Series B. Mark ups are less significant where we generally see only an increase in valuation at about 2.5X, which sits around the middle of the pack.

Biotech

Biotech sector appreciation values and follow-on recommendations

The biotech sector sees a large drop in appreciation value at the Seed stage. This time, whereas dilution seems to match the pace of the rest of the pack (at an average of 25%), the two other factors shine greater in making a follow-on decision. Valuation step up are rather low, sitting at 1.5X. And less than 50% graduate to the next stage.

In the late 2023 market, one might also consider re-upping at the Series C round. Main driver is the unexpectedly low step-up function of 1.5X, which matches the slow pace of deployment for growth and late stage VCs. On the flip side, a dilution of 17% and graduation rate of 60% are quite the norm at this stage.

In closing

All in all, the same exercise is useful in evaluating two scenarios – either as an LP or as a GP:

  1. Is your entry point a good entry point?
  2. Between two stages, where should you deploy more capital?

For the former, too often, emerging GPs take the stance of the earlier, the better. Almost as if it’s a biblical line. It’s not. Or at least not always, as a blanket statement. The point of the above exercise is also to evaluate, what is the average value of a company if you were to jump in at the pre-seed? Do enough graduate and at a high enough price for it to make sense? While earlier may be true for many industries, it isn’t true for all, and the model above can serve as your litmus test for it. You may be better off entering at a stage with a higher scoring entry point.

For the latter, this is where the discussion of follow on strategies and if you should have reserves come into play. If you’re a seed stage firm, say for biotech, using the above example, by the A, your asset might have appreciated too much for you to double down. In that case, as a fund manager, you may not need to deploy reserves into the current market. Or you may not need as large of a reserve pool as you might suspect. It’s for this reason that many fund managers often underallocate because they overestimate how much in reserves they need.

If you’re curious to play around with the model yourself, ping Arkady at ak@rpv.global, and you can mention you found out about it through here. 😉

Photo by Gene Gallin on Unsplash

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The views expressed on this blogpost are for informational purposes only. None of the views expressed herein constitute legal, investment, business, or tax advice. Any allusions or references to funds or companies are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be relied upon as investment recommendations. Consult a professional investment advisor prior to making any investment decisions.

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