Myths around Startups and Business Ideas

In a number of recent conversations with friends outside of venture and “aspiring entrepreneurs”, a couple myths, which I’m going to loosely define here as popular beliefs held by many people, were brought to my attention. 4 in particular.

  1. If I have a great idea and build it, it’ll sell itself.
  2. That idea/startup is over-hyped.
  3. The startup/venture capital landscape is over-saturated.
  4. If it doesn’t make sense to me, it’s not a good idea.

Quite fortuitously, a question on Quora also inspired this post and discussion.

If I have a great idea and build it, it’ll sell itself.

Unfortunately, most times, it won’t. As Reid Hoffman puts it: “A good product with great distribution will almost always beat a great product with poor distribution.” As a founder, you have to think like a salesperson (for enterprise/B2B businesses) or a marketer (for consumer/B2C businesses). People have to know about what you’re building. ’Cause frankly you could build the world’s best time machine in your basement, but if no one knows, it’s just a time machine in your basement. Probably a great story to tell for Hollywood one day (even then you still need people to find out), but not for a business.

That idea/startup is over-hyped.

I’ll be honest. This really isn’t a myth, more of a common saying.

Maybe so, at the cross-section in time in which you’re looking at it. But if you rewind a couple months or a year or 2 years ago, they were under-hyped. In fact, there’s a good chance no one cared. While everyone has a different technical definition of over- and under-hyped, by the numbers, time will tell if it’ll be a sustainable business or not. If it’s keeping north of 40% retention even 6 months after the hype, we’re in for a breadwinner.

Take Zoom, for example. Pre-COVID, if you asked any rational tech investor, “would you invest in Slack or Zoom?” Most would say Slack. Zoom existed, but many weren’t extremely bullish on it. Today, well, that may be a different story. As of this morning (Oct. 12, 2020), while I’m editing this post before the market opens, the stock price of Zoom is $492 (and same change). Approximately 343% higher than it was on March 17th, the first day of the Bay Area shelter-in-place. And, right now, the price of Slack is $31. Approximately 56% up from the beginning of quarantine.

Neither are startups anymore, but the analogy holds. Also, a lesson that predictions, even by experts, can be wrong.

The startup/venture capital landscape is over-saturated.

“There’s too much money being invested (wasted) on startups.”

From the outside, it may very well look that way. Every day, every week we see this startup gets funded for $X million or that startup gets funded for $YY million. According to the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), $133 billion were invested into startups last year. Yet, it pales in comparison to the capital that’s traded in the public markets.

VC funds see thousands of startup pitches a year. Per partner (most funds 2–3 partners), they each invest in 3–5 per year (aka about once per quarter). Meaning >99% of startups that a single VC sees are not getting funded by them. That doesn’t mean 99% never get funded, but it’s just to illustrate that proportionally, capital isn’t being spent willy-nilly.

If we look at it from a macro-economic perspective, if we are reaching saturation in the startup market, we should be getting closer to perfect competition. And in a perfectly competitive market, profit margins are zero. The thing is profits aren’t nearing zero in the startup/venture capital market. In fact, though the median fund isn’t returning much on invested capital. A good fund is returning 3–5x. A great one >5x. And well, if you were in Chris Sacca’s first fund, which included Uber, Twitter, and more, 250x MOIC. That’s $250 returned on every $1 invested.

If it doesn’t make sense to me, it’s not a good idea.

Revolutionary ideas aren’t meant to conform. If an idea is truly ground-breaking, people have yet to be conditioned to think that a startup idea is great or not. As Andy Rachleff, co-founder of Wealthfront and Benchmark Capital, puts it: “you want to be right on the non-consensus.” Think Uber and Airbnb in 2008. If you asked me to jump in a stranger’s car to go somewhere then, I would have thought you were crazy. Same with living in a stranger’s home. I write more about being right on the non-consensus here and in this blog post.

Frankly, you may not be the target market. You’re not the customer that startup is serving. The constant reminder we, on the venture capital side of the table, have is to stop thinking that we are the core user for a product. Most products are not made for us. Equally, when a founder comes to us pre-traction and asks us “Is this a good idea?”, most of the time I don’t know. The numbers (will) prove if it’s a good idea or not. Unless I am their target audience, I don’t have a lot to weigh in on. I can only check, from least important to most important:

  1. How big is the market + growth rate
  2. Does the founder(s) have a unique insight into the industry that all the other players are overlooking or underestimating or don’t know at all? And will this insight keep incumbents at bay at least until this startup reaches product-market fit?
  3. How obsessed about the problem space is the founder/team, which is a proxy for grit and resilience in the longer run? And obsession is an early sign of (1) their current level of domain expertise/navigating the “idea maze”, and (2) and their potential to gain more expertise. If we take the equation for a line, y = mx + b. As early-stage investors, we invest in “m’s” not “b’s”.

In closing

While I know not everyone echoes these thoughts, hopefully, this post can provide more context to some of the entrepreneurial motions we’re seeing today. Of course, take it all with a grain of salt. I’m an optimist by nature and by function of my job. Just as a VC I respect told me when I first started 4 years back,

“If you’re going to pursue a career in venture, by nature of the job, you have to be an optimist.”

Happened to also be one of the VCs who shared his thoughts for my little research project on inspiration and frustration last week.

Photo by K. Mitch Hodge on Unsplash


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The Different Types of Risk a VC Evaluates

Photo by trail on Unsplash

Founders take on many different types of risk when creating a business. Subsequently, investors constantly put founders and their businesses under scrutiny using risk as a benchmark. In broad terms, in my experience, they largely fall under two categories: execution risk and market risk.

Where I first introduced the dichotomy of market and execution risk in the frame of idea-market fit.

Some Background

Contrary to popular belief, VCs are some of the most risk-averse people that I know. As an investor, the two goals are to:

  1. Take calculated bets, via an investment thesis and diligence;
  2. And de-risk each investment as much as possible.

From private equity to growth equity to venture capital, more and more investors are writing ‘discovery checks.’ Typically, funds write checks that are 2-4% of their fund size. For example, $100M fund usually write $2-4M initial checks. Yet, more and more investors are writing increasingly smaller check sizes (0.1-0.5% fund size). In the $100M fund example, that’s $100-500K checks. This result is a function of FOMO (fear of missing out), as well as a proving grounds for founders before the fund’s partners put in their core dollar. Admittedly, this upstream effect does lead to:

  • Less diligence before checks are written (closing within 48-72 hours on the extreme end, and inevitably, more buyer’s remorse);
  • Less bandwidth allotted per portfolio startup (even less for startups given discovery checks);
  • And, inflated rounds (and therefore, inflated startup valuations).

The Risks

The risks for a startup investor are fairly obvious, and so are the rewards. Effectively, an early-stage investor is betting millions of dollars on a stranger’s claim. But not all risks are the same.

In the eyes of a VC, an execution risk is categorically less risky than a market risk. Furthermore, even within the category of execution, a product risk is usually less risky than a team risk.

Execution Risk

Why are more and more early-stage investors defaulting to enterprise over consumer startups?

Two reasons.

  1. Enterprise startups often run on a SaaS (software-as-service) subscription business model. There will always be recurring revenue, assuming the product makes sense. For an investor, that’s foreseeable ROI.
  2. It’s an execution risk, not a market risk. Often times, an enterprise tech startup is the culmination of existing frustrations prevalent in the respective industry already. And therefore, have reasonably stable distribution channels and go-to-market strategies.

Eric Feng, formerly at Kleiner Perkins, now at Facebook, used Y Combinator’s data set at the end of last year to illustrate the consumer-to-enterprise shift.

Using discovery checks, and playing pre-core business, VCs can evaluate team risk. Between the discovery check and their usual ‘core checks’, VCs can also test their initial hypotheses on their founders.

As a startup grows, especially after realizing product-market fit, market risk becomes more of a product risk. Best illustrated by market share, product risk is when a product fails to meet the expectations of their (target) customers. It can be evaluated via a permutation of key metrics, like unit economics, NPS, retention and churn rate. There is an element of technological risk early on in the startup lifecycle for deep tech ventures, but admittedly, it’s not a vertical I have my finger on the pulse for and can share insight into.

Given that VCs are either ex-operators or have seen a breadth of startup life-cycles, VCs can best use their experience to mitigate a startup’s execution risk.

Market Risk

Market risk requires a prediction of human/market behavior. And unfortunately, the vast majority of investors can predict about the constant evolution of human behavior as well as a founder can. What does that mean? Founders and VCs are walking hand-in-hand to gain market experience. It, quite excitingly, is an innovator’s Rubrik’s cube to solve.

Market risk is frequently attributed to consumer tech products. In an increasing proliferation of consumer startups, consumers have become more expensive to acquire and harder to retain. Distribution channels change frequently and are determined by political, economic, technological, and social trends.

In Closing

Every VC specializes in tackling a certain kind of risk. But founders must quickly adapt, prioritize, and tackle all the above risks at some point in the founding journey. As Reid Hoffman, co-founder of LinkedIn, famously said:

“An entrepreneur is someone who will jump off a cliff and assemble an airplane on the way down.”

Happy hunting!