Not long ago, there was this massive TikTok craze on sea shanties. And while I don’t have a TikTok account, the ripple effects have reached me as well. What started as a shower thought after a founder recommended I gamify my advice to founders fundraising, well… turned into this. To the tune of Soon May the Wellerman Come:
There once was a team that put to sea The name of that team was Friends ‘N Me The winds blew hard, but growth tipped up O’, burn that midnight oil (huh)
Soon may the investor fund To bring us money and help and some One day, when the term sheet’s done We’ll take the dough to grow
She had not been two years from start When push became the pull we sought The founder called all hands and wrought The product to scale now (huh)
Soon may the investor fund To bring us money and help and some One day, when the term sheet’s done We’ll take the dough to grow
The servers’ now a right real mess We had to call the AWS They had us pay for more bandwidth But that’s okay with us (huh)
Soon may the investor fund To bring us money and help and some One day, when the term sheet’s done We’ll take the dough to grow
We’ve tripled our growth last year, oh yus With dollar retention as one cause When we were asked what it was We said ’twas one twenty (huh)
Soon may the investor fund To bring us money and help and some One day, when the term sheet’s done We’ll take the dough to grow
We’ve ten cust’mers that five of which Are referenceable you’ll find on pitch That one of which is kinda rich They’re paying hundy K (huh)
Soon may the investor fund To bring us money and help and some One day, when the term sheet’s done We’ll take the dough to grow
#unfiltered is a series where I share my raw thoughts and unfiltered commentary about anything and everything. It’s not designed to go down smoothly like the best cup of cappuccino you’ve ever had (although here‘s where I found mine), more like the lonely coffee bean still struggling to find its identity (which also may one day find its way into a more thesis-driven blogpost). Who knows? The possibilities are endless.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Ever since I started my career in VC, I’ve been trying to understand the concept of “intuition”. Yet, it wasn’t after I’d seen over 500 pitch decks and met over 100 founders before I began to have an inkling of what intuition meant. In fact, embarrassingly so, when I first started at SkyDeck, Berkeley’s startup accelerator, I thought every other startup I met was gonna be a winner. After all, it was rather rare that a founder wouldn’t be excited about their idea at the first meeting. I was told again and again by investors, one of the key drivers for a startup is the founder’s passion. I thought, well, the numbers might not be there yet. But with this founder’s excitement, they’ll get there eventually. And quickly, I mistook “hopefully” as “eventually”. Two words with very different meanings.
You don’t have to be a full-time investor to know that I was quite off the mark. I soon and quickly learned that passion can be faked, especially in the first meeting. And on that journey, I realized how important having a large and deep sample size was. Large, in the sense of number of founding teams I was meeting. Deep, in the sense of spending longer hours with these teams. Of course, realistically, I couldn’t spend more time with everyone I met, but that also meant I shouldn’t just spend half an hour with them and call it a day. My general rule of thumb became I was going to meet every founder at least twice, and at least a week apart. This gave me:
Time to cool my head from the excitement of the meeting
Am I more, less, or just as excited to meet them in meeting two as I was in meeting one?
If I were [insert my mentor’s name], would I do the deal? Why or why not?
Sometimes, it was really helpful to put myself in the shoes of someone’s who’s way more experienced than I am.
Time to approach the opportunity more analytically
Does it align with the macro trends I’ve seen?
Do they have some early semblance of product-market fit? Why can that be an early proxy for it?
Would I be a power user?
Is their origin story enough to compel them towards this idea for the next 7-10 years? Are they meant/”destined” to do this?
Would they be able to succeed without me? Without funding?
Is venture funding a path they need to take towards growth? What about equity crowdfunding? Bootstrapping? Reaching profitability via a tweak in their business model?
Of course, there were, are, and will be exceptions.
Alfred Chuang of Race Capital recently shared his “co-founder test”: “People asked me so well, how do you determine this is a company you want to invest in. In early stage, I say if this company I want to co-founded with, that I will, in any moment jump on my own two feet in the building, the company would have found this, I don’t do it. Wow. Right. That’s where the conviction come from. Right? This is the ultimate gut test, you don’t pass that gut test, you don’t do it. So I urge the founders on either side to say, Well, think of me as your co-founder. If you don’t think of me as a co-founder, don’t do the deal with me.”
I recently tuned into one of Basecamp‘s Jason Fried‘s latest interviews, in which he describes how he chooses to pursue projects based on feel. Particularly when he gets the goosebumps. Similar to him, and I’m sure many others, I regret far more of what I say yes to than what I say no to. It’s not that I jump in knowing I will regret my decision. In fact, I’m usually pretty sure I won’t. Nevertheless, in only a rare few circumstances, is it a full-body yes, as Tim Ferriss would call it. VCs, as with any investor or buyer, aren’t immune to buyer’s remorse.
When imagining what could go right – the greatest, most impactful possible upside, does it send happy chills down my spine? Am I riffing off their energy and actively throwing ideas out? Am I unconsciously trying to hit my limit on words per minute? If so…
Some investors call it intuition. Others call it conviction. I’m gonna need my own pretentious phrase. Let’s call it the goosebump test.
My goosebumps will undoubtedly evolve over time. It will react to new stimuli, based on my accumulated knowledge and experience. It will also learn from the scar tissue that will form in the future. While I will try to follow my goosebumps as much as I can, they will undoubtedly also fail me at times. Just like how I wouldn’t be as excited now by some of the startups that got me excited back at SkyDeck, I imagine there will be a healthy handful that I do now that my body will learn from in the future. And I will continue to do my best to codify my learnings and share my scar tissue for myself and on this blog over time.
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I’ve written about product-market fit on numerous occasions including in the context of metrics, pricing, PMF mindsets, just to name a few. And one of the leading ways to measure PMF is still NPS – the net promoter score. The question: On a scale of one to ten, how likely would you recommend this product to a friend?
As investors, while a lagging indicator, it’s a metric we expect founders to have their finger always on the pulse for their customers. Yet how often do investors measure their own NPS? How likely would you, the founder, recommend this fund/firm/partner(s) to your founder friend(s)?
Let’s look for a second from the investor side of the table…
Mike Maples Jr. of Floodgate pioneered the saying, “Your fund size is your strategy.” Your fund size determines your check size and what’s the minimum you need to return. For example, if you have a $10M pre-seed fund, you might be writing 20 $250K checks and have a 1:1 reserve ratio (aka 50% of your funds are for follow-on investments, like exercising your pro rata or round extensions). Equally so, to have a great multiple on invested capital (MOIC) of 5x, you need to return $50M. So if you have a 10% ownership target, you’re investing in companies valued around $2.5M. If two of your companies exit at $200M acquisition, you return $20M each, effectively quadrupling your fund. You only need a couple more exits to make that 5x for your LPs. And that’s discounting dilution.
On the flip side, if you have a $100M fund with a $2-3M check size and a 20% ownership target, you’re investing in $10-15M companies. Let’s say your shares dilute down to 10% by the time of a company’s exit. If they exit at unicorn status, aka $1B, you’ve only returned your fund. Nothing more, nothing less. Meaning you’ll have to chase either bigger exits, or more unicorns. But that’s hard to do. Even one of the best in the industry, Sequoia, has around a 5% unicorn rate. Or in other words, of every 20 companies Sequoia invests in, one is a unicorn. And that means they have really good deal flow. Y Combinator and SV Angel, who have a different fund strategy from Sequoia, sitting upstream, have around 1%.
Up to a $20m fund, there are are many ways to do 3x+
Up to a $60m fund, there are several ways
After $150m fund, there is probably 1 way
— Jason ✨Be Kind✨ Lemkin 🇮🇱 (@jasonlk) April 5, 2017
Why does a VC’s fund strategy matter to you as the founder?
A fund with a heavily diversified portfolio, like an angel’s or accelerator’s or participating investors (as opposed to leads), means they have less time and resources to allocate to each portfolio startup. The greater the portfolio size, the less help on average each startup team will get. That’s not to say you shouldn’t seek funding from funds with large AUMs (assets under management). One example is if you have an extremely passionate champion of your space/product at these large funds, I’d go with it.
I wrote late last year about founder-investor fit. And in it, I talk about Harry Hurst‘s check-size-to-helpfulness ratio (CS:H). In this ratio, you’re trying to maximize for helpfulness. Ideally, if the fund writes you a $1M check, they’re adding in $10M+ in additive value. And based on a fund’s strategy (i.e. lead investors vs not, $250K or $5M checks, scout programs or solo capitalist + advisory networks, etc.), it’ll determine how helpful they can be to you at the stage you need them.
If you were to plan out your next 18-24 months, take your top three priorities. And specifically, find investors that can help you address those. For example, if you’re looking for intros to potential companies in your sales pipeline and all a VC has to do is send a warm intro to their network/portfolio for you, bigger funds might be more useful. On the other hand, if you’re struggling to find a revenue model for your business, and you need more help than one-offs and quarterly board meetings, I’d look to work with an investor with a smaller portfolio or a solo capitalist. If you’re creating a brand new market, find someone with deep operating experience and domain expertise (even if it’s in an adjacent market), rather than a generalist fund.
While there’s no one-size-fits-all and there are exceptions, here are two ways I think about helpfulness, in other words, value adds:
The uncommon – Differentiators
The common – What everybody else is doing
The uncommon
Of course, this might be the more obvious of the pair. But you’d be surprised at how many founders overlook this when they’re actually fundraising. You want to work with investors that have key differentiators that you need at that stage of your company. By nature of being uncommon, there are million out there. But here are a few examples I’ve seen over the years:
Ability to build communities having built large followings
Content creation + following (i.e. blog, podcast, Clubhouse, etc.)
Getting in’s to top executives at Fortune 500 companies
Closing government contracts
Access/domain expertise on international markets
In-house production teams
They know how to hustle (i.e. Didn’t have a traditional path to VC, yet have some of the biggest and best LPs out there in their fund)
Ability to get you on the front page of NY Times, WSJ, or TechCrunch
Strong network of top executives looking for new opportunities (i.e. EIRs, XIRs)
Influencer network
Category leaders/definers (i.e. Li Jin on the passion economy, Ryan Hoover on communities)
Having all accelerator portfolio founder live under the same roof for the duration of the program (i.e. Wefunder’s XX Fund pre-pandemic)
Surprisingly, not as common as I thought, VCs that pick up your call “after hours”
The common
Packy McCormick, who writes this amazing blog called Not Boring, wrote in one of his pieces, “Here’s the hard thing about easy things: if everyone can do something, there’s no advantage to doing it, but you still have to do it anyway just to keep up.” Although Packy said it in context to founders, I believe the same is true for VCs. Which is probably why we’ve seen this proliferation of VCs claiming to be “founder-friendly” or “founder-first” in the past half decade. While it used to be a differentiator, it no longer is. Other things include:
Money, maybe follow-on investments
Access to the VC’s network (i.e. potential customers, advisors, etc.)
Access to the partner(s) experience
Intros to downstream investors
That said, if an investor is trying to cover all their bases, that is a strategy not to lose rather than a strategy to win, to quote the conversation I had with angel investor Alex Sok recently. As long as it doesn’t come at the expense of their key differentiator. At the same time, it’s important to understand that most VCs will not allocate the same time and energy to every founder in their portfolio. If they are, well, it might be worth reconsidering working with them. It’s great if you’re not a rock-star unicorn. Means you still get the attention and help that you might want. But if you are off to the races and looking to scale and build fast, you won’t get any more help and attention that you’re ‘prescribed’. If you’re winning, you probably want your investor to double down on you.
Even if you’re not, the best investors will still be around to be as helpful as they can, just in more limited spans of time.
Finding investor NPS
You can find CS:H, or investor NPS, out in a couple of ways:
The investors are already adding value to you and your company before investing. Uncommon, but it really gives you a good idea on their value.
You find out by asking portfolio founders during your diligence.
Your founder friends are highly recommending said investor to you.
Then there’s probably the best form of validation. I’ve shared this before, but I still think it’s one of the best indicators of investor NPS. Blake Robbins once quotedBrett deMarrais of Ludlow Ventures, “There is no greater compliment, as a VC, than when a founder you passed on — still sends you deal-flow and introductions.”
In closing
“How likely would you, the founder, recommend this fund/firm/partner(s) to your founder friend(s)?” is a great question to consider when fundraising. But I want to take it a step further. NPS is usually measured on a one to ten scale. But the numbering mechanic is rather nebulous. For instance, an 8/10 on my scale may not equal an 8/10 on your scale. So your net promoter score is more so a guesstimate of the true score. While any surveying question is more or less a guesstimate, I believe this question is more actionable than the above:
If you were to start a new company tomorrow, would you still want this investor on your cap table?
With three options:
No
Yes
It’s a no-brainer.
And if you get two or more “no-brainers”, particularly from (ex-)portfolio startups that fizzled off into obscurity, I’d be pretty excited to work with that investor.
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For a number of friends and founders I’ve chatted this with, I’ve been a big fan of the concept of “winning versus not losing”. Ever since I heard back in 2018. In an interview with Tim Ferriss, Ann Miura-Ko of Floodgate said, “This is probably the hardest piece – knowing the difference between a winning strategy versus a strategy not to lose. […] Not losing often involves a lot of hedging. And when you feel that urge to hedge, you need to focus. You need to be offensive.”
There are a few great examples of what differentiates winning and not losing from both Tim and Ann in that interview. For instance, a lack of focus by going after two different market segments is a strategy not to lose. “The reason why that’s really hedging is you have two completely different ways of selling to those organizations and you’re afraid to pick one because maybe you have some revenue in both.”
My college friend recently connected me with entrepreneur, designer, angel investor, Alex Sok. Both of us found unlikely common ground in using sports analogies to relate to building a company. Me, swimming (e.g. here and here). Alex, football. Specifically, American football. Having been a quarterback for his school’s football team back in the day, he said something quite fascinating, “You can’t win in the first quarter, but you can lose in the first quarter.” And you know me, I had to double click on that.
I was previously under the assumption that you only needed a strategy to win, but not to lose. But as all generalizations that start with the word “only”, I was wrong. And Alex contextualized it for me – that sometimes you do need to think about how not to “lose”.
Winning versus not losing
“You can’t win in the first quarter, but you can lose in the first quarter.”
Throwing the ball deep for your running back to make the touchdown is a strategy to win. On the flip side, if you don’t convert on the third down, you’re going to lose. You may not win, but if you don’t, you could very much lose. Not all mistakes carry the same gravitas. Some mistakes can be detrimental; most mistakes aren’t. Just because you’re making sure that you convert on the third down does not mean you can’t still swing for the fences.
For founders, losing in the first quarter is akin to:
Burning through your seed funding in six months;
Hiring four professional executives before you get to product-market fit;
Not talking to your customers;
There is no one in the room who can tackle the biggest risk of the business (i.e. no engineer when you’re building an AI solution, or no one who can do sales when you’re an enterprise tech company)
You’re still aiming high, but that doesn’t mean you should burden yourself with an astronomical burn rate.
“Game plans will have to vary depending on your market or product. Key fundamental traits that increase the probability of failure will always be present. It’s important to identify which ones matter most in relation to the game plan,” says Alex. “A tough defense or go-to-market means being more focused on identifying which channels to pursue and then doubling down if it works out.”
On the flip side, “an aggressive defense or burgeoning industry might mean taking more chances but setting up plays wisely to take advantage of their aggressive, risk-taking nature. This will force the defense to settle down and play you more honestly. In startup terms, that might mean steady progress and growth with a few deep shots to achieve escape velocity from your competitors.”
Not to get forget about winning
You’ve probably heard of the saying, “If you want your company to truly scale, you have to do things that don’t scale.” Especially in the zero to one phase. From idea to product-market fit. Many of us in venture break down the early life cycle of a company by zero-to-one and one-to-infinity. The first “half” is doing things that don’t scale. Figuring out what frustrations your customers are going through. Getting that pedometer up on the street yourself. Daniel Kahneman wrote in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, “Acquisition of skills requires a regular environment, an adequate opportunity to practice, and rapid and unequivocal feedback about the correctness of thoughts and actions.”
Here are a few examples:
In the early days of Airbnb, Brian, Joe, and Nathan used to visit early Airbnb hosts with a rented DSLR to photograph their houses.
For Stripe, the founders manually onboarded every merchant to deliver “instant” merchant accounts. Of course, the Collison brothers took it a step further to mint the term “Collison installation”. Usually when founders ask early leads “Will you try our beta?”, if people say yes, then they say, “Great, we’ll send you a link.” Rather, Patrick and John said, “Right then, give me your laptop” and set it up for them right then and there.
At Doordash, they found restaurant menu PDFs online, created landing pages, put their personal number out there for people to call, and personally executed deliveries within the day.
To get his first 2000 users, Ryan at Product Hunt wrote handcrafted emails to early users and reporters to grow what started off as an email list.
Similarly, in football, teams often spend the first half of the game feeling out their opponents. Their strengths, their weaknesses. And the back half, doubling down on where your opponents fall short on. While not your opponents, founders should be spending the first half feeling out their market. Be scrappy. Nothing that’ll make you lose in the first quarter, but make mistakes. Give your team and yourself a 10-20% error rate. One of your greatest superpowers as a small team is your ability to move fast. Use it to your advantage.
Paul Graham once wrote, “Tim Cook doesn’t send you a hand-written note after you buy a laptop. He can’t. But you can. That’s one advantage of being small: you can provide a level of service no big company can.”
In closing
Alex said, “In order to be a dominant offense, you have to force the defense to cover every inch of the field.” If you only throw long, then your opponents will only need to cover long. If you only throw to the left, they only have to cover left. But if you have a diversified strategy, your opponents will have to cover every inch of the field. And to win, all you need is for your opponents to hesitate for half a second. And with a laser-focused strategy, that’s all you need to break through against your incumbents. Your incumbents often have bigger teams, can attract more talent, have deeper pockets, and the list goes on.
As a small team, you’re on offense. You can’t cover every inch of the field, and neither do you need to. You just need to be a single running back who makes it past a wall of linebackers. To do that, you need focus. As Tim Ferriss recently said on the Starting Greatness podcast, “the biggest risk to your startup is your distraction.” And it’s not just you and your team, but also the investors you bring on. Sammy Abdullah of Blossom Street Ventures wrote that the question you need to be asking yourself about your investors is: “Are you going to distract me from running the business and will you be candid with me when I have a problem?”
Focus. If you’re focusing on everything, you’re focusing on nothing. You have no room to hesitate, but it’s exactly what you want your competitors to do. That half a second on the field is about two years in the venture world. Or until you can find your product-market fit. Until you reach scale. Until you reach the “one” in zero-to-one. ‘Cause once you’re there, you just need to put your head down and run. And it’s the beginning of something defensible. Of something you can win with.
If you’re curious about taking a deeper dive on product-market fit, I recommend checking out some of my other essays:
Thank you Alex for helping me with early drafts of this essay!
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In the venture world, the word timing is thrown around in a very canonical way. Many investors and founders mythologize the concept of timing around a business. While there is some science and data that might be able to point in the general direction, success is a lagging indicator of timing. And arguably, the only way anyone can really determine if the timing is right or not is in hindsight. Investors that said they knew the exact timing of the market may just be attributing their success to survivorship bias.
To analogize it, it’s the same as knowing when to invest in the market or in a particular stock. Everyone wants to buy at the lowest, sell at the highest. Your ROI is positively correlated with the sell price, and negatively correlated with the buy price. But when is the lowest? No one really knows for certain. We can guesstimate a timeframe with reasonable confidence, but that’s the best we can do. The same is true for measuring timing in the market. Yet there is one thing that I’ve come to learn in my years in the venture world that’s as close as you can get to the “true” timing of the market. A miracle.
Let me explain.
One miracle
Every startup needs one miracle to succeed. One. No more. No less. Elad Gil said in an interview with James Currier at nfx, “Every startup needs to have a single miracle… If your startup needs zero miracles to work, it probably isn’t a defensible startup. If your startup needs multiple miracles, it probably isn’t going to work.” He further elaborates, “If you have more than one, you have compounding small odds and that means you’re very, very likely to fail.”
Before that miracle, if you’re truly creating a revolutionary business, by definition, you’re in the non-consensus. You have more non-believers than you do believers. If it were an obvious business, then everyone would do it. If everyone does it, economically-speaking, the ROI is low. In a situation, where every kid sells lemonade with the exact same recipe by the street corner, everyone is fighting for the exact same customers. Eventually, it’ll lead to a race to the bottom.
That single miracle is going to be that trial by fire. The true test of grit and founder obsession. That trial, whenever it is, predictable or not, determines if your product will stay a niche idea (and possible fizzle into obscurity) or a business that will change the world. For you and your business, that miracle could have been catalyzed by the pandemic, the GME short squeeze, ’08 recession (if you’re an older business), the inauguration, or something yet to come. The question is: How do you respond in the face of adversity?
Why is that miracle important?
Tim Ferriss once said, “Your superpower is very often right next to your wound, like your biggest wound. […] They’re often two sides of the same coin.” If you can survive and conquer that trial, the miracle – your superpower – becomes one of your strongest moats. The lessons you learned, the trust you (re)built, and the legacy you begin to construct. Those lessons – those earned secrets – while not impervious, will ideally be incredibly hard to obtain for others without walking through fire. A metamorphic journey from a vulnerable caterpillar to a beautiful monarch. What Joseph Campbell calls the “hero’s journey“.
And in the longer time horizon, that you are no longer just the protagonist of that miracle, but that you are also a producer of miracles for others. You are then capable of minting miracles systematically. Be it your customers, your team members, and your investors.
Why #unfiltered?
You might be wondering why I tagged this essay as #unfiltered. Frankly, it’s a new unrefined hypothesis that I’ve been playing around with. While it’s been inspired by others, I believe there’s more nuance I still need to uncover as well. That I’ll need to test a bit more to see if it can be a more robust thesis.
Going forward, I will continue to ask founders questions like:
What is the origin story of this idea?
If you were to fail in 18 months, what would be the most likely reason why?
Conversely, if you were to wildly succeed in that same time frame, what would be the biggest contributor?
Why are you a different person today than when you started this business? Who/what catalyzed this/these change(s)?
Examples of who: customers, team, partners, investors
Examples of what: black swan events, market trends, socio-economic habits, new technologies, an inflection point in your life when you faced impossible odds, failures, etc.
But I’ll be particularly looking for the earned secret among a miracle of adversity. Simply put, I’m looking to hear this song play in the background. The beginning of a mythical legend in the making.
#unfiltered is a series where I share my raw thoughts and unfiltered commentary about anything and everything. It’s not designed to go down smoothly like the best cup of cappuccino you’ve ever had (although here‘s where I found mine), more like the lonely coffee bean still struggling to find its identity (which also may one day find its way into a more thesis-driven blogpost). Who knows? The possibilities are endless.
Stay up to date with the weekly cup of cognitive adventures inside venture capital and startups, as well as cataloging the history of tomorrow through the bookmarks of yesterday!
Over the years, the silver screen sure has mythologized the dropout founder – from Steve Jobs to Bill Gates to Mark Zuckerberg. While students who choose to dropout will continue to wow the world, and I believe it (otherwise, I wouldn’t be working with Danielle and Mike at 1517 Fund, if I didn’t), reality isn’t nearly as black and white. A Quora user requested my answer to this question recently. Why do business schools not make world class entrepreneurs? It presumed that great academic institutions, mainly B-schools, were no longer capable of minting world-class founders. Admittedly, it’s neither the first, nor will it be the last time I see or hear of it.
The MBA grads
I met a Fortune 100 executive last year who said that it was because of her Wharton MBA, that she catapulted her career in artificial intelligence and machine learning. Specifically, it was because of the research she did with her professor, Adam Grant, that led to opportunities and introductions down the road. On the same token, David Rogier of MasterClass met his first investor at the Stanford GSB. In fact, it was his business professor who wrote that first check, just under $500K.
Business schools are amazing institutions of learning, but admittedly most people go for the network and the brand. On the same note, I would never go as far as to say that business schools don’t mint world-class entrepreneurs. If we’re going by pure valuation, there’s a study that found a quarter of 2019’s top 50 highest valued startups had MBAs as founders.
And here are a few more founder names among many, not even including some of the most recognizable CEO names, like Satya Nadella (Microsoft), Tim Cook (Apple) and more.
Tony Xu and Evan Moore of Doordash
Michael Bloomberg of Bloomberg
Steve Hafner of Kayak
Aneel Bhusri and Dave Duffield of Workday
Jeremy Stoppelman of Yelp
Mark Pincus of Zynga
Having grit and having a business degree don’t have to be mutually exclusive. I work with founders who come from all manners of educational backgrounds: high school dropouts, college dropouts, BA/BSs, MBAs, PhDs, MDs, JDs, home schooled, and self-taught. At the end of the day, it doesn’t matter what kind of education someone has. What matters is what they do with the education.
What an Ivy League dean once told me
Back when I toured the US to decide which school to SIR (statement of intent to register) to, I met the dean of an Ivy League school. I thought he was going to spend our 20 minutes trying to convince me to come to his school. But he didn’t. Instead he said, “David, it doesn’t matter which school you choose to go to. While I would be honored to have you attend ours, what matters is what you do while you’re in school. You could choose to just take classes here or you could go to a CC, but choose to be a member of 5 clubs, 3 of which you take leadership positions in. And if I were to look at you in four years, I’d be prouder of the latter person you chose to become.”
Capping the risks you could take
When I graduated from Berkeley, I also came out with a certificate in entrepreneurship and technology. While I still believe to this day that no class can really teach one to be entrepreneurial, I learned quite a bit of the institutionalization around entrepreneurship – what exists in the ecosystem, some of the risks involved and how to hedge those bets. Yet, my greatest lessons on entrepreneurship didn’t came from a textbook. But rather, the risks I took outside the classroom. Because each time I made one, I internalized it.
To do great things, you have to first dream big and act on those big dreams. By definition, big dreams entail high degrees of risk. High risk, high reward. And with risk, you’ll make mistakes. So one of the rules I live by is that I will force myself to make mistakes – many mistakes – more than I can count. But my goal is to make each mistake at most once. Jeff Bezos once said, “If you can’t tolerate critics, don’t do anything new or interesting.”
Equally so, there’s a joke that Andy Rachleff, founder of Wealthfront and Benchmark, shares with the class he teaches at the Stanford GSB. While it pertains to VCs, I find it analogous to founders and mistakes, “What do you call a venture capitalist who’s never lost money on an investment?”
“Unemployed.”
But, what institutionalized academia does help you with is provide you a platform to make mistakes. Without the downside. Capped downsides, but it’s up to you, the student, to realize what could be the uncapped upside. Last month I chatted with a VC, who works at a top 10 firm. Our conversation eventually spiraled into her MBA at the Stanford GSB. There she took on projects that put her on the streets talking and building products for potential customers. Her professors taught her the hustle, but it was up to her to apply her learnings. While she chose the VC path after, her experience led her to become a trusted advisor to founders while she was still in school.
In closing
Similarly, world-class entrepreneurs aren’t decided by which school they go to, or lack thereof, but how and why they choose to spend the days, weeks, and years of the short time they have on Earth. And where they practice their entrepreneurial traits.
I would be pretentious to say that you should get an MBA if you want to be founder. Or that you should dropout if you want to be one. If we’re to look at the cards on the table, MBAs are expensive. A $200K investment. Almost half of what might be your pre-seed round. But I can’t tell you if it’s a great investment or not, nor should I. For an MBA, or for that matter, any higher education. I pose the two extremes – MBA (or a PhD too) and a dropout – as I presume most of our calculi’ fall somewhere in-between. Instead, I can merely pair with you with the variables and possible parameters that may be helpful towards your decision. So, I’ll pose a question: Are there rewards you seek in the process rather than just in the outcome (of an MBA/higher education)?
In other words, are there skills, relationships, gratitude, entertainment, and/or peace of mind you build in the journey that transcend the outcome of your decision on the future of your education?
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If you’re a regular on this blog, you’re probably no stranger to my essays on cold emails – whether it’s my cold outreach mental model or lessons from replying to spam emails or how I write longer cold emails as opposed to shorter. Yet, I recently realized I’ve shared my thoughts on the pre-game and the game itself, but I’ve yet to write on the post-game. So this essay is dedicated to exactly that. What do you do after you send that initial cold email?
The short answer: If you want to stand out, always follow up. To quote my good friend, Christen on her TikTok, where she shares amazing soundbites of career advice and networking.
The longer answer
I met a founder once who emailed an executive at Disney every business day for almost one year, minus ten days. The caveat is at the top of every daily email he wrote, “If you want me to stop, I will.” Almost a year after he began, the executive took the meeting. And Disney is now one of this startup’s biggest customers.
I met another founder a few years ago, who retweeted tweets from a Forbes’ Midas 100 VC every week for three months, while including his own constructive commentary each time. So, when this founder began his fundraise three months later, this VC set up a meeting with that founder within two hours of the cold email, first thanking the founder for his thoughts over the past few months.
Garry Tan and Apoorva Mehta have bothshared this story publicly. Apoorva, founder of Instacart, back in 2012, wanted to apply to Y Combinator. Unfortunately, he was applying two months late. So he reached out to all the YC alum he knew to get intros to the YC partners. He just needed one to be interested. But after every single one said no, Garry, then a partner at YC, wrote: “You could submit a late application, but it will be nearly impossible to get you in now.”
For Apoorva, that meant “it was possible.” He sent an application and a video in, but Garry responded with another “no” several days later. But instead of pushing with another email and another application, Apoorva decided to send Garry a 6-pack of beer delivered by Instacart. So that Garry could try out the product firsthand. 21st Amendment’s Back in Black, to be specific. In the end, without any precedent, Instacart was accepted. And the rest is history.
So, what is the common thread here?
As my friend once told me, “It’s not hard to be persistent. Most people can easily be. But most people aren’t persistent AND considerate.” Persistence is keeping your promises to yourself. Being considerate is respecting and keeping your promises to others – explicit and implicit. Explicitly, if you say you’re going to do something, do it. Implicitly, understand the social context, their schedule, their cognitive load. One of the lines I always add at the bottom (or sometimes at the top) of my cold outreaches:
“I know you get a hundred emails a day, and if you don’t have any time to respond, I completely understand.”
To take that one step further, sometimes you’re reasonably confident they won’t have time to respond. Big life or career events may make it hard for them to respond, like:
New baby/paternity/maternity leave
New publication
Recently did a (podcast) interview
Released some version of viral content (i.e. YouTube video, TikTok, Clubhouse, Twitter, etc.)
Founder raising a new round
Upcoming product launch they’re a key player in
VC raising a new fund
Shit hit the fan
Anything else the press is actively writing about
If that is your assumption, I add in one more line:
“If you don’t have time to respond, I’ll follow up one week [or whatever other timeframe] from today.”
And once you’ve said it, do it. To save you the time to draft up a follow up email a week later, a hack I use is to just write that follow up email as soon as you send the first email. Then schedule it to send a week from the day you sent the first. Make sure that each follow-up email isn’t the exact same. Show updates on what you learned, found, or thought about, as well as additional value to the person you’re reaching out to. While this hack is the bare minimum of what you can do to follow up, this should never be the ceiling. 9 out of 10 times I find myself going back, cancelling the send, updating the email with my learnings, then re-scheduling it.
Follow up at least twice after you send the initial cold email. But be understanding of their circumstances. And of course, never overstay your welcome. Understand the difference between a soft “no” and a hard “no”. In the circumstances of a soft “no”, recognize the variables that led to it. And reach back out when those variables are not in play, or to your best guess.
In closing
I met a brilliant founder years ago who, at the time, scaled his business to 100 employees, and he told me something that resonates with me till this day. “You can only learn from experience, but it doesn’t necessarily have to be yours.” Though I learned of his saying a few years after, it summarizes why I started my 6-year at least once a week cold outreach streak. To learn vicariously through others’ experiences. And if that was and is the impetus, it’d be a shame if I didn’t see it through to the best of my ability. ‘Cause if I was gonna give up after just sending one email, why start?
As Ron Swanson once said, “Never half-ass two things; whole-ass one thing.” So if you’re gonna start with the first email, you might as well send the next two. If the first shot doesn’t swish, catch the rebound and shoot again. Persistence. And ideally rebound thoughtfully.
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Not too long ago, I came across a question on Quora that I had to double click on: Why should founders care about VC brand? Money is money, isn’t it? While the question itself seemed to have a come from a less-informed perspective, I found it to be a useful exercise to once again go through the checklist of founder-investor fit.
Money, frankly, is just money. A Benjamin will look the same and work the same as any other Benjamin out there. Assuming you don’t need anything else other than money, I’d recommend other sources of funding other than venture funding, i.e.:
(Equity) crowdfunding,
Rev share,
Angels – high net-worth individuals who write checks in the 1000s to 10s of 1000s of dollars;
Also worth looking into, but are representative of the VC model, are super angels and solo capitalists. Many of whom might be leading their own rolling funds (more context) now;
Government (public) and private grants – really small sums of money, but money nonetheless;
Accelerators/incubators – less upfront capital. But the partnerships they have with other startup services save you a lot of money (i.e. AWS, Adobe Suite, etc.);
Selling domain names (yes, I have a friend who initially funded his business by doing that, but other than that, I’m kidding);
And I’m sure I missed some others out there.
On the other hand, most founders who raise VC funding want something more than just monetary capital, including, but not limited to:
Mentorship/advisorship –
Ex-operators who can give you tactical advice,
Former founders who can empathize with you,
VCs who can check your blind side and had previous portfolio founders who have gone through what you’re going through now,
People who have access to resources that will aid you on the founding journey (ideally not distract you),
And frankly, people who’ll be there for you when you have to make the tough calls,
Highly recommend Harry Hurst’s tweet about the CS:H ratio (check size: helpfulness, which I elaborate on here) as a mental model to figure out which VCs depending on fund size/check size can help you the founder the most at the stage you’re at.
If you’re trying to fill up a round, a brand name investor can easily help you fill in the rest of the round with their network and their participation alone. They’ll also help you raise downstream capital – directly or indirectly.
It’ll be easier to find customers. With a brand name VC, you also get quite a bit of media attention from Forbes, TC, NY Times, and so on. Customers are more likely to trust you knowing that you’re backed by a recognizable brand, especially the folks on the other side of the chasm on the adoption curve.
It’ll be easier to hire world-class talent. Your business, in their mind, is less likely to go out of business tomorrow. And while you’re not looking for candidates who seek stability, it does give the candidates you do want to hire a peace of mind and confidence that you have external validation.
There’s a saying that the difference between a hallucination and a vision is that other people can see the latter. It’s really a chicken and egg problem. I’m not saying a VC’s brand will guarantee the success of your startup, but I do believe it will help, with the underlying assumption that you pick the right VC. Whereas it used to be a differentiator a decade ago, all VCs these days say they’re founder-first or founder-friendly. But unfortunately not all are. They might be if things are going well. But the true tells are what happens when things don’t go well. Here are some of my favorite questions to ask portfolio founders before you work with a VC. And how to find founder-investor fit.
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Every time I think it’s easier to say “pass on the good to make space for the great”, the world says you’re wrong. Last week, once again, I realized how hard it was to say “No”.
We’d been chatting for a few months now. They were raising a pre-seed. And they checked most of the boxes I look for in an epic founding team:
Spent time in the idea maze and deep domain expertise,
Had a unique insight which led to innovation in their business model,
Because I didn’t know their market well enough, I hesitate to say if this was an earned secret or just a lesser-known fact that an outsider would never hear about. The difference between, what Kanyi Maqubela at Kindred Ventures, a mystery and a secret.
Consistently followed through with their promises and commitments (to me),
Dreamed big – big TAM, big vision,
Hustled to build relationships with some of the largest enterprise customers in their sector (though, yet to close any contracts),
Onboarded some incredible talent,
As I heard on my buddy’s podcast recently, “you can only learn from experience, but it doesn’t have to be yours.
Over the past few months, I asked for more time in hopes to find something more. Admittedly, I could think of a million excuses. And I have. I could have said:
They’re too early, since I rarely do pre-seed deals these days.
Or it’s the lack of traction.
Maybe that they could be more articulate about their go-to-market and product-market fit.
Maybe it’s the fact that at an early stage, that they have both a CEO and president. In other words, competing personalities in leadership.
Surprisingly large team for pre-seed startup.
Or, simply, I don’t know their space well enough, albeit adjacent to mine.
The more I thought about it, the more I realized I was just making excuses. I could circumvent most of these “reasons” with just a little effort on my part. And the fact that I was introduced to them by someone I really respect in the industry didn’t make it any easier. In fact, that alone was one of the strongest driving forces for me to want this deal to work out. The truth is, I just wasn’t excited about the product. And I had been spending time – arguably wasting theirs – trying to find my excitement. But I couldn’t, no matter how hard I tried.
I know it may be completely self-serving here. Call it immaturity or naivete. As a scout, I live by a self-imposed rule that every deal I refer, I want to be their greatest champion – their greatest evangelist – when I do so. In other words, if I had the capital, I would invest in each and every one I refer. On the same token, every deal I refer is just the start of an exciting long-term relationship. Post-referral, during diligence, post-investment and even if the deal doesn’t close. But for this startup, I just felt myself dragging my feet through knee-deep water just to meet with them over time.
Thinking I was in over my head, I hit up two mentors of mine in the space to give me the reality check I thought I needed. I thought and was, borderline, hoping they’d say, “You’re a sucker to bring personal emotions into an investment.” Or “Suck it up. Stop being a millennial/snowflake.” But neither did. I also told another friend last night and she replied, “It’s what makes you human. And I think people need to know about this side of VC.”
So, I’m writing this now in hopes that it will contextualize some of the decisions we make on this side of the table. I made the decision with the expectation that I’d be forgotten or passed on by them when they raise a future round. If they ask me again, it’ll be an honor and a privilege. And maybe my disposition will change in 1-2 years’ time. But it’s naive of me to expect that. Nevertheless, I still wish them the absolute best, and I hope they become the rock-star success they set out to be.
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As part of my work, I talk to many seed-stage SaaS founders. At the seed, most of these founders are thinking about how to get to product-market fit. The one in zero to one. They’re launching their product with a select few companies to really nail their pain points. And often times, pricing and the business model take a backseat when they offer their customers the product for free or at an extreme discount. While investors don’t expect founders to nail pricing at the seed, it’s useful to start thinking about your revenue model early on. After all, pricing is both an art and a science. And with the right pricing structure, it can also be your proxy for assessing product-market fit. Here’s how.
Every product manager out there knows that customers don’t always know what they want, so asking them for a solution rarely nets valuable feedback. Rather, start with the problem. What are their frustrations? What sucks? What’s the last product they bought to attempt to alleviate their problem? Subsequently, what’d they like about that product? What didn’t they like?
There are two perspectives you can use to approach pricing: cost-plus and value-based. Cost-plus pricing is pricing based on selling the product at a given markup from its unit cost. The biggest mistake founders often make here is underestimating how much it costs to produce a product.
On the other hand, there’s value-based pricing. An approach where you determine the economic value of the service you are providing and give it to your customers for a bargain. Superhuman, for instance, prices the fastest email experience at $30/month. Or in a different light, a dollar a day. If you are saving more than a dollar of economic value a day by responding to emails faster than ever, then the product is worth it. The biggest pitfall here is that founders often don’t fully understand the value they’re bringing to their customers, which is a result of:
They don’t understand your value,
Or you can’t convince them of the value you think you offer.
To visualize both of these approaches better, let’s use the pricing thermometer, as YC calls it.
The greater the gap between two nodes (i.e. value and price, or price and cost), the greater the incentive. If you’re selling at a price far greater than its unit cost, you are far more motivated to sell your product. On the flip side, if your product is priced far below the value and benefits you provide, a customer is more motivated to purchase your product.
Buyers vs Customers
To take it a step further, if you’re planning to scale your startup, what you’re looking for our customers, not buyers. Buyers are people who purchase your product once, and never again. They learned from their mistake. Your product either didn’t deliver the value you promised or the value they thought you would deliver. Customers are repeat purchasers. Why? Because they love your product. It addresses your customers’ needs (and ideally more) again and again. Your customers’ satisfaction is evergreen, rather than ephemeral.
When you only have buyers, you have to push your product to others. It’s the epitome of a door-to-door salesperson. Think Yellow Pages.
When you have customers, you feel the pull. Customers are drawn to you. They come back willingly on their own two feet. As Calvin French-Owen, co-founder of Segment, once said: “The biggest difference between our ideas pre-PMF vs. when we found it was this feeling of pull. Before we had any sort of fit, it always felt like we had to push our ideas on other people. We had to nag people to use the product.”
Value-based pricing is playing to win. Cost-plus pricing is playing to not lose. While the latter is convenient strategy when you’re a local business not looking to scale (i.e. coffee shop, local diner, local auto parts store, etc.), it’s incredibly difficult to scale with, especially as customer needs evolve. As you scale, your customers might include anyone from Microsoft who wants you to bring a sales engineer to integrate your product to a 5-person startup team who’s just testing your product out. With cost-plus pricing, you’ll be forced to determine price points on a case-by-case scenario. With value-based pricing, you can systemize dynamic pricing based on evolving customer needs. As their value received goes up, the price does too.
As the name suggests, to generate pull, we have to start from value. In this case, your value metric.
